source of the germs or when they gained entrance to the wound. The time which elapsed between the abrasion and the beginning of blood poisoning was the usual period of infection for this disease. The court held that the disability was due to the injury.45

Where infection formed in a laceration on the head of a subway worker, caused by the falling of a beam, compensation was allowed.46

Compensation was allowed for death caused by tetanus, as the result of a wound in the foot by a rusty nail.47

Compensation was denied, because of lack of evidence, for the death of claimant's husband, alleged to have been caused by blood poisoning, due to rupture of the mucous membrane inside of the nose, permitting the entrance of germs. The rupture having been caused by an accidental blow from a container.48

A bookeeper received a slight scratch, and three days later the pain became very great from the infection which set in. It was held that this was an accidental injury.49

Compensation was denied in a claim for infection alleged to have resulted from an injury caused by a chapping of an employee's hands as a result of working with his hands in staining furniture with an analine dye solution. It was held to be an occupational disease, not an accidental injury.50

Where an employee, while helping a fellow employee after working hours to install the plant of his employer, received a slight injury to his thumb, which developed into bloodpoisoning, finally resulting in death from acute, inflammatory rheumatism, the evidence was held to sustain a finding that death resulted

45.

Great W. Power Co. v. Pillsbury, 171 Cal. 79, 151 Pac. 1136, L. R. A. 1916 A. 281, 11 N. C. C. A., 493.

46.

Pelctreck v. Degnon Cont. Co. S. D. R. Vol. 6, pg. 394.

47. Putnam v. Murray, 174 App. Div. N. Y. 720, 160 N. Y. S. 811; Marstus v. Employers Liab. Ass., 1 Cal. I. A. C. Part 2, 360.

48. Partridge v. Norwich Pharmacial Co., S. D. R. Vol. 6, pg. 336. 49. Jameson v. Bush, 1 Cal. I. A. C. Part 2, 507; Dreyer v. G. W. Power Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. Part 2, 489.

50. Jerner v. Imperial Furniture Co., 200 Mich. 265, 166 N. W. 943, 17 N. C. C. A. 345; Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1 Mass. I. A. Bd. 180.

from an accidental injury received in the course of the employment.51

A workman in a city park sustained a scratch on the back of his hand, which became infected, and caused his death from bloodpoisoning. Although there was no evidence to indicate in what manner he was injured there was evidence that the injury occured while he was at work, and the superior court sustained an award in the widow's favor.52

Where compensation was sought for the death of an employee due to infection of the kidneys, and it was shown that an accident had occurred which affected the kidneys, but all the medical evidence was to the effect that the infection could not have resulted from the accident but had its origin in the insertion of a pessary, which was unsanitary, it could not be said that death resulted from an accident.53

§ 207. Influenza.-Influenza contracted as the result of a weakened vitality following an injury is compensable under the Pennsylvania Act.54

Under the construction placed upon the word injury as used in the California Act, influenza, contracted by a hospital employee in the course of his employment, and not by any bodily injury through violence is compensable. The court said: "Two grounds are urged why the award is invalid. The first, and more important, is that the awarding of compensation for death by disease, the origin of which was not a bodily injury suffered through violence, is beyond the power of the commission.

"The decision on the first question presented turns on the meaning to be given to the word 'injury' as used in article 20, Section 21, of our Constitution. The section has been amended since Slattery's death, but at that time read:

51. Perdew v. Nufer Cedar Co., 201 Mich. 520, 167 N. W. 868, 16 N. C. C. A. 921, 2 W. C. L. J. 313.

52. In re Bean, 227 Mass. 558, 116 N. E. 826.

53.

J. 232.

Kade v. Greenhut, App. Div. - 185 N. Y. S. 9, 7 W. C. L.

54. Dubluskey v. Phil. & Reading Coal & Iron Co.-Pa., 1921, 112 Atl. 745.

"The Legislature may by appropriate legislation create and enforce a liability on the part of all employers to compensate their employees for an injury incurred by the said employees in the course of their employment, irrespective of the fault of either party.'

The word 'injury' as so used means, of course, only bodily injury, and the position of the city is that it means only bodily injury suffered by or resulting from violence, while the position of the commission is that it covers any harmful effect upon the body, whether by violence or by disease. The word is frequently used in both the broader and the more limited sence. In common usage, it has the more general meaning. Thus, Webster defines 'injury' as: (1) 'Any wrong, damage, or mischief done or suffered;' as (2) 'a source of harm;' or as (3) 'a wrong or damage done to another." On the other hand, when personal injuries are spoken of, there are apt to be meant only bodily injuries suffered through violence in some form or to some extent, traumatic injuries. The exact meaning of the word 'injury' as used in Workmen's Compensation Acts, or in a similar connection, has come before the courts for consideration on numerous occasions, and their rulings are by no means harmonious. On the one hand, there are a number of cases holding that word has the more limited meaning. An example of this is Linnane v. Aetna Brewing Co., 91 Conn., 158, 99 Atl. 507, L. R. A. 1917D, 77, where it was held that the phrase personal injury did not include injury or harm suffered by disease, and that compensation was not allowable for the death of an employee by pneumonia contracted as the result of unusual exposure and exhaustion in the course of his employment. Other examples along the same line are Industrial. Accident Com., etc., v. Brown, 92 Ohio, 309, 110 N. E. 744, L. R. A. 1916B, 1277; Adams v. Acme, etc., Co., 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485, L. R. A. 1916A, 283, Ann. Cas 1916D, 689; Richardson v. Greenburg, 188 App. Div. 248, 176 N. Y. Supp. 651; Liondale, etc., Works v. Riker, 85 N. J. Law, 426, 89 Atl. 929.

"On the other hand, there are large number of decisions which adopt the broader meaning, and hold that compensation is allowable for the injury or harm done by disease, although the disease

is not contracted as the result of any violence whatever in the ordinary sense of that word.

"Under the English Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation is, or was allowable only for 'personal injury by accident,' a much more limited expression than that found in our constitutional provision, and one in which it might well be thought there was some implication of an injury by violent external means. Nevertheless, the House of Lords held, in Brinton's v. Turvey, L. R. Ap. Cases (1905) 230, that compensation was allowable for the injury sustained by a workman from anthrax contracted by him. in the handling of infected wool; there being no violence other than bacteria from the wool found their way into his system.

"Similarly, it as held in Scott v. Pearson, L. R. 2 K. B. Div. (1916) 61, that compensation was allowable for cattle ringworm contracted by an employee by coming in contact, not violent, with infected calves.

"Along the same line, the House of Lords held in Glasgow Coal Co. v. Welsh, L. R. 2 Ap. Cases (1916) 1, that a miner was entitled to compensation for rheumatism contracted by him as a result of his being required to stand for a number of hours in cold water to bale out the mine pit.

"The Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act, like the English Act, allows compensation for 'personal injury or death by accident.' But in United Paperboard Co. v. Lewis (Ind. App.) 117 N. E. 276, Compensation was allowed to a workman for acute nephritis contracted by him through his being required to work for several hours in heated paper pulp. The following portion of the opinion is pertinent here.

'The courts have also differed as to whether a disease following an employment should be considered an injury by accident within the meaning of such acts. In the various decisions on this subject it is generally recognized that diseases are of two classes: First, the so-called industrial or occupational diseases, which are the natural and reasonably to be expected results of a workman following a certain occupation for a considerable period of time; second, diseases which are the result of some unusual condition of the employment. The first class is illustrated by lead poisoning and the second by pneumonia following an enforced exposure. As

a rule such industrial or occupational disease are not considered as injuries by accident and in the absence of special statutory provision compensation is not allowed therefor. On the other hand, it is generally accepted that a disease, which is not the ordinary results of an employee's work. reasonably to be anticipated as a result of pursuing the same, but contracted as a direct result of unusual circumstances connected therewith, is to be considered an injury by accident, and comes within the provisions of acts providing for compensation for personal injury so caused. citing a long list of authorities).'

"In Hurle's Case, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N. E. 336, L. R. A. 1916A, 279, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 919, a workman employed to tend furnaces for making gas claimed compensation for the loss of his sight due to an acute attack of optic neuritis induced by poisonous gases from the furnaces to which his work constantly exposed him. The Massachusetts act allowed compensation for 'personal injury' without requiring that it be by accident, and the question discussed by the court was as to whether the case was one of a 'personal injury.' The discussion concludes thus:

'The learned counsel for the insurer in his brief had made an exhaustive and ingenious analysis of the entire act touching the words 'injury' or 'injuries,' and has sought to demonstrate that it cannot apply to an injury such as that sustained in the case at bar. But the argument is not convincing. It might be decisive if 'accident" had been the statutory word. It is true that in interpreting a statute words should be construed in their ordinary sense. Injury, however, is usually employed as an inclusive word. The fact remains that the word 'injury,' and not 'accident,' was employed by the Legislature throughout this act. It would not be accurate, but lax, to treat the act as if it referred merely to accidents.'

"In State v. Trustee, 138 Wis. 133, 119 N. W. 806, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1175, the widow and children of a policeman dying from pneumonia contracted by exposure in the course of his duty made application for a pension under a statute which provided for a pension to the dependents of a policeman "in jured" in the performance of his duty. It was contended that