tion.

the term flesh we are to understand the human nature of the Redeemer, and by the term Spirit, his divine nature. In Rom. 1:3, it seems difficult to adopt any other interpretation, without doing violence to the most obvious principles of construc"Concerning his Son, Jesus Christ, our Lord, who was made of the seed of David, according to the flesh, and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of Holiness, by (Winer, § 51, p. 297, source of proof and conviction) the resurrection from the dead." No one can fail to perceive here the correlation between xarà σágzαxarà пrɛvμa, demanding that the two clauses should be similarly understood. It is the same correlation which is so often effected by per and dé, (Xen. Ages. 11: 7, zov pèr owμaros εἰκόνα στήσασθαι ἀπέσχετο, τὴς δὲ ψυχῆς οὐδέποτε ἐπαύετο μνημεῖα διαπονούμενος,) as ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπὼν τῷ σώματι-παρὼν δὲ To пvεúμαιı. 1 Cor. 5: 3, and often indeed without these particles, the correlation being indicated by a repeated preposition, (Rom. 8: 1, 4, 5, 9, 11,) an adjective, participle, etc. But, if we here refer лvɛvμa áɣiwoing to the third person in the Trinity, a new meaning must be attached to xarà in the second clause, (through the operation of,) and the symmetry of the passage will thus be destroyed. It appears, then, to be necessary to regard this passage as presenting a contrast between the human and divine natures of Christ. So probably 1 Tim. 3 : 16, ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκὶ, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι. So, undoubtedly, the words of Peter should be interpreted, Having suffered death in consequence of his assumption of humanity, having been quickened (raised from the dead) in consequence of the union which the divine nature had effected between itself and this humanity. Such a sense is, we think, sustained by the passage in Romans, already examined, and by 2 Cor. 13: 4, "Though he was crucified through weakness, yet he liveth by the power of God." His crucifixion resulted from his weakness-his having become subject to the infirmities of human nature; but his resurrection to an unending life resulted from the exertion of his own divine power co-operating, as we believe, with that of the Father and the

Holy Spirit, for in no other way can the teachings of inspira tion on the resurrection of Christ be harmonized. It is evident that, with this interpretation, "the contrast" in Peter is not "lost," as the Professor imagines must be the case, if his exposition is rejected; but, on the contrary, is presented in bold relief.

On the subject of the nagovoía, or second coming of Christ, we have but a word to offer. Expressing no opinion ourselves as to the nature of that coming, we assert most unhesitatingly, that so far as the argument before us depends on the import of onroua, it is absolutely destitute of force We have shown most conclusively, that there is no "appropriation" of this, or of any other term, to the subject of spiritual vision.

But it is time to bring this protracted investigation to a close. We cannot, however, pause in our labors without an expression of deep regret, that in a work proceeding from such a source there has been so much occasion for animadver sion. We have long admired the talents of our author, and should feel ourselves enriched with but a tithe of his attainments; and yet, in the whole of his philological argument, he has scarcely taken one position which is tenable. With a slight variation we may apply to his recent works the remark of another: "He has many new things, and some true things; but his true things are not new things, and his new things are not true things." In the treatise we have been examining, instead of opening "a field of philological deduction," "which must inevitably put a new phasis on a whole class of texts," he has busied himself in the accumulation of straws, that with these he might prop up a system, pressing already too heavily upon its foundation; unconscious of the fact that the stubble thus accumulated would serve but to light the funeral pile of "The Spiritual Resurrection."

ARTICLE VI.

EXAMINATION OF PROF. HENRY P. TAPPAN'S WORKS ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.

By Rev BENJAMIN N. MARTIN, Hadley, Mass.

The Doctrine of the Will, determined by an Appeal to Consciousness. By HENRY P. TAPPAN.

The Doctrine of the Will, applied to Moral Agency and Responsibility. By HENRY P. TAPPAN.

NOTE-The present article was promised in a previous one, published in Bib. Repos. Jan. 1843. It has been, by unavoidable circumstan so long delayed, that the writer would scarcely feel at liberty now to offer it to the public, but for some indications which intervening numbers of the Repository afford, of an interest in one, at least, of its prominent topics of discussion.

The writer would avail himself of this opportunity, to correct an erroneous quotation of the language of Edwards, which occurred in his former article. (B. R. No. XVII., p. 43.) The sentence as quoted, runs thus: "Whether it has any PRODUCTIVE influence or not." The word productive has no place in the original, and was carelessly supplied from a former sentence in revision. The correction would be scarcely worth making, were it not that the marked emphasis given to the word, renders it, unfortunately, an object of particular attention.

own.

HAVING already offered our readers some observations on Prof. Tappan's views of the philosophy of Edwards, we propose to extend our examination, in the present article, to his These are presented in the two later volumes of his work, the titles of which, as above recited, sufficiently disclose their general character. We shall indicate them in the progress of our remarks, for the sake of convenience, as Vols. II. and III.

There is necessarily a wide difference in the style and character of the two treatises. The former, aiming to establish a theory of the will, deals with whatever is most recondite and abstruse; and requires an accurate analysis, an acute discrimination of the most elementary ideas of psychology. The latter, which seeks to apply the conclusions thus reached

to systems and creeds, calls for less of critical analysis, and more of logical connection: it has less to do with nice distinctions, and demands different qualities of thought and style. We e are of opinion that the latter is to be regarded as altogether the more successful portion of the work. Prof. T.'s conclusions are generally drawn with strict accuracy, conse quences are logically inferred, and both are sustained with a vigor of thought, and urged with a power of language, which gives great effect to his reasonings. His analysis, however, of elementary ideas, is scarcely sufficiently nice; and his fundamental principles and truths are assumed with too little caution and tact. In maintaining, as he does, the entire freedom of the will, we fully coincide with him; as well as in many of the principles with which this doctrine is connected; as for instance, that the mind is the cause of its own acts, and that it causes voluntary acts with full power to the contrary. His general classification, too, of the mental faculties into intellect, sensitivity, and will, and the entire separation of the last two faculties, (which is a cardinal point in the system,) meet our entire approbation; and we rejoice in the wide currency which these views are likely to obtain through the medium of his work. But the psychological theories which our author connects with these great truths, and on which some of the most important conclusions are made to rest, we are constrained to regard as unsubstantial, and even fanciful. The elementary discussions of the work, wear, in one respect, an unfavorable aspect. The positions chosen seem to have been assumed rather for their convenience, than for their strength. The author occupies the ground he does, not because there is plainly no standing elsewhere, but because he can contend to better advantage there than elsewhere, for the support of some favorite views. Deeply impressed with the importance of the doctrine of man's liberty of will, he places it on a most ample, but scarcely a very firm foundation. He frames a theory of the largest liberty, and seeks for elementary distinctions which will sustain it. The primary conceptions of things from which he reasons, seem to have been

adopted, not on account of their absolute and necessary truth, but because they furnish ground for a broad theory of liberty to rest upon. This, at least, is the aspect which the author's philosophy wears to our view. We shall afford our readers some opportunity to judge of its correctness, in a somewhat detailed examination of the principles of the system.

We took occasion, in a former article, to exhibit Prof. T.'s general use of the fundamental terms of his discussion; and particularly to speak of his frequent identification of the idea of cause, with that of causality or power. The subsequent portions of his work are, we regret to say, chargeable with this defect to a still more unfortunate degree. In the former volume, this use of terms is found principally in the application of them—in those oft-recurring forms of speech which a writer is under the necessity of using on almost every page, and which, from the frequency of their occurrence, cannot be carefully weighed. In the latter, especially the second, it is not only in the application, but in the definition of terms that the defect manifests itself; in those controlling statements which require the most careful and accurate expression. In support of our remark, we refer our readers to p. 60 of vol. II. They will find there a brief chapter entitled " Definition of the Will," which commences thus: "Will is employed to express the causality of the mind." . . . "To this usage I mean to confine it in the following investigation." causality denotes something which belongs to a cause, a quality or property of a cause; and this language implies, beyond dispute, that the will is not a cause, but only some quality or property of one. But on p. 294, in the formal announcement of the result of a lengthened discussion on motives, this language occurs: "The important conclusion at which we arrive is this will is cause, and there is no cause but will." In this very chapter, the former definition of the will as causality is again and again repeated; and yet, the matured language of this important conclusion affirms, with numerous other passages of the book, that the will is not causality, but cause.

Now

The former of these seems the more deliberate and care