depression which ensued, a gleam of hope and consolation came to him from the conviction that it was better to follow righteousness, than not to do so. Righteousness was still to him something absolute and eternal in its essence, on which his soul could rest.

So likewise there are many in this country who, although they have ceased to believe in the authority of Christ as God, are yet forced by their conscience to assent to the intrinsic truth of a portion, at least, of His precepts. They recognise them as truth, not because of His authority, but because of their own essential truth.

On the other hand, how different is the result on those whose consciences have been darkened and perverted by sophistry and false religion! It was foretold by Christ that the time would come when those who killed His followers would think they were doing God service; and perhaps many who have assisted in the burning of socalled 'heretics' have done so in supposed obedience to the dictates of conscience. But what has been the result amongst the thousands on the Continent whose belief in religion, as it had been presented to them, has been overthrown? Has the false morality and superstition of their religion any further hold on them? On the contrary, it is entirely repudiated, and their true conscience, freed from the incubus of error, has endorsed their decision, and led many to follow a truer morality.

So also throughout the history of this dispensation, and also before it, the conscience of individuals here and there has, at all times, protested against the too often immoral morality of the popular religion, showing that there is in man a faculty which, in spite of authority, pronounces authoritatively on moral right and wrong.

It is on this point that Dean Mansel seems to have been mistaken,* as indeed has been ably shown by Bampton Lectures.

*

Professor Goldwin Smith.* Arguing from certain metaphysical definitions of God as the Infinite' and 'the Absolute,' Dean Mansel arrives at the same conclusion as Mr. Herbert Spencer-viz., that God is unknowable by man, not merely with regard to His power, wisdom, and the nature of His being, but also with regard to the nature of His righteousness, and therefore that man cannot pronounce on the righteousness and morality of God as set forth in revelation, but must accept it as righteousness and morality on the authority of that revelation alone.t

But such a conclusion ignores the teaching of the very Scriptures which Dean Mansel would defend and exalt. For they constantly appeal to the conscience, rather than to the reason of man; and Christ condemned those upon whom the intrinsic force of the truth had no effect, and who insisted on sensible proof. Because I tell you the truth,' He said to the Jew, 'ye believe not.' 'He that is of God heareth God's words; ye therefore hear them not because ye are not of God.' 'Except ye see signs and wonders ye will not believe.' The moral evidence and intrinsic force of moral truth, which appeals to the conscience, had no effect on them, because their consciences were hardened; and, failing that, no amount of sensible evidence, however striking (which is generally capable of being explained away if a person wishes to do so), would have had any effect on them. If they believe not Moses and the prophets' (in whom they professed to believe), neither will they believe though one rose from the dead.' The remark of Christ, If I do not the works of the Father, believe Me not'-i.e., 'If I do not the works which are in keeping with the righteousness and goodness of God '—was a direct appeal to the tribunal of

* Rational Religion and Rationalistic Objections.'

+ See Appendix A, where the question is more fully considered.

His hearers' conscience, and to their perception of right and wrong.

Those attributes of God, which are in their nature. infinite, are necessarily beyond human conception, and can only be expressed by a negation, or as something which is not finite or conceivable; but righteousness is in its nature positive, and actions having a moral character must either be righteous, or unrighteous. Thus, to claim an inconceivable justice for an act, all the circumstances connected with which are known, and which is opposed to the justice approved by the highest human conscience, is a contradiction in terms. It is not justice, but injustice.* Again, the term infinite love' is often used without consideration of its meaning. If love was really infinite, or unlimited, it would be immoral and unmeaning; for, as applied to God, it would imply that the love which He bore to all beings, whether they were angels of holiness, or devils and monsters of irredeemable wickedness, was practically the same. But this indifference would be contrary to the very idea of love, which implies a hatred of evil, and would be condemned by human conscience as unrighteous and immoral. Therefore, although we may speak of perfect righteousness, perfect justice, and perfect love, the word 'infinite' as applied to them is without meaning; and its use would also imply that the righteousness of God' in the person of Jesus Christ was imperfect, because manifested to finite beings.

Equally incorrect is the term 'absolute' as applied to

* Men are often inclined to question the justice and righteousness of God's dealings, both in history and in their own individual experience, when a fuller knowledge of all the circumstances would have led them to justify Him; and if the general evidence is to show that the Lord is righteous in all His ways and holy in all His works,' it is only wisdom to believe that a fuller knowledge will prove that seeming exceptions are not real exceptions to this. See Appendix D.

6

righteousness. 'Absolute' is a term used to express the ' unrelated,' but to assert that the righteousness of God is absolute,' and therefore 'unrelated,' is merely a metaphysical confusion of ideas. The acts of God in the material universe are neither righteous nor unrighteous, for righteousness has no meaning save with regard to acts having a relation to conscious beings, to whom those acts are either good or evil. To say, then, that God's acts with regard to them must be righteous whether they are so or not, or that an Absolute Being cannot do wrong because He is absolute, is to make the term 'righteous' without meaning. God cannot do wrong, not because He is absolute,' but because He is perfectly righteous.

In addition to man's capacity for recognising righteousness as right, and wickedness as wrong, there is also an innate sense of confidence and security, that is, of good, -produced by following the one, and an innate sense of fear and misgiving, or of evil, which is consequent on doing the other; and these consequences are apart, and distinct from all considerations of religion and of the fear of man.

That Adam's conscience should have troubled him when he had sinned is easy to understand. He had disobeyed the command of his Creator, and he was immediately conscious that he had become separated from Him, and had lost that love and protection, and consequent sense of peace and safety, which he had formerly enjoyed. He felt morally naked and unprotected, and was afraid, and hid himself. But the same effects are constantly seen to follow in the case of those who give little thought to God, or who are wholly ignorant of Him and of religion. For there are men of this description who, having committed a secret crime of which they have no fear of discovery, are yet so haunted by remorse of

conscience that they have been known to voluntarily confess their crime to the world, and court the punishment due to it, in the hope of getting peace of mind.

Are there not also men who, although they have rejected revealed religion as without authority, are yet honest, just, and generous? Will it be pretended, or will they pretend, that if they commit some evil deed unknown to man, and which they know need never be discovered, that they will be free from all sense of misgiving and unrest? Will not the memory of that evil deed trouble them just in proportion to their natural justice and generosity of character?

Even in the case of many who have a knowledge of God, and a belief in the forgiveness of sin and the mercy of God, although they have honestly repented, yet the same indefinite anxiety often follows a great sin although unknown to the world, or perhaps condoned by it. Believe as they may in the forgiveness of God, yet their anxiety and distress of mind cannot be overcome at

once.

It is evident that men with undeadened moral perceptions are keenly alive to questions of righteousness and wickedness, recognising and approving the one as right, and condemning the other as wrong, and that they are attracted by righteousness in others, and are indignant against tyranny, cruelty, treachery, ingratitude, etc. If so, then it necessarily follows that these characteristics must excite similar feelings when manifested by themselves; and thus self-approval will follow when they do right, and self-condemnation when they do wrong. What is this but conscience, as defined by the Apostle, 'bearing witness, their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another'? (Rom. ii. 14, 15). But why should this self-approval or self-condemnation carry with it pleasure or pain, the one producing a sense of calm and happiness, the other an indefinite fear and mis