§ 143. Artery Rupture. Deceased was always regarded as a strong healthy man and worked regularly, except occasionally when he indulged in liquor to excess. While pushing a mine car up grade he complained of his side, and died three hours thereafter of a rupture of the aorta. A diseased condition existed at the place of rupture as shown by its unnatural thinness. It was held to be a personal injury by accident, as it hastened to a fatal termination an ailment; and this even under the rule requiring that a definite occurrence must be indentified in order that a certain injury may be said to be accidental.84 A laborer became ill while at work and died the same day. An autopsy disclosed a rupture of the aortic artery. Compensation was claimed on the theory that the aneurism was caused or aggravated by an injury which the deceased had sustained five days previous. It was held that the claimant did not prove this, and that indications were that the aneurism was due to disease rather than injury.85 In connection with this case it must be remembered that the word "accident" is not used in the Massachusetts Act. A quarry laborer using a sixteen pound sledge suffered a pulmonary hemorrhage from which he died before medical aid could reach him. "The evidence warranted a finding that the physical structure of the man gave way under the stress of his usual labor. He certainly did not intend to kill himself by breaking rock and loading cars at a price per car. He did not know or in any event was inattentive to the limited power of his blood vessels to resist blood pressure aggravated by vigorous muscular effort, out of this ignorance or miscalculation of forces came misadventure, and the term accident applies to what happened to him.' 9786 Where an employee died in the course of his employment from a rupture of the aorta, caused by "an extra effort in vomiting," 84. Indian Creek Coal & Mining Co. v. Calvert, (Ind. App.) 119 N. E. 519 (1918), 2 W. C. L. J. 230; Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. v. Owens, Tex. Civ. App. 198 S. W. 662, 1 W. C. L. J. 271. 85. In re Knight, 231 Mass. 142, 120 N. E. 395 (1918). 86. Gilliland et al., v. Ash Grove Lime & P. C. Co., 104 Kan. 771, 180 Pac. 793, 4 W. C. L. J. 187. brought on by conditions arising in the employment, a claimant, irrespective of anterior causes, or pre-existing condition, was entitled to compensation, as the rupture itself occurring from such effort would constitute accidental "violence to the physical structure of the body.''87 An employee while working in a lumber yard moved quickly in order to avoid being struck by a fall, and in doing so made a suḍden backward movement of his head which caused him considerable pain. The following day paralysis resulted, and he died later. An autopsy revealed that the death was due to glioma or brain tumor which is not of accidental origin. Therefore the contention that death was due to a rupture of a cerebral blood vessel was overruled.88 "In the instant case all the characteristics of an accident were present. The occurrence was sudden, unexpected, and undesigned by the workman. The circumstances were clearly such that the commission was justified in finding that the hemorrhage was due to blood pressure intensified by vigorous muscular exertion. Relating the hemorrhage to physical exertion, rupture of the aorta by force from within was as distinctly traumatic as if the canal had been severed by violent application of a sharp instrument from without. There was no direct evidence of extraordinary exertion suddenly displayed. When last observed before the hemorrhage, the deceased was working in the manner habitual to his employment. The fact remains however, that an extraordinary and unforeseen thing suddenly and unpremeditatedly occurred, and the presence of all essential attributes of accident cannot be gainsaid. There was ample evidence in the record to justify the finding of the Industrial Commission that the deceased came to his death by accident, and the circuit court therefore properly confirmed the award. Peoria Terminal Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 352, 116 N. E. 651; Western Electric Co. v. Industrial Com., 87. Clark v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 264 Pa. 529, 107 Atl. 858, 4 W. C. L. J. 747. 88. Babo v. Blinn Lumber Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. (1914) 45,7 N. C. C. A. 651; Barnabas v. Bersham Colliery Co., 103 L. T. 513, 55 Sol. J. 63, 4 B W. C. C. 119, 7 N. C. C. A. 652. 285 Ill. 279, 120 N. E. 774. In Schroetke v. Jackson-Church Co., 193 Mich. 616, 160 N. W. 383, L. R. A. 1917D, 64. "'89 § 144. Arterio-Sclerosis. It was held that where the evidence as to whether an employee's disability arose out of an injury he had sustained was conflicting, but there was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of the district court that it did; the finding was not disturbed on appeal, although there was testimony by two physicians that the employee's condition was the result of progressive arterio-sclerosis.90 "Either the alleged heat prostration caused the cerebral hemorrhage or it was the result of hardening of the arteries, and may have been superinduced by the heat prostration, we cannot say that either of said propositions has been established by a preponderance of the evidence. If an inference favorable to the applicant can only be arrived at by guess, the applicant fails.''91 Compensation was denied on the ground that the workman's death may have been due to arterio-sclerosis existing prior to the injury. But where an accident aggravated a pre-existing condition of multiple sclerosis compensation was allowed.93 92 While the evidence showed that the employee at the time and for two years prior to the accident had been suffering from arterio-sclerosis, it was held that the strain upon the arteries caused by over exertion and excessive heat resulted in the rupture of a blood vessel in the brain, causing paralysis.94 Where a workman suffered from vertigo after an accident, it was held to be due to a pre-existing condition of arterio-sclerosis, and not to the accident.95 89. E. Baggot Co. v. Indus Comm., —Ill. 125 N. E. 254, 5 W. C. L. J. 202. 90. Manning v. Pomerene, 101 Neb. 127, 162 N. W. 492. 91. Stinnette v. Gillispie Co, Second Rep. Ky. Leading Dec. p. 5. 92. Tucillo v. Ward Baking Co., 180 App. Div. 302, 167 N. Y. Supp. 666, 15 N. C. C. A. 638. 93. Blackburn v. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co., Kan. (1920), 193 Pac. 351, 7 W. C. L. J. 58. 94. La Veck v. Park Davis & Co., 190 Mich. 604, 157 N. W. 72, L. R. A. 1916 D. 1277. 95. Carter v. Llewellyn Iron Wks., 2 Cal. I. A. C. D. 971. Where it does not appear that a cerebral hemorrhage is due to an unusual strain or effort in the course of the employment but rather to pre-existing arterio-sclerosis, compensation will be denied.96 Compensation was awarded where an accident was followed by arterio-sclerosis and other disabling conditions.97 Where one physician testified that dilation of the heart and arterio-sclerosis was caused by the accident, and the expert appointed by the commission was unable to state whether it was or not, compensation was awarded.es § 145. Artificial Limb Broken.-The breaking of an artificial limb is not an accident within the meaning of the compensation act.99 The repair of an artificial limb which was furnished to the employee, by the commission, is a valid claim under the Federal Act. The California Act was amended in 1921 to include artificial members § 3 [4]. § 146. Artificial Teeth Broken. It has been held that the breaking of artificial teeth firmly attached to natural roots is a personal injury.2 3 § 147. Artificial Eye Broken.-The breaking of an artificial eye is not a compensable accident, neither is the breaking of an eyeglass, as a result of a fall, a personal injury.* § 148. Asphyxiation.-Claimant's decedent was discovered in an unconscious condition near a stopcock from which gas was 96. In re Mrs. Alfred Haries, Vol. 1, No. 7, Bul Ohio I. C. 101. Rouda & Spick v. Heenan, 3 Cal. I. A. C. D. 36. 97. 98. Welch v. C. F. Weber & Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 693; Risedorph Bottling Co., 175 App. Div. 224, 161 N. Y. Supp. 535. 99. Re Eulogio Rodriguez Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L., p. 189. Fowler v. 2. 1. In re Alonzo N. Babcock, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 234. Robinson v. Glendale Hardware Co., 3 Cal. I. A. C. 376. 3. 4. In re Christian W. Honold 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 232. escaping. It was his duty to open the stopcock daily. In affirming an award in claimant's favor the court said: "If the owner of an automobile was found unconscious in his closed garage, with the engine to his car running, would not one familiar with like situations at once say he had been overcome by inhaling the exhaust from the engine? The inferences to be drawn from the circumstances in the instant case are of like kind to that drawn in the suppositious case, though perhaps differing in degree.'' Where a workman was found dead from asphyxiation in a room with doors locked and gas cock open, it was held not to have been proved that the death was due to an accident that arose out of the employment." Where two employees were found dead from asphyxiation in a wine tank, the commission found that the evidence was insufficient to establish wilful misconduct in the violation of a rule and awarded compensation." Death by asphyxiation while working in a mine is an accident within the meaning of the compensation act.8 § 149. Assaults.-The accidental shooting of a salesman, who had accompanied a local dealer on an auto trip, by a posse, who had mistaken the occupants for auto thieves was held to be an accidental injury arising out of the employment. The court said: "The finding that the injury to Wold was accidental must be sustained, for there is no evidence that any of the shooters intended to hit the occupants of the car. At most they purposed to puncture the tires so as to recover the car or apprehend the supposed criminals in charge of it." 5. Holnagle v. Lansing Fuel & Gas Co., 200 Mich. 132, 166 N. W. 843. 6. Gray v. Sopwith Aviation Co., 119 L. T. R. 194. 7. United States F. & G. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. of Cal. 163 Pac. 1013, 15 N. C. C A. 150; Coady v. Igo, 91 Conn. 54, 98 Atl. 328, 15 N. C. C. A. 457. 8. Larr v. Hecla Coal & Coke C., Pa.- (1920), 109 Atl. 224, 5 W. C. L. J. 904. 9 Wold v. Chevrolet Motor Co., Minn.- (1920), 179 N. W 219, 6 W. C. L. J. 699. |