Hobbs et al. v. Cowden. nature, bound the township, and not himself personally. We are not inclined to adopt that conclusion. The addition of "T. C. T." to the defendant's name, if it means any thing, is mere "descriptio personarum." He contracted-though he was the then appellant's trustee-in his own name, agreed to pay 200 dollars in case the condition was not performed, and the result is, he is individually liable. McClure v. Bennet, 1 Blackf. 189; Deming v. Bullitt, id. 241; Pitman v. Kintner, 5 Blackf. 250; Mears v. Graham, 8 id. 144; Taft v. Brewster, 9 Johns, 334; Prather v. Ross, 17 Ind. 495. Another ground assumed against the maintenance of the action is, that from the judgment of the justice no appeal could be legally taken, and that consequently the appeal-bond is void. It is true the statute which authorizes the suit against the supervisor does not specially give the right of appeal, but that right is no doubt included in the general provisions respecting appeals from the judgments of justices of the peace. 1 R. S., p. 467, § 26; 2 id., p. 461, § 64. Again, it is insisted that the township, when she sues a supervisor, and is unsuccessful in her action, is not liable for cost. We think otherwise. "In all civil actions, the party recovering judgment shall recover cost, except in those cases in which a different provision is made by law." 2 R. S., p. 126, § 396. We know of no provision of law making the exception indicated as to a township when she is the plaintiff. There is a bill of exceptions which shows that certain testimony offered by the plaintiff was, over the defendants' objection, admitted by the court; but the grounds of objection do not appear to have been pointed out in the Common Pleas; and the ruling on the admission of the testimony can not, therefore, be assigned for error. Deny v. The NorthWestern University, 16 Ind. 220. Indeed, we perceive no difficulty in the determination of this case. The appeal from the justice seems to have been The City of Logansport v. Legg. regularly taken. The bond sued on is in form and substance Per Curiam.-The judgment is affirmed, with costs. THE CITY OF LOGANSPORT v. LEGG. PLEADING IMPROVEMENT OF STREETS.-In an appeal from a precept issued for the collection of assessments for the improvement of streets in a city, the transcript must contain, amongst other things," a proper order of the common council of the city, directing the improvement to be made, and if the transcript show that the common council consisted of 10 members, and that, when the alleged order was made, there were but 9 members present, of whom but 6 voted for the order, and 3 against it, such order will be a nullity, and such transcript defective as a complaint. APPEAL from the Cass Common Pleas. DAVISON, J.-Me Taggart, a contractor for the improvement of Fourth street, in the city of Logansport, obtained a precept against Lyman R. Legg, a property holder on said street, to enforce payment of an amount assessed against him, as his proportion of the cost of the improvement. Legg appealed to the Common Pleas. When such appeal is taken, the charter requires the city clerk to make out and certify a full, true and complete copy 20 315 143 171 The City of Logansport v. Legg. of all papers connected in any way with said street improvement, beginning with the order of the council, directing the work to be done, and contracted for, and including all notices, precepts, orders of council, bonds, and other papers filed in the matter, which transcript shall be in the nature of a complaint, and to which the appellant shall answer upon rule. Acts 1859, pp. 215-216, sec. 12. Upon the taking of the appeal, the clerk sent up and filed, in the Common Pleas, the required transcript. To this transcript, the same being in the nature of a complaint, Legg, the then appellant, demurred. The Court sustained the demurrer, and final judgment was rendered, &c. The city appeals to this court. Against the validity of the proceedings before the city council, it is alleged that the transcript, as a complaint, is defective, because it fails to show any proper order of the council, directing the improvement. The charter provides, section 66, that "When the owners of two-thirds of the whole line of lots bordering on any street or alley, in any city, shall petition to the common council to have the side walks graded and paved, or the whole width of the street graded and paved, or for either kind of improvement, or for a full improvement in general, the common council may cause the same to be done by contract, given to the best bidder, after advertising to receive proposals therefor." And section 68, declares that "The common council, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members thereof," may order all of the improvements contemplated in the preceding section, without the petition of the owners, &c. Acts 1857, pp. 63–64. Thus it will be seen that street improvements, such as made in this case, can not be ordered unless on petition of twothirds of the property holders, or by a concurrence of twothirds of the members of the common council. The transcript before us fails to show any petition for the improve Johns et al. v. Harrison et al. ment. Indeed, it is conceded that none was presented to the council; and the only order directing the work to be done is thus stated in the transcript: "Council Chamber, March 16, 1859. Mr. Taylor moved that a committee of 3 be appointed to receive proposals for the grading and macadamizing of Fourth street, from Broadway to North street, which motion was adopted by the following vote, viz: The yeas and nays being ordered were, yeas, Messrs. Taylor, Levien, Bryer, Mitchell, Tomlinson, and Henkee. Nays, Messrs. Coleman, Backman, and Ward; and Messrs. Taylor, Coleman, and Backman, were appointed such committee." See 19 Ind. 344. The order appears to have been voted for and passed, by two-thirds of the members then present, but the transcript very clearly shows that the city council of Logansport is composed of 10 members, and the charter, as has been seen, affirmatively requires the concurrence, to such order, of twothirds of the members. As the order in question was concurred in by only 6 members, and that number not being two-thirds of the city council, it must be deemed a nullity. Kile v. Malin, 8 Ind. 34. And the order being thus inoperative, the proceedings subsequent to it can not be maintained. Per Curiam.-The judgment is affirmed, with costs. D. D. Pratt and D. P. Baldwin, for the appellants. JOHNS et al. v. HARRISON et al. CONTRACT-PROMISSORY NOTE.-A, as principal, and B, C, D, and E, as his endorsers and sureties, were indebted by note to F, in a certain sum, which was past due. They desired further time for Johns et al. v. Harrison et al. payment. It was agreed therefore that the debt should be renewed, and new notes, by way of renewal, executed by the same parties, but without any agreement as to the time for which the renewal notes should run. A then procured blank notes, and caused them to be filled, except as to the time of maturity, and signed by himself, and endorsed by B, C, D, and E, as his sureties, and delivered in that condition to F, who thereupon, filled the blank for the time with 3 months. At the time the notes were endorsed by some of the parties, it was represented to them by A, that the renewal would be for 4 months, and they endorsed the note with that understanding, but F had no knowledge of and did not authorize such representations. The notes were not paid at maturity; F sued on them. A made default. The endorsers answered by a general denial under oath, and, on the trial, admitted that their signatures were genuine, but urged that the notes were void, because they had been altered by F, by inserting 3 months instead of 4, after they had been executed and delivered by them. Held, 1. That the general denial under oath, merely put in issue the execution of the notes, and excluded all questions of usury, want and failure of consideration, and frand, except in connection with the execution of the notes. 2. That, under the circumstances, F was, by implication, authorized by the parties to fill up the blank as to the time of payment, at his discretion. 3. That the representations of A to the endorsers could in no way effect the rights of F, who had not authorized, and had no knowledge of them, and that proof of such representations, under the issues, was irrelevant. 4. That, upon the issues, and the admissions of the endorsers, the burden of showing the invalidity of the notes rested upon them. APPEAL from the Marion Circuit Court. PERKINS, J.-This suit is founded upon a promissory note of the following tenor: |