196.

Headaches From Eye Injury And Other Causes. 197. Heart Disease.

a. Cases in which Compensation was awarded. b. Cases in which Compensation was denied. Hemorrhage.

Hemorrhoids.

198.

199.

200.

Hernia.

218. Mental Shock Or Fright And Nervous Trouble.

219. Mitral Regurgitation.

250.

Suicide.

Sun Stroke And Heat Stroke.

Sympathetic Affection Of One Eye By Injury To The Other.

§ 135. Definitions. "The word 'accident' as used in this act shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.” Missouri Act Section 7, (b).

The court in a Wisconsin case said: "The term 'accident' as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act is susceptible of being given such scope that one would hardly venture to define its boundaries. Courts have indulged in very general statements in regard to it but have not worked out any very definite guide. "1

The above set out definition from the Missouri Act as applied to an industrial accident resulting in personal injury will avoid much of the controversy that has heretofore arisen under the acts of other states over the construction and application of this term. This definition is copied from the Nebraska Act.2

The payment of compensation to the disabled employee is predicated under most compensation acts upon an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment and directly resulted in the disabling injury. In those states where the terms is not defined in the act itself it is used in the popular sense1 and the

1. Bystrem Bros. v. Jacobson, 162 Wis. 180, 155 N. W. 919. 2. Wk. Comp. Act (Laws 1913, c. 198) §52b) Johansen v. Union Stockyards Co., 99 Neb. 328, 156 N. W. 511. See also 1 Corpus Juris 396.

3. In the following states the word "injury" alone is used instead of "accidental injury" or "injury by accident:" California, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming and the Federal Act.

4. Boody v. K and C, Mfg. Co., 77 N. H. 208, 90 Atl. 859, L. R. A. 1916 A. 10, 29, 227; Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 154 N. W. 640 L. R. A. 1916 A. 273, 10 N. C. C. A. 729; Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 Atl. 458, 3 N. C. C. A. 585; Mutual Acc. Ass'n v. Barry 131 U. S. 100, 121, 33 L. Ed. 60, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, 762; Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Wks 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485, L. R. A. 1916A 283; Walker v. Lilleshall Coal Co., (1900), 1 Q. B. 488; Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co., 191 Mich. 122, 157 N. W. 437; Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 169 App. Div. 177, 154 N. Y. Supp 620; Clayton & Co., v. Hughes (1910) A. C. 242, 26 T. L R. 359; Fenton v. Thorley & Co. (1903) 5 W. C. C. 6; Indian Creek Coal etc., Co. v. Calvert (Ind. App.) 119 N. E. 519, 2 W. C. L. J.

following definition from Webster has usually been adopted by the Courts: "An event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event; chance contingency." This definition has been repeatedly quoted by the courts, added to and embellished, but its numerous variations are immaterial. It is in its application that courts and commissions have differed most widely and frequently gone astray. The above definition from the act, setting out clearly and concisely the necessary elements of the term, will very materially serve to keep its application within the intent and spirit of the act.

As previously stated the acts of most states use the words "injury by accident or accidental injuries" or phraseology to the effect that the injury must be of an accidental nature or origin, otherwise it is not covered by the act. The Missouri Act, Section 3 reads, "personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.” Where the word injury is used alone it has generally been held to cover a broader scope than where the element of accident must accompany the injury in order that it may be compensable. As for example in the case of lead poisoning which in Massachusetts is held to be an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment but it is not accidental. In other words "injury"

230; Haskell etc., Car. Co. v. Brown, 64 Ind. App. —, 117 N. E. 555, 1 W. C. L. J. 48; Hollenbach v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W. 152, 2 W. C. L. J. 493; Lane v. Horn etc., Baking Co., (Pa.) 104 Atl. 615, W, C, L. J. 922; Southwestern Insurance Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 768, 158 Pac. 762.

Ill.

5. Walther v. American Paper Co., 89 N. J. L. J. 732, 98 Atl. 264; Seel Sales Corp, v. Indus. Comm,, -, (1920), 127 N. E. 698, 6 W. C. L. J. 303.

6. Johnson v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., Ltd, 217 Mass. 388, 104 N. E. 735; In re Madden, 111 N. E. 379, 222 Mass. 487; In re Mooradjian, 118 N. E. 951, 1 W. C. L. J. 812; In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N. E. 336, 4 N. C. C. A. 527, L. RĮ A. (1916) A. 279; In re E. L. Hill Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L., p. 204; In re. J. B. Irving Op. Sol. Dep., C. & L., 211; In re William Murray Op. Sol. Dep., C. & L., p. 201; In re Willard E. Jule, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L., 261; Contra, see Adams v. Acme White

where used alone includes all accidents but the word "accident" does not include all injuries. The two terms are not synonymous.7

In the Massachusetts case above the court said: "Under the act 'personal injury' is not limited to injuries caused by external violence, physical force, or as a result of accident in the sense in which that word is commonly used and understood, but under the statute is to be given a much broader and more liberal meaning, and includes any bodily injury."

This question does not arise in Missouri and many other states because of the following language of Section (7) b. of the Missouri Act; provisions substantially similar to which are found expressed or implied in many other acts: "The terms 'injury' and 'personal injuries' shall mean only violence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom. The said terms shall in no case be construed to include occupational disease in any form, or any contagious or infectious disease contracted during the course of employment, or death due to natural causes but occuring while the workman is at work.'

The discussion of "accident," "injury by accident," "accidental injury" and "injury" or "personal injury," will of necessity overlap somewhat the discussion of the phrase "arising out of and in the course of the employment," which, in most Workmen's Compensation Acts, immediately follows the other term. But since the words "injury" and "accident" as used in Workmen's Compensation laws and decisions have a meaning independent of the above phrase, it is thought best to treat them separately.

In determining whether disability is due to a personal injury by accident within the meaning of the Missouri Act and other acts containing substantially the same provisions, the following elements must be considered. It is immaterial that it was due to

Lead & Color Works, 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485, 6 N. C. C. A. 482; Miller v. American Steel etc. Co., 90 Conn 349, 97 Atl. 345, See, also, Matthiessen, etc., Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 378, 120 N. E. 249, 2 W. C. L. J. 876; Coates v City of Elisnore, 3 Cal. L. A. Com. 269.

7. Cooke v. Holland Furnace Co., 200 Mich. 192, 166 N. W. 1013, 1 W. C. L. J. 994, 17 N. C. C. A. 153.

8. It does not follow the word accident in the acts of Michigan, Texas, Wyoming, West Virginia and Wisconsin.

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