§ 248. Suicide.-An engine driver suffered an injury to his thumb which became infected and took a long time in healing. He became depressed and suffered from neurasthenia, and later committed suicide by throwng himself in front of a train. Compensation was denied, the court saying that the injury was not the cause of the insanity resulting in suicide.61

An employer received an injury through a splash of molten lead in his eye. He received hospital treatment, and later became silent and moody, was depressed and suffered from certain marked hallucinations. While in this condition he threw himself from

a window in the hospital and was killed. Upon the evidence adduced, it was held that the death was a direct result of the injury, the court stating the following rule with approbation; "This decision rests upon the rule established in Daniels v. New York N. H. & H. R. Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424, 62 L. R. A. 751. That rule applies to cases arising under the Workman's Compensation Act It is that, where there follows as the direct result of a physical injury an insanity of such violence as to cause the victim to take his own life through an uncontrollable impluse or in a delirium of frenzy without conscious volition to produce death, having knowledge of the physical consequences of the act,

V.

Michigan Paper Co,. 184 Mich. 449, 151 N. W. 554, 6 N. C. C. A. 405; Eddes v. School District of Winnipeg, 22 Manitoba 240, 21 W. L. R. 214, 2 W. W. R. 665, 2 Dom. L. R. 696,14 N. C. C. A. 542; La Veck v. Park Davis & Co., 190 Mich. 604,151 N. W. 72, 12 N. C. C. A. 325; See aggravation of pre-existing disease, Scales West Norfolk Farmers' Chemical Co., 1913 W. C. & Ins. Rep. 165; Hills v. Oval Wood Dish Co., 191 Mich. 411, 158 N. W. 214; Bell v. Hayes-Ionia Co., 192 Mich. 90, 158 N. W. 179, 14 N. C. C. A. 532; See Hernia, Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co., 191 Mich. 122, 157 N. W. 437, 14 N. C. C. A. 530. See Hernia., Brown v. Kemp, 6 B. W. C. C. 725, 14 N. C. C. A. 535, Smelik v. Peabody Coal Co., Ill. Ind. Bd. July 10, 1914, 6 N. C. C. A. 398; Fulford v. Northfleet Coal & Ballast Co., 1 B. W. C. C. 222, 6 N. C. C. A. 399; In re Clark & Op. Sol. Dept. Labor, 188; Voorhess v. Smith Schoonmaker Co., 86 N. J. L. 500, 92 Atl. 280; Zappala V. Ind. Ins. Com., 82 Wash. 314, 114 Pac. 54, L. R. A. 1916A. 295; Poccardi v. Public Service Comm., 75 W. Va. 542, 84 S. E. 242, L. R. A. 1916A, 299; Donahue v. R. A. Sherman Sons Co., 39 R. I. 373, 98 Atl. 109, 14 N. C. C. A. 547.

61. Withers v. London, B. & S. Co. Ry. (1916) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 317, 15 N. C. C. A. 349.

then there is a direct and unbroken causal connection between the physical injury and the death. But where the resulting insanity is such as to cause suicide through a voluntary willful choice determined by a moderately intelligent mental power which knows the purpose and the physical effect of the suicidal act, even though choice is dominated and ruled by a disordered mind, then there is a new and independent agency which breaks the chain of causation arising from the injury.'

7762

An employee, who had prior to the date of injury lost one of his eyes, was while at work struck by a splinter in the remaining eye and gradually lost the sight of this eye also, at which time he committed suicide. The widow alleged that in consquence of the injury the deceased received a severe shock and that his nervous system broke down, his mind became affected resulting in insanity during which he committed suicide; the sheriff's substitute dismissed the application as irrelevant. In declaring that the application should not have been dismissed, it was held that the averments should not be as strictly construed as in case of an action at law, and that applicant should be allowed to offer proof of the matter averred, and be afforded an opportunity of establishing the chain of causation between the injury and the death.63

Where a workman's head was injured by a fall, and traumatic neurasthenia developed and gradually grew worse, and about eight months after the accident he was found drowned in a canal, the county court judge found that he committed suicide, due to a diseased mental condition resulting from the accident. On appeal this order was reversed on the ground that there was no evidence to justify such finding.64

The decedent received an injury to his hand in the course of his employment, by striking it against a rusty pipe. Infection followed and he was taken to a hospital. Later he escaped from the

62. In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N. E. 466, 8 N. C. C. A. 1025; Lupfer v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, Pa.- (1921), 112 Atl. 458.

63. Malone v. Cayzer, Irvine & Co., 1 B. W. C. C. 27, 1908 S. C. 479, 45 Sc. L. R. 351, 8 N. C. C. A. 1026.

64. Southal v. Cheshire County News Co., 5 B. V. C. C. 251, (1912), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 101, 8 N. C. C. A. 1028.

hospital and was found dead on a railroad track. The sole contention was whether there was any connection between the death and the injury. Medical experts were of the opinion that the injury produced a diseased mental condition, and the absorption of the toxins from the infection caused him to become violent. The board found that there was a causal connection between the injury and the death.65

Where a workman, who had suffered an injury to his eye, and committed suicide after the doctor had expressed the thought that he might lose the sight of it, and there was no evidence of insanity, compensation was denied.66

Where the body of an employee was found on the pavement under the window of the mill where he worked, and there was no direct evidence of suicide or murder, the presumption against the commission of a crime is sufficient to warrant a finding that the death was due to an accident. "Where the evidence shows deceased to have been in good health and there is a complete absence of evidence showing suicide, it must be presumed that the death was accidental.67

§ 249. Sun Stroke and Heat Stroke.-Plaintiff's deceased, 57 years of age, suffered a heat stroke in a sheet iron building while the therometer stood at 86 or 87 degrees. Deceased had been employed there for 7 years. Defendant contended that there had been no physical violence to the deceased's body; that the heat prostration resulting in the death was due to natural causes; that the death did not result from violence or the resultant effect of violence. The court, in affirming the judgment for the plaintiff said: "There would have been no injury if the business had not existed. The heat and humidity, the corrugated sheet iron in

65.

Chisea v. United States Crushed Stone Co. Ill. Ind. Bd. Oct. 28, 1914, 8 N. C. C. A. 1029.

66. Grime v. Fletcher (1915), 1 K. B. (Eng.) 734, 31 Times L. R. 158, 84 L. K. B. N. S. 847, 8 B. W. C. C. 69, (1915), W. N. 43, 59 Sol. Jo. 233. 67. Sparks Milling Co. v. Indus. Comm. III. (1920), 127 N. E. 737, 6 W. C. L. J. 299; Wilkinson v. Aetna Insurance Co., 240 111. 205, 88 N. E. 550, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1256, 130 Am. St. Rep. 269; Hammond, Standish & Co., 201 Mich. 192, 166 N. W. 993

Wiscaless v.

the building, the tarred roof, the poor ventilation, and the dust and particles of matter in the air, all acting together caused the sickness that brought about the death of the decedent. A stronger man might have lived, but it is enough that the industry brought about this man's death. An accident is an event which proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of known cause, and therefore not expected. *** It is our view that compensation is a charge against the industry because the industry itself is responsible for the injury. As applied to this case it may be fairly assumed that plaintiff's decedent would not have died at the time he did but for the fact that he went to the factory on a hot day and worked in a heated building.

7768

An employee suffered a heat stroke and died an hour thereafter. Two physicians testified that heat stroke is generally regarded as an accident, especially when due to artificial heat, also that it produces pathological changes in the body. On appeal, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to show that an accident had happened to the deceased, such as was contemplated by the compensation act.69

In an English case, where the employee died of heat stroke while working as a stoker on a ship on the Red Sea, the court said: "The elements of accident such as suddenness and unexpectedness or miscalculation, all seem to be absent; everything happened as might be expected. ''70

In a Minnesota Case, the court held that sunstroke or heat stroke was an accident, saying: "This was as a violent mjury produced by an external power, not natural. *** The intense heat

68. Young v. Western Furniture & Mfg. Co., 101 Neb. 696, 164 N. W. 712, 15 N. C. C. A. 676; Zoler v. American Steel & Wire Co., Ill. I. Bd. No. 844 (1915), 12 N. C. C. A. 319; In re Wm. F. Manning, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 205; In re Henry Ecke, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 205; In re Johann, 2nd. A. R. U. S. C. C. 206.

69.

Kanscheit v. Garrett Laundry Co., 101 Neb. 702, 164 N. W. 708, 15 N. C. C. A. 675; City of Joliet v. Indus. Comm., -III.— 126 N. E. 618, 5 W. C. L. J. 802.

70. Pyper v. Manchester Liners, Ltd., (1916), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 301, 15 N. C. C. A. 678; Contra, Maskery v. Lancashire Shipping Co., 7 B. W. C. C. 428, 6 N. C. C. A. 708.

of the sun associated with the humidity of the atmosphere emanating from the wet sand as an external cause was a violent agency in the sense that it worked upon decedent so as to cause his injury and death. The conclusion that his death was caused by violent and external means is inevitable. That a death is unnatural imports a violent agency as the cause.

9971

In a Michigan case the employee was doing brick work about a boiler. The temperature was 136 degrees, and he was overcome with the heat and went home for a day, after which he returned, was overcome and died. The Industrial Accident Board awarded compensation for his death. In reversing the award on appeal, the court, after remarking that the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act provided compensation for accidental injuries only, said: "The record is absolutely barren of any evidence that anything untoward or unusual happened in the course of his employment during any of the three days or that he exerted himself in any unusual manner or to an unusual degree. He was doing the work which he and his associates were employed to do exactly in the manner they expected to do it. To permit recovery in this case would make it impossible to deny recovery in any case where a fireman of a stationary or marine boiler in the performance of his ordinary and accustomed labor succumbs to heat prostration."72

In Massachusetts it was held, in the case of an employee working in a pit, that since there was no evidence that the heat in the pit was greater than elsewhere outside and no evidence that the employee was required to work in the pit after he found that the heat was too severe for him, it would reverse the award which the board had made in his favor.73 On a second hearing it was held that the employee suffered an injury arising out of the employment.74

71. State ex rel, Rau v. District Court Ramsey Co., 138 Minn. 250, 164 N. W. 916, 15 N. C. C. A. 679, 1 W. C. L. J. 93.

72. Roach v. Kelsy Wheel Co., 200 Mich. 299, 167 N. W. 33 (1918), 17 N. C. C. A. 999, 1 W C. L. J. 1025.

73. In re McCarthy, 230 Mass. 429, 119 N. E. 697 (1918), 16 N. C. C. A. 754.

74. 123 N. E. 87, 4 W. C. L. J. 96.