Applicant was injured by having his foot caught between a belt and a pulley, resulting in a fracture of his left leg, and upon the advice of the attending physician he returned to work before the injury had entirely healed, and on his way home from work he rebroke his leg. It was held that there was really not a second accident but that the rebreaking of the leg was a direct result of the original accident. Compensation was continued.89

An employee received an injury by which the neck of the femu was broken, six months later, while exercising his leg by walking, as directed by his physician, he slipped and refractured the boue. The bones never united after the second accident, and an operation had to be performed. The operation seemed to be a success, but his stomach filled with gas a few hours thereafter, his heart collapsed, and he died. The industrial accident commission awarded a death benefit, and, affirming the award, the court said: "The undisputed facts are as above stated; and, it appearing therefrom that Fleming (deceased) at the time of the second injury was obeying his doctor's instructions to exercise his leg, that he fell and that the fibrous connection which had been established was torn loose at the point of the previous fracture, are circumstances which seem to us to be conclusive to the effect that this second injury arose from a condition produced by the first injury, 7790

Where an employee had sustained a broken arm and dislocated wrist while cranking an automobile, the bones had knit well and he was making a satisfactory recovery, but while taking an automobile trip the partly knit bones slipped or shifted, prolonging disability, the court denied further compensation, holding that the commission had no power to grant further compensation, and could not be given such power unless the subsequent injury was the natural and proximate result of the first injury.91

89.

Reiss v. Northway Motor & Mfg. Co., 201 Mich. 90, 166 N. W. 840,

1 W. C. L. J. 1008, 16 N. C. C. A. 550.

90. Shell Co. of California v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 36 Cal. App. 463, 172 Pac. 611 (1918), 2 W. C. L. J. 34; Squire Dingee Co. v. Indus. Bd. of Ill., 281 Ill 359, 117 N. E. 1031, 15 N. C. C. A. 400; In Re Roman Mamps, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 244.

91. Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury, 171 Cal. 319, 153 Pac. 24, 16 N. C. C. A. 554.

Where an employee sustained a spiral fracture of the leg, and returned to work before he had completely recovered from the injury, and sustained a second injury, in allowing compensation for the prolonged disability due to the second fracture, the court said that a subsequent accident resulting in "further disability," where not the result of lack of ordinary care of the injured employee, may be regarded as a part of the proximate consequences of the original accident.92

Where a displacement of a semilunar cartilege of the knee, which had been cured by an operation, recurred without the intervention of an accident, and which is likely to happen at anytime, cannot be said to result from an accident arising out of the employment.93

Where an employee suffered the loss of one leg and, as a result of this loss, his other leg became infected and he lost the use of the other leg, it was held that the loss of the second leg was due to an accident.94

blacksmith shop

§ 238. Rheumatism.-A workman in a pinched his finger, and an infection resulted necessitating four operations. Four days after he left the hospital he was found to be suffering from acute inflammatory rheumatism, which caused his death. Medical testimony was conflicting as to whether the rheumatism was caused by the injury. The board found that there was sufficient evidence to hold that death did result from the injury and awarded compensation.95

A miner was compelled to stand in water up to his chest while. baling out water in a mine, in consequence of a breakdown of a pump. He contracted subacute rheumatism as a result of the exposure. The lower court found that the applicant had been disabled by an injury caused by an accident. On appeal to the

92.

Head Drilling Co. v. Indus. Acc. Com., 170 Pac. 157, 177 Cal. 194, 16 N. C. C. A. 550, 1 W. C. L. J. 470.

93. Giamopolini-Lombardi Co. v. Raggio, (1916) 3 Cal. I. A. C. 324. 94. Saddlemire v. Amer. Bridge Co., Conn.

6 W. C. L. J. 130.

(1920), 110 Atl. 63,

95. Perdew v. Nufer Cedar Co., 201 Mich. 520, 167 N. W. 868, 2 W. C. L. J. 313, 17 N. C. C. A. 884.

House of Lords the judgment was affirmed, Viscount Haldane saying: "Had he (applicant) died suddenly while so exposed, say, of heart disease, there can be no doubt that this would have given a title to his dependents to claim on the footing of injury from accident. I am unable to see why a claim in respect of a less serious mishap should be excluded by the circumstance that the miscalculated action of entering the water took time to produce its consequences. This miscalculated action of entering the water in the present case must be taken to have constituted a definite event which culminated in rheumatic affection. It was the miscalcuation which imported into that event the character of an accident within the meaning of the act.96

Where a strain in the course of the employment together with a pre-existing rheumatic condition produces disability, compensation will be allowed.97

Where the continuous use of muscles required by claimant's work was a contributing cause of his disability, which was also due to a pre-existing rheumatic condition, and to getting wet in a storm, and his work was not of a kind to have injured one performing it, requiring no more exertion than ordinary duties, it was held that his incapacity was not due to any injury arising from the employment.98

Further compensation was denied, where an employee had suffered an accidental injury and was also suffering from rheumatism. The present disability was found not to have been caused by the accidental injury.""

Where an employee dropped a heavy weight upon his fooot, and later gangrene and rheumatism resulted, it was held that the disability was due to the accidental injury.1

96. Glasgow Coal Co. Ltd. v. Welsh, (1916), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 79, aff'g (1915), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 463, 2 Sc. L. T. 123, N. C. C. A. 690; In re C. F. Garner, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 139.

97. In Re Wm. D. Bowker, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 138; In Re John H. Spillane, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 138.

98. Pelersen v. Sperry & Barnes, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 370.

99. Worden v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 1 Mass. I. A. Bd. 153. 1. Stinton v. Brandon Gas Co., 5 B. W. C. C. 426.

Inflammatory rheumatism or rheumatic fever being an infectious disease is not caused by exposure to extreme climatic changes from heat to cold and cannot under the evidence submitted be said to be due to a personal injury, and therefore not compensable under the Federal Act.2

For want of evidence that rheumatism was caused by exposure or personal injury compensation under the Federal Act was denied."

§ 239. St. Vitus Dance.-An employee developed St. Vitus dance subsequent to a blow received upon the head. Medical experts were of the opinion that this was a sufficient shock to cause St. Vitus dance, and it was held to be a personal injury.* A woman employee fainted, when the cry of fire was given in a factory, and remained unconscious for two hours, and thereafter suffered from chorea or St. Vitus dance. An award of compensation was unanimously affirmed."

§ 240. Sarcoma.-Where a workman, while exerting great pressure on a bar, slipped and fell, sustaining an injury which later developed into sarcoma, causing death, compensation was allowed on the ground that the death was due to the accidental injury.

An employee experienced a sharp pain in the left side over the region of the kidney while he was lifting a heavy stone, and upon examination he was found to be suffering from hypertrophied kidney. An operation revealed a sarcoma or tumor of the left kidney, which had been developing for some time previous. The operation failed to restore the patient's health, and he died a few weeks later. It was held that death was caused by sarcoma

2. In Re Lewis D. Davis, 2nd A. R. U. C. C. C. 194.

3. In Re Chas. J. Gibson, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 194.

4.

5.

Christofore v. Employer's Liab. Assn. Corp., 2 Mass. I. A. Bd. 364. London v. Casino Waist Co., 181 App. Div. N. Y. 962, Special N. Y. Bull. for August 1916-May 1918, pg. 213.

6. Ondeck v. The Edward Balf Co., 2 Conn. C. D. 308; In Re John Bengston, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 140; In Re Andrew Nachtman, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 141.

of the kidney which could not have been caused by lifting a stone. The only relationship shown to have existed between deceased's act of lifting the stone and the disease is that deceased's attention was called to the diseased kidney by the pain experienced at the time of the act mentioned, and the death was not due to the injury."

An employee suffered a strain in the groin and a sarcoma developed, which was removed by operation. Medical testimony denied the probability of a sarcoma being caused in this way. It was held that the sarcoma had existed prior to the injury, and the accident only served to call the attention of the employe to it. Compensation was denied.

§ 241. Scarlet Fever. Where an injured employee, while in the hospital, contracted scarlet fever, which aggravated his injury the prolonged disability caused thereby, was held to be the result of the accident."

It appeared that the applicant was a porter in an infectious disease hospital and was employed in the wards, and also to clean out the mortuary. He contracted scarlet fever, and claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906. It was held, by the Court of Appeal, that, though it was very probable that he had caught the fever in the hospital, and even on a particular occasion of cleaning out the mortuary, yet there was no evidence definitely to establish these facts; and that in any event the contracting of the disease could not, under the circumstances, be called an "accident" within the meaning of sub-section 1 of section 1 of the Act.10

Where, after an operation for hernia a workman took scarlet fever, and died, while still in the hospital, and the attending physician certified that his death was due to the fever, it was

7. In Re Czwick, (No. 127812) Bull. of I. C. of Ohio Vol. 4, pg. 108. 8. Monsoulis v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 1 Mass. I. A. Bd. 154; In Re Wm. F. Woods, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 141.

9.

Brown v. Kent Ltd. (1913), W. C. Ins. Rep. 639, 6 N. C. C. A. 626. 10. Martin v. Manchester Corp., 5 B. W. C. C. 259, 106 Law Times Rep. 741, 28 Times Law Rep. 344, 3 N. C. C. A. 238.