CONCEPTION OF THE MIRACLE. THOMAS AQUINAS. 471 relation to a higher inworking. Thus, God has furnished nature with everything requisite for the realization of the ends correspondent to her, but so constituted her, at the same time, that she should receive into herself still higher powers, and produce still higher effects." He distinguishes that which takes place contra, praeter, and supra naturam. The first, is when God, according to his secret plan of the world, the ideas in which all things were prefigured (ex causis rationalibus in se ipso absconditis) produces, from some object or other, a thing which had not already been prefigured and prepared in it by the seminal principle implanted within it (quod seminaliter non inest in ipso). Praeter naturam, is that which does not in itself, indeed, transcend the power of nature, that which has been produced from these powers bearing within themselves, by constitution and in the germ, everything that is at sometime or other to appear in manifestation ; but which, however, could not of itself proceed from the developing process of nature from within herself, but presupposes a certain inworking from without upon the forces hidden within her, an impulse whereby the process of natural development is hastened, the separated forces in her are rapidly concentrated, so that something is accomplished at once, which nature could have produced only through a gradual and slow development. Supra naturam, but not contra naturam, is that which could not come about indeed at all by natural powers, which therefore is purely supernatural, like the second; but which still, however, stands so related to nature, as to find first in her its completion; as, for example, the appearance of Christ.5 "He affirms, again, a certain analogy between the natural and supernatural, in so far as, in fact, even that whereby corrupted nature is restored, must be the same with or something similar to that whereof the nature was originally constituted. Thomas Aquinas unfolds this idea as follows:7 "If we look at the order of the world as it proceeds from the primal cause, nothing can happen contrary to this order of the world, which has its ground in God; for if God brought to pass anything at variance with it, he would act against his foreknowledge, his will, or his goodness. But if we look at the order of the world, as it is grounded in the cosmical chain of causes and effects, then God may bring to 1 Quod creator nihil commodorum nega vit naturae in his, quae sunt in natura secundum causales rationes sufficienter deducentes ad actum, quia in his passivum proportionatum est activo et e converso activum passivo. In his autem, quae tantum obedientialiter sunt in natura et quae secundum causales rationes pertinent ad causam superiorem, negavit commoda, quia haec ad naturam non pertinent, sed ad causam superiorem. *The causae seminales. 3 Non modo natura ab intrinsecus generante, sed extrinsecus adhibitis motibus et fomentis. 4 Hoc quod secundum ordinem naturae paulatim operantis produceretur, velocius et repente producitur. Quod in potestate naturae nullo modo potest esse, et tamen ad naturam se habet ut perfectio naturae. Sunt ad simile in specie causae seminales et obedientales, et hoc ideo, quod seminales sunt ad institutionem naturae, obedientales autem et causales ad corruptae naturae restaurationem nec potest corrupta natura restaurari nisi per eadem aut similia, quibus instituta est. et ideo omne miraculum deducit ad aliquid simile natuSee the Summa, p. ii, Tract. viii. Quaest. xxx, seqq. 7 Summa, lib. i, Quaest. cv, Artic. vi. rae. The causae secundae. 472 CONCEPTION OF THE MIRACLE. THOMAS AQUINAS. pass something praeter ordinem rerum, understood according to this latter sense; because he is not tied and limited to this series of causes and effects; but, on the contrary, the order of the world thereon reposing depends on him, as it proceeds from him, not by any necessity of nature, but by his own freewill. As the ordo naturae is implanted by God in things (ordo rebus inditus), so that which takes place praeter hunc ordinem, is not contrary to nature." He now raises the objection, "God would be a mutable being, if he acted contrary to the order of things established by himself." To this he replies: "That God, in implanting a certain order in things, still reserved to himself the right of sometimes, for cause, acting otherwise.1 Considered in reference to the divine omnipotence, nothing, we must allow, can be called a miracle; for, compared with this, everything is little. The miracle is so called only in reference to the capability of nature, which some event transcends.2 Hence, different degrees of miraculous power may be supposed." In his inquiry respecting the idea of the miracle, in his commentary on the Sentences,3 he starts, like Albertus Magnus, with making the distinction between the rationes causales vel obedientales, and the rationes seminales in nature. And he too places the supernatural, not in an infringement of the former, but of the latter. Accurately understood, however, the miracle, even in relation to the latter, is not an event running counter to them, but exalted above them, -one that takes place independent of them: an event exalted above them when God produces an effect, which nature must ever fall short of, as the form of a glorified body; or when he produces an effect, to which nature is competent, without the mediation of natural causes, as in the changing of water into wine. But he does nothing contrary to nature; for he cannot so order it that the operative causes in nature, while still remaining the same in kind, should produce essentially different effects, any more than that a thing should be the same and different at the same time. In the second book,5 he distinguishes two several conceptions of the miraculous; the relatively such to a particular individual, when the natural causes which give rise to the phenomenon are concealed from him; and the miraculous in itself, the cause of which is one simpliciter occulta; so that if the powers of nature had been fol lowed, it must have taken place otherwise. Of this kind is whatever is brought to pass immediately by the divine power, which is the most hidden of causes. How miracles are comprised in the divine order 1 Quod Deus sic rebus certum ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi ipsi reservaret, quod ipse aliquando aliter ex causa esset factu rus. Unde, cum praeter hunc ordinem agit, non mutatur. Quod nihil potest dici miraculum ex comparatione potentiae divinae, quia quod cunque factum divinae potentiae comparatum est minimum. Sed dicitur aliquid miraculum per comparationem ad faculta tem naturae, quam excedit. Summa, lib. i, Qu. cv, Art. viii. 3 Dist. 42, Qu. ii, Art. ii. Proprie loquendo tunc etiam contra eas non facit, sed praeter eas vel supra eas. 5 Distinct. 18, Quaest. i, Artic. iii. Ita etiam, quod in re est aliqua virtus secundum rei veritatem, per quam aliter debeat contingere. 7 Haec proprie miracula, quasi in seipsis et simpliciter mira. CONCEPTION OF THE MIRACLE. RAYMUND LULL. 473 of the world, and serve along with the effects that proceed from natural causes to reveal the divine providence, he explains again in his work Contra gentes,' in perfect accordance with what he teaches in the Summa. "There are, indeed," he says in this latter work, " many abnormal effects in nature, which do not correspond with what usually takes place, while still the order of providence in nowise changes. If then it may be so brought about by creaturely power, that the course of nature, without any change of the divine providence, may suffer such change as to allow of phenomena deviating from what commonly appear, then, a fortiori, the divine power may, without any infringement on providence, sometimes bring to pass an event otherwise than as it would take place in the natural order of things. This serves especially to make it manifest that all nature is subject to God's will; and that the order of nature does not spring from a natural necessity, but from his freewill. And it can be no matter of surprise, that God should effect something in nature with a view to reveal himself to the souls of men, when we consider that rational beings are the end in which all corporeal being terminates. But the end of rational beings is the knowledge of God; it can be no matter of surprise, therefore, if a change should take place in corporeal nature for the purpose of communicating to rational beings the knowledge of God." Raymund Lull refers those who refuse to admit anything supernatural, to the creation: of the world from nothing, as the greatest miracle.2" In nature," says he," are many and great mysteries; and the human understanding is not competent to know and comprehend all the works of nature; for the power of nature to work according to her own course, is far greater than the power of the human soul to understand the works of nature. If, then, man finds himself so limited in the knowledge of nature, how should he be able to understand everything supernatural; especially if he is disposed to conceive what lies beyond the limits of nature as something embraced within them?" "Neither the natural nor the supernatural," he affirms, "can be rightly understood except in their connection with each other. The understanding of the one conditions the understanding of the other."5 The tendency to the supernatural, he considers as the characteristic of the Christian age and position, proceeding from faith in the incarnation of God, as compared with antiquity, which leaned towards nature." 1 Lib. iii, c. xcix. * Valde mirum est, Domine, de hominibus discredentibus, nam quoniam negant et discredunt esse rem contra cursum naturae, quare non respiciunt nec perpendunt esse mundi, quod est magis impossibile secundum cursum naturae, quam sit impossibile, te esse Deum et hominem simul? nam mundus de privatione devenit in esse per tuam voluntatem et non per cursum naturae, t. ix, f. 39. Adeo magna et multa sunt secreta naturae, quod non possint omnia percipi ab homine, quoniam multo major est possi bilitas, quam natura habet ad operandum secundum suum cursum. Et maxime si hoc inquirat intra terminos naturae, intra quos non sunt inclusae res, quae non sunt secundum cursum naturae? t. ix, f. 401. 5 Opera naturae percipiuntur per opera, quae sunt supra naturam, et opera, quae sunt supra naturam, percipiuntur per opera naturae, quoniam alia sunt aliis occasio, ut percipiantur. L. c. f. 402. Benedictus sis, Doinine, quia a tempore tuae incarnationis plus tractant et cogitant homines in tuis operibus, quam in 474 ROGER BACON. FOREKNOWLedge and PREDESTINATION. In connection with the doctrine of miracles, we should here notice the peculiar views of Roger Bacon, who endeavors to explain certain marvels wrought by the power of man's word, from the potentiated natural power of mind, to which the uttered word serves as a natural organ. "Every action of man is stronger and mightier when he bends his mind thereto with firmness of purpose, and confidently expects to compass what he aims at. And because the word is formed out of the thought and longing of man's heart, and man has his joy in it, and it is the most connatural instrument of the rational soul, therefore has it the power of producing the greatest effects of all that is done by man; especially when it proceeds from a sure intention, a great desire, and a strong confidence. A proof of this is, that all the miracles wrought by holy men were, from the first, performed by the power of words.' When we enter into the investigations of these theologians respecting the relation of the divine foreknowledge and predestination to creaturely freedom, we ought not to forget, that the Augustinian system swayed the religious consciousness and thinking of this age; as in fact, this ground-tendency ever constituted the most important difference, though the one of which there was the least consciousness on both sides, between the occidental and the oriental churches. Starting from the principles of Augustin, these writers were carried, by the stern consistency of monistic speculation, to the point of sacrificing the freedom of the creature, notwithstanding all their pains to rescue it. And here, too, while we see how a well-authorized practical interest was forced to give way, in speculative minds, to the stiff and rigid consistency of thought, we cannot fail to mark also the extent of mischief which arose from a confounding of the philosophical and relig ious points of view in theology. But the power of the ethical element within them, and their good sense, appear in this, that they attempted, at least in appearance, to maintain freedom, to remove the causality of evil from God, and to avoid everything calculated to shock the moral sensibility of mankind. Their skilful dialectics, and their custom of resorting to the arts which Augustin had already employed in such a variety of ways, stood them greatly in stead. Anselm composed a tract on the question, How divine foreknowledge and predestination could be reconciled with freewill? He makes out an answer by resorting to distinctions, which might serve the purpose, no doubt, of guarding against many misconceptions, many extravagant operibus naturae, et per hoc significatur, quod ipsi sint plus in tempore gratiae post tuam incarnationem, quam ante ipsam, quando philosophi plus tractabant de operibus naturae, quam de tuis. De contemplat. in Deum vol. ii, lib. iii, Dist. 28, c. cli, f. 349. Omnis operatio hominis est fortior et impetuosior, quando ad eam est multum sollicitus et voluntarius et fixo proposito firmat intentionem et sperat firmiter, se posse consequi, quod intendit. Quia ver bum ab interioribus membris naturalibus generatur et formatur ex cogitatione et sollicitudine, et delectatur homo in eo, et propriissimum est instrumentum animae ra tionalis, ideo maximam efficaciam habet inter omnia, quae fiunt ab homine, praecipue cum ex intentione certa, desiderio magno et vehementi confidentia profertur, Cujus signum est, quod omnia fere miracula, quae facta sunt per sanctos, a principio fiebant per virtutem verborum. Opus majus, f. 252. FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION. ANSELM. VICTORE. 475 and ugly positions; but which were not suited to remove the real difficulty. His doctrine is this: "Divine foreknowledge by no means excludes free self-determination. The necessary and the free, God knows beforehand, each in its own way. All depends on distinguishing the standing-point of eternity and that of development in time. As there is no contradiction in this, that, viewed from the standing-point of eternity, everything is an immediate present, which in the unfolding of time is a past and a future, so it easily admits also of being reconciled, that what from the standing-point of eternity exhibits itself as immutable and necessary, should, in relation to temporal development, appear to be free and mutable, as dependent on the creaturely free self-determination. Paul, in Rom. 8: 28, employs the perfect tense, -even when speaking of an action yet future,- for the purpose of denoting, by this circumstance, that he had not in view here a temporal action, but was constrained to use this expression-by the poverty of language -to denote the immediate presence of eternity;2 since that which is once past is immutable, like the eternal."3 Now it is quite evident that, by this distinction of the two points of view, nothing is gained as yet for the defence of freedom. This distinction would much rather serve directly to make contingency a mere appearance, necessary in order to temporal development, so that what is fixed in the divine plan of the world as something necessary, should be actually realized, only in the form of a seeming contingency. Anselm himself, cannot avoid observing the consequences which might be derived from his positions: "Must not the causes of good and evil fall back then, on God, if he knows nothing as a mere fact (therefore, not even evil), but his foreknowledge precedes everything?" To this he answers, that "Everything positive comes from God; but evil is a negative thing. Even in evil actions, all that is positive comes from him, but not evil, which consists just in the want of that rectitudo voluntatis, which comes from God."4 By these distinctions, however, when taken in connection with the positions above noticed, the acknowledgment of a freedom simply self-determining,—not determined from without, as the cause of evil,-is by no means placed clearly beyond doubt. There is something more real in the acute distinctions, by means of which Hugo a St. Victore endeavors to make the freedom in sin consistent with the acknowledgment of the divine omnipotence and providence to which all things are subjected. He says: "We must distinguish from each other the act of willing in itself, and the direction of the will to a particular object. Willing in itself, is purely the act of the man; but as soon as it directs itself to particular objects, it finds itself limited by the divine order of the world, so that it can take only the 1 Hoc propositum, seeundum quod vocati sunt sancti, in aeternitate, in qua non est praeteritum vel futurum, sed tantum praesens, immutabile est, sed in ipsis hominibus ex libertate arbitrii aliquando est mutabile. 'Propter indigentiam verbi, significantis aeternam praesentiam, usum esse verbis praeteritae significationis. 3 Ad similitudinem aeterni praesentis omnino immutabilia. 4 Deus facit omnes actiones et omnes motus, quia ipse facit res, a quibus et ex quibus et per quas et in quibus fiunt. |