used therein.81 The word "construct" is synonymous with "erect” as "construction" is with "erection."' 82

"The words 'erection' and 'construction' seem to be synonymous in their meaning, and in common acceptance when applied to a house, they mean the building of it by putting together the necessary material and raising it." 83

86

It may include work of enlargement,84 and extension.85 The word may include maintenance and repair or alteration,* or it may not,87 depending upon the manner in which it is used. The phrase "the immediate doing of the work of construction," in a policy of insurance relating to telephone construction work, was held to include the work of trimming a tree while putting up a line.88

§ 69. Dairy.--A dairy company engaged in distributing milk is not engaged in carriage by land within the meaning of the act so as to bring it within the enterprises enumerated as extrahazardous when it would not otherwise be within this class.89

A superintendent of a dairy company's wholesale routes was injured when alighting from a street car, while enroute to reach a place where he was to give a new employee instructions in regard to his route. It was held that he was not at the time of

81. Scharff v. Southern Illinois Const. Co., 115 Mo. App. 157, 92 S. W. 126. 82.

State ex rel. City of Chillicothe v. Gordon, 233, Mo. 383, 135, S. W. 929; Butz v. Murch Bros. Const. Co., 199 Mo. 279, 97 S. W. 895; McNair v. Ostrander, 1 Wash. 110.

83. Burke v. Brown, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 298.

84. People v. Farmer's etc., Co., 52 Colo., 626, 123 Pac. 645.

85. Graymount v. Stott, 160 Ala. 570, 49 So. 683; State ex rel. v. Miller, 21 Okl. 448, 96 Pac. 747.

86. Bell County v. Lightfoot, 104 Tex, 346, 138 S. W. 381.

87. Com. v. Hayden, 211 Mass. 296, 97 N. E., 783; State ex rel. v. Wilder, 200 Mo. 97, 98 S. W. 465; The O. H. Wessels, 177 Fed. 589, affd, 183 Fed. 561, 106 C. C. A. 107; Hancock's Appeal, 115 Pa. 1.

88. Camden Atlantic Tel. Co. v. United States Casualty Co., 227 Pa. 242, 75 Atl. 1077.

89. Bishop v. Bowman Dairy Co., 198 Ill. App. Div. 312, 16 N. C. C. A. 667.

the injury engaged in a hazardous employment or operating a wagon within the meaning of the New York Act.90

§ 70. Decorating. An employee was injured while hanging a picture which his employer had sold. This work was merely incidental to his regular employment and would not, therefore, come within the designated class of hazardous employments of "decorating" or "picture hanging." 91

§ 71. Dredging.-Employees of a corporation engaged in dredging upon navigable waters, who are employed solely upon land are within the Washington Act.92

§ 72. Driver. An employee injured when putting away his horse at the end of a day's work of driving his truck in the usual course of a hazardous employment was held to be within the act."

93

A driver who was killed while driving a delivery wagon for a partnership engaged in selling gasoline, was sufficiently connected with the extrahazardous employment of the employer to entitle his widow to compensation under the Illinois act.94

Where the driver of a motorbus was killed by falling therefrom, the death occurred while the deceased was engaged in the operation of an engine, and other forms of machinery which is hazardous within the meaning of the statute.95

construction com

A teamster engaged in hauling rock for a pany is within the act. The court said: "The enterprise cannot be considered a mere incident to the general business in which plaintiff in error was engaged. It was the business or enterprise itself. * * # If it was only the hauling of one load of crushed.

90.

Balk v. Queen City Dairy Co., App. Div.

172 N. Y. S. 471, 3 W. C. L. J. 177; Glatzl v. Stumpp, 220 N. Y. 71, 114 N. E. 1053. 91. Grassell v. Broadhead, 175 App. Div. 874, 162 N. Y. S. 42, 16 N. C. C. A. 684.

-

92. Puget Sound Bridge and Dredging Company . Indus. Ins. Comm. (1919) 177 Pac. 788, 3 W. C. L. J. 544.

Wash.

93. Smith v. Price, App. Div.

712.

- 153 N. Y. S. 221, 9 N. C. C. A.

94. Gibson v. Indus. Bd., 276 Ill. 73, 114 N. E. 515, 16 N. C. C. A. 637. 95. Haddad v. Commercial Motor Truck Co.,, (1920) -La-, 84 So. 197, 6 W. C. L. J. 54.

stone by a farmer or business man who was not engaged in construction or contracting work generally, undoubtedly then the proper conclusion would be to hold the hauling of such single load a mere incident to the main business.''96

The Supreme court of Illinois in holding that a teamster was within the provisions of the act where the main business was hazardous, said: "Here the duties of the deceased required him to work in and around the plant where the ice was manufactured, and included the loading of ice, and the care of the horses in a large stable on the premises of plaintiff in error immediately adjacent to the main ice plant. We cannot see how it can fairly be held that the employment in which the deceased was engaged was not a part of plaintiff in error's business or occupation of manufacturing and selling ice ***. The men in the buiding of plaintiff in error where the machinery was located and the ice manufactured were certainly within the act. The workmen around the building and caring for the property were within the act. Those whose duties took them to the plant to take away the product were within the act, and we can reach no other conclusion than that the duties of the deceased were of such a nature, so related to and connected with the occupation of plaintiff in error, under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, shall be held liable for the injury.'97

One driving a wagon, for an employer, with his own team for delivering to customers of the company, cannot recover for injuries sustained in falling from the wagon. The court said: "Plaintiff in error contends that defendant in error comes within the terms of the Compensation Act because it was maintaining a structure within the meaning of the act, and because it was engaged in carriage by land, and because it was engaged in a business in which statutory and municipal ordinance regu lations were imposed. We held in Hochspeier v. Industrial

96.

Parker Washington Co. v. Indus. Bd., 274 Ill. 498, 113 N. E. 976, 14 N. C. C. A. 1097.

97.

Suburban Ice Co. v. Indus. Bd., 274 Ill. 630, 113 N. E. 979, 14 N. C. C. A. 1080.

of

Board, 278 Ill. 523, 116 N. E. 121, L. R. A. 1918 F, 227 and in Fruit v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 154, 119 N. E. 913, that the hauling of commodities as a mere incident to the business of the employer does not constitute the employer a carrier by land within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation act. We think our holding in those cases is decisive of the question here presented. The business or enterprise in which defendant in error was engaged and in which plaintiff in error was employed when he was injured was that of supplying water to the inhabitants of the city of Mattoon. The hauling and delivery of this water are mere incidents of that business. The fact that the defendant in error was maintaining a structure and, that it had machinery at its plant is not controlling here. Plaintiff in error was not at the time of his injury engaged in any part the business of defendant in error that had to do with the maintenance or operation of the plant or pipe lines. Defendant in error had not elected to come under the act, and the injury sustained by plaintiff in error is not one arising out of or in the course of any employment declared by the act to be extrahazardous. Because some other employees of defendant in error may have been engaged in some other part of the work that was extrahazardous would not change the character of employment of plaintiff in error or bring him within the provisions of the act. This question was discussed at length and the conclusion reached in Vaughn's Seed Store v. Simonini, 275 Ill. 477, 114 N. E. 163, Ann. Cas. 1918B. 713, 288 Ill, 163, 124 N. E. 297. The record does not show that defendant in error is engaged in a business in which statutory or municipal regulations are imposed. Even if it was engaged in such business in the conduct and management of its water works plant, the injury did not arise out of or in the course of the employment of plaintiff in error in that business. In order to bring the employer under the act without election, it is necessary to show that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment in which such regulations are imposed. Compton v. Industrial Com., 288 Ill. 41, 122 N. E. 872.'' 98

98. Matton Clear Water Co. v. Indus. Comm., Ill. (1920), 126 N. E. 168, 5 W. C. L. J. 671.

Under the Washington act the operation of a truck is not a hazardous occupation.99

§ 73. Drug Store. The conducting of a drug store is not a hazardous occupation.1

§ 74. Elevators.-The operation of ordinary freight and passengers elevators is not considered hazardous employment."

Prior to the amendment of the New York act, an employee in an apartment house who was injured while bringing an elevator from the basement to the main floor was denied compensation.3 Repairing the doors of an elevator is incidental to its opera

tion."

§ 75. Engineering-Lifting Radiator.-An employee engaged as a general plumber and carpenter about an apartment house, who was injured when endeavoring to obtain a radiator from a storeroom for the purpose of installing it was held not to be engaged in a hazardous employment. The court in construing the New York act said: "Group 42 of section 2, as it existed in January, 1916 (Cons. Laws, c. 67; Laws 1914, c. 41) specified 'plumbing, sanitary or heating engineering, installation and covering of pipes or boilers.' The lifting of a radiator to connect it up for heating purposes was not heating engineering nor the installation and covering of pipes or boilers. That such work was not included within these terms is evident for the amendment

99. Collins v. Terminal Transfer Co., 91 Wash. 463, 157 Pac. 1092; Guerrieri v. Indus. Ins. Comm., 84 Wash. 266, 146 Pac. 608, 8 N. C. C. A. 440.

1. Freess v. Kleinau, App. Div. —, (1919), 179 N. Y. Supp. 347, 5 W. C. L. J. 430.

146 Pac. 608, 8 N. C. (1921), 196 Pac. 871. 633, 112 N. E. 568,

2. Guenieri v. Indus. Ins. Comm., 84 Wash. 266, C. A. 440; Page v. New York Realty Co., Mont. 3. Sheridan v. P. J. Groll Const. Co., 218 N. Y. Revg. 171 App. Div. 958, 155 N. Y. S. 859, 16 N. C. C. A. 669; Wilson v. C. Dorflinger & Sons, 218 N. Y. 84, 112 N. E. 567, 16 N. C. C. A. 670. 4. Carey v. Frambo Realty Co., 183 App. Div. 910.