The claimant contracted lead poisoning in the course of his employment while working in a white lead plant, and became sick and disabled by reason thereof. The court held that this was an occupational disease and not a compensable injury under the Ohio Act.99

An employee contracted lead poisoning while using magic paint remover, a mixture of denatured alcohol, ammonia and lead, The committee found that the employee suffered an accidental injury, but did not make findings of specific facts or state any conclusion drawn from the evidence in support of the general findings. For this reason the higher court reversed the decree and remitted it for further proceedings.1

Claimant was employed in handling type, and was suffering from lead poisoning. There was no evidence tending to show the source from which the poison was received. The court held that there were no facts to show that claimant suffered a compensable injury.2

A lead grinder, who had been engaged in the same employment for 20 years, and who became incapacitated as a result of lead poisoning, was held to have suffered a personal injury under the Massachusetts Act.3

Where an employee worked 38 years in a zinc reducing plant, and there was no evidence in the record showing lead poisoning, and the employee was suddenly stricken with lead poisoning, it was held that the disease was traceable to a definite time, place and cause, and was therefore an accident, and not an occupational disease within the meaning of the Workman Compensation Act.*

An employee, working in a red lead plant, contracted lead poisoning and died. His duties as sifter or bolter tender brought

99. Industrial Comm. of Ohio v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 309; 110 N. E. 744; 14 N. C. C. A. 843.

1.

In Re Mathewson, 227 Mass. 470, 116 N. E. 831, 14 N. C. C. A, 846. 2. In Re Doherty, 222 Mass. 98, 109 N. E. 887, 14 N. C. C. A. 847; In Re Peter Sweeney, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 163.

3. Johnson v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., Ltd., 4 N. C. C. A. 843, 104 N. E. 735, 217 Mass. 388; Walker v. Gage, 223 Mass. 179, 111 N. E. 353; Odonnell's Case, · Mass., (1921), 125 N. E. 353.

4.

Matthiessen-Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 378, 120 N. E. 249, 2 W. C. L. J. 876.

him in contact with the lead. The court reversed the award of the Industrial Accident Board saying, that lead poisoning is an occupational disease and not an injury for which compensation can be had under the Michigan Act.5

Where lead poisoning contracted by a workman was the cumulative effect of inhalation of enamel powder extending over a considerable time, and could not be traced to any definite time, it was held not to be an accidental injury."

Where an employee contracted acute bronchitis and lead poisoning as a result of inhalation of gas fumes from an oxyacetylene burning machine, it was held that the incapacity was due to an injury.

Lead poisoning is not an accident.8

Nor is an attack of colic brought on by lead poisoning." Lead poisoning contracted while at work in the usual course of the employment is a compensable injury under the Federal Act.10

§ 214. Lightning. Where an employee of a bridge contractor is, with other employees, lodged and boarded on the ground where the work is done, and after the day's work is done is in the boarding tent, waiting until it is time to go to bed, and while thus engaged is killed by lightning, this is held not to be an acciden arising out of his employment. The court said: "The words 'out of' involve the idea that the accident is in some sense due to the employment. Barnabus v. Colliery Co., 103 L. T. R. 543; Fitzgerald v. Clarke, 2 K. B. 796. It is said in Hopkins v. Sugar Co., 184 Mich. 87, 150 N. W. 325 L. R. A. 1916 A. 310: 'An employee may suffer an accident while engaged at his work, or in the course of his employment which in no sense is attributable to the nature of or risks involved in such employment, and therefore cannot be

5.

Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 148 N. W. 485, 6 N. C. C. A. 482, 182 Mich. 157, L. R. A. 1916A, 283.

6.

Derkinderen v. Rundell Mfg. Co., Rep. Wis. Ind. Com. 1914-15, p. 16. 7. In Re Claim C. Marata, Op. Sol. 1915-264; In Re Claim Willard E. Jule, Op. Sol. 1915-261. See Inhalation of Noxious Gases.

8. Steel v. Cammel Laird & Co., (1905) 7 W. C. C. 9.

9.

Williams v. Duncan, (1898) 1 W. C. C. 123.

10. In Re Geo. Prescott, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 166.

said to arise out of it. In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 4 N. C. C. A. 522, 102 N. E. 697, L. R. A. 1916, A. 306, wherein recovery for injury by lightning is denied, it is done because no causal relation or peculiar exposure appears, and it is said that while the injury need not have been foreseen or expected, yet 'after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.

99911

It has been held in a number of cases that injury and death due to lightning stroke under ordinary conditions was not an accident arising out of the employment.12

In a Montana case, where the employee was killed by lightning while operating a metal road grader, it was held that the grader did not have enough influence on lightning to increase the deceased's natural hazard.18

Quoting further from Griffith v. Cole, supra: "It is not intended to hold that injuries from lightning can in no case be due to an industrial employment. It has been rightly said that it can be. (But see State v. District Court of Ramsey Co., 129 Minn, 502, 153 N. W. 119 which apparently recognizes this prnciple as beng sound but does not follow it) And so in Roger v. School Board, 1 Scots Law Times 271 wherein it is said that, 'To be struck by lightning is a risk known to all and independent of employment, yet the circumstances of a particular employment might make the risk not a general risk, but a risk sufficiently exceptional to justify its being held that the accident from such risk was an accident arising out of the employment. And it has been rightly held that injury from lightning did arise out of the employment where a telephone or tel egraph operator was hurt by an electric shock received in the course of his work. Atlantic Ry. Co. v. Newton, 118 Va. 222, 12 N.

11. Griffith v. Cole Bros., 183 Ia. 415, 165 N. W. 577, 15 N. C. C. A. 674 12. Klawinske v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 185 Mich. 643, 152 N. W. 213; Hoenig v. Indus. Comm. of Wis., 153 Wis. 646, 150 N. W. 996, 8 N. C. C. A. 192, L. R. A. 1916 A. 339.

13. Wiggins v. Indus. Acc. Bd. 54 Mont. 335, 170 Pac. 9, 1 W. C. L. J. 643, 15 N. C. C. A. 696; Kelly v. County Council, 1 B. W. C. C. 194; An. drew v Society 2 K. B. 32; Falconer v. Building Co., 3 Ct. of Sess. Cas. (5th Series) 564.

C. C. A., 328, 87 S. E. 618. And so where a workman on a high scaffolding was kept at work during a storm. Andrew v. Industri al Society, 2 K. B. 32. But where the servant is riding a corn cultivator and plowing corn, being struck by lightning is suffering from what is not peculiarly invited by the employment.

A driver of an ice company was required to follow a fixed route in substantial disregard of weather conditions. He was permitted to seek shelter in times of necessity. During a severe rain storm accompanied by lightning he was struck by lightning while under a tree. He either went there to seek shelter or was on his way to solicit orders. The court held that he suffered a compensable injury, within the meaning of the act.11

Where an employee was standing on a steel bolt, connected with a steel carrier track running through a barn, when a bolt of lightning struck the carrier track and traveled through the bolt and through the employee's foot, causing his death, it was held that the employment did not expose him to more than ordinary risk of lightning, and that the injury was not compensable.15

§ 215. Lumbago.-Lumbago resulting from an injury received in the employment is compensable under the Federal Act, but compensation was denied because of insufficient evidence.16

§ 216. Malarial Fever.-Malarial fever caused by exposure to the sun, and heat of a forest fire, and to overexertion was held to be a compensable injury.17

§ 217. Meningitis.-Meningitis caused by an injury to the spine is compensable under the Federal Act.18

Where compensation was claimed for the death of an employee caused by meningitis alleged to be due to an injury and abscess of

14. State ex rel. Peoples Coal & Ice Co. v. Dist. Court of Ramsey Co., 153 N. W. 119, 9 N. C. C. A. 129, 129 Minn. 502.

15. Cornwall v. Brock, 2 Conn. Work, Comp. Com. 581.

16. In re Eugene E. Pratt, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 120; In re Walter A. Reiss, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 120.

17. In re Archie A. Arbuckle, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 127.

18. In re Thomas Brogan, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 118.

the ear, it was held upon conflicting medical testimony that claimant had failed to show any causal connection between the injury and the cause of the death.19

§ 218. Mental Shock or Fright and Nervous Trouble.-A ner vous shock sustained by a workman due to excitement and alarm, resulting from a fatal accident to a fellow employee, was held to be an accidental injury, for which compensation would be allowed.20

Where an employee, while aiding in the rescue of several coemployees, who were killed, became insane, due to the mental and emotional shock caused by the accident, it was held that insanity was a disability caused by accident.21

Where an employee, working on a scaffold, fell, injuring himself, from which he became subject to nervousness, the court held that the nervousness was the result of an accidental injury, and compensable. 22

Where an employee suffered dizziness and nervousness from an injury which incapacitated her from work, the court found that she was entitled to compensation for the incapacity due to the nervousness and dizziness.23

Where an employee suffered a nervous shock from being entirely buried, when the bank of a trench in which he was working caved in, it was held that the incapacity caused by the nervous condition was a compensable injury.24

Where an employee had completely recovered from an injury, caused by his arm being caught in a cog wheel, but was still

19.

In re James A. Hardy, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 117; In re. Chas E. Barry, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 170.

20. Yates v. South Kirby Featherstone and Hemsworth Collieries Ltd., 2 K. B. 538; 3 N. C. C. A. 225; 3 B. W. C. C. 418; In re John W, Lyons, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 106.

21. Industrial Accident Comm. in Reich v. City of Imperial, 1 Cal. Ind. Acc. Com. 337, 10 N. C. C. A. 479.

22. 23.

Coslett v. Shoemaker, 38 N. J. L. J. 116, 10 N. C. C. A. 1046. Lata v. Am. Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 1 Mass. W. C. C. 283, 10 N. C. C. A. 1046.

24. Paolo v. Frankfort General Ins. Co., 1 Mass. Wkm. Com. Cas. 31, 10 N. C. C. A. 1047.