So also Mr. Mansel speaks of being forced by the 'constitution of our minds to believe in the existence of an 'Absolute and Infinite Being, a belief which appears to be 'forced upon us as the complement of our consciousness ' of the relative and finite '; referring to which Mr. Spencer remarks: 'He clearly says by implication that this consciousness is positive, and not negative.' But Mr. Mansel does not distinguish between extension and contradiction. The 'infinite' is an extension or increase of the 'finite.' The 'unrelated' is a negation of the 'related,' just as nothing' is a negation of something,' and our consciousness of the unrelated' is therefore no more positive than our consciousness of 'nothing.' If, then, the First Cause is not, and cannot be unrelated,' it is not, as Mr. Spencer says, 'absolutely inscrutable.' We cannot, indeed, grasp the idea of an infinite being, any more than we can grasp the idea of infinite space; but to say that we can know absolutely nothing of the former, would be as clearly false as to say we can know nothing of space. For, as every cause is known by its effects, and can be known by them only, so the First Cause may be known by its effects, in precisely the same way as we attain a knowledge of everything else. APPENDIX B. RELATIVE KNOWLEDGE AND THE EVIDENCE OF DESIGN IN CREATION. MR. SPENCER has argued that our knowledge consists in referring facts which come under our observation to other facts of a like nature, and that when we have recognised their similarity we say that we know all about them.' But this hardly expresses the case correctly. The mere recognition of the similarity of a fact to other facts is not real knowledge, nor does it produce the sense of knowledge. On the contrary, it may fill us with perplexity, as when some peculiar symptoms of illness attack a person, and are recognised as exactly the same as those which have attacked others. Our question under such circumstances is, What is the cause? If, however, we ascertain that these effects are due to a certain food, or liquid, possessing certain properties, which have a uniform action on living organisms, and which can be eliminated or neutralized by a certain process, then indeed we feel we know all about it'; because we have ascertained the law which produces the effects, and know the powers and limitations of that law, and can not only avoid its effects ourselves, but can predicate its effect under a variety of other circumstances. Instead of being the slaves of the law, the law has become our obedient servant. So with all knowledge. It is a knowledge of laws, enabling those who have it to use them for their own advantage, and to avoid dangers which the ignorant cannot. Knowledge is thus power, and constitutes the difference between the highest civilization and the most complete barbarism. On the other hand, it is true, as Mr. Spencer has shown, that all our knowledge is relative-that is to say, we only know things in their relation to ourselves, by the effects which they produce on our consciousness, but that, in its essence, everything is utterly inscrutable.'* Thus we recognise the properties of matter, and distinguish between one object and another by the impressions on our consciousness, through the medium of our senses, of weight, hardness, toughness, elasticity, shape, size, heat, cold, etc.; and by a similar observation of their effects, we distinguish between one form of force and another. So also we distinguish between different forms of life, and between different minds or intelligences, by the same means. For, even in the latter case, our knowledge of a person's mind is solely due to the words and actions of that person, by the observation of which we learn the characteristics of his mind. But what matter, or force, or life, or mind are in their essence we do not know. Nevertheless, we have a real knowledge of these things if we know the laws or principles which govern them, and by which we can predicate their action and effects under a variety of circumstances. Nor does it matter to us in the slightest degree that we do not know the essence of mind, if by habitual intercourse with a person, and observation of his actions, we so thoroughly know the laws or principles of his mind that we can confidently predict what he will do under any particular set of circumstances. Our knowledge of him is relative, * First Principles': Ultimate Scientific Ideas. i.e., the effect which his actions have produced, or will produce, on our consciousness, but it is none the less real. In like manner we may know ourselves. Mr. Spencer,; arguing from the fundamental condition of all consciousness, viz., the antithesis of subject and object, says: The mental act in which self is known implies, ' like every other act, a perceiving subject and a perceived 'object. If, then, the object perceived is self, what is the subject that perceives? or if it is the true self which 'thinks, what other self can it be that is thought of? Clearly a true cognition of self implies a state in which 'the knowing and the known are one, in which subject and object are identified; and this Mr. Mansel rightly 'holds to be the annihilation of both.'* 6 It is clear, however, that we do not perceive our own minds in their essence, any more than we perceive the minds of other persons. We perceive our own bodies, just as we perceive other bodies, by the effects which they themselves, or their actions, produce on our consciousness through our senses. So also we only perceive the acts of our own minds-i.e., our thoughts—which, like outward acts, also make more or less permanent impressions on our consciousness, which we call 'memory'; and the cause of our thoughts, which the constitution of our minds obliges us to recognise, being within us, we call our minds, or ourselves.' Thus all knowledge, even of ourselves, is relative, but it is not the less real on that account. In like manner we may have a relative, and yet a real, knowledge of the First Cause, although unable to know Him in His essence. * First Principles,' p. 65. ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND DESIGN. Those who have argued that the First Cause must be a 'mind' are charged with 'anthropomorphism,' i.e., with supposing that God is like man in this respect, as if it was a mere ignorant presumption on their part; and a colour is given to this charge of ignorance and presumption, by associating the conclusion with the anthropomorphism of paganism, which supposed that the gods had passions, and even sexual desires, like men. 'To think,' says Mr. Spencer, of the creative power as in 'all respects anthropomorphous is now considered im'pious by men who yet hold themselves bound to think of it as in some respects anthropomorphous, and so do 'not see that the one is but an evanescent form of the * other.' This is incorrect. The gods of paganism, as Stanley Faber, Hislop, and others have incontestably proved, were originally deified men, to whom it was therefore natural to attribute the passions of men. But the conclusion which regards the Creative Power as a mind of infinite wisdom is one of pure inductive reasoning. Can the agnostic advance' any argument to prove that the First Cause is not a mind of infinite wisdom? Clearly not, save that He is absolute,' and therefore unknowable, which is false. All that he can truly predicate of Him is that He is 'infinite,' and if there is such a thing as 'infinite wisdom,' then, most certainly, it can be the attribute of none other but He who is infinite. Will the agnostic deny that the First Cause has infinite power? Then, as already shown, 'infinite wisdom' is the necessary complement of that infinite power. But the conclusion does not depend merely, or even principally, on these abstract principles. 6 |