suffering from histerical paralysis and nervous spasm, the court, in a proceeding to discontinue compensation, found that the employee was entitled to compensation for the nervousness as long as it should last.25

Where the claimant asked additional compensation for nervous exhaustion, and it was found that the condition was due more to lack of occupation and his habit of dwelling upon himself to the point of exaggeration, than to the injury, the court held that compensation would not be allowed for longer than the period of incapacity.20

Fright, without actual physical injury, is not sufficient to sustain an award of compensation under the Michigan Act.27

§ 219. Mitral Regurgitation. Deceased was found at the bottom of a platform on which he had been doing moderately heavy work. A thud was heard, and bruises about the body indicated a fall. Thirty minutes afterwards the doctor pronounced him dead of heart failure. The coroner found mitral regurgitation. The court, in reversing the commission, said that "there was nothing unusual or fortuitous about the work. It cannot be assumed that the man made a misstep, and then again assumed that such misstep caused fright and then again assumed that the fright caused the heart to stop. This would be not only basing an assumption upon an assumption, but would be taking one into the realm of conjecture.28

§ 220. Myocarditis. Deceased, while doing heavy lifting, suffered a hernia. After an operation he made a fair recovery, was about for a time, but remained in a weakened condition, and

25. Ream v. Sutter Butte Canal Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 168; 10 N. C. C. A. 1048; Finley v. San Francisco Stevedoring Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 174, 10 N. C. C. A. 1048.

26. Ford v. Travellers Ins. Co., 1 Mass. Wkm. Com. Cas. 332, 10 N. C. C. A. 1051.

27. Visser v. Michigan Cabinet Co., Mich. Ind. Acc. Bd. Bul. No. 3 p 24 In re Edith Woodward, 3rd A. R. U, S. C. C. 129.

28. Guthrie v. Detroit Shipbuilding Co., 200 Mich. 355, 167 N. W. 37, 1 W. C. L. J. 1035, 17 N. C. C. A. 867.

died in six weeks of myocarditis arteriosclerosis, which existed at the time of the operation and prior thereto. It could not be said that the operation hastened the death from this cause or caused it, and compensation was denied.20

§ 221. Myositis.-Myositis resulting from an accidental injury is compensable under the Federal Act.30

§ 222. Nephritis.-A cellar boy was compelled in the performance of his duties to flush out hot pulp from the floor of the basement, by means of water coming through a hose from the exhaust of the engine. On his way home at noon he became chilled after having become wet and overheated at his work. He developed nephritis which incapacitated him from work for considerable time. The court held that the illness of the claimant was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.31

A carpenter received a blow on the back in the course of his em ployment and later acute nephritis developed, which lowered his vitality and power of resistance until pulmonary tuberculosis became active, causing death. The court held that "the accidental injury suffered by the employee aroused the latent germs of the disease to which he was predisposed, materially accelerated the disease and caused his death earlier than it would otherwise have occurred." 32

Where an employe, having lost control of a bogey, which he was using to come down the employer's line of railway, jumped, and sustained injuries, which aggravated a previous condition of nephritis, and as a result of such aggravation death resulted sooner than it otherwise would, the court held that the applicant did not have to prove that death would not have resulted from this preexisting disease but for the accident. It was sufficient if the ap

29. Tucillo v. Ward Baking Co., 180 App. Div. 302 167 N. Y. Supp. 666 (1917), 15 N. C. C. A. 637.

30. In re James Wood, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 122. 31. United Paperboard Co. v. Lewis, 64 Ind. App

N. C. C. A. 887.

117 N. E. 276, 16

32. Retmier v. Cruse, (Ind. App.), 119 N. E. 32, 17 N. C. C. A. 870, 1 W. C. L. J. 971.

W. C.-27

plicant showed that death occurred sooner than it would have been brought about by the disease, if the disease had not been. accelerated by the accident.33

An employe was struck by a boom at the end of a trolley pole when a trolley wire broke. The blow, together with a shock of electricity from the wire, brought on a condition of acute nephritis and total blindness. This was held to be a compensable injury.34 The Commissioner held that the claimant succeeded in establishing the causal connection between the injury received in the course of his employment and his disability, immediately caused by nephritis, where two physicians who had known him previous to the accident, and one who had not known him until subsequent to the accident, testified that his disability resulted from the injuries, while another physician testified that the disability was due to old age and disease.35

Where an employee was exposed to severe cold after falling from a trestle, and later Bright disease or nephritis developed, the commission held that the disease was due to the accidental injury and exposure, and compensation was allowed. 36

An employee sought compensation for disability resulting from nephritis, alleged to have been brought on through the inhalation of sulphuric acid fumes. Medicial testimony showed that disablity might result from the inhalation of sulphuric acid fumes, but that nephritis did not result from such cause. Compensation was denied.37

An overheated employee was exposed to a damp, cold draft while in an overheated condition, and was stricken with severe pains in the elbows and between the shoulder blades, resulting in inabilty to use his hands, elbows, shoulder and legs. The injury was diagnosed as multiple neuritis, and was held to be a compensable injury.38

33. Golder v. Caledonian Ry., 5 F. 123, 400 Sc. L. R. 89, 10 N. C. C.A, 764; In re Hickman (Dec. 1913) Op. Sol. Dept. of L. P. 751.

34. Cooper v. Mass. Employees Insur. Ass'n., 2 Mass. W. C. C. 573. 35. Cody v. Beach, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 447.

36.

Gale v. Petroleum Development Co., (1916), 3 Cal. I. A. C. 363; In

re Elton W. Riley, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 128.

37.

Costain v. Carson Chemical Co., (1916), 3 Cal. I. A. C. 334.

38. Re Charles J. Withy, Op. Sol. Dep. L., p. 273.

Because of insufficient evidence to show any casual connection compensation was denied where death resulted from nephritis alleged to be due to a blow on the testicles.39

§ 223. Occupational Diseases.-"Occupation' has been defined by the courts of this (Ohio) and other states to be 'that particular business, profession, trade, or calling, which engages the time and efforts of an individual.' In other words, the employment in which one regularly engages, or the vocation of one's life. A disease contracted in the usual and ordinary course of events, wheh from the common experience of humanity is known to be incidental to a particular employment, is an occupational disease, and not within the contemplation of the workmen's compensation law." So where an employee was required to heat paint in an enclosed room, and through the inhalation of poisonous gases arising from the heated paint, death resulted, the court held that the accidental and unforseen inhaling by an employee, in the course of his employment, of a specific volatile poison or gas, resulting in injury or death, is not an occupational disease.40

An employee engaged in staining mahogany suffered from chapped hands, resulting in infection. The court held that the injury occurred by reason of the character of the employment and the act makes no provision for compensation to those suffering from occupational diseases. 41

39. In re John H. Cutler, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 128; In re E. E. Hosking, 2nd A. R.U. S. C. C. 170.

40. Industrial Com. of Ohio v. Roth, et al., 98 Ohio St. 34, 12 N. E. 172 17 N. C. C. A. 342. 2 W. C. L. J. 829; Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Brown-Ohio-110 N. E. 744. The Ohio Constitution has been amended to authorize Compensation for occupational diseases. Since the decisions, mentioned in this section changes have been made in the laws of some of the states. Occupational diseases are now specifically included by the Calif. Conn. Porto Rico, Hawaii and Ohio (1921) Acts. N. Dak. by decision of Bureau. Mass. by interpretation. Excluded specifi cally by following Acts; Ala., Del., Idaho, Ind., Ia., Ky., Mo., Mont., Neb., S. Dak., Tenn., Utah, Md. and Minn. Oregon excluded by implication. Michigan, Utah and Texas excluded by interpretation.

41. Jerner v. Imperial Furniture Co., 200 Mich, 265, 166 N. W. 943, 17 N. C. C. A. 344, 1 W. C. L. J. 1066; McCauley v. Imperial Wollen Co., 261 Pa. 312, 104 Atl. 617, 2 W. C. L. J. 933; Hiers v. John A. Hall & Co., 164 N. Y. S. App. 863.

Where an employer rejected the act, and an employee suffered an injury in a mine, caused by the foul air therein, and sought recovery of damages in a common-law action, the court said that the question as to whether an occupational disease was covered by the Iowa compensation act was not in the case, but in defining what such a disease it said: "An 'occupational disease' suffered by an employee, if it means anything as distinguished from a disease caused by an actionable wrong or injury, is neither more nor less than a disease which is the usual incident or result of a particular employment in which the workman is engaged, as distinguished from one which is caused or brought about by the employer's failure in his duty to furnish him a safe place to work. If the employer fails in his duty to furnish a safe place to work and the employee is injured, the liability of such employer can not be avoided by calling such injury an occupational disease. This injury having been actionable before the enactment of the workmen's compensation law, was no less actionable afterwards."'42

A cigar maker who suffered from Neurosis as a result of his sitting posture while rolling cigars for over twenty-five years, was denied compensation because this was held to be an occupational disease. The court said: "No case has gone so far as to hold that a 'neuresis of the nerves' supplying certain muscles, resulting from a posture which causes the employee 'to bend with shoulders forward so as to induce pressure on the brachial plexus is a personal injury. The words 'personal injury' in their connection in this statute, do not naturally lend themselves to a situation such as that here disclosed. *** It awards compensation for disease when it rightly may be described as a personal injury. A disease of mind or body which arises in the course of employment, with nothing more, is not within the act. It must come from or be an injury, although that injury need not be a single definite act but may extend over a continuous period of time. Poisoning, blindness, pneumonia, or the giving way of heart muscle, all induced by the necessary exposure or exertion of the employment, fall within well-recognized classes of personal injuries. On the

42. Gay v. Hocking Coal Co., 184 Iowa 948, 169 N. W. 360, 17 N. C. C. A. 346.