From January to June, 1919, inclusive.
I. THE RELATION.
(A) CREATION AND EXISTENCE.
Though adjustment and payment of compensation operated to transfer legal
title to employer, or surety, employee still retained equitable interest and
was real party in interest. Bassot et al. v. United Railroads of San
Francisco
Federal act applies and there is no liability under state act if employee at
time of injury was engaged in interstate commerce. Wangerow v. In-
dustrial Board et al. (III.)..........
(C) TERMINATION AND DISCHARGE.
State Act which in actions against employer who has not accepted its terms
provides a different measure of compensation from that of maritime
law, does not apply to seaman injured while employed on vessel on
navigable waters of the United States. Barrett v. Macomber & Nickerson
Co. (U. S.).
27. Disability of servant.
Test as to whether employee was engaged in "interstate commerce" at time
of injury is whether performance of act in which he was engaged directly
and immediately tended to facilitate movement of interstate commerce,
or, conversely, whether failure to perform act directly and immediately
interfered with or hindered movement of such commerce. Morrison v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.. (Wash.)..............
Employee in local switching crew injured while setting brake on car being
switched between sidings, car having come from Pennsylvania consigned
to company in New Jersey not engaged in interstate commerce. Dela-
ware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Peck (U. S.)......
III. MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO SERVANT.
(A) NATURE AND EXTENT IN GENERAL.
87. Statutory provisions.
There can be no recovery against master under federal Act without plaintiff
showing negligence of carrier's officers, agents or employees.
Adm'x v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (Ky.)
Street railway engaged in carrying passengers between states is
carrier by railroad" within Federal Act. Nelson v. Ironwood & B. Ry.
Light Co. (Mich.).
Where master had not elected to come under act agreement for compensation
was not binding upon servant. Nelson v. Ironwood & B. Ry. & Light Co.
(Mich.)
§ 88 (7). Commencement, suspension, or termination of relation.
Servant employed in cleaning fires and coaling locomotives injured when rid-
ing to work on master's engine, such being method of reaching work pro-
vided by master, was injured while relation of master and servant ex-
isted. Lindstrom v. New York Cent. R. Co. (N. Y.)...
95. Unlawful employment or services.
Employment of minor between 14 and 16 years of age will not be held to be
illegal on account of fact that child's mother signed age and employment
certificate issued by school committee under Statute and falsely stated
that she had control of child, when child was in fact under control of
father. Taglinette v. Sydney Worsted Co. (R. I.)..............
Under statute inhibiting employment in certain places during hours schools
are in session, child of 15, not supplied with age and schooling certificate
his employment for all hours of day, being an entirety, is illegal even
after school hours-employment is not saved from illegality by fact he
is attending night school. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission of California et al. (Cal.)
(B) TOOLS, MACHINERY, APPLIANCES, AND PLACES FOR WORK.
§§ 101, 102 (10). Care required dependent on knowledge and x-
perience of servant.
Absence of light on locomotive moving in yard is not negligence as to em-
ployee who knew his position and was injured after jumping from it with
light, creating absence of light. Palermo v. Erie R. Co. (N. Y.)...... 346
Violation of Labor Law, guarding machinery is evidence of negligence, even
in action by infant illegally employed. Wolff v. Fulton Bag & Cotton
Mills (N. Y.)...
Railroad's locomotive engineer and its brakeman, while engaged in making
flying switch_with_locomotive and car were "fellow servants." Jones v.
Norfolk Southern R. Co. (N. C.)......
(F) RISKS ASSUMED BY SERVANT.
204. Statutory provisions.
204 (1). In general.
In actions under federal Employers' Liability Act, the common-law doctrine
of assumption of risk applies and as to extraordinary risks and those due
to employee, negligence there is no assumption unless the risks are so
obvious that an ordinarily prudent man would observe and appreciate
them. King v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. (N. C.)......
216. Incompetency or negligence of fellow servants.
216 (1). In general.
At common law, or under later decisions of common-law courts, negligence of
fellow servant was classed among risks assumed by employee engaged in
common service. Jones v. Norfolk Southern R. Co. (N. C.)..
217. Knowledge by servant of defect or danger.
Opportunity to acquire knowledge.
Under federal Employers' Liability Act. brakeman making flying switch and
thrown from car and run over on account of locomotive engineer's sudden,
and unusual manner of stopping engine, did not assume risk of negli-
gence of his fellow servant. Jones v. Norfo Southern R. Co. (N. J.)..........
217 (29). Incompetency or negligence of fellow servants.
Doctrine of assumption of risk of negligence of servant is based on knowledge,
or on fair and reasonable opportunity to know, and usually such knowl-
edge and opportunity must come in time to be of use. Jones v. Norfolk
Southern R. Co. (N. C.)....
(G) CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANT.
236 (3). Inadvertence or sleeping while on duty.
Where ice was being unloaded from sleigh into farm icehouse by means of
skid, farm laborer, who was guiding ice down skid, knowing that when
ice entered building, sleigh end of skid was lifted in air, was guilty of con-
tributory negligence in placing foot within skid to release ice wedged in
doorway, where ice could have been released without so doing. Mullen
V. Little (N. Y.)...
(H) ACTIONS.
253. Jurisdiction and venue.
Under federal Act making jurisdiction of state and federal courts concurrent
in actions thereunder and fixing venue in district of defendant's residence
or in which cause of action arose or in which defendant shall be doing
business where cause of action arose in Kentucky and defendant cor-
poration was doing business in Minnesota, Minnesota courts had jurisdic-
tion if action might have been brought in federal court in Minnesota-
action in tort may be brought at any place where defendant may be
found and served, but federal Act limits actions thereunder to district of
defendant's residence or in which defendant is doing business or in which
cause of action arose. Reed's Adm'x v. Ill. Cent. R. Co, (Ky.).......
258 (8). Violation of statutes or ordinances.
In common-law action for injuries to servant between ages of 14 and 16,
right to sue being based on ground that employer did not have in posses-
sion an age and employment certificate, as required by statute, it is nec-
essary to allege that employer did not have such certificate at time of
accident. Taglinette v. Sydney Worsted Co.. (R. I.)..
: 662
265 (4). Operation and effect of statutory provisions.
Defendant master has burden of proving servant's contributory negligence.
Mullen v. Little (N. Y.)......
§ 278 (17). Methods of work.
Jury may draw on their own information, without proof, touching simple
matters of common knowledge and experience and they do not have to
be told that use of jack is necessary to raise wheels of heavily loaded
vehicle-jury may properly find that attempt to drag loaded vehicle out
of groove without use of jacks was an act of negligence and their find-
ing will not be disturbed. Rickel v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. C.
(Kans.)
§ 284 (1). In general.
Whether employee, injured in taking locomotive to storage track for night,
was engaged in interstate commerce was for jury. Palermo v. Erie R.
Co. (N. Y.)......
§ 286 (4). Tools and appliances in general.
Action by taxicab driver who claimed to have suffered injuries as result
of defective wrench furnished by employer, evidence sufficient to carry
case to jury. Ridley v. Portland Taxicab Co. (Ore.)..........
286 (7). Nature and kind of appliances.
Master cannot as matter of law be said to be exercising ordinary care
merely because he uses methods and appliances customarily employed
by others in same character of work, nor yet to be without such care
solely because he fails to adopt latest and most approved devices known,
but question in such cases is for jury. Batson-Milholme Co. v. Frank
Faulk (Tex.)
286 (8). Customary appliances and mehods of construction.
Master cannot as matter of law he said to be exercising ordinary care merely
because he uses methods and appliances customarily employed by others
in same character of work. nor yet to be without such care solely be-
cause he fails to adopt latest and most approved devices known, but ques-
tion in such cases is for jury. Batson-Milholme Co. v. Faulk (Tex.).... 805
286 (10). Machinery.
In action by plaintiff member of construction gang to recover for injury sus-
tained while unloading rails, held, under evidence, that plaintiff at the
time of injury was engaged in the very act which he was directed by de-
fendant's foreman to do. Reed v. Dickinson et al (Ia.)
286 (27). Methods of work in general.
Jury may draw on their own information, without proof, tuoching simple
matters of common knowledge and experience and they do not have to
be told that use of jack is necessary to raise wheels of heavily loaded
vehicle-jury may properly find that attempt to drag loaded vehicle out
of groove without use of jacks was an act of negligence and their find-
ing will not be disturbed. Rickel v. Atchison, T. &. S. F. Ry. C. (Kan.).. 708
§ 289 (29). Operation of railroads in general.
In action under Federal Act by plaintiff, member of construction gang, in-
jured while unloading rails. contention of defendant being that injury
was due exclusively to plaintiff's negligence, held, that court erred in
directing verdict for defendant. Reed v. Dickinson et al (Ia.) ...
287
294 (6). Vice principals and other representatives of master.
Held that the charge adopted was proper test of vice-principalship and a
new trial should not have been granted because of alleged error in charge.
Gutmann v. Anderson (Minn.).
IV. LIABILITIES FOR INJURIES TO THIRD PERSONS.
(A) ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF SERVANT.
Jury may draw on their own information, without proof, tuoching simple
matters of common knowledge and experience and they do not have to
be told that use of jack is necessary to raise wheels of heavily loaded
vehicle-jury may properly find that attempt to drag loaded vehicle out
of groove without use of jacks was an act of negligence and their find-
ing will not be disturbed. Rickel v. Atchison, T. &. S. F. Ry. C. (Kan.).. 708
(A) NATURE AND GROUNDS OF MASTER'S LIABILITY.
NATURE AND THEORY OF LIABILITY.
346.
Purpose of act is to transfer burdens resulting from industrial accidents
from individual to industry and to be finally distributed upon society as
whole by compelling it to contribute to those who are lawfully de-
pendent upon deceased. Scott's Case (Me.)......
Compensation Act has substituted another liability in place of common-law
liability in tort, but it does not necessarily follow that principles applica-
ble to torts should be applied to this new liability. Anderson v. Miller
Scrap Iron Co. et al. (Wis.)..
Policy of law to place burden of personal injuries upon business or industry
in which employee is engaged. Employers' Liability Assur. Corporation,
Limited, of London, England, v. Industrial Accident Commission (Cal.).. 407
Compensation under act is analogous to, and is to take place of damages at
common law or under Personal Injuries Act-Compensation Act is not
based on theory that it provides a means of support during period of
adjustment following death or injury of employee, but on idea of com-
pensation for death or injury arising out of employment and on
broad economic theory that such compensation is properly chargable as
part of cost of industrial activity. Wangler Boiler & Sheet Metal Works
Co. v. Industrial Commission et al. (IÏ.).
847. CONTITUTIONALITY OF STAJUTES.
There is no constitutional objection to statute providing for attorney's fees
where employer does not institute proceedings for review of decision of
Board and refuses to pay compensation. Friedman Mfg. Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission of Illinois et al. (Ill.)..........
Act will be construed liberally with view to carrying out its general purpose
and not strictly as other statutes in derogation of common law. Scott's
Case (Me.)
Classification of occupation or employment, made subject to Compensation
Act, is not arbitrary and wanting in uniformity so as to make act un-
constitutional. Marshall Field & Co. v. Industrial Commission of Illinois
et al. (Ill.)
Compensation Act as amended is constitutional in its general aspects under
both state and federal constitutions. Duart v. Simmons (Mass.)........ 136
Legislature has power to place limitations upon rights of beneficiaries under
act. Wangler Boiler & Sheet Metal Works Co. v. Industrial Commission
et al. (Ill.)..
Plaintiff being resident of the state and not belonging to class of nonresidents
to be discriminated against not entitled to attack act on grounds of dis-
crimination. A. F. Estabrook Co. et al. v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission. Klamath S. S. Co. v. Same (Cal.)..
One not an employee in an excepted class in Compensation Act may not as-
sert any grievance that excepted class might have to the validity of act
-the act does not deny equal protection of the laws in that it excludes
from operation domestic servants, etc and employees of persons employ-
ing more than five. Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co. (U. S.)...
Compensation Act is held constitutional only because it imposes a charge, not
only upon the individual employer, but upon branch of industry in which
he is engaged. Miller & Lux Incorporated v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission of California (Cal.)....
The difference in modes by which employee and employer may indicate their
election to be bound by act is not objectionable on ground that it dis-
criminates against either-Board is not unlawful body because state
auditor is member, only limitation being that of forbidding imposition of
duties on auditor that appertain to legislative or judicial departments.
Shea v. North-Butte Mining Co. (Mont.)
The act providing for election between compensation for death under act or
damages in law action, and under section for waiver of right to bring
law action by application for compensation is not violative of Const. art.
16, as abrogating right of adult to recover damages for death, an adult
being capable of making election-the act in so far as it attempts to
limit compensation to minor heirs and enforce a waiver of right to bring
law action for death, is invalid where death was by employee's wrongful
act, minors having right of action in such case. Garfield Smelting Co.
v. Industrial Commission of Utah (Utah)
In defining terms "employer" and "employee" in any statute passed in pur-
suance of Const. Art. 20 authorizing Compensation Law, no definition
therein contained can enlarge scope of constitutional authority. Em-
ployers' Liability Assur. Corporation, Limited, of London, England, v.
Industrial Aecident Commission. (Cal.).....
Compensation Law if authorizing state Industrial Commission to require
mutual insurers and self-insurers, whose solvency was not doubted to
pay into state fund the present value of future installments of compen-
sation under awards for death claims is unconstitutional as discriminat-
ing against such insurers and in favor of others, etc. Sperduto v. New
York City Interborough Ry. Co. (N. Y.)....
Legislature had power to provide that one negligently killing employee sub-
ject to act should be liable to dependents instead of next of kin. Trav-
elers' Ins. Co. v. Padula Co., Inc. (N. Y.)....
1348.
CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF STATUTES IN GENERAL.
Compensation Act being highly remedial and beneficent in purpose is to be
liberally construed. Karoly v. Industrial Commission of Colorado et al.
(Col.)
Compensation Act provides compensation and new remedies for those injured
in industrial employments which involve loss, delay and expense and
render more certain recovery of compensation when most needed and is
to be interpreted with liberality calculated to effectuate such purpose-
Pub. Laws 1916, c. 1378, was enacted after passage of Compensation
Act and is therefore, in so far as their provisions conflict, if such be the
case, controlling. Taglinette v. Sidney Worsted Co. (R. I.)..
Compensation Act having been primarily intended for protection and benefit
of employees it should not be given such strict and technical construc-
tion as to deprive meritorious claimant of compensation. Bates & Rogers
Const. Co. et al. v. Allen (Ky..)
Supreme Court must assume that words of Statute amending and reenacting
Compensation Act were chosen with reference to their established legal
|