It is precisely in this respect that the law will ever fail! It is but in vain that the law attempts declaring him honored, whom public opinion condemns, as it would but unavailingly declare him infamous, whom public opinion absolves. And still more in vain do the wise disapprove the practice, and hold it unnecessary to revenge offences which really or seemingly do injury to one's honor; nay, they were to be held, before the tribunal of the whole human family, the first accountable for the duels fought in our days, and for the evils which that practice does crowd amidst social intercourse; because they, living apart from the people, concur not in forming a public opinion, which will always arise from among men gathered together, and of which, whether it be wise or senseless, sociable beings will always feel the want. What does it avail

me, that I have the suffrages of persons whom I shall never meet, and to whom I am as much unknown as their suffrages are unable to reach me, and incapable of securing me the enjoyment of the same intercourse, which was wont to lay a soothing balsam upon the chagrins of life? What we need, I wish to repeat it, is the favorable opinion, and the esteem of those, among whom, by choice or duty, we are to live. How are the votes, which are concealed within a closet, to console us for such a loss? I beg leave to repeat it again, what the law should secure to all men, is the public estimation which every one may enjoy, the favorable vote of his acquaintances. Let not the law, and the wise require, that any one should patiently

bear insult and contempt, only because the law com

mands them to believe that insults and contempt will make life dear to them; or because wise men, carelessly looking about, say to themselves: he suffers not infamy! Finally, it is totally unavailing to proclaim public opinion erroneous; because it is individual men who have to bear the fatal consequences of its liableness to error, as long as the law places those who are apt to resent an offence, between the derision of their acquaintances and the sword of the executioner.

Again; there is no partial public opinion where the law speaks positively, and always holds the same language. The public opinion, which sanctions the practice of duelling, requires that those offences be atoned for by the means of duels, which the law shows itself unable to punish. The law will never obtain the intent, unless it provides, that the penalty should be inevitably suffered by the violators of the law, and establishes such penalties as will be in just proportion to the injury, that a man living in a state of civil society is deemed to receive by the offences, which have been considered as physical causes of duels. In the twentieth note of my essay, I have attempted to show what a great means of social happiness is honor; here I say, that the opinion expressed by those with whom one has to live, will always be respected by him, or at least feared. In how many instances would a gentleman rather submit to receive a mortal wound by a treacherous dirk, than a blow by the hand of one who deems himself offended?

If the law will inevitably punish him, who has made himself guilty of any of the offences which I have

considered as being the physical causes of duelling, and, if punishing him, it places him in the circumstances in which every violator of the laws should be placed, that is to say, in such a condition as to be deprived of the ability to repeat the same offence; he, to whom offence was done, will never wish for any other indemnificatiou; and if he should, the very condition, in which the person doing the offence has been placed, would for ever render his wish unavailing. And if the offence is adequately avenged by the law, and the person doing the offence placed in such condition as will deprive him of the choice at least to repeat the same offence, there will no longer be a partial public opinion determining the means, by which offences are to be atoned for. Because that public opinion, as I have already said, either tends to supply the law, or wishes to attain the two ends which the law shows itself unable to attain; that is, to have the offence atoned for, and the person doing the offence deprived of the ability to repeat the same offence.

Now coming to the subject of these writings, I say: that the opinion of those who pretend, that, of those who fight, or are concerned in fighting a duel, the aggressor alone ought to be punished, has been the cause of inventing a fraud, by which to invalidate the law, causing it to fail of its aim; the opinion of those who think that the law ought to punish all who are concerned in a duel, has been the cause of the impunity of the whole number.

Among those people where the law punishes the aggressor alone, both the challenger and the chal

lenged swear, and cause their assistants to swear, that he who falls dead shall be denounced as the aggressor. By the same oath they provide, that in the case of wounds without death, the quarrel shall be denounced as proceeding from sudden passion. Thus they make themselves guilty by that oath of another violation of the law, founded on the trite saying, "that any one may renounce his own title to be benefited;" wherefore the dead, and the wounded, by the means of a spontaneous oath, taken in a state of full health of both, mind and body, have renounced the indemnification offered to them by the law, and have, by the same oath, bound those, whom they consider as their executors, to cause their last will to be respected. By that oath, those who assist in fighting a duel, knowingly violate the truth in order not to perjure their own oath. So far is this from the fact, that the severity of the punishment, which the aggressor shall be caused to suffer, is in the least availing to prevent duels, that we see practised among those people where such laws are enacted, a virtue worthy of a better purpose, and a magnanimity that would honor ancient chivalry; one too often hears, that the rich duellist has placed, before the combat, at the disposal of the duellist, who is poor, means, by which he may both, escape punishment or trial, by a timely flight, and console himself for the bitterness of his exile.

They who are of the second opinion, deprive the law of the witnesses necessary for the conviction of the guilty; because of the legal axiom, "that no one is bound to accuse himself." I even doubt whether the

means resorted to by some framers of penal codes, that in order to afford the necessary witnesses to the law, he shall be exempted from punishment, who, having been present at the combat, should furnish the necessary evidence for the conviction of the combattants, will ever be the cause of any good to society. I believe that there are but few cases in which the law could grant impunity to him who discovers the crime, in the perpetration of which he assisted, and gives evidence against them, in whose previous deliberation to commit the crime he concurred? Better if there was none! It appears to me, that to reward treachery, in whomsoever it be, will never prove to be a source of real advantage to a well established society. However, as I believe, that in all probability I shall have to speak of the impunity in the course of this work, though much would not be wanting to the subject I treat, if I should not; I feel now satisfied with having expressed this doubt of mine.

It would, perhaps, be a source whereby some good may be derived to society, if I now, instead of proceeding to discourse of the laws, which might prove efficacious to prevent duels, should contrive to define, by showing what are the bad effects which the execrable practice of duelling causes to weigh upon the whole family of civilized men, if that practice is in fact to be abhorred and dreaded by all people and nations, whether duels are fought or not, within the boundaries of their own territories. All men of sense, who were seriously to reflect upon the subject, would, I believe, agree in this, that the practice of duelling is