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disallowed, and the report was adopted by the Industrial Commission.91

Where an employee suffered from heatstroke while working in a trench, it was held to be an injury arising out of the employment, and compensation was allowed."

Sunstroke, though classed as a disease, is not a disease strictly speaking, but is an injury of an accidental nature under the Federal Act.93

Where an employee, engaged in shoveling coal, collapsed from the effects of the sun's heat, and later died as a result thereof, it was held that the employee sustained a personal injury within the meaning of the Workman's Compensation Act. The court said: "This untoward event or unexpected condition under which Ahern's work was carried on therefore constituted an accident which directly and contemporaneously caused this localized abnormal condition. We conclude that under the authority of our decisions Ahern's death from sunstroke was a compensable injury. The second question, 'Whether Ahern was exposed to such risk as to make the results thereof compensable,' is determined by ascertaining whether the sunstroke arose 'in the course of and out of his employment.' It clearly appears that he was doing what he was employed to do when he was stricken; hence the sunstroke did. occur in the course of his employment. 'An injury "arises out of" an employment when it occurs in the course of the employment and as a proximate cause of it.' Larke v. Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 90 Conn. 303, 97 Atl. 320, L. R. A. 1916 E, 584. An employment will be a proximate cause of an injury when it is the natural and necessary incident of the employment, or when the employment brings with it greater exposure to injurious results than those to which persons generally in that locality are exposed, and such injurious result occurs in the course of the em

91. In re Knittle, Ohio Ind. Comm. No. 89545, July 1915, 12 N. C. C. A. pg. 317.

92. Kringel v. Meyers, Ill. I. Bd. Sept. 12, 1914, 12 N. C. C. A. 318; Thompson v. Banning Gas & Lighting Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 571 (1915), 12 N. C. C. A. 327.

93. Re J. J. Walsh, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & J. pg. 193.

ployment. Larke v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., supra. The finding explicitly brings this case within this rule. It does appear that the sunstroke was an accident of Ahern's employment. And that his exposure and risk to sunstroke in this employment was far greater than that of the rest of the community. This is the final test applied by us in the Larke Case. That Ahern was not exposed to sunstroke in greater degree than others in the same employment, and than many other out-of-door workers, we hold to be immaterial, as we did in the Larke Case.''94

§ 250. Sympathetic Affection of one eye by Injury to the Other. An employee was struck in the eye by a chip of steel. which caused total blindness of the injured eye, and all of the physicians advised an operation for its removal in order to prevent sympathetic ophthalmia of the other eye, which might cause its loss. The employee objected to the operation unless it could be performed in Italy. The court held that this objection was unreasonable and that the disability of the employee was due to his own unreasonable refusal to undergo an operation.95

An employee suffered an accidental injury which caused a traumatic cataract. The other eye was sympathetically affected, causing total disability. This was held to be a compensable injury.96

§ 251. Testicles: Injuries to:-Where a swamper slipped on a log, fell and injured his right testicle, necessitating an operation which later resulted in death, it was held that the death was due to the accident, and compensation was awarded."7

94. Ahern v. Spier et al., 91 Conn. 151, 105 Atl. 340, 3 W. C. L. J. 221. 95. Nicotero v. Globe Indemnity Co., 2 Mass. Wkm. C. C. (1914), 531, 10 N. C. C. A. 187.

96. Stachuse v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 2 Mass. Ind. Acc. Bd. 324; Weber v. Geo. Haiss Mfg. Co., -App. Div.— (1920), 181 N. Y. S. 140, 5 W. C. L. J. 872.

97. Vasey v. Industrial Comm. of Wis. 167 Wis. 479, 167 N. W. 823, 17 N. C. C. A. 89, 2 W. C. L. J. 424.

Where a canvasser was riding a bicycle, furnished by his employers for his work, and when the bicycle skidded he was thrown violently to the ground, with the result that a testicle was crushed and bruised, causing cancer, from which he died, compensation was allowed.98

Where a carpenter was accidentally pushed off of two beams upon which he stood, and fell upon and astride of a single beam, suffering an injury to one of his testicles, necessitating its removal, compensation was allowed. The court held that the injury produced temporary disability and came within section II, paragraph 11, subdivision (a) of the New Jersey Act.99

A workman engaged in splitting stones was injured by a fragment of stone flying and striking his left testicle. The injured testicle had to be removed. Later the right testicle was found to be tubercular, and this tubercular condition extended to the lungs. Physicians claimed that the tubercular condition would have developed in the absence of the accident. It was held that the claimant failed to show any causal relationship between the trauma hereinbefore described and the tuberculous conditions present in his system, whereupon compensation was allowed for the original injury and denied for the tubercular condition.1

An automobile repair tester strained himself in cranking a motor. The accident necessitated removal of a testicle. A tumor followed the operation. The commission awarded him compensation, which the Appellate Division affirmed unanimously and without opinion. The Commission decided to award compensation for impaired earning power to an iron worker, incapacitated by a blow on the testicle, due to slipping of a pair of tongs; but, for insufficiency of evidence, denied compensation to a blacksmith who claimed to have been struck on the testicle by a hammer.1

98. Haward v. Rowsell and Mathews, (1914), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 314, 7 B. W. C. C. 552, 9 N. C. C. A. 1028.

99.

Coslett v. Shoemaker, 38 N. J. L. J. 116, 10 N. C. C. A. 1046.

1. Frabbie v. Freeburg, 1 Conn, C. D. 614.

2.

Smythe v. Packard Motor Co., 181 N. Y. App. Div. 907, Nov. 14, 1917, 137 N. Y. S. 1128.

3.

Muller v. Ludlum Steel Co. N. Y. Comp. Bul., Vol. 2, pp. 15, 21.

4. Cronk v. Turner, S. D. R., vol. 13, p. 547, N. Y. Comp. Bul., Vol. 2, p. 167, Apr. 11, 1917.

No compensation will be allowed under the Indiana act "where there is no evidence that the removal of a testicle had or would in the slightest degree impair the future usefulness or opportunity of appellee, or that it had or would produce any disability for work, or a loss of any physical function."

Compensation will however be allowed for injury to testicles where it resulted in temporary disability."

Under some acts compensation is allowed on the ground of impairment of a physical function."

§ 252. Tetanus.-A street worker stepped upon a rusty nail, thereby piercing his foot. The wound became poisoned, resulting in tetanus, from which he died. Compensation was awarded.'

An employee received a lacerated wound, as the result of being struck by the bucket of a dredger, and developed tetanus. This was held to be the result of the accidental injury.s

Shortly after a fall of coal from the roof of a mine at the place where a miner was working, he complained of his foot hurting. Twelve days later he died of tetanus. A physician found an abrasion on the outer side and a scar on the sole; both wounds were healing, and at the time of his death the wounds were healed. The court found that the death was due to an accident."

Where a longshoreman died as a result of tetanus, caused by having his foot crushed and lacerated by lumber falling upon it, it was held that his death was due to the accidental injury, and compensation was awarded.10

Where a gardener stepped upon a nail while at work, and a month later died from tetanus, it was held that the evidence supported a finding that the death resulted from the injury11

5.

Centlivre Beverage Co. v. Ross,- Ind. App.

125 N. E. 220,

5 W. C. L. J. 212; International Harvester Co., v. Indus. Comm. 157 Wis. 167, 147 N. W. 53, 5 N. C. C. A. 822.

6.

N. J.

7.

8.

Hercules Powder Co. v. Morris County Ct. of Common Pleas,

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Putnam v. Murray, 174 N. Y. App. Div. 720, 160 N. Y. Supp. 811.
Oaks v. Berkeley Steel Co., 1 Cal. 1, A. C. Part 2, 218.

9. Stapleton v. Dinnington Main Coal Co., 1912, 5 B. W. C. C. 602.
10. Broderick v. Southern Pac. Co., 4 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 371.
11. Walker v. Mullins, (1909), 1 B. W. C. C. 211 C. A.

§ 253. Trachoma.-Where an employee, who had been severely burned about the face and eyes, was found to be suffering from trachoma, but the evidence showed that this condition of the eyes was due to infection, and not to the burns received by the accident, compensation was denied, because the disability resulting from the burns did not last beyond the waiting period of two weeks. Medical expenses necessitated by the burning were allowed.12

Where a workman, who had been injured in the eye by a flying piece of steel, claimed compensation for trachoma, alleged to have been caused by the injury. The application was dismissed, the court saying: "Trachoma is recognized as a disease by the medical profession and it is said not to be brought about by injury to the eye or by foreign particles getting into the eye.'

13

Where an employee, suffering from trachoma, was incapacitated, following the blowing of cement dust in his eyes, compensation was denied for the continued disability due to the disease of trachoma, which is a highly infectious disease, not caused by an accident.14

§ 254. Tuberculosis. An electrician was engaged in stringing wires in an ash cellar and became ill from coal gas. Three months later he died of pulmonary tuberculosis. It was held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that death was due to the gas poisoning, and compensation was allowed.15

Under the Federal Act, tuberculosis caused by brass poisoning was held to be an injury.16

Where a stevedore ruptured himself on the right side, necessitating an operation, and later he developed pulmonary tuberen

12. Guardian Cas. Guar. Co. v. Castilo, 1 Cal. Ind. A. C. D. (No. 9, 1912) 5, 6 N. A. C. C. 897.

13. In re Leware, Ohio I. C. Aug. 21, 1914, 6 N. C. C. A. 897. 14. Beauchamp v. Chanslor-Canfield Midway Oil Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 285.

15. Odell v. Adirondack Electric Power Co., 223 N. Y. 686, 119 N. E. 1063, 17 N. C. C. A, 877; Black v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 1 Mass. I. A. Bd. 319.

16. Re Edward Devine Op. Sol. Dept. L. pg. 277.

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