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other hand the gradual breaking down or degeneration of tissues caused by long and laborious work is not the result of a personal injury within the meaning of the act.43

A lead grinder, seventy-two years of age, who had been engaged in the same employment for more than twenty years, and who became incapacitated as the result of lead poisoning or plumism, suffered a "personal injury" within the meaning of the Massachusetts Act which omits the words, "by accident. ''**

Claimant contracted lead poisoning while employed by a manufacturer of white lead, and became sick and disabled by reason thereof. Compensation was denied on the ground that it was an occupational disease.45

Where a workman contracted lead poisoning from working in a room where fumes were arising from molten lead, compensation was denied under the Connecticut act, as the disease was occupational and not a personal injury.46

Where a chambermaid contracted dermatitis which resulted in infection of the hands, compensation was denied on the ground that this disease is seldom due to any accident arising out of and happening in the course of employment, although it may be an injury arising out of such employment. In this case the trouble began with what is generally regarded as an occupational disease occurring without the happening of any accident."

A boat builder bruised his knee, from which an abscess formed. Medical experts testified that the injury could only come from

43. In re Maggelet, 228 Mass. 57, 116 N. E. 972, 15 N. C. C. A. 520. But see Pimenthals Case-Mass.-127 N. E. 424.

44. Johnson v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., Ltd., 217 Mass. 388, 104 N. E. 735, 4 N. C. C. A. 843. See also, In re Hurle 217 Mass. 223, 104 N. E. 336.

45. Industrial Com. of Ohio v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 309, 110 N. E. 744, 14 N. C. C. A. 843; Adams v. Acme White Lead Works, 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485, 6 N. C. C. A. 482, Bennetts Case, Comm. of Ind. of Vt. 1918. 46. Miller v. American Steel and Wire Co., 90 Conn. 349, 97 Atl. 345, 14 N. C. C. A. 842; Re claim of Peters, Vol. 1, Bull. Ind. C. of Ohio for Dec. 1914, pg. 25.

47. McDonald v. Dunn, 2 Cal. I. A. C. D. (No. 1, 1915), 71, 8 N. C. C. A. 1091; Liondale Bleach, Dye & Paint Works v. Riker, 85 N. J. L. 426, 89 Atl. 929, 4 N. C. C. A. 713.

an accident in such employment. The commission found that the bursitis was not due to occupational disease, but to injury as alleged, and awarded compensation.48

Of interest and value in this connection is the recent decision of an English court in a suit for damages at common law, on account of injuries suffered, due to occupational disease. "Where a person undertakes to do work which is intrinsically dangerous, notwithstanding that reasonable care has been taken to render it as little dangerous as possible, he no doubt voluntarily subjects himself to the risks inevitably accompanying it, and cannot, if he suffers, be permitted to complain that a wrong has been done him, even though the cause from which he suffers might give to others a right of action. For example, one who has agreed to take part in an operation necessitating the production of fumes injurious to health, would have no cause of action in respect of bodily suffering or inconvenience resulting therefrom, though another person residing near to the seat of these operations might well maintain an action if he sustained such injuries from the

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Where an employee, engaged in operating sheet steel finishing rolls, was blinded and invalided by the strong glare of powerful lights from the glittering surfaces he had to inspect, compensation was denied, the court holding this to be an occupational disease, not compensable under the Ohio Act.50

Housemaids knee, while an occupational disease common to plumbers and those compelled to work on their knees, has been held to be compensable under the Connecticut act, the commission holding that the date of the injury is the time when the injured person by reason of his illness became unable to work.51

Where a traffic officer had to stand on his feet eight hours a day, and flat feet or broken arches resulted, compensation was

48.

Porter v. Anderson, 1 Cal. I. A. C. D. (No. 24, 1914), 46, 8 N. C. C. A. 1093.

49. Smith v. Baker & Sons, (1916) A. C. 325, 60 L. J. Q. B. 683, 65 L. T. 367, 13 N. C. C. A. 1084.

50. Zajkowski v. American Steel and Wire Co., 258 Fed. 9, 4 W. C. L. J. 579, 169 C. C. A. 147.

51. Roberts v. Hitchcock Hdw. Co., 1 Conn. C. C. D. 213.

awarded on the ground that the employment especially exposed him to the danger of such injury and that therefore it arose out of and was proximately caused by the employment.52

A workman who contracted pneumonia by wading through wet drifts and working in wet garments in response to an emergency call, in the course of his employment, will not be denied compensation on the ground that this was one of the probable consequences of his employment and therefore an occupational disease.53

Where an employee suffered from eye strain, brought on gradually by the constant use of her eyes extending over a period of seven weeks, compensation was denied.54

A workman employed by a coach painter contracted lead poisoning. This was held to be a compensable injury under the British Workman's act.55

Under the British Act one who had been employer by several different employers, and is found to be suffering from an occupational disease, may recover compensation in the first instance from the employers in whose service he spent the twelve months immediately preceding the disablement.56

Where the occupational disease progressed during several different employments, compensation should be assessed according to the degree of progress the disease attained under each contract of employment, and not according to the time spent in the different employments.57

An occupational disease must manifest itself during the contract of employment, otherwise the burden is upon the claimant to es tablish that it arose out of the employment.58

While an employee was engaged in snapping and stripping string beans in a cannery, she noticed a blister or sore upon her

52. R. M. Hedden v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, & City of San Diego, 5 Cal. I. A. C. D. 1.

53. 54.

Linnane v. Aetna Brewing Co.,, 1 Conn. W. C. C. D. 677.
Cochran v. Elizabeth A. Fenton, 1 Conn. W. C. C. D. 690.

55. Pears v. Gibbons, 6 B. W. C. C. 722.

56. Merry & Cunningham v. McGowan, 8 B. W. C. C. 344.

57. Barron v. Seaton Burn Coal Co., 8 B. W. C. C. 218.

58. M'Laggart v. Wm. Barr & Sons, 8 B. W. C. C. 377; Russell v. Keary (Sch. Ct. of Session) 8 B. W. C. C. 410.

thumb which later became infected, requiring the amputation of the thumb, this was held to be an accidental injury, and not an occupational disease.59

A druggist who, suffering from constant irritation of his eyes, due to poor lights in his working quarters and the fumes arising from the chemicals, was denied compensation for the disability, the commission holding that the injury was due to an occupational dis

ease.

60

Where a fiireman developed a case of lobar pneumonia following exposure and a wetting while fighting a fire, compensation was denied, the court holding that the "pneumonia was brought on, not by an accident but what was in the nature of an occupational disease an event which was an incident to his regular employment." 61

Where an employee had worked for 38 years in a zinc reducing plant and there was no evidence in the record showing any arsenical or lead poisoning prior to the injury for which compensation was sought, and the employee is suddenly stricken with lead poisoning, the court, holding that the disease was an accident and not an occupational disease, said: "The second objection to the judg ment is that Adrian (deceased employee) died from an occupational disease incident to the business of smelting zinc. A disability caused in that way or from that source is not to be regarded as an accident, because such a disease has its inception in the occupation and develops over a long period of time from the nature of the occupation and not from any unusual or unforeseen cause or event. For the prevention of such diseases there ia a statute (Occupational Diseases Act J. & A. Par. 5433') requiring the employer to use certain precautions for the safety of the employee and an action may be mantained against the employer for failure to comply with the provisions of the act (Wilcox v. International Harvester Co. of America 278 Ill. 465, 14 N. C. C. A. 728, 116 N. E. 151). For such failure the injured employee is

59. Pettit v. Mendenhall, 2 Cal. I. A. C. 238.

60.

61.

Boehme v. Owl Drug Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 520.

Landers v. City of Muskegon, 196 Mich. 750, 163 N. W. 43, 14 N. C. C. A. 947.

is not confined to the compensation provided by the workmen's compensation act nor limited by the amount provided by the act. For nearly 50 years in the active operation of the plant of the plaintiff in error a case of lead or arsenical poisoning had never been known, and the plaintiff in error would have had a perfect defense to the death of Adrian on the ground of the failure to obey the statute relating to occupational diseases. There was no evidence tending in any degree to prove that the arsenical poisoning of Adrian was a disease incident to the occupation of plaintiff in er

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Occupational neuritis resulting from constant work at a typewriter is, under the Federal Act, held to be a compensable injury arising out of the employment.63

§ 224. Osteomyelitis.-A workman who was engaged in moving rails, backed into a prop with the result that the rail struck him a blow on the thigh. He continued work for some time, until excessive pain forced him to quit. A physician pronounced the case to be osteomyelitis and septicaemia and advised an immediate operation, which resulted in death. Medical testimony claimed that osteomyelitis might result from a blow. It was held that the death was caused by an accident.64

§ 225. Osteosarcoma from Fall.-Where an employee claimed to have slipped on a stairway and osteosarcoma to the bone of the

62.

Matthiessen-Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Ind. Bd., 284 Ill. 378, 120 N. E. 249, 17 N. C. C. A. 342; Dragovich v. Iroquois Iron Co., 109 N. E. 999, 269 Ill. 478, 10 N. C. C. A. 475; Frey v. Kerens-Donnewald, Coal Co., 271 III. 121, 110 N. E. 824; Armour & Co. v. Industrial Board, 273 Ill. 590, 113 N. E. 138; Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 III. 336, 113 N. E. 629; Suburban Ice Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 630; Bloomington D. & C. R. Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 454, 114 N. E. 611; Ohio Bldg. Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial Board, 115 N. E. 149, 277 Ill. 96; Albaugh-Dover Co. v. Industrial Board, 278 Ill. 179, 115 N. E. Squire-Dingee Co. v. Industrial Board, 281 Ill. 359, 117 N. E. 1031. In re Catherine A. Flynn, 3rd, A. R. U. S. C. C. 129.

834; 63.

64. Mills v. Dinnington Main Coal Co. Ltd., 1917 W. C. & Ins. Rep. Rep. 390.

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