A cerebral hemorrhage which is not the result of an accidental injury does not entitle an employee to compensation."7 Cerebral hemorrhage not occasioned or contributed to in any way by unusual effort or strain or traumatism is not an injury, within the meaning of the Ohio Act.68 Where a mine employee inhaled carbon dioxide gas commonly known amony miners as black damp, as a result of which he sustained a cerebral hemorrhage, which caused his death, it was held to be a personal injury by accident." Where an employee died of cerebral hemorrhage brought on by over exertion from chasing thieves, who were attempting to steal the employer's property, his death was held to have been caused by an injury, and compensation was awarded.70 Where a workman fell and struck his head, and was rendered unconscious for half an hour, but was not incapacitated thereafter, but three weeks thereafter suffered a stroke of paralysis and died of cerebral hemorrhage, it was held that the death was not proximately caused by the fall." Where an employee was found on the floor frothing at the mouth, and next day died of blood clot on the brain, the court found that the award, founded upon said facts alone, was based on guess work and conjecture, and should therefore be reversed.72 § 164. Cerebral Oedema.-It was held that cerebral oedema and delirium tremens, causing the death of the driver of an automobile 67. Birnie v. Contractor's Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 2 Mass. I. A. Bd., 619; In re John W. Powell, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 116; In re Wm. Walker, 3rd. A. R. U. S. C. C. 115 68. In re Beck Vol. 4, Ind. C. of Ohio 107. 69. Giacobbia v. Kerens-Donnewald Coal Co., Ill. I. Bd. 10 N. C. C. A. 261; Kelly v. Auchenlea Coal Co., 4 B. W. C. C. 417; In re Ellis Vol. 4, Ind. C. of Ohio 150. 70. In re Ellen Fair, Vol. 1, No. 7, Bul. Ohio I. C. 83. 71. McAdoo v. Cudahy Packing Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 500, see also ap oplexy. 72. Hansen v. Turner Const. Co., 224 N. Y. 331, 120 N. E. 693, 17 N. C. C. A. 787. truck, was the natural result of a fractured wrist and lacerations of the face and scalp suffered while cranking the engine." 73 § 165. Colds.-Colds resulting from ordinary exposure are "not due to an injury sustained while in the performance of duty" within the meaning of the Federal Act and therefore not compensable.74 § 166. Concussion of Brain.-Where a traveling salesman, after getting off a ferry boat, fell as a result of dizziness, striking his head and causing concussion of the brain compensation was denied on the ground that there was no evidence tending to connect the cause of the fall with a risk incidental to or arising out of the work being performed." Where a workman was found lying at the bottom of a stair, which he used in doing his work, and was unconscious and suffering from concussion of the brain, the court held that: "All that is known is consistent with the natural view to take, namely, that the workman fell from the stair, there is thus a prima facie case for compensation. "76 Where an employee, through an accidental injury, suffered a concussion of the brain, but recovered sufficiently to work for a week, when he fell dead, compensation was awarded on medical testimony to the effect that the death was caused by the injury." A similar decision was rendered in a case where the employee died about eight months after suffering a concussion of the brain in an accidental fall, and had apparently recovered from its effects.78 § 167. Death, Presumption From, While at Work.-"It is said Hollenbach's death did not result from electric shock because the 73. Bridgeman v. McLoughlin, 7 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 425. 76. Fagan v, Jack Bros., 31 Sheriff Ct. R. (Sc.) 332. 77. Deem v. Kalamazoo Paper Co., 189 Mich. 655, 155 N. W. 584. 78. Milwaukee Coke & Gas Co., v. Industrial Commission, 160 Wis. 247, 151 N. W. 245. voltage (114) was not sufficient to produce death. Defendent was a strong, able-bodied man in the full enjoyment of his faculties at the time the current struck him. The voltage may have been less than is usually found to produce death. The wire burned into his flesh. The current was so powerful that the other workmen could not take hold of his body long enough to remove him from the wire. He died under the current. In such cases the presumption is that the accident was the cause of death, and this presumption will prevail unless overcome by evidence."79 Where the evidence showed that the deceased workman had for 21 years been in perfect physical condition, it is the reasonable. presumption that his sudden death while at work was due to external efficient agency.8 80 Where an elevator operator was found dead in the bottom of the shaft, and the elevator was found stopped between floors, the court held that, in view of the presumption against suicide and in favor of accident, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the award.1 Where a sailor, recovering from a drinking bout, disappeared from a deck having a railing about it 311⁄2 feet high, the court held that in spite of the presumption against suicide, it was unable under the circumstances to infer that the death of the deceased was due to an accident. 82 Where an employee was killed when he entered a transformer room in violation of rules, the court held that the burden was on the administrator to prove that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment.83 The same rule was followed where a hotel porter, who was supposed to be off duty, was found dead in an elevator.8+ 79. Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W. 152, .2 W. C. L. J. 492, 16 N. C. C. A. 879. 80. Bloomington etc., R. Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 III. 454, 114 N. E. 939. 81. Wishcaless v. Hammond Standish & Co., 201 Mich. 192, 166 N W. 933, 17 N. C. C. A. 793. 82. Rourke v. Holt & Co., W. C. & Ins. Rep. 7, 51 Ir. L. T. 121. 83. Northern Ill. L. & T. Co. v. Industrial Board, 279, Ill. 565, 117 N. E. 95, 15.N. C. C. A. 159; Grant v. Fleming Bros Co., Ia.—, 176 N. W. 640, 5 W. C. L. J. 688. 84. Savoy Hotel Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 329, 116 N. E. 712, 15 N. C. C. A. 233. Where death results from injury, the dependents are entitled to recover although death may not have been the natural or probable consequence of the particular injury 85 "The board could reasonably infer from the facts proved by direct or circumstantial evidence that the employee fell from the frost covered and unguarded trestle to the ground thirty-six feet below, and thereby sustained fatal injuries. We cannot say that such a conclusion is based upon mere surmise or speculation; it is supported by logical reasoning from established facts."'86 Where a workman was found dead on a cement floor at the bottom of some stairs, a wooden beam having been placed about 4 feet above the stairs the same day, the court, in affirming an award of compensation, said: "Circumstances shown may justify inferences which bring liability within the realm of probability, rather than leaving it a matter of conjecture merely." 1187 Where a night watchman was found dead at the bottom of a well under a stairway, it held that an award of compensation was justified by the evidence.88 On August 15, 1916, the husband of the petitioner was a farm hand, whose particular employment on that day was to make a trip to Philadelphia with a truck wagon drawn by a team of mules. He left the farm between 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon, and at 2 o'clock the next morning was found dead, sitting on the seat of the truck with his body crushed between the seat and the overhanging roof of a shed, under which the mules were standing. From the circumstantial details in evidence, the judge of the pleas determined that the decedent's death was caused by an accident, and that such accident arose out of and in the course of his employment.89 85. Dunham v. Clare, 66 L. T. 751, 4 W. C. C. 102. 86. In re Uzzio, 228 Mass. 331, 117 N. E. 349, 15 N. C. C. A. 235, 1 W. C. L. J. 80; Davis v. Boston Elev. Ry. 222 Mass. 475, 111 N. E. 174. Proof may be by circumstantial evidence. Peoria Ry. Terminal Co. v. Indus. Bd. 279 Ill. 352, 116 N. E. 651,15 N. C.. C. A. 632. 87. DeMann v. Hydraulic Engineering Co., 192 Mich. 594, 159 N. W. 380, 15 N. C. C. A. 236. 88. Fogarty v. National Biscuit Co., 221 N. Y. 20, 116 N. E. 346. 89. Dixon v. Andrews, 92 N. J. L. 512, 103 Atl. 410, 2 W. C. L. J. 105. Where a workman was found dead beside his work on a low platform, from which he had fallen, the autopsy showing mitral regurgitation, the court, in denying compensation said: "It cannot be assumed that the man made a misstep and then again assumed that such misstep caused fright, and then again assumed that the fright caused the heart to stop. This would not only be basing an assumption upon an assumption, but would be taking one into the realms of conjecture. 9790 Evidence that an employee, in previous good health, dropped dead at the moment of contact with an electric wire or socket while he was working on a wet cement floor, sustains a finding that he died an accidental, and not a natural death."1 Where a workman, who previously had been in good health, suffered a slight injury to the eye, which gradually became worse until he lost the sight of the eye, and then gradually grew worse, exhibited neurotic symptoms and died six months after the accident, it was held that there was evidence to support the finding that the accident was the proximate cause of the death."2 If death ensues it is immaterial whether that was the reasonable and likely consequences of the injury or not; the only question is whether in fact death resulted from the injury.93 The Workmen's Compensation Act does not required demonstration as to the cause of death, but only that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."4 "The dependents were not required to present such proof as would entirely exclude the possibility that the decedent's death was due in part to a diseased condition of the heart."'95 90. Guthrie v. Detroit Shipbuilding Co., 200 Mich. 385, 167 N. W. 37, 1 W. C. L. J. 1035. 91. 92. 577. State v. District Court, 134 Minn. 324, 159 N. W. 755. Johnston v. Southern Cal. Box Factory, 1 Cal. Ind. Com. Part 2, 93. In re Sponatske, 220 Mass. 526; 108 N. E. 466, 8 N. C. C. A. 1025. 94. Shell Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. 36 Cal. App. 463, 172 Pac. 611, 2 W. C. L. J. 34; Western Grain etc. Products Co. v. Pillsbury, 173 Cal. 135, 159 Pac. 423. 95. Bucyrus v. Townsend 64 Ind. App. - 117 N. E. 565, 1 W. C. L. J. 166. |