BERNARD'S DIVISION OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE. 371 demonstration become matter of conviction. Often must we distinguish, in his case, between the profound ideas lying at bottom, and the faulty syllogistic form of their setting forth. Thus, in Anselm, we see the different main directions of the spirit that actuated his times harmoniously combined. But the spiritual elements that were blended together in him became separated in the progress of the spiritual life of this period, and proceeded to antagonisms which belong amongst the most significant appearances of the twelfth century. Controversies arose which were at first nécessary, in order to conduct the unfolding process of theology to its decision. In particular, the abbot Bernard of Clairvaux, and Abelard, in the beginning of the twelfth century, appear to us as the representatives of the two main theological directions that started forth from the unity in which they had been combined in Anselm; one, issuing from the life of feeling, the practico-mystical; the other, the dialectical tendency. In the first place, as it respects Bernard, it will be necessary here to refer back, to what we observed in the history of monasticism, concerning his religious position. We saw that the experience of the heart, growing out of faith, was with him the main thing; that he allowed that sort of knowledge in religion alone to be the right one, which leads man back into the recesses of his own heart, and teaches him to be humble. The man, whose entire life belonged to monasticism, and that mode of intuition which lies at the bottom of it,-contemplating the matter from this point of view,- did not consider the highest aim of the Christian life as genuine Christianity required that he should do, the humanization of the divine, the ennobling of all that is human by a divine principle of life, but a stage of Christian perfection above the purely human; a soaring upward of the contempla tive spirit, that leaves all that is human behind it. The highest, to his apprehension, is not that which is to be reached by the harmonious development of all the powers of man's nature; but it is the rapture of inspiration, which, overleaping all intermediate stages, antedates the intuition of the life eternal. "The greatest man," says Bernard, "is he, who despising the use of things and of sense,- so far as human frailty may be permitted to do so,-not by a slowly ascending progression, but by a sudden spring, is sometimes wont to reach in contemplation those lofty heights." To this kind he reckons the account of St. Paul, how he was caught up to the third heaven. He distinguishes three different stages, or positions: "That of a "That of a practically pious life, maintained amidst the relations of civil society, where sense and the things of sense are used in a sober and orderly manner, according to the will of God; second, where one rises by a gradually progressive knowledge from the revelation of God's invisible essence, § 3. 1 Omnino maximus, qui spreto ipso usu consuevit. De consideratione, lib. v, c. i, rerum et sensuum, quantum quidem humanae fragilitati fas est, non ascensoriis gradibus, sed inopinatis excessibus avolare interdum contemplando ad illa sublimia 2 Excessus, non ascensus, nam raptum potius fuisse, quam ascendisse, ipse se perhibet. 372 BERNARD'S DIVISION OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE. in creation, to that essence itself; third, and highest, where the spirit collects its energies within itself, and, so far as it is divinely sustained, divests itself of things human, to rise to the contemplation of God. At this last stage, the man attains immediately to that which is the aim of all aims, the experience of the divine. To the same point, the other two stages also tend, but by a longer way. That which is highest, cannot be taught by words, but only revealed through the Spirit. No language can explain it; but we may by prayer and purity of heart attain to it, after we have prepared ourselves for it by a worthy life." Again, he compares together the three different relations of the mind to the knowledge of religious truth, expressed by opinion, faith, and intellectual apprehension (opinio, fides, intellectus). "Intellectual apprehension" proceeds from rational knowledge; faith reposes on authority; opinion holds only to the probable. The two former are in possession of the truth, but in different ways; faith possesses the truth, but enveloped and hid under a veil; intellect possesses it unveiled, and revealed. It is especially important to distinguish these three operations of the mind, and to hold them to their respective provinces; to take care that faith does not seize, as a matter of certainty, upon what belongs to bare opinion; or that opinion does not call in question the settled convictions of faith. If opinion affirms with authority, it is presumptuous. If faith companies with doubt, it is weak. If intellection attempts to force open the sealed treasure of faith, it is wanton self-will rebelling against the majesty of the divine. Faith is a sure prelibation of truth, as yet not made clear, a foretaste, growing out of the bent of the will. The following characters, or marks, therefore, are brought together in faith: the bent of the will, whereby conviction is determined; practical appropriation of the truth; living fellowship with divine things, which are still hidden from knowledge. Conviction here is not determined by outward reasons, as in the case of knowledge; it proceeds from something subjective, from a bent of the disposition towards the divine; and the conviction which proceeds from this source is a sure one. Intellection is a certain and clear knowledge of the invisible. The difference, therefore, between intellection and faith, is not constituted by the degree of certainty, but by the degree of clearness; that being wrapped up in faith which is unfolded to intellection.3 "There is nothing we long to know, more than that which we already know by faith; therefore we desire that, to the certainty already given in faith, should be added the clearness of knowledge. To our blessedness nothing more will be wanting, when that which is already certain to us by faith shall also be seen by us without 'Dispensativa est consideratio, sensibus sensibilibusque rebus ordinate et socialiter utens ad promerendum Deum. Aestimativa est consideratio prudenter ac diligenter quaeque scrutans ac ponderans ad vestigandum Deum. Speculativa est consideratio se in se colligens et, quantum divinitus adjuvatur, rebus humanis eximens ad contemplandum Deum. * Voluntaria quaedam et certa praclibatio necdum propalatae veritatis. Quod etsi non habet incertum, non magis quam intellectus, habet tamen involucrum, quod non intellectus. EARLY LIFE OF ABELARD. 373 a vail." It would therefore be doing Bernard injustice to assert that he altogether discarded the striving after knowledge, that he was a stranger to all such longings of the mind. The satisfaction of this need, implanted in the mind, he reckoned in fact among the things that constitute the blessedness of the eternal life; nor would he banish such a striving even from the condition of the present life, although he himself was more inclined to that contemplation which is fed from the heart. But a striving, not conscious of its proper limits, not respecting the sacred precincts of faith, violating the simplicity and humility of faith and the warmth of feeling, the striving of peculation, was hateful to him. Had speculative theology ever marched onward in the path marked out by Anselm, Bernard could easily have come to an understanding with it; and, although his own path was a different one, yet have entertained friendly feelings towards it. But the case was altered by the bold appearance of Abelard. Peter Abelard, born 1079, at Palais, not far from Nantes in Bretany, was already in the first years of his youth seized with an enthusiasm for those dialectical studies. He was endowed with splendid natural gifts; but he was perhaps too conscious also of this fact. A too intense feeling of self, that constantly received fresh nourishment from the brilliant recognition which his talents soon met with, was the moral failing which, from the outset to the evening of his life, he had especially to contend against, and which contributed to involve him in those strong trials that finally reacted to chastise and purify his heart. He soon fell into controversy with his teachers; for example, with that renowned dialectician, master of a realistic school, William de Champeaux of Paris. In Melun, Corbeil, Paris, he acquired, by his proficiency in dialectics, a great name and much approbation. From the study of philosophy, he was desirous of passing over to theology; although he was still far from possessing that disposition of heart without which such studies cannot be successfully prosecuted. He went to Laon, to hear Anselm, then a famous teacher; but not finding himself satisfied with his teachings, soon had the boldness to stand forth as teacher himself, in rivalship with his master. Driven thence, he betook himself to Paris; and there, by his philosophical and theological lectures, he created a great sensation. From Rome, Italy, all parts of France, the Netherlands, Germany, young men flocked to hear him. His fame and plentiful income tempted him to remit more and more a proper watchfulness over himself, so that he gradually let drop the reins. and abandoned himself to his pleasures.3 He himself afterwards 1 Nil autem malumus scire, quam quae fide jam scimus. Nil supererit ad beatitudinem, cum, quae jam certa sunt nobis fide, erunt aeque et nuda. In a work written in a later period of his life, after his various misfortunes, he says of himself: Confido in ea, quae mihi largior est, ingenii abundantia, ipso cooperante scientiarum dispensatore, non pauciora me praestiturum eloquentiae peripateticae munimenta, quam illi praestite VOL. IV. runt, quos Latinorum celebrat studiosa doctrina. Dialectica ed. Cousin, p. 228. Abelard says of himself, in his Historia calamitatum: Cum jam me solum in mundo superesse philosophum aestimarem, nec ullam ulterius inquietationem formidarem, frena libidini coepi laxare, qui antea vixeram continentissime. Et quo amplius in philosophia vel sacra lectione profeceram, amplius a philosophis et divinis immundi. tia vitae recedebam. 32 recognized, in the misfortunes which he thus brought upon himself, the means appointed by divine providence for removing the moral disorders of his life, among which he names in particular pride and luxury.1 The outrageous inflictions he suffered, induced him to withdraw from the world, and in the year 1119 he entered, as monk, the abbey of St. Denis, near Paris. Here he was importunately beset with petitions, from many of his earlier disciples and other young clergymen, to recommence, in a new sense and spirit, and for the glory of God, those courses of lectures, which he had formerly given for the purpose of gaining money and a name. The monks of St. Denis, with their licentious manners, rejoiced at any opportunity of getting rid of a severe and bitter censor, and were therefore extremely urgent that he should follow this invitation. A priory belonging to this abbey, and bordering on the province of count Theobald of Champagne, was given up to him for this object: and soon he became, once more, the centre of attraction for the youth, who flocked from all quarters to his lectures, so that neither rooms nor means of subsistence sufficed for their accommodation. It is true, he still continued to busy himself here also with the explanation of ancient authors, and the resolution of dialectic questions; but the new and more serious turn which misfortune had given to his mind, induced him to direct his attention more particularly to theological subjects, which he treated according to his own peculiar dialectical method. In compliance with the wishes of his auditors, he commenced embodying his theological doctrines in a work, in which, doubtless, he intended to embrace the whole system of faith, but which did not extend beyond the doctrine of the trinity; Theologia, or Introductio in Theologiam. From this work, it appears evident that a controversy had already broken out between the dialectical and the practical church party. Abelard writes, not without a certain degree of excitement, against the antagonists of the new dialectical method. He makes it a matter of complaint, that so many, who had no conception of a rational exposition of the doctrines of faith, sought to console themselves for their inaptitude by extolling in the highest terms that glowing zeal of faith, by virtue of which one believes without inquiry or examination. He describes them, therefore, as the advocates of a blind belief on mere authority. He says, in opposition to such, that, in following their notions, no means would be left to refute the followers of a false religion and to reclaim them from their errors. All 1 Cum igitur totus in superbia atque luxuria laborarem, utriusque morbi remedium divina mihi gratia, licet nolenti, contulit. He himself, in giving the history of his misfortune, remarks with regard to his lectures, what certainly we have no reason to consider as exaggerated: Ad quas tanta scholarium multitudo confluxit, ut nec locus hospitiis nec terra sufficeret alimentis. 3 In his preface, he even uses the ex pression: Sacrae eruditionis summa quasi divinae scripturae introductio. 4 Nunc plurimi solatium suae imperitiae quaerunt, ut cum ea de fide docere nituntur, quae ut etiam intelligi possint, disserere non sufficiunt, illum maxime fidei fervorem commendent, qui ea quae dicantur, antequam intelligat, credit, et prius his assentit ac recipit, quam quae ipsa sint videat et, an recipienda sint, agnoscat seu pro captu suo discutiat. Lib. ii, p. 1061. idolaters, too, might plant themselves on the same principle. If this party affirmed that the truths God had revealed could not be understood in the present life, this would lead to Montanism: it would follow from it, that the sacred authors had been blind instruments of the Holy Spirit, and did not themselves understand what they wrote. A faith that sprung up so easily, that was not the result of examination, could never possess firmness. He appealed to the words of Sirach, 19:4:"He who believes soon, is fickle-minded." Men who are not of easy faith, require reasons, that may determine them to believe either rational arguments or facts. Thus Thomas, Paul, were led to the faith by facts; and the greater the difficulty which Paul encountered in making his way to the faith, the stronger his faith proved to be after his conversion." He argued, that this apostle preferred the gift of prophecy above all other gifts of the Spirit, because it enabled him to expound that which is contained in the collective matter of religious consciousness, in a way calculated to convince others; and undervalued the gift of tongues, because the former faculty was not connected with it.2 He distinguished different stages in the growth and development of faith. In the way just described, arises only the first degree of faith, religious conviction, determined by the force of rational arguments or of objective facts. This is, as yet, no such faith as has merit in the sight of God. From this is developed, by the supervention of love, a faith which, without allowing itself to be led astray by outward appearances, recognizes something as indisputably true, on account of God's word; where the love that trusts in God requires no other reason; as in the case of Abraham's faith.3 But the first mentioned faith is only a preparatory step, though not on that account to be despised. Abelard, accordingly, supposes the following process of development. "One first inquires into the reasons, which show the truth of Christianity; thus, faith obtains its warrant. Out of this proceeds next, by the power of the Holy Spirit, the confidence of religious conviction in reference to things unseen. Faith ever has reference to the invisible things of God. The visible and sensuous may furnish a foothold or occasion for faith, an outward vehicle, whereby that which is the object of faith manifests itself to the mind; but not the object of faith itself. Even Thomas, to whom our Lord said, 'thou believest because thou hast seen,' did not believe on that which he saw. He saw the sensible appearance, and he believed only in God, concealed under the same."4 |