frequent complaints of and censures upon the favoritism and family interest which had raised so young a soldier to such responsible rank, merely because he was the younger brother of the Marquis Wellesley, GovernorGeneral of India. Grey-headed commanders, who considered themselves skilled in Indian warfare, murmured and expostulated; but the brilliancy of Colonel Wellesley's success, although a justification of his appointment only from its result, overpowered all complaints and remonstrances, and made them appear uncalled for and ridiculous. It was admitted too by all except the prejudiced and interested-a powerful party now, and more powerful then-that Wellesley had great difficulties to cope with-intrigue, Asiatic guile and faithlessness, a faithlessness beyond the "punica fides,' the "punic faith" of the ancient Africans, and a frequent deficiency of food for the troops.

In November, 1805, Sir Arthur Wellesley-for he was now a Knight-Companion of the Bath-was selected to command a brigade in an expedition to Hanover, under Lord Cathcart. So high, however, was at that period the power and prestige of Napoleon Buonaparte, and so low and mean the shuffling, the fears, and the selfishness among German powers, that nothing could be done, even by Sir Arthur, to preserve the king's continental dominions from the unscrupulous grasp of the Emperor of the French and King of Italy. Sir Arthur Wellesley accordingly returned to England, in February, 1806, having been on the 30th of the previous month appointed to an infantry brigade in the Sussex district, and promoted to the colonelcy of the 33rd regiment.

From this date to July, 1807, when he was appointed to a command in the army under Lord Cathcart, in an expedition against Copenhagen, he was engaged in civil state business, having been Secretary for Ireland and M.P. for Rye. On the 29th of August, he attacked a Danish force in the town of Kioge, carrying the outworks and then the town itself, in a rapid and gallant style, and making about 1200 prisoners. Soon after, the Crown Prince of Denmark, his capital having been

bombarded, submitted to a capitulation, Sir Arthur Wellesley being one of the negotiators. He then returned to England, and resumed his official civil duties. On the 1st February, 1808, he replied, in the following terms, to the Speaker, on that dignitary conveying to him the thanks of the House of Commons for his conduct in Denmark:

Mr. Speaker, I consider myself fortunate that I was employed by his Majesty on a service which this House has considered of such importance as to have marked with its approbation the conduct of those officers and troops who have performed it. The honor which this House has conferred upon my honorable friends and myself is justly considered by the officers of the navy and army as the highest which this country can confer: it is the object of the ambition of all who are employed in his Majesty's service, and to obtain it has doubtless been the motive of many of those acts of valour and good conduct which have tended so eminently to the glory, and have advanced the prosperity and advantage, of this country. I can assure the House that I am most sensible of the great honor which they have done me, and I beg leave to take this opportunity of returning you, Sir, my thanks for the handsome terms, respecting myself, in which your kindness to me has induced you to convey the resolution of the House.

Shortly after Sir Arthur Wellesley had expressed himself thus modestly and briefly, without one allusion to his own merits, from his seat in the Imperial Parliament, he was busied with the conflicting anxieties of his chief secretaryship in Dublin. Thence he was summoned in July, to take charge of an expedition which lay at Cork. Its destination was said to be against Spanish America; but the fact appears to be, that the ministers of the day had not determined upon what expedition the accumulated force should be despatched, and they held it ready for any emergency. This was a prudent precaution, as their former expeditions had rarely been wise in plan, or happy in result.

Napoleon's multifold successes had, by this period, made him arrogant almost to insanity. Spain, degraded by the weakness and vices of her rulers, was but an

appanage of the French emperor, whose eldest brother, Joseph, was a delegate king over the Spaniards. Junot, as an imperial lieutenant, ruled at Lisbon like a bold bandit as he was, and the whole Iberian peninsula seemed rapidly becoming a French "department," when the people, roused by coarse, foreign oppression, rose with sudden spirit. King Joseph left Madrid, and Junot with difficulty maintained his power in Lisbon. At this juncture it was determined by the English Government to aid the opponents of French domination in the Peninsula, and Sir Arthur Wellesley landed, with 9000 soldiers, on the 9th August, in Mondego bay, between Lisbon and Oporto. He was soon joined by 5000 additional men; and the home authorities, as this movement advanced, determined to employ, in the same warfare, a disciplined and veteran force of 12,000 under Sir John Moore. Wellesley speedily repaired to Oporto, where he consulted with the Junta, and with the warlike bishop of the province. These gentlemen were profuse in promises. They offered a full submission to the English general's directions in the field and the camp; they only wanted guns, ammunition, clothes, shoes, and a little money; and with these appliances 10,000 ardent peasants would soon be converted into 10,000 good soldiers. It was said, not long after, in England, that General Wellesley's plain, good sense was smothered in Spanish fustian.

It was in the conduct of this war that Sir Arthur Wellesley raised the military reputation of Britain to the highest summit. Before that, continental nations regarded the English, away from their naval superiority, as good, hearty, blundering soldiers, with indifferent discipline and worse strategy; the kingdom, indeed, seemed looked upon by European potentates as most unmilitary, but largely and properly available as a sort of general paymaster to Europe. It was in his conduct of this war, moreover, that the first of English captains dearly earned the appropriateness of the title of this book: THE WISDOM OF WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington, in every situation of mili

tary command, has been his own best historian; not auto-biographically, nor yet historically, but inferentially. His collected dispatches prove to demonstration the coolness of his judgment; his earnest sagacity; his unflinching perseverance, and his ability to cause others to persevere; his repudiation of all undue interference with the proper singleness of his command; his most untiring or unflagging care to provide for every emergency; his promotion of the discipline, well-being, and efficiency of the army, British or foreign, under his command: in fine, his documents-dispatches, orders, manifestoes, proclamations, and friendly letters alike-proclaim his possession of every quality which may be said to constitute the wisdom of a chief warrior. There may be little of what is known as a chivalrous spirit in these dispatches-little of what the many have been taught to consider eloquence-but there is the best eloquence, when lives or national prosperity or security are at stake, the convincing, sound eloquence of truth. There is a hard, practical, wise, and self-reposing sense and confidence in the sentiments of these dispatches; for they are the wise and practical instructions and opinions of a wise and practical man. It may be seen, however, from some of his private, or rather his friendly letters, how the hard man softens. Compared with the much-lauded manifestoes of Napoleon, an admixture of high but often meretricious eloquence, Wellington's style is admirably superior; it is as the meaning and gravity of Milton's style, to the vague eloquence of Ossian.

The value of these dispatches, and the greatness and clearness of the intellect which prompted them, may be well illustrated to the reader by the following extract from a letter addressed to the Right Hon. John Villiers, the English envoy in Spain:

Coimbra, May 2nd, 1809.

I am obliged to you for your offer to procure me assistance to copy my dispatches; but I have plenty of that description. The fact is, that, excepting upon very important occasions, I write my dispatches without making a draft.

The dates of these documents are always given in the

same form, and there is hardly an expletive in the dispatches of many years; very rarely an "&c.," a phrase, or whatever it is to be called, most convenient to the vague and hasty writer;-but the Duke of Wellington was a hasty writer without the vagueness. He rarely used italics, and we are responsible for this mode of emphasising the wisdom, as it were, to the reader.

On the 10th August, the advanced guard of the British army reached the town of Leyria, where they found General Freire, with 5000 Portuguese, who were to be the allies of the British, but were for a long time-a word applied on the occasion, we do not know on what authority-their sponges.

The English commander's troubles soon began, as the following letter proves :

Calvario, 13th August, 1808.

I have just received your letter, and I am concerned to find that the arrangements to enable the Portuguese army to take the field, in co-operation with the British troops, have been so much neglected as to render that measure impracticable. I have one proposition to make to General Freire; that is, that he should send me his cavalry and his light infantry, and a corps of 1000 regular infantry, to be employed as I choose; and I engage to give these men their bread; and for meat, wine, and forage, they shall fare as well as our troops. If he will accept of this proposition, let the troops join me to-morrow at Alcobaça. If he does not, I beg that he will carry on such operations as he may think proper.

I shall execute the orders which I have received from my Government without the assistance of the Portuguese Government, and General Freire will have to justify himself. To Lieut.-Colonel Trant.

In the foregoing letter there is a tone of quiet determination-at which Napoleon sometimes strained, but fell into bravado, which is easier, and more self-complacent -but in this Portuguese instance, Wellesley's tone had not its legitimate effect, as the following extracts show. Viscount Castlereagh was then the home minister of state for the war department, and to him (a personal