he a

A brewery wagon driver began work at 7 a. m. At 3 p. m., lighted from his wagon about 5 miles from the city where he had been working. He walked around apparently suffering from the heat, and in about 10 minutes dropped dead. The death was held to be due to an accidental injury arising in the course of the employment, but not out of it, and compensation was denied.75

An employee had been feeling badly for a day or two, apparently on account of the heat, the temperature being 90 degrees and the humidity 82, which was excessive. He was persuaded to stay at his work until 11:40, though he stated he was "all in" and had a "touch of the heat." At 6:30 p. m. he was found dead near his work. Compensation was awarded on the ground of accidental death by sunstroke.76

The claimant's deceased husband was overcome by heat while working at the defendant's lunch counter on a hot August day in 1917, and died within two hours. There was nothing to show that the place where the employee was working was hotter than the outside atmosphere, or that he was affected by different heat conditions than prevailed in the community at large. The commissioner, whose language was adopted by the Supreme court of Pennsylvania, said: "The term 'Personal injury' in our act is confined to injuries of accidental origin and such diseases as naturally result therefrom, and must be held to include any form of bodily harm or incapacity (accidentally) caused by (either) external violence or physical force. *** A stroke by lightning, a stroke from the direct rays of the sun, a heat stroke, or heat prostration, are untoward, unexpected mishaps, and accidental injuries within the meaning of the act. * It is immaterial whether the heat prostration is produced by artificial heat, or by the natural heat of the sun, directly or through the heated atmosphere, if the exhaustion comes from heat in the course of employment." The court in this case also quotes from Lord Loreburn, speaking for the House of Lords in Ismay, Inrie & Co. v. William

# *

75. Campbell v. Clausen-Flannagan Brewery, 183 N. Y. App. Div. 490, 171 N. Y. Supp. 522 (1918), 17 N. C. C. A. 1001, 2 W. C. L. J. 676. 76.

Hernon v. Holahan, 182 App. Div. 126, 169, N. Y. Supp. 705 (1918), 1 W. C. L. J. 1120, 17 N. C. C. A. 1002.

son Law Rep. A. C. 1908, 437: "This man died from an accident. What killed him was a heat stroke, coming suddenly and unexpectedly upon him while at work. Such a stroke is an unusual effect of a known cause, often, no doubt, threatened, but generally averted by precaution which experience, in this instance, had not taught. It was an unlooked for mishap in the course of his employment. In common language, it was a case of accidental

דדיי.death

Under the Pennsylvania Act it is not necessary that the accidental injury should arise "out of the employment" it is compensable if it arises in the course of the employment.

Where a coal hauler was engaged on a very hot day in shoveling coal from a wagon at a place where there was no shade, and was stricken with heat or sunstroke, and later died, he suffered a compensable injury.78

While an employee is engaged in stacking bags of cement in a warehouse with an iron roof and which had no windows, he was overcome with heat. The thermometer outside registered 105 degrees in the shade. It was held that he was especially exposed to the danger of heat stroke and suffered an accidental injury.79

A bricklayer, employed in a place shut off from prevailing breeze and subjected to reflected heat, collapsed from heat strokes. It was held that predisposition to heat stroke is no bar to compensation, and that the heat stroke was in this case an accidental injury.80

Compensation will be allowed for injuries caused by artificial heat used in connection with workmen's employment, as distin

77. Lane v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 261 Pa. 329, 104 Atl. 615, 17 N. C. C. A. 998, 2 W. C. L. J. 928. The Pennsylvania act was amended in 1920 so as to include death from sunstroke. Pa. St. 1320 § 21916; Matis v. Schaeffer, Pa. 1921, 113 Atl. 64. Death from sunstroke accidental, Pack v. Prudential Casualty Co., 170 Ky. 47, 185 S. W. 496,

L. R. A. 1916 E. 952.

78. Cunningham v. Donovan et al., 93 Conn. 313, 105 Atl. 622, 3 W. C. L. J. 584.

79. Fenslar v. Associated Supply Co., 1Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 447, 12 N. C. C. A. 321; Lillman v. Sperry Engineering Co., 1 Conn. C. D. 408. 80. McGarva v. Hills, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 533.

guished from natural heat of the sun's rays. Thus, where a workman, engaged in raking out ashes that had fallen from the furnace, suffered from an attack of heat stroke and died as a result thereof, it was held that the death was due to an accident.81

Where a workman died as a result of heat stroke, and defendant contended that heat strokes and sun stroke were not accidents, the court said: "The word 'accident,' as usually interpreted in compensation statutes, would in most circumstances properly be applied to both mishaps, and injury arising from either may be regarded as having been accidentally received. ''82

Where other causes contribute to the cause of death, the question as to whether the injury was caused by an accident is one of fact for the judge. It was so held where a fireman's death was caused by cerebral hemorrhage, due to the heat and drinking of excessive quantities of water.s

83

An engineer suffered from heat stroke while working in an engine room of a steamer, and died later from the effects. The heat was normal for the climate. It was held that death was due to an accidental injury.84

An employee in a mine died as a result of heat prostration. The evidence showed that the place where deceased was working was cooler than out in the open, and there was no artifical heat. In denying compensation, the board, in discussing the question, cited a number of cases of injuries resulting from atmospheric conditions, such as frostbites, sunstrokes, lightning, etc., in which the rule was applied which excludes an injury not fairly traceable to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and was a hazard to which the workman would have been exposed apart from his

81. Ismay, Imre & Co. v. Williamson, 77 L. J. P. C. 107 (1908), A. C. 437, 1 B. W. C. C. 232, 6 N. C. C. A. 714; Wajteniak v. Pratt & Cady Co., Inc. 1 Conn. C. Dec. 545.

82. Walsh v. River Spinning Co., 41 R. I. 490, 103 Atl. 1025, 17 N. C. C. A. 998, 2 W. C. L. J. 689.

83. Johnson v S. S. "Torrington," (Owners of), 3 B. W. C. C. 68 (1909) 6 N. C. C. A. 715; Olson v. Steamship "Dorset" (owners of) (1913) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 604, 6 B. W. C. C. 658, 6 N. C. C. A. 715.

84. Maskery v. Lancashire Shipping Co. Ltd., (1914) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 290, 6 N. C. C. A. 708.

employment; in other words, the causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. In the light of such authorities, the board found that the evidence in the instant case did not justify a finding that the employee died of heat prostration, superinduced by his employment.85

Where an employee suffers from paralysis due to cerebral hemorrhage, caused by heat and overexertion, it was held that his disability was caused by an accident.86

The English decisions make a distinction between the prostration caused by the sun's rays and prostration caused by artificial heat. In the former class, the injury is denied to be one arising out of the employment, and in the latter the employment is considered to be the source of the injury. Thus, where an employee was seized with heat apoplexy (sunstroke), it was held that this was not an accident.87

Where a boss roller in a rolling mill was attacked by heat prostration, resulting in death, it was held that the prostration was an injury, within the meaning of the Ohio Act.ss

88

Where a laborer, employed in the wash-house of defendant's brewery, was apparently overcome by heat, and died later, the court, in holding that deceased did not come to his death as the result of an accident, said: "The deceased in this case was subjected to the same dangers from the excessive atmospheric conditions of a humid summer day, as was every other person who had to work in the general locality of the brewery where he was employed. I am unable to find, from the evidence, that there was anything so unusual about the washroom of the brewery as to cause this

85.

Mooney v. Illinois Steel Co., Ill. Ind. Bd. No. 740, Sept. 1915, 12 N. C. C. A. 319.

86. La Veck v. Park Davis & Co., 190 Mich. 604, 157 N. W. 72, 12 N. C. C. A. 325.

87. Robson, Eckford & Co., Ltd. v. Blakey, 1912 S. C. 334, 49 Sc. L. R. 254, 5 B. W. C. C. 536, 6 N. C. C. A. 710; Rodger v. Paisley School Ba., 49 Sc. L. R. 413, 5 B. W. C. C. 547, 6 N. C. C. A. 710; Tank v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., Wkm. Comp. Rep. 80 (1914), 6 N. C. C. A. 711; Stinnette v. Gillespie Co., Ky. W. C. D. Bull. (Nov. 1, 1917 to Jan. 22, 1919), pg. 5.

88. Ress v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., Ohio I. C. Nov. 13, 1914, 6 N. C. C. A. 713; McGarva v. Hills, 1 Conn. C. D. 533.

accident. There is some evidence to the effect that it was cooler there than outside. There is certainly no evidence that would justify me in reaching the conclusion that it was hotter there. The work he had been doing was of the usual character and he was, therefore, subjected to no unusual strain. He probably was overcome by heat; he had some beer to drink, and one of the witnesses testified: 'He was hitting the ice-water up pretty strong that morning.' There is, in fact, considerable evidence which would justify me in reaching the conclusion that his condition. may have been induced by drinking water excessively or by alcoholism. Under all the circumstances of this case, after a careful examination of the authorities, I am of opinion that the heat stroke which deceased had was not an accident arising out of his employemnt.''89

Where the natural heat is intensified by artificial means, the tendency is to place the injury on the same footing as heat prostration from artificial heat. and to allow compensation. Thus, where a seaman was on duty on a blackened steel deck for several hours, with the temperature ranging from 108° to 120° Fahrenheit. and suffered from blindness, due to this exposure, it was held that the employment involved special exposure to the risk of sunstroke, and compensation was allowed.90

A carpenter suddenly became unconscious and died, and medical experts attributed his death to heat exhaustion. An autopsy was performed, and it was found that the conditions which produced death could not have been produced by heat stroke. It was shown that deceased had been in good health prior to the date of his death, but that, shortly before, he had been told by his employer that his work was very defective and that the latter could no longer use him. The claim department recommended that the claim be

89. Burke v. Ballantine & Sons, (Essex C. P.) 38 N. J. L. 105, 12 N. C. C. A. 322; Jaskulka v. Hartford & New York Transportation Co, 1 Conn. Comp. 542.

90. Davies v. Gillespie, 105 L. T. 494, 28 T. L. R. 6, 56 Sol. J. 11, 5 B. W. C. C. 64 (1911), 6 N. C C. A. 713; Morgan v. S. S. "Zenaida” (owners of), 25 T. L. R. 446, 2 B. W. C. C. 19 (1909), 6 N. C. C. A. 714.