of which belonged to him, he was engaged in the business of maintaining buildings and subject to the Illinois Compensation Act.52 The casual engagement of a carpenter by the hour to put shelves in a store does not make the proprietor engaged in structural carpentry.53

A farmer employing help temporarily to make repairs on his dairy barn was not engaged in a hazardous employment enumerated in the New York Act as "structural carpentry," "roofing," and "construction and repair of buildings," as he was not engaged in that business for pecuniary gain.54

The superintendent of an apartment building, who was injured while standing on a stepladder planing away a part of a door, which work was a part of his duties, was not engaged in hazardous employment or structural carpentry, or construction, repair, and demolition of buildings.55

The operation of a school building is not extra hazardous under the Illinois Act.50

§ 57. Butcher Shop. The child labor law, the woman's ten hour law and city ordinance requiring butcher shops to take out licenses is not such legislation or regulation as would bring a retail grocery store and butcher shop, within the employment enumerated as hazardous by reason of section 3, cl. 8, of the Illinois Act, applying the act to persons engaged in enterprises in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations, are inposed for the protection of employees.57

§ 58. Cannery.-An employee of a canning factory, injured while gathering beans on land cultivated by the factory, was held to be within the New York Act.58

52. Storrs v. Indus. Comm., III. 121 N. E. 267, 3 W. C. L. J. 238; Johnson v. Choate, 284 Ill. 214, 119 N. E. 972, 2 W. C. L. J. 458.

53. Geller v. Republic Novelty Works, 180 App. Div. 762, 168 N. Y. Supp. 263.

54. Coleman v. Bartholomew, 175 App. Div. 122, 161 N. Y. Supp. 560. 55. Schmidt v. Berger, 221 N. Y. 26, 116 N. E. 382.

§ 59. Carpenter Shop. An employer conducting a department store, a nonhazardous occupation, who had a carpenter shop upon one floor and employed carpenters regularly to work about the store, was conducting a hazardous occupation as far as the carpenters were concerned.60

A carpenter engaged in repairing cars was engaged in a hazardous undertaking.61

§ 60. Carriers-Carriages.-Common Carriers, by land are engaged in hazardous occupations so as to bring them within the provisions of the Illinois act of 1913.62

A teamster hauling crushed stone for a teaming company which is engaged by another company to haul the stone for paving work, is employed in the occupation of carriage by land.63 One engaged in pushing a handcart was not engaged as a carrier by land, within the meaning of the act."

64

The driver of a milk wagon is not engaged in "carriage by land," so as to bring him within the act; his duties not bringing him in connection with any extrahazardous feature of his employer's business.65

The operation of vehicles to carry any person to funerals and burials conducted by an undertaker does not bring the business within the extrahazardous occupation of "carriage by land." 66

§ 61. Hauling Incidental to Employers Business.-The hauling of commodities as a mere incident to the business of the

60. Alterman v. A. I. Mann & Son, Supp. 584.

61.

705.

62.

C. A.

Meyers v. La. Ry. & Nav. Co., La. -, 74 So. 256, A. 1 W. C. L. J.

Chicago Rys. Co., v. Indus. Bd. 276 Ill. 112, 114 N. E. 534, 16 N.C. 670.

63. Parker-Washington Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 498, 113 N. E. 976, 14 N. C. C. A. 1079.

64. Holtz v. Greenhut & Co., 175 App. Div. 878, 162 N. Y. S. 359, 16 N. C. C. A. 671.

65. Bowman Dairy Co. v. Industrial Comm., 292 Ill. 284.

66. Hochspeier v. Industrial Board, 278 Ill. 523, 116, N. E. 121.

W. C.-17

employer does not constitute the employer a carrier by land, within the meaning of the Illinois act."7

So, where a corporation was engaged in supplying water to the inhabitants of a city, the hauling of water to customers in parts of the city not reached by the pipe lines, was a mere incident of its business, and did not constitute it a carrier by land.68

An employer conducting a retail coal business who hires teamsters to make deliveries to his customers, was not a carrier by land. "The hauling and delivery of the coal were mere incidents of that business. Defendant in error was not hauling and delivering coal for anyone but himself, and was therefore not engaged in the business or enterprise of carriage by land as such dealer in coal. In such business he was neither a common carrier of persons or property nor a private carrier for hire. He was simply conducting his own business of a retail coal dealer, and the delivery of the coal or hauling of the same was not the business of the defendant in error, but a mere incident of it, as was also the hauling of the hay or feed or any other product that was necessary or convenient in the prosecution of his business." 69

"Carriage by land,' under subdivision 3 of paragraph (B), in the strict, literal meaning of the term might require that it include the hauling of grain by team and wagon from the farm to the elevator. Surely that was not within the legislative intention." 70

The Illinois Act as it now exists includes "the distribution of any commodity by horse-drawn or motor driven vehicle where the employer employs more than three employees in the enterprise or business, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8" of section 3.71

Fruit v.

67. Mattoon Water Co. v. Industrial Comm., 291 Ill. 487; Industrial Board, 248, Ill. 154; Hochspeier v. Industrial Board, 278 Ill. 523. 68. Mattoon Water Co., v. Industrial Comm., 291 Ill. 487. 69. Fruit v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 154, 119 N. E. 931, 16 N. C. C. A. 686.

70. Uphoff v. Industrial Board, 271 III. 312, 318, 111 N. E. 128, L. R. A. 1916 E, 329, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 1.

71. Hurd's Rev. St. Ill., 1919, ch. 48, sec. 3...

§ 62. Loading and Unloading.-"The words 'loading and unloading,' in common use and understanding, apply as well to passengers as to freight and to street railways as well as to steam railways. Loading and unloading passengers on street railways is connected with the carriage of such passengers, and we have no doubt from the language of the act, persons engaged in such employment were intended to be embraced within its provisions.""2

§ 63. Charitable Institution.-A Charitable institution does. not come within the Massachusetts Act.73

§ 64. Chauffeur Repairing Family Car.-One injured in repairing a family car of an employer engaged in a hazardous occupation was held not to be engaged in work incidental to the hazardous occupation and not within the act.74

§ 65. Coal Business. Prior to the amendment of 1916, conducting a coal yard was not a hazardous occupation."

In November of 1916 coal yards were not listed as hazardous occupation in the New York Act, and one injured while unloading coal from a car to a wagon by coal falling upon him, could not bring himself within the act by claiming to be operating a wagon, when he was especially employed to shovel coal off the car and had nothing to do with the operation of the wagon.76

One engaged in the retail coal business, is not engaged in an extrahazardous occupation bringing him within the act. Nor does it come within the classification of carriers by land, which of itself would make it an extra-hazardous employment. The hauling and delivery of coal was a mere incident of the employer's business. He was not engaged in the calling of common carrier

72. Chicago Rys Co. v. Industrial Board, 114 N. E. 534, 76 III. 112. 73. Zoulalian v. New England Sanitoriu:n, 7 Benevolent Ass'n, Mass. -, 119 N. E. 686, 2 W. C. L. J. 267.

74. Wincheski v. Morris, 179 N. Y. App. Div. 600, 166 N. Y. S. 873, 16 N. C. C. A. 681; Kender v. Reineking, - N. Y. App. Div. (1920), 126 N.

E. 713, 5 W. C. L. J. 870.

75. Casterline v. Gillen, 182 App. Div. 105, 169 N. Y. S. 345, 16 N. C. C. A. 646.

76. In re Hassan, App. Div.

172, N. Y. S. 430, 3 W. C. L. J. 181.

of persons or property nor a private carrier for hire, but was merely conducting his own private business.77

§ 66. Collector.-A collector for an employer engaged in the manufacture of malt was, while in the performance of his duties as collector, shot and killed in a saloon away from the plant, the shooting being intentional and for the purpose of securing money which the deceased had collected. Affirming an award the court said: "Under subdivision 4 of section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, as amended by chapter 622 of the Laws of 1916, Spang at the time of his death was within the protection of the act. That amendment was intended to include an employee in the service of an employer carrying on a hazardous employment, even though such employee is not actually engaged in a hazardous employment.' Dose v. Moehle Lithographic

*

*

Co., 221 N. Y. 401, 117, N. E. 616, 16 N. C. C. A. 633.

And by the plain language of the statute it is immaterial whether the shooting of Spang occurred at the plant of the employer 'or in the course of his employment away from the plant.' He was clearly 'in the course of his employment' at the time of his injury." 78

§ 67. Commission Business.-A commission business, conducting no warehouse in connection with its establishment other than its own store-room where it held its goods for sale and distribution, is not a hazardous occupation.79

A wholesale produce commission merchant employing four or 'more men at his place of business comes within the act.so

§ 68. Construction. The term "construction," with reference to a building, means the putting together of the materials

77. Fruit v. Indus. Ba, 24 I11. 154, 119 N. E. 931; 16 N. C. C. A. 68. 78. Spang v. Broadway Brwg. & Malting Co., 182 App. Div. 473, 169 N. Y. 574; 16 N. C. C. A. 637.

79. State v. J. P. Powels & Co., Inc. 94 Wash. 416, 162 Pac. 569, 16 N. C. C. A. 690; Mihm v. Hussey, N. Y. App. Div.

11 N. C. C. A. 328.

80. State Indus. Comm. v. Voorhees,

S. 888, 7 W. C. L. J. 238,

155 N. Y. S. 860.

App. Div. -, (1920), 184 N. Y.