in an elevator and its appurtenances, is a public warehouseman.2 It is also held in Illinois, however, that a building in which a meat corporation stores its products pending their sale and distribution to local dealers is a "warehouse or general or terminal storehouse," within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, although no goods are stored for the public for hire.3 "Nor can it be limited so as to apply only to a building where the public can send their goods to be stored for them, as in the case of the large furniture repositories. The word is applicable to a building used by the owner for the storage of his own goods, though it has no connection of any sort with water transit. While it may be difficult to define 'warehouse,' I am of the opinion that, as used in the Act of 1897, it involves the idea of a place normally of considerable size, mainly used for the storage of goods in bulk or in large quanitities, and in which consequently the dangers incident to the handling of goods in bulk or in large quantities might naturally arise.” "I think that, upon the admitted facts as stated to us, there was clearly a prima facie case that these premises were a warehouse. The premises were used for the purpose of breaking up old iron for sale. Very large quanities of old iron were kept stored in large covered sheds upon the premises." 5 A warehouse used by a corporation for the storing and vending of its commodities which contains an electric elevator and is located in a city which regulates by ordinance the use and operation of elevators, is an extra-hazardous enterprise, within the Illinois Act of 1913. Under the Warehouse Act of Oregon, a warehouse is a place where any of the commodities enumerated in the Act are received on storage for the owner by some one engaged in the general business of receiving such goods in store for profit or compensation.” 2. National Bank v. Langan, 28 Ill. App. 401. 3. Armour & Co. v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 328, 114 N. E. 173. 6. Armour & Co. v. Industrial Board, 197 Ill. App. 363. 7. State v. Stockman, 30 Oreg. 36, 46 Pac. 851. It has been held that a general storage and warehouse business is not so extra-hazardous in character as to warrent the Industrial Commission of Washington to declare it to be within the Compensation Act as amended by the Washington Laws of 1919, c. 131.9 A retail furniture company which maintained a warehouse for the storage of its furniture, from which distribution was made to its customers was engaged in a hazardous occupation and was automatically brought within the provisions of the act in the absence of any affirmative action on its part to reject the act, therefore a truck driver engaged in delivering from the warehouse at the time of a collision between his truck and a street car came under the protection of the act." Where the operation of a warehouse in connection with docks and wharves was essentially dangerous, it was held to be hazard ous employment.10 § 133. Window Cleaning. While washing windows is not specifically enumerated as one of the hazardous employments, it does come within the enumerated class of "building, maintaining, repairing or demolishing of any structure, which the legislature has seen fit to classify as extrahazardous. 7711 In holding that a window washer who was injured in the course of his employment was entitled to compensation under the New York act the court said: "The commission properly disregarded the objection and made the award. It was held in the case of Matter of Mulford v. Pettit & Sons, 220 N. Y. 540, 116 N. E. 540, 116 N. E. 344 (1917), as to an accidental injury happening in July, 1915, that an employee while engaged in a hazardous employment which was incidental to the nonhazardous business of his employer was entitled to com 8. State v. Eyres Storage & Distributing Co.,-Wash.-, 198 Pac. 390, (1921). 9. Friebel v. Chicago Ry. Co., 280 I11. 76, 117 N. E. 467. 13 N. C. C. A. 390. 10. Obrien v. Indus. Ins. Dept.,-Wash., 171 Pac. 1018, 2 W. C. L. J. 171; 16 N. C. C. A. 663. 11. Chicago Cleaning Co., v. Indus. Bd. 283 Ill. 177, 118 N. E. 989, 16 N. C. C. A. 683. pensation. By the amendment of subdivision 4 of section 3 of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law chapter 622 of of th Laws of 1916, the doubt which had existed previously to the Mulford decision, as to the proper contruction of the subdivision, under facts similar to those presented by the case at bar, was removed, the amendment providing 'employee' means a person engaged in one of the occupations enumerated in section two. ''12 Removing a shade for the purpose of washing the window, is incidental to cleaning the window, under the New York Act. § 134. Determination of Question.-Where the commission declared that conducting a warehouse was an extrahazardous occupation the court in review, assuming for the sake of argument that the commission had such powers, said: "If there be or arise any such plainly hazardous occupation as to bring it under the act, we apprehend that it would come under the act regardless of whether the commission so determined or not. In other words it would be the fact of the existence of such extrahazardous occupation, and not determination of such facts by the commission that would bring it under the act.14 In discussing the questions of who is entitled to the benefit of the New Hampshire Act the court said: "The test to determine whether an employee is entitled to the benefit of the act is to inquire whether: (1) He was engaged in manual or mechanical labor: (2) any part of his work was done in proximity to hoisting apparatus or power driven-machinery (Morin v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 78 N. H. 567, 103 Atl. 312; and (3) whether five or more persons in manual or mechanical labor were employed in and about the mill, etc., in which he worked.' 7715 12. Zubradt v. Shepherds Estate, 180 N. Y. App. Div. 20, 167 Supp. 306, 16 N. C. C. A. 644. 13. Tracy v. Mertens, 2 N. Y. Bul. 102, 12 S. D. R. 562. 14. State v. J. B. Powles & Co., 94 Wash. 416, 162 Pac. 569. 16 N. C. C. A. 665. (1919) 108 Atl. 810, 5 W. C. L. J. Co., 77 N. H. 209, 90 Atl. 859, L. R. A. 1916 15, Regnier v. Rand, N. H. 559; Boody v. K. & C. Mfg. A. 10. Where the employer and the employee agreed that both parties were working under the compensation act, and the only question before the commission was whether the accident arose out of and in the course of employment, the court held that by entering into the agreement the question of jurisdiction was waived and the question whether the employment was hazardous could not be raised on appeal.16 Where the employer's business falls within the enumerated class of hazardous occupations, and an employee is injured, it will be presumed, in the absence of a showing by the employer that the employee was not engaged in a hazardous occupation, that the employee was so engaged.17 16. Chicago Packing Co. v. Indus. Bd.., 282 Ill. 497, 118 N. E. 727, 16 N. C. C. A. 696. 17. McQueeny v. Sutphen & Myer, 167 N. Y. App. Div. 528. 11 N. C. C. A. 326. Kohler v. Frohmann, 167 N. Y. App. Div. 533, 11 N. C. C. A. 326; Larsen v. Paine Drug Co., N. Y. App. Div. 155 N. Y. S. 759, 11 N. C. C. A. 327. |