FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION. RAYMUND LULL. 481 highest cause. God works in all; yet in each according to its own peculiar constitution; hence he works in natural things so as to communicate to them the power for activity, and to determine their nature to this or that action; but he works in the free will so as to impart to it the power to act; and, under God's agency, the free will is active;2 but still, the determination and the end of the action stands in the power of the free will; therefore, the control over its own actions remains to it, though not so as in the case of the first cause;" and by the limitation here introduced, the whole may again be brought round to the proposition that all must, in the end, be referred back to the causa prima, which works through all the instrumentalities established by itself.3 How far Thomas is from really acknowledging the free will to be an independent causality, appears evident from the way in which he repels the objection that, by his doctrine, freewill is annihilated. He says, God works in the free will as the nature of it requires that he should; although, therefore, he changes the will of man to another direction, nevertheless, by his almighty power, he causes that man should freely will the change which he experiences; and thus all constraint is removed. For to suppose otherwise, that the man willed not the change which is a change in his will, would involve a contradiction.5 We recognize the profound and acute discernment of Raymund Lull, in his mode of treating these subjects; but in his case also it is plainly apparent that, in seeking to vindicate freedom, he is driven, in spite of himself, by the monistic tendency of his speculation, into the denial of it. He too, like Thomas Aquinas, distinguishes two different points of view in which things may be contemplated; first, as they subsist after an eternal mode in God, or in the idea which is one with God; second, as they manifest themselves in temporal evolution. "The world and its parts existed from eternity in the divine reason, by the idea or the ideas; for the divine reason suffers nothing of its essence, and of the essence of its attributes, to pass without itself, so the seal, which is impressed on wax, or the image reflected in a mirror, remains in itself the same. When God created the world, nothing that belongs to the being of the idea was transferred, in this act of creating, without himself; else this idea would be subject to change, would not remain the eternal one, which is impossible, since this idea is God himself.7 But God willed that, from nothing, should be created that which he had prima, necesse est, quod sint in ipso ejus intelligere et quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem. Nam omne, quod est in altero, est in eo secundum modum ejus in quo est. Summa, p. i, Quaest. xiv, Artic. v. God knows all things in se ipso, in quantum essentia sua continet similitudinem aliorum ab ipso. The scientia Dei non causa mali, sed boni, per quod cognoscitur malum. L. c. Artic. x. Ita tamen, quod in unoquoque secundum ejus conditionem. VOL. IV. 2 Ut virtutem agendi sibi ministret et ipso operante liberum arbitrium agat. 3 Sentent. lib. i, Distinct. 25, Quaest. i, Artic. i. 4 Etiamsi voluntatem hominis in aliud mutet, nihilominus tamen hoc sua omnipotentia facit, ut illud, in quod mutatur, voluntarie velit. Sentent. lib. i, Distinct. 25, Quaest. i, Artic. iii. 6 Nihil extra mittente. 7 Idea esset alterata, et non acterna, quod est impossibile, quum idea sit Deus. 41 482 FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION. RAYMUND LULL. with himself, from eternity, by the idea; and what he willed, his almighty power could perform. That which exists, after an eternal manner, in him, could not pass into the forms of quantity, time, motion. We must, accordingly, distinguish between created being, as such, as it unfolds itself and appears in time, and as it exists, simply in and for itself, comprehended by the divine wisdom from eternity. And that which divine wisdom conceives, after an immediate manner, is the idea.* God's creative and his preserving agency are to be distinguished from each other only as immediate and mediated agencies. As all things must, alike, be referred back to God's creative power, whether that power be exerted directly, as in the creation from nothing, or through creatures as its instruments; so, creation and preservation are the same.5 The intermediate instrument of God's preserving agency is the implanted vis conservativa residing in things, to which all other agencies coming from without are only subservient." This distinction, between the immediate and the mediate agency of God, he employs for the purpose of explaining the doctrine of predestination." "The predestinated is, in idea, God himself; since the idea and God are the same this predestination is, therefore, infallible and immutable. But predestination, so far as it concerns a created man, is something else. And although the new-created man is not, in essence, different from the man of the idea, yet he differs from the same, in so far as a created man exists under the forms of quantity, space, and time; and, in this regard, his salvation is not a necessary thing, for God works here by the way of means. He predestinated Peter through the merit of his good works, as he gives warmth by means of the sun and fire. So was it, also, with the perdition of Judas; all depends, here, upon our having regard to middle causes, so as not to impinge on the divine order and rectitude. The human mind may present a thing as questionable, conceive of it as possible, which cannot be so contemplated in the divine mind, where the question falls null of itself, since it belongs to a case that cannot once be supposed, in relation to thought in God. What man conceives as possible, viewed from the position of bare abstract thought, is a thing that can find no place in the chain of actual 1 Sed divina voluntas voluit, quod de nihilo esset creatum hoc, quod ab aeterno habuit per ideam. Respecting time and space, he explains himself in the liber contemplationis in Deum, vol. iii, lib. iv, Distinct. 38, c. cclxvii, t. x, f. 141. As the union of matter and form constitutes body, so potence and act constitute time. Time is the intermediate between potential and actual being. Because in God all is actus, therefore in him there is no time. 3 Ens creatum secundum hoc, quod est simpliciter per se simpliciter comprehensum ab aeterno per divinam sapientiam. 4 See Quaest. super lib. Sentent. i, Qu. xxvii, Opp. t. iv, f. 27. 5 Et quia creatio ita est per creare creaturam, quae conservat aliam creaturam, sicut est per creare illam creaturam conservatam, ergo sequitur quod creatio et conservatio sint idem. Qu. xxxviii. 6 Vide Quaest. super lib. Sentent. i, Qu. xxxiii. 7 Thus we must distinguish una praedestinatio, quae est Deus, et alia praedestinatio, quae est effectus, et in novo subjecto sustentata et creata, et hoc sine mutatione divini intellectus, qui non mutatur per suum effectum, cum suus effectus non sit novus in quantum idea, sed est novus quoad seipsum, cum ex nihil de novo sit productus. FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION. RAYMUND LULL. 483 existence." In his work, entitled Contemplatio in Deum,2 he endeavors to show that neither predestination nor foreknowledge (praescire), on the part of God, carries with it any force of constraint, since this would stand in contradiction with the divine attributes of wisdom, justice, etc. "The palm-tree, by the course of nature, yields dates; the apple-tree, apples; so one man, Peter, by freewill, by his own unconstrained faculty and merit, brings forth good works; and another, William, by a nature equally unconstrained, evil works. As the cause in one case is the course of nature, in the difference of the two trees, so the cause in the other is a course of nature of another sort, in the difference of the two men. But while nature, in the case of the two trees, necessitates (constringit) them to yield different fruits, each after its kind, there is, in the case of man, no such natural necessity constraining him to bring forth good or evil works, because here nature takes up freewill. He continually comes back upon the point, that predestination does not exclude second causes,- that it is a mistaken respect for divine wisdom, which leads men to ascribe too much force to predestination. If the misunderstood-doctrine of predestination makes a man negligent in the practice of virtue and avoiding of sin, it were better that he had not meddled with it.5 As one who, unknowingly, sows seeds which have lost their vitality, considers the seed productive, when it is not so, and supposes that possible, therefore, which in fact is not so ;6 so two individuals, of whom one is predestined to salvation, the other to perdition, not knowing to what they are predestined, both believe they have everlasting happiness and perdition within their control; and, because they consider this to be possible, there is in them an unconstrained freewill. As the sower supposes that wheat will grow from the spoiled seed, while however only that becomes actual which is determined beforehand in the seed; so Peter and William arrive at the end to which they are predestined by means of what they actually do, notwithstanding they suppose that to be possible to them, potentialiter, which is impossible to them both potentialiter and actualiter." He is aware of the mischievous practical consequences which might be drawn from this comparison, but justifies himself by saying that interest for the truth compelled him to write thus.7 "All the works done by ' Quod Deus non possit damnare Petrum, nec salvare Judam, et tale non posse non est ens reale, sed intentionale in humano intellectu, cum Deus sicut non diligit salvare Judam et damnare Petrum, sic non intelligit damnare Petrum et salvare Judam. Quaest. xxxvi. 2 Vol. iii, lib. iv, Distinct. 38, c. cclxv, t. x, f. 135. In anima rationali formantur diversa opera secundum formam, qua recipiuntur qualitates praedictae, quae formantur accidentaliter ad bona opera vel ad mala ratione accidentium separabilium, quae eveniunt iis. Ratio, quare homo dat praedestinationi majorem vim et potestatem, quam ipsa 484 FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION. RAYMUND LULL. Peter and William, and the ways in which they do the same, are predestined to them, and yet they are done by them with freewill, apart from all constraint whatsoever. In respect to men as well as nature, everything takes place according to the divine predetermination; but, in the case of a natural being, as there is no free will, so neither can there be merit or demerit. If the predestined Peter does a bad action, and the foreknown (praescitus) William a good one; the good is, to the human mind, a mark of predestination to everlasting happiness; the evil, a mark of predestination to perdition: while yet no change can, on this account, be supposed to have taken place in the divine councils. Hence then the mistake, when the human mind undertakes to judge by these fallacious symptoms in temporal manifestation concerning predestination, without having regard to the nature of the evolution in time, to the antithesis between potence and act, to the confinement of human reason, which cannot comprehend predestination after the perfect manner in which it is settled in the divine wisdom.3 Such an absolute knowledge of predestination would, however, destroy what essentially constitutes the great principle of human ethics; and there would be nothing more to be said about freedom of choice in the will, or about guilt and desert. But purely human action can only be found under the condition of this uncertainty in reference to predestination, whether one is predestined to everlasting happiness or misery. Now as the husbandman, who knows that the shocks of corn are potentially in the seed-kernel, must scatter the seed according to the measure of his knowledge, notwithstanding his ignorance about the result, just so must we act, in bringing forth good actions as a means of attaining to everlasting happiness; nor can uncertainty with regard to the divine decrees serve as an excuse for any man.5 Suppose Peter predestined to represent to himself and will something that is good, and William something that is evil; we must say that, before they represented to themselves or willed this, both had freewill to represent to themselves and to will good and evil. Their determination having been freely made, goes as freely into execution. They act freely, because each of them is conscious that he can do the opposite if he chooses. Although it is decreed that this individual shall kill that other, yet he acts with entire freedom. So if he cannot accomplish his purpose, if the arrow misses the mark, this also is predetermined. Yet with such an inten Quia in te, Domine, non est defectus, ideo salvatio et damnatio non est alterabilis in eis, sed solum in operibus ip Borum. Quando figura actualis repraesentat falsitatem, sicut speculum falso repraesentat falsam figuram. 3 Unde haec falsa figura praedestinationis formatur ratione temporis, quod est inter actum et potentiam et ratione defectus humani intellectus, qui non potest ita perfecte percipere praedestinationem, sicut tua sapientia eam scit. f. 143. Si noster intellectus ita bene id, quod homini est praedestinatum, sciret sicut tua sapientia, non fieret homini falsa figura in praedestinatione, neque haberet homo liberam voluntatem, nec obligationem nec meritum in suis operibus. Et non excusat eum ignorantia, quam habet de salvatione vel damnatione, quam scit tua gloriosa essentia divina; c. cclxviii, f. 145. 6 Voluntas venit libere ad potentiam motivam, quin sit constricta per praedesti nationem. MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE. ANSELM. 485 tion, the guilt also is present, although the sensible instrument may fail of executing that intention." But it is easy to see with how little propriety the example could be employed for the purpose which Lull had in view, of proving that predestination generally had not the force of constraint, and did not destroy freedom of the will; for predestination certainly refers not barely to the outward action, but also to the inward determination of the will. For the rest, he expresses the conviction that, in this doctrine, the discursive development falls very far short of the intuition. And so he concludes this whole exposition, with the apology, quod noster intellectus ipsam melius intelligat, quam nostra sensualitas potuerit scribere. From theology we now pass to anthropology, and shall consider the farther prosecution of the doctrine concerning man's primeval state, concerning the fall, and its consequences. In anthropology, we must trace forward the threads of development from the earlier periods into the present age, in order to have a right understanding of its history. Important in their consequences, in this regard, were the opposite views that arose during the Pelagian controversies, which related, not barely to the present condition of human nature, to the acknowledgment or denial of its need of redemption, but also to the relation of human nature and of the created spirit, in itself considered, to God; the acknowledgment or denial of a moral autonomy of human nature. Augustin had applied the distinction of natural and supernatural, not merely to the condition of fallen man, but also to man in his primeval state; he had proceeded on the supposition that man, from the beginning, needed communion with God, in order to attain to the realization of that likeness to God for which his nature was destined, and hence he made use of the term gratia, in this sense, even in relation to the primeval state of man. Accordingly, this view passed over into the theology of the present period. Anselm controverts the Pelagian definition of free will, as being the faculty of choice between good and evil. "The capability of choosing the last could not possibly, as he thought, be one of the necessary characters of this conception; for such a definition must, though differences might occur in its application, admit of being applied, in a certain degree, to all objects to which the thing denoted by this conception is to be attributed. But this character would not apply to those, to whom we must ascribe freedom in the highest sense, namely, God, and the spirits of the blessed. And the further a being is advanced in his moral development, the farther removed must he be from the possibility of choosing evil. A character which diminishes freedom when added, and increases it when absent, cannot then possibly form Quia motiva intellectualis est prior sensuali, est meritum in intellectuali, et licet sensualis non occidat Joannem, intellectualis jam est in peccato et culpa, eo quod, quia praedestinatio eam constringat, se obligat ad peccatum per liberam voluntatem, quia, si praedestinatio eam obligaret et con stringeret, tunc eam obligaret ad nolendum occidere Joannem eo quod sit praedestinatum Gulielmo, non occidere eum, f. 147. 2 Quia ista res in verbo et in scriptura non potest ita bene manifestari, sicut est in intellectu, f. 136. 3 In his dialogue, De libero arbitrio. |