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held that the death did not result from the injury, and compensation for the death was denied.11

§ 242. Sciatica.-A workman was alternatively exposed to heat and cold, and as a result of such exposure he contracted sciatic rheumatism. Compensation was denied because of the absence of an accident. Affirming the judgment, the court held that, as there was no violence to the physical structure of plaintiff's body there was no "accident," within the meaning of the compensation act, that: "The case is in no wise different than the ordinary case where a man who has been engaged in indoor work for a time does outdoor work in cold weather and contracts a severe cold."

12

A boatman, acting as an unlicensed pilot jumped to his own boat, after his duties were performed on the boat he was piloting, and in landing in the boat he nearly upset it, and water filled the boat. Later he developed sciatica, which incapacitated him. This was held to be an accidental injury.13

On March 13, an employee was assisting in loading 4 by 6 timbers on trucks, when he either slipped or in some manner wrenched his back and fell down and was unable to move. He was confined to his home under a doctor's care until August 10th. He testified that he worked until August 26th when the "sciatica" came back. The court held that the employee suffered a compensable accidental injury.14

§ 243. Septicemia.-Where blood poisoning results from the intentional use of a hypodermic needle, and it is shown that the contents of the needle was of such a nature as not to cause the infection, but that the germ must have come from the exterior of the needle, it has been held that this was an accident.15

11. 12.

Corcoran v. Farrell Foundry & Machine Co., 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 42.
Blair v. Omaha Ice and Cold Storage Co., 102 Neb. 16, 165 N. W.

893, 15 N. C. C. A. 694, 1 W. C. L. J. 424.

13. 14.

Barbeary v. Chugg, (1915), 8 B. W. C. C. 37.

Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 768, 158 Pac. 762, 14 N. C. C. A. 538.

15. Bailey v. Interstate Cas. Co., 8 App. Div. 127, 40 N. Y. Supp. 513,

An employee had died of septicemia following an injury to his finger, compensation was denied because of lack of evidence. to show that the injury to his finger was the result of an accident.16

Where a miner received an injury to his foot, caused by a heavy fall of coal, and later died from tetanus. The county court judge held that the death resulted from the accident. On appeal it was held that there was evidence to support this finding.17

Although there is a diseased condition existing before an injury, and the injury would not cause death but for the pre-existing, condition, still if septicæmia ensues naturally, actually and unavoidably from the injuries, the disability is compensable.18

A workman sustained an injury to his ribs and side in a fall down a stairs. After his discharge from the hospital, he was compelled to return to the hospital, where he died from general septicemia, which was held, on conflicting evidence, to be the result of the accident, and compensation was awarded.19

A workman received a wound in the hand on April 17, and erysipelas developed on the face on July 7th, following. It was held that there was no evidence to justify a finding of accidental injury.20

A workman crushed his index finger, which resulted in streptococcus infection, necessitating an amputation of the finger. Later this infection spread over his body and to his leg. It was held that this continued disability resulted from the original injury.21

Compensation was denied for the death of a miner from bloodpoison, claimed to have resulted from an abrasion received during a fall of stone in the mine. Medical evidence showed that the time

Aff'd 158 N. Y. 723, 53 N. E. 1123; Marchi v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 N. Y. 606.

16. Peoria Cordage Co. v. Indus. Bd., 284 Ill. 90, 119 N. E. 996.

17. Rist v. Larkin & Sangster, 171 App. Div. 71, 156 N. Y. Supp. 875; Stapleton v. Dinnington Main Coal Co., (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 602; Walker v. Mullins, 42 Irish L. T. 168, 1 B. W. C. C. 211.

52.

18. 19.

Mazzarisi v. Ward, 170 App. Div. 868, 156 N. Y. Supp. 964.
Dependents of Chas. Biero v. New Haven Hotel Co., 1 Conn. C. D.

20. Hugo v. Larkins and Co., 3 B. W. C. C. 228.

21.

Batch v. Borough of Broton, 1 Conn. C. Com. 177.

between the fall of stone and the discovery of the infected condition was entirely too brief, and the board held that there was no evidence that the blood poisoning was the result of an injury.22

Where one sustains an injury while working in the ordinary way, with the customary materials and appliances, the injury cannot be said to be the result of an accident. It was so held where an engine fitter had a blister on his finger, and in consequence of using red lead the finger became poisoned.23

Where a railroad engineer cut his finger at home and bloodpoison supervened, necessitating the amputation of the finger, it was held that the injury was not the result of an accident.24

Where an employee was thrown from a wagon and later general septicaemia followed and death resulted, it was held that the death was due to the personal injury.25

A workman, who was engaged in moving rails, backed into a prop and injured his thigh. He continued work until forced to quit because of pain. Upon consulting a physician it was determined that he was suffering from osteomyelitis and septicaemia, and an operation was performed, from the effect of which the patient. died. Medical testimony was to the effect that a blow might cause osteomyelitis. It was held that the death was caused by an accident.20

§ 244. Skin Affections.-Claimant sought compensation for skin eruption, the cause of which was unknown. The claim was disallowed, in the absence of evidence to establish that it resulted from an accident in the course of employment.27

22.

Jenkins v. Standard Colliery Co., (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 71, 11 N. C. C. A. 509,

23. Walker v. Lilleshall Coal Co., (1900), 81 L. T. 769, 2 W. C. C. 7. 24. Chandler v. G. W. R. Co., (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 254.

25. Silva v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2 Mass. I. A. Bd. 597. See infection, Blood Poisoning; Friction injuries, Anthrax; Gangrene and erysiplas. las.

26. Mills v. Dinnington Main Coal Co, Ltd., 1917, W. C. & Ins. Rep. 11, 17 N. C. C. A. 94.

27. In re Drews, Ohio I. C. No. 92709, July 1, 1915, 11 N. C. C. A. 500.

Where an employee was removing an old water closet, and suffered poisoning of his face and hands, due to contact with harmful substances, compensation was allowed for the disability.28

An employee, working, in a bleachery, was affected with a rash, which was pronounced to be a condition of eczema which might be due to the acids. It was found that the condition resulted from coming in contact with moistened clothes, and not an accident within the meaning of the New Jersey Act.29

An employee in a hotel was afflicted with a disease making his skin abnormally sensitive, and while washing dishes in a tank containing hot water, soap and caustic soda his hands became greatly inflamed. Later his nails came off, and he was disabled for about four and a half months. Compensation was allowed for the injury resulting from the accident.30

An employee, who neglected to use the proper gloves, suffered from dermatitis, brought on by washing inkstands with a solution. of caustic soda. This was held not to be an accident.31

Where a workman's hands became bruised and poisoned from handling rough tanbark, compensation was awarded, although no specific time could be assigned to the happening of the accident.32

Where a leather cleanser caused an acute inflammation of the skin and blisters, which left the hands raw and sore, and which could not be prevented by the use of gloves, it was held that this was such an injury as entitled the employee to compensation.33

§ 245. Sleep. The facts in this case, as stated by the court in its syllabus, are as follows: "On August 15, 1916, the husband of the petitioner was a farm hand, whose particular employment. on that day was to make a trip to Philadelphia with a truck

28.

29.

Re F. J. Courboyer, Op. Sol. C. & L. 582.

Liondale Bleach, Dye and Paint Works v. Riker, 85 N. J. T. 426, 89 Atl. 929, 4 N. C. C. A. 713; Rev'g. 36 N. J. L. J. 305.

30.

31.

32.

Dotzaur v. Strand Palace Hotel, (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 387.
Cheek v. Hamsworth Bros. (1901), 4 W. C. C. 3.

Seward v. Sunset Trading and Land Co., 3 Cal. I. A. C. 49.

33. Boris v. Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co., 1 Mass. I. A. C. Bd., 276, for additional cases, see Dermatitis and Eczema.

wagon drawn by a team of mules. He left the farm between 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon, and at 2 o'clock the next morning was found dead sitting on the seat of the truck with his body crushed between the seat and the over hanging roof of a shed under which the mules were standing." "The court was jus tified in finding that the injury of which the decedent died was not intentionally self-inflicted or the result of intoxication. This left two hypotheses upon which to account for the manner in which such injury was caused, viz., that the decedent was asleep when the mules went under the low roof, or that he was negligent if he was awake. The latter hypothesis need not be considered, inasmuch as negligence is no bar to a recovery of compensation. "The main contention is that the injury was not accidental if the decedent was asleep; the argument being that sleep is not an accident. The act of going to sleep may or may not be an accident, depending upon whether or not it was designed; but the failure to wake up in time to avert a catastrophe is an accident in every sense of the word. If the going to sleep was not designed, it was accidental; if it was designed it was negligence. In any event, the undesigned failure of the deceased to wake up until he was crushed between the seat and the low roof was purely 'accidental' in the sense in which that term is constantly and correctly employed. Falling out of bed asleep is an accident, even if the sole design in going to bed was to go to sleep. The sole case in which falling asleep is clearly not within an employment is that of a watchman or similar service, where the servant is employed expressly to stay awake. In such case the failure of the servant to do the one thing he was specially employed to do is, in effect, an abandonment of his employment. Such seems to have been the recent case. Gifford v. Patterson, 222 N. Y. 4 (15 N. C. C. A. 263), 117 N. E. 946." It was held that deceased came to his death by an accident arising out of the em ployment 34

34. Dixon v. Andrews, 91 N. J. L. 973, 103 Atl 410, 16 N. C. C. A. 894. 2 W. C. L. J. 105.

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