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Bitters v. The Board of Commissioners of Fulton County.

in its title, and that is all that is required by article 4, section 19, of the constitution."

The act does not embrace two subjects. It makes provision for the performance of certain duties by public officers, and prescribes the compensation which shall be paid to officers or others rendering service to the public, in connection with public matters and official duties. Whatever is connected with official duty, and is the subject of compensation from the public treasury, is within the act, and forms part of one general subject. The act makes it the duty of the county commissioners to provide for the publication of the delinquent list, and fixes the compensation to be paid the publisher. The matter is directly connected with official duties, and the fact that the services are rendered in a matter connected with the collection of taxes, does not separate it from the general subject of services rendered the public. Services and compensation together constitute no more than parts of one general subject. Official services and duties naturally and reasonably belong to, and are included within, the same subject; they are not distinct and different subjects. It is proper to place in one act provisions for services to public officers in public matters directly connected with the duties of the offices, and limitations upon the compensation which the officers shall pay for such services. It was proper to embody in the act under examination provisions for official duties and for services to officers in the collection of the public revenues. No provision of the constitution is invaded by gathering such provisions together in one general act.

A subject may be composed of many parts. It does not follow that because the title of a statute enumerates many particulars, there are, therefore, many subjects. If there is but one subject, the act is valid, although that subject may be composed of many parts, and all of them be enumerated in the title. The rule which should here apply is that declared in Shoemaker v. Smith, 37 Ind. 122, where it was said of a title enumerating many things: “If the different particulars enu

Burk v. The State.

merated are to be regarded as so many different subjects, then
the law is wholly void because of a multiplicity of subjects.
If, on the other hand, the enumerated particulars do not em-
brace different subjects, but have reference to one general sub-
ject, which is not sufficiently expressed in the title, the law is
still void. If, however, the enumerated particulars are not
expressive of different subjects, but of one general subject,
which is sufficiently indicated or expressed, the law is valid.”

Judgment reversed.
WOODS, J., dissents.

81 128 125 415 81 128 147 162

No. 10,123.

BURK v. THE STATE.

CRIMINAL LAW.-Perjury.Sufficiency of Indictment. -Under the criminal

code, section 1747, R. S. 1881, it is only necessary, in an indictment for perjury, to set forth the substance of the controversy or the matter in respect to which the crime was com

ommitted, and in what court or before whom the oath alleged to be false was taken, and that the court or person before whom it was taken had authority to administer it, with the proper averments to falsify the matter whereof the perjury is assigned, without setting forth any part of the record or proceeding, or the commission or authority of the court or other authority before

which the perjury was committed. SAME.- Materiality of Testimony.—It must appear, though it need not be

alleged in express terms, in an indictment for perjury, that the testimony given, and alleged to be false, was touching a matter material to

the point in question. SAME.- Pleading.- Former Acquittal.Jeopardy. -A plea of former acquittal

is sufficient, if it shows that the defendant had been indicted, tried and acquitted, in a court of competent jurisdiction, for the same felony charged in the indictment in the pending case; for the fundamental law forbids, that a person charged with crime be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence.

From the Montgomery Circuit Court.

M. D. White, G. W. Paul and J. E. Humphries, for appellant.

Burk . The State.

D. P. Baldwin, Attorney General, J. II. Burford, Prosecuting Attorney, and J. Thompson, for the State.

HOWK, J.-On the 16th day of December, 1881, an indictment was duly found and returned into the court below, charging the appellant, Nelson Burk, with the crime of perjury. At the February term, 1882, of the court, the appellant appeared in person and by counsel, and moved the court in writing to quash the indictment, which motion was overruled, and the appellant's exception was duly saved to this ruling. The appellant then filed a written plea in bar of the further prosecution of said indictment; and to this plea the State, by its attorneys, demurred, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defence to the indictment, or to bar this prosecution. This demurrer was sustained by the court, and to this ruling appellant excepted. Upon arraignment on the indictment the appellant refused to plead thereto; and thereupon a plea of “not guilty” was entered by the court, and to such action of the court the appellant excepted.

The issues joined were tried by a jury, and a verdict was returned finding the appellant guilty, as charged in the indictment, and assessing his punishment at confinement in the State's prison for two years, and a fine in the sum of fifty dollars, and disfranchisement and incapacity to hold any office of trust or profit for two years. Over the appellant's motion for a new trial, and his exception saved, the court rendered judgment on the verdict.

In this court the appellant has assigned as errors the following decisions of the circuit court:

1. In overruling his motion to quash the indictment;

2. In sustaining the State's demurrer to his special plea in bar; and,

3. In overruling his motion for a new trial.

1. The indictment charged, in substance, that the appellant, “Nelson Burk, on the 27th day of October, 1881, at and

VOL. 81.-9

a

Burk v. The State.

in the county of Montgomery, and State of Indiana, before one William Armstrong, a duly elected, qualified and acting justice of the peace, in and for Franklin township, in the county of Montgomery, and State of Indiana, then and there sitting as a court, a certain issue between one Andrew J. McMaken and one John Miller, in a certain suit and complaint for one hundred and eighty dollars, for money had and received of said Andrew J. McMaken by the said John Miller, wherein the said Andrew J. McMaken was plaintiff and the said John Miller was defendant, came on to be heard and tried in due form of law; the said justice of the peace then and there sitting as a court, and having then and there competent authority in that behalf, and the said issue was being tried then and there by a jury of the county, duly sworn and taken between the parties aforesaid, upon which said trial one Nelson Burk then and there appeared as a witness for and in behalf of said plaintiff Andrew J. MeMaken, and was then and there duly sworn as such witness by the said William Armstrong, as such justice of the peace, then and there having full power and competent authority to administer the said oath to the said Nelson Burk, as such witness in that behalf; that upon the trial of said cause and issue joined between the said parties aforesaid, it then and there became and was material to the said issue and point then and there in question, whether the said plaintiff in said cause, the said Andrew J. Me Maken, did, on the 13th day of August, 1881, at the city of Crawfordsville, in the county of Montgomery, and State of Indiana, purchase of the said defendant in said cause, John Miller, the cattle mentioned in the complaint of said Andrew J. McMaken against John Miller, in said cause, and pay said John Miller on the purchase price thereof a sum of money; and the said witness Nelson Burk, then and there on the trial of said cause, and on the trial of said issue, upon his oath aforesaid, unlawfully, feloniously, wilfully, corruptly and falsely before the justice, the court and jury aforesaid, did depose and swear, in substance, and to the effect following, that is to

Burk v. The State.

say: that said Andrew J. McMaken, plaintiff in said cause, did, in his presence, on the 13th day of August, 1881, at the city of Crawfordsville, Indiana, buy said cattle of and from the said John Miller, and then and there paid to the said Miller a sum of money upon the purchase price of said cattle, and that the said Andrew J. McMaken did, on the 13th day of August, 1881, between the hours of two o'clock P. M. and five o'clock P. M., of said day, near the alley between the Joel clothing store and Gregg's hardware store, in the city of Crawfordsville, Indiana, pay the said John Miller a sum of money for said cattle. Whereas, in truth and in fact, the said Andrew J. McMaken did not buy said cattle of and from the said John Miller on the 13th day of August, 1881, or at any other time, and pay a part of the purchase price on said cattle in the city of Crawfordsville, or any other place; and whereas, in truth and in fact, the said Andrew J. McMaken did not on the 13th day of August, 1881, between the hours of two and five o'clock P. M., of said day, at the city of Crawfordsville, Indiana, or any other place, pay the said John Miller a sum of money on the price of said cattle, all of which was well known to the said Nelson Burk at the time he so testified. Wherefore the said grand jury, on their oath aforesaid, do charge and present that the said Nelson Burk, in manner and form as aforesaid, did then and there feloniously, wilfully, corruptly and falsely commit wilful and corrupt perjury, contrary to the form of the statute,” etc.

It will be seen that the indictment charged that the alleged offence was committed by the appellant on the 27th day of October, 1881. At that time the act of April 14th, 1881, concerning public offences and their punishment, had taken effect, and was in force. In section 101 of said act (section 2006, R. S. 1881), it is provided as follows: “Whoever, having taken a lawful oath or affirmation in any matter in which, by law, an oath or affirmation may be required, shall, upon such oath or affirmation, swear or affirm wilfully, corruptly, and falsely touching a matter material to the point in ques

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