Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

Where an injury so reduced an employee's vitality as to leave him susceptible to an attack of disease which caused his death, the death can be said to be due to the original accident.18

Disease contracted in the course of the employment and resulting in pain does not amount to an accidental injury and is not compensable.19

Locomoter ataxia following an injury, being a form of syphillis, was held not to be due to the injury but rather to the syphilitic condition and not compensable under the Federal Act.20

Death from a disease contracted while in a weakened condition, caused by bad air and not traceable to a definite time, place and cause, is not a compensable accidental injury.21

Where an attack of caisson disease came on suddenly, due to the negligence of a coemployee in decompressing air too fast, and resulted in the death of the employee, death was due to an accidental injury arising out of the employment and not to some inherent physical defect.22

Disease contracted while caring for patients in a hospital is compensable under the Federal Act.23

A claim for disability from chorea due to overwork was disallowed, the medical testimony being that this disease was not caused by overwork.24

Where death results from disease and not from the injury compensation will be denied.25

18. Lanner v. Aluminum Castings Co., Mich.- (1920), 178 N. W. 69, 6 W. C. L. J. 337.

19. Pimental's Case, Mass.- (1920), 127 N. E. 424, 6 W. C. L. J. 185; In re Henry Mayer, 3rd. A. R U. S. C. C. 163.

20. In re Joseph Bradley, 3rd. A. R. U. S. C. C. 127; In re Elmer D. Light, 3rd. A. R. U. S. C. C. 161.

[blocks in formation]

Colo.,

194 Pac. 625.

22. Williams v. Missouri Bridge and Iron Co., Mich.— (1920), 180 N. W. 357.

23. In re Mary C. O'Hanlon, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 195.
24. In re Russell A. Cummings, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 153.
25.

In re Chas. E. Garvin, 2nd

A. R. U. S. C. C. 178; In re Wm. A. Kell, 2nd. A. R. U. S. C. C. 179; In re Wm. J. Lehr, 2nd, A. R. U. S. C. C. 183.

§ 174. Dislocation.-A dislocation of the semilunar cartilage of the knee, caused by quickly arising from a stooping position, required by the nature of the employment, was held to be an accidental injury.26

Where an employee slipped and fell, dislocating the clavicle, and was operated upon three days later, and died of hypostatic pneumonia, caused by the weakening of his system by the operation, it was held that his widow was entitled to compensation.2

Where an employee, through accidental injury, suffered a dislocation of the coecum, general adhesions in the abdomen, and constipation, resulting in traumatic peritonitis, which condition. necessitated the removal of the appendix, all this was held to be caused by the accident, and the resulting disability compensable. 28 Where an elevator operator, in raising heavy gates above his head, sustained a dislocation of the collar bone, it was held that the resulting disability was compensable.29

§ 175. Dizziness.-There was testimony to the effect that nails protruded from the floor where applicant worked, and on two occasions prior to this, applicant testified, he had tripped on them, but he also stated that he could not account for the fall unless the nails caused it. Affirming an award of the board the court said: "While plaintiff testifies that at times he has been dizzy and weak, he also testifies that it was nothing to speak of, but slight, and never sufficient to cause him to lose his balance and fall. His fellow workmen and superiors in the plant who saw him daily never noticed any appearance of dizziness or fainting, and never saw him fall before. The fact that he did not recall just how the accident happened is in no way extraordinary, when we contemplate that in the fall he struck his head with sufficient force to inflict a gash in his scalp. He was over 70 years of age, not as nimble as in his younger years, and had had trouble with his limbs and feet a short time before. We are not persuaded that

26. Giampolini-Lombardi Co. v. Raggio, 2 Cal. I. A. C. 936.

27.

Cantwell v. Traveler's Insur. Co., 2 Mass, Wk. Comp. Cases 246. 28. Gregg v. Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co., 2 Mass. W. C. C. 581

29. Bonin v. California Hawaiian Sugar Refinery, Cal. I. A. C. 334.

we should say, as a matter of law, that the cause of the accident under the evidence in the case is so conjectural as to require us to set aside the finding and award of the board. 0

Where a workman was working on a pile of bricks, fifteen feet above the ground, and was seized with an attack of vertigo, or with some similar disorder which cauesd him to fall to the ground," the court in affirming an award of compensation held that the fainting and fall were caused by the conditions under which the man was working.3

31

Where there was evidence to the effect that a hack driver's team ran into the curbing and pitched the driver out on the sidewalk, the court held that his fall was due to something more than mere dizziness or unconsciousness from which he suffered just before the accident.32

Where a workman received an accidental injury, became dizzy and fell down stairs, it was held he was entitled to compensation during the continuance of disability from both injuries.33

Where an employee, because of dizziness, fell and sustained a concussion of the brain, compensation was denied because there was no evidence to connect the cause of the fall to a risk incidental to or arising out of the work being performed.34

[ocr errors]

§ 176. Dog Bite. The presence of the dog, with defendant's implied knowledge and consent, was one of the physical conditions of the plant under which the defendant required the plaintiff to perform his duties. The mere fact that the direct cause of the injury was animate rather than inanimate does not alter the result." It was held to be a compensable accident."5

30. Wilson v. Phoenix Furniture Co., 210 Mich. 531, 167 N. W. 839, 17 N. C. C. A. 786.

31.

Santacrose v. Sag Harbor Brick Works, 182 N. Y. App. Div. 442, 169 N. Y. Supp. 695, 17 N. C. C. A. 787.

32.

Carroll v. What Cheer Stables Co., 38 R. I. 421, 96 Atl. 208, 12 N. C. C. A. 174.

33. 436.

Murray v. Massachusetts Employe's Ins. Assn. 1 Mass. I. A. Bd.

[ocr errors]

Van Winkle v. Johnson Co., 2 Cal, I. A. C. D. 189.

Barone v. Brambach Piano Co., 101 Misc. Rep. 669, 167 N. Y. S.

34.

35.

W. C.-23

§ 177. Drinking Acid or Poison by Mistake. Where an employee was killed as a result of drinking acid by mistake, from a bottle which he found where he was accustomed to keep a bottle of drinking water of like appearance, it was held to be a compensable accident.36

Where an employee drank beer furnished by the employer, but poisoned by an employee, the resulting disability was held not compensable.37

§ 178. Drowning. Where a traveling salesman found it necessary, in order to reach his destination, to cross a river in a row boat, and was drowned in crossing, it was held to be a compensable accident.38

An employee in charge of a boat permitted it to slip away from the dock, and in attempting to get into it from the dock, fell into the water and was drowned, after starting to swim upon his back to the stern of the boat. This was held to be a compensable accident.3 39

Where it was claimed that the employee jumped into the water with the intent to commit suicide, it was held that the evidence. was sufficient to sustain an award for accidental death by drowning, 40

Where an employee was drowned in attempting to clean rocks which protected an intake flume, it was held to be an accident within the meaning of the compensation act.11

933, 1 W. C. L. J. 703; In re Wm. Miller, Vol. 1, No. 7, Bul. Ohio I. C., p. 46; In re Bailey, Op. Sol. Dept. of L. 232.

36. In re Osterbrink, 229 Mass. 407, 118 N. E. 657, 1 W. C. L. J. 814; Archibald v, Ott, 77 W. Va. 448.

37. Koch v. Oakland Brewing & Malting Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. D. 373. 38. McCarthy Bros. Co. v. District Court Hennepin, Co., 141 Minn. 61, 169 N. W. 274, 17 N. C. C. A. 959.

39.

Boyle v. Mahoney & Tierney, 92 Conn, 404, 103 Atl. 127.

40. Western Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 159 Wis. 635, 15 N. W. 998.

41. Boody v. K. &. C. Mfg. Co., 77 N. H. 208, 90 Atl. 859, L. R. A. 1916 A. 10, 5 N. C. C. A. 840; Leach v. Oakley, 1 K. B. 523, 4 B. W. C. C. 91.

1

Where the evidence showed that a sailor went on deck at night to get fresh air, and was found next morning in the water, dead, this was held sufficient proof of accident.42

§ 179. Dust. Where an employee was sawing timbers, it was held that it might be inferred, when he said that he got dust in his eye, that he meant saw dust from the sawing he was doing, and it was therefore a compensable accident.43

It has been held that disability caused by the inhalation of fine dust into the lungs in the course of employment, is an injury under the Federal Act.44

Where the blowing of cement dust into the eyes of a workman continued the disability from the disease of trachoma, it was held a compensable accident.45

Where a stone grinder was injured by inhaling small particles ⚫ of stone and dust, by reason of which he contracted fibroid tuberculosis, it was held that he was entitled to compensation under the Massachusetts Act.46

Where it was determined that the loss of sight of the eye was due to natural causes, rather than irritation from emery dust accidentally getting into the eye, compensation was denied.*

Compensation was allowed for disability due to iron rust accidentally entering a workman's eye.48

§ 180. Dysentery Dysentery caused by drinking impure water furnished by the employer for drinking purposes is compensable injury under the Federal Act.49

42. Marshall v. Owners of Ship, "Wild Rose," 3 B. W. C. C. 514 H. L.

43. Dickinson v. Industrial Board of Ill., 280 Ill. 342 117 N. E. 438, 17 N. C. C. A. 154.

44. In re Edward Edmonds, Op. Sol, D. L. (1915); 254; In re Carey E. Stone, 3rd. A. R. U. S. C. C. 114.

45. Beauchamp v. Chansler-Confield Midway Oil Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 485.

46. Kalanquin v. Traveler's Insur. Co., 2 Mass. Wk. C. C. 748. 47. Lohrke v. Benicia Iron Works, 1 Cal. I. A. C. D. 261.

48.

Keatly v. Shields & Son, 1 Cal. I. A. C. D. 191.

49. In re Fred J. Shurz, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 100.

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »