§ 168. Delirius.-Where an injured workman, while delirious as a result of injuries received, did things contrary to the doctor's orders, got out of bed and subsequently died, possibly from the effect of these acts, it was held that the rights of dependents to death benefits was not thereby affected.9

§ 169. Delirium Tremens.-Where a condition of alcoholism or tremens is aggravated through an accidental injury causing death, the death is held to be due to the accident."7

Where an employee suffered a serious physical injury, and while in the hospital developed delirium tremens, and the physicians testified that the injury was sufficient to be the producing cause of the delirium tremens in view of the employee's habits, compensation was awarded.98

Where it appeared that delirium tremens would not have developed had it not been for the injury and the shock following it, the court said, "The fact that his system had been so weakened by his intemperate habit that it was unable to withstand the effects of the injury does not thereby shift the proximate cause of death from his injury to his intemperate habit. ''99

§ 170. Dementia Praecox.-Where an employee sustained a fracture of the right tibia, and while still disabled was committed to a hospital for the insane, the commission found after extended testimony from alienists that dementia praecox is a type of insanity into which trauma cannot enter either as a direct cause

96. Brogi v. Hammond Lumber Co., 1 Cal. Ind. Acc. Comm., (Part 11) 137.

97. Sullivan v. Industrial Engineering Co., 173 App. Div. 65, 158 N. Y. S. 970; Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 169 App. Div. 450, 155 N. Y. S. 1; Winters v. New York Herald Co., 171 App. Div. 960, 155 N. Y. S. 149; Dunn v. West End Brewing Co. 5 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 380. Affirmed later in the appellate Div; In re James Kelley, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 122. 98. Minnis v.Young 9 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 314.

99. Ramlow v. Moon Lake Ice Co., 192 Mich. 505, 158 N. W. 1027, L. R. A. 1916 F. 955, 14 N. C. C. A. 295.

or as a precipitant. It was held that the applicant was entitled to compensation solely for the disability incident to the fracture.1

§ 171. Dermatitis.-Where a chambermaid contracted dermatitis, an infection of the hands, it was held that the resulting disability was not compensable, because there was no proof of its accidental origin or of an opportunity for the infection to enter by accident.2

Compensation was awarded in a case of "Dermatitis venenata." The commission said, "we are inclined to the opinion that the infection in this case is to be attributed to walking back and forth all day in this wood dust to the depth of an inch, which irritated the lower limbs and was communicated to the hands and arms, perhaps from scratching the lower limbs.'' This was therefore held to be a personal injury and consistent with the Act as amended by the elimination of the word "accident," prior to the occurrence of disability in this case. Though the commissioners admitted the case was not free from difficulties.

A claim for disability resulting from dermatitis alleged to have been caused by the handling of heavily inked papers was denied because of lack of medical evidence to sustain the claim.*

A claim was allowed for disability resulting from dermatitis due. to irritation caused by machine oils."

§ 172. Diabetes.-All the evidence tended to prove that before the accidental injury the employee was a well man, a few days after the injury his urine was examined and there were indications of the presence of diabetes. The court in affirming an award held that the conclusion that the diabetic condition resulted from the injury was not based on mere conjecture, there be

1. Oliver v. Union Iron Works, 5 Cal. I A. C. D. 193; Laderman v. Standard Accident Insurance. Co., 2 Mass. I. A. Bd. 551.

2. McDonald v. Dunn, 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 91; Petschett v. Preis, 8 B. W. C. C. 44.

Reeves v. The Diamond Match Co. et al., 5 Cal. I. A. C. D. 236.

3.

4.

In re Theodore H. Schlessman, 2nd. A. R. U. S..C. C. 154.

5.

In re S. G. Moran, 3rd. A. R. U..S. C. C. 155.

ing evidence that a well and healthy man when injured might develop the disease."

In a suit at common law for damages, the court held evidence of the existence of diabetes resulting from the accident admissible."

§ 173. Disease Following Injury.-Disease must be traceable to an accident before it is compensable.

8

Where an employee suffered a rupture, and after an operation left the hospital two weeks after the injury, which was on April 14th, in a thin and emaciated condition, and on September 22nd entered an infirmary, and died of pulmonary tuberculosis on December 12th, it was held that the claimant had not sustained the burden of showing that there was any connection between the rupture and the death."

Under a policy covering death as a result of injuries caused solely by external, violent and accidental means, the insurer was held liable where death was caused by a disease which was itself caused by external, violent and accidental bodily injuries.10

Where an accident to an employee's eye, which at first appeared not serious, resulted, after a week or more in a diseased condition. of the eye which destroyed the sight, the injury occurred, within the meaning of the statute, when the diseased condition culminated.11

Decedent, working in a blacksmith shop, pinched his finger and an infection resulted. Four operations were performed, the last apparently successful. Four days later he was suffering from acute inflammatory rheumatism and died in ten days. The physician

6. Balzer v. Saginaw Beef Co., 199 Mich. 374, 165 N. W. 785, 1 W. C. L. J. 399.

7. Woody v. Louisville R. Co., 153 Ky. 1, 154 S. W. 384. 8. Blair v. Omaha Ice and Cold Storage Co., Neb. 165 N. W. 893, 1 W. C. L. J. 424; In re Patrick Coughig, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 128. Kemp v. Clyde Shipping Co., Ltd., 119 L. T. R. 131,17 N. C. C. A.

9.

876.

10. Armstrong v. West Coast Life Ins. Squire Dingee Co. v. Indus. Bd., Ill.

331.

Co., 41 Utah 112, 124 Pac. 518.

117 N. E. 1031, 1 W. C. L. J.

11. Johansen v. Union Stockyards Co., 99 Neb. 328, 156 N. W. 511.

who treated him during the ten days was of the opinion that the rheumatism was caused from a secondary infection as a result of the local one. The other physicians claimed the fourth operation entirely eradicated the infection. The court, in affirming the award, held that the board was the judge of the credibility of the witness both medical and lay, and its finding in the absence of fraud was conclusive, if there was any evidence to support it.12 Deceased, while employed in a bowling alley, suffered a broken thigh bone, from a flying pin. He was discharged from the hospital with the bone not entirely healed, and later reentered the hospital and died. Deceased had a cut on his forehead which an attendant stated he had suffered by falling when he tried to get up. Reversing the judgment, the court held that there was no evidence from which a fair inference could be drawn that deceased's death resulted from the injury sustained in the bowling alley.13

Deceased slipped and struck his head. He was dizzy for a few minutes. but continued to work. He complained of pains in his head, but worked all afternoon. He did not work the following day on account of the weather, but did work the next day. Не went home weak and dizzy, and never recovered. A lump came out at the end of his spine. The physician who treated him said that he died of pneumonia, the others said he did not. Affirming the award the court said that it was unable to say there was no testimony supporting the finding of fact of the board that the death was due to the injuries received while in the employ of the defendant. ''14

Deceased fell and struck his head, and was unconscious for a few minutes, and three days afterwards resumed his duties and worked for a week, and was apparently normal. About three weeks thereafter he entered a hospital, and in two weeks died.

12.

Perdew v. Nuffer Cedar Co., 201 Mich., 520, 167 N. W. 868, 17 N. C. C. A. 884, (1918).

13. Perry v. Woodward Bowling Alley Co., 196 Mich. 742, 163 N. W. 52, 17 N. C. C. A. 885.

14.

Homan v. Boardman River Elec. Light & Power Co., 200 Mich. 206, 166 N. W. 860 (1918).

It was contended that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the finding that death resulted from the injury. The doctor who made an autopsy testified that the death resulted from a hemorrhage of the brain of traumatic origin, which the court on appeal held sufficient to justify the finding."

Latent disease, accelerated by an accident to the extent that it produces disability is compensable.16

"Where a workman receives a personal injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and disease ensues which incapacitates him for work, the incapacity may be the result of the injury, within the meaning of the (English) Workmen's Compensation Act, even though it is not the natural result of the injury. The question to be determined on a claim for compensation is whether the incapacity is in fact the result of the injury. Ystradowen Colliery Co. v. Griffiths, (1909) 2 K. B. 533. In a case where a petitioner's arm was broken while he was in defendant's employ, and the fracture properly united, but there developed an abscess upon the fleshy part of the thumb, which resulted in ankylosis, making the thumb useless, the Supreme Court held that the ankylosis of the thumb was an injury arising by accident out of and in the course of the employment. Newcomb v. Albertson, 85 N. J. Law, 435, 98 Atl. 928. And Mr. Justice Swayze, in writing the opinion in Liondale Bleach Works v. Riker, 85 N. J. Law, 426, at Page 429, 89 Atl. 929, observed that the question of disease following an accident was considered in Newcomb v. Albertson, Supra. The decision there, rested on certain English cases, is to the effect that an injury which follows an accident, and which but for the accident would not have happened, justifies the finding that the injury in fact results from the accident." 17

15. State ex rel. London & L. Indemnity Co. v. District Court Hennepin Co., 139 Minn. 409, 166 N. W. 722, (1918).

16. Indianapolis Abattoir Co. v. Coleman, 502 1 W. C..L. J. 41.

Ind. App., 117 N. E.

17. Lundy v. George Brown & Co., N. J. App. 108 Atl. 252, 5 W. C. L. J. 294; State ex rel. Anseth v. District Ct. of Koochiching County, 134 Minn. 16, 158 N. W. 713; Foley v. Home Rubber Co., 89 N. J. Law, 474, 99 Atl. 624, Affirmed 91 N. J. Law, 323, 102 Atl. 1053.