Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

In the absence of sufficient evidence to show that there was an injury of sufficient magnitude to cause intestinal ulcers, compensation was denied for the disability, alleged to have been caused by the ulcers.57

Where an employee suffers a bruise as the result of an injury and an ulcer subsequently develops therefrom, the employee bas sustained a compensable injury.58

Where an employee is suffering from an acute gastric ulcer, which, according to medical testimony, will puncture the walls of the stomach, and did puncture the walls of the stomach immediately after the exertion of cranking his employer's automobile, such injury was not caused by the exertion. The exertion was the occasion but not the cause of the puncture, and therefore is not compensable.59

§ 258. Vaccination.-Claimant was compelled to submit to vaccination, which was requested by the board of health. Following the vaccination claimant was found to be suffering from "Acute Mastoiditis, lymphatic infection." An operation was performed which incapacitated claimant for a considerable tin?. Reversing the award, the court held that even assuming that the acute mastoiditis was caused by the invasion of the germs through the vaccination wound, there was a lack of evidence tending to show that the germs secured lodgment in claimant's arm in the course of her employment. The court said: It seems quite clear to us that claimant has failed to show any connection between her employment in the store of respondent and the infection following vaccination. There was nothing in her employment which made her more susceptible to the reception of the germ than if she was walking upon the street or attending a theater or church. In other words the risk of infection was such and such only as that to which the general public is exposed. Claimant's injury, if it can be traced to the vaccination, arose not out of her employment with the respondent, but through the active agency of the Detroit

57. Hyland v. Winant, Inc., 6 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 304. 58. Hoffman v. Korn, 2 Cal. I. A. C. D. 166.

59. Chenowith v. Mitchell, 2 Cal. I. A. C. D. 75.

Board of Health, which for the benefit of the general public requested her to submit to the operation."'60

An employee submitted to vaccination against his will at the order of his superior. Later death resulted from septicemia and the question was whether the infection of a vaccination on the arm would result in an abscess of the knee which would cause death. Upon a conflict of testimony, it was held not to be due to the vaccination.61

Under the Federal act an employee submitting to a vaccination, ordinarily harmless, at the direction of a superior officer, and sustaining injuries thereby, is entitled to compensation.62

Where an employee submitted to a vaccination in obeying the orders of the Board of Health, and infection followed, incapacitating the employee, it was held to be a personal injury.63

§ 259. Varicose Veins.-Applicant claimed to have suffered a strain while lifting, which resulted in varicocele, necessitating an operation. In denying compensation, the Commission said: "The statute requires that the applicant establish to a moral certainty the fact of accident and that the injury was proximately caused by such accident. The applicant was unable to do this. Medical and surgical opinion is that varicocele is almost never the result of an injury, but is a gradual development, as in the case of varicose veins in general. Therefore, this application for compensation

must be denied.'' 64

A teamster was kicked by a horse and was incapacitated by a varicocele, alleged to have been caused by the blow on the groin when he received the kick. In allowing compensation, the commis

60. Krout v. J. L. Hudson Co., 200 Mich. 287, 166 N. W. 848, 16 N. C. C. A. 881, 1 W. C. L. J. 1048.

61. In Re Miller, Ohio Ind. Comm. No. 78, 789, Aug. 16, 1915, 11 N. C. C. A. 506.

62. Re C. B. Flora, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L. pg. 188; Re Joseph D. Haley, Op. Sol. Dep. L. p 255.

63. Fevore v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 2 Mass. I. A. Bd. 332.

64.

Holden v. Maryland Cas. Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. D. (No. 1, 1914) 11, 4 N. C. C. A. 859; In re Emil Beyer, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 139; In re James F. O'Donnell, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 139.

sion said: "The issue is not easy of determination. Ordinarily varicocele comes through gradual development and afflicts men who have to stand much upon their feet, but it is conceded by competent medical authorities that it may result from an accident.'

19 65

Where a foundry helper suffered from a burn, due to the spattering of hot iron, and later received a second burn, which aggravated a pre-existing varicose condition, necessitating an operation, compensation was allowed.66

An employee sustained an inguinal hernia and was operated upon. Shortly afterward a lump was apparent upon his groin. A second operation showed that the lump was due to a varicocele, aggravated but not caused by the hernia. It was held that the employee was not entitled to compensation for continued disability due to the varicocele.67

Since the employer takes the employee as he finds him, it was held that where an employee 50 years of age, weighing over two hundred pounds, whose physical condition was so poorly that a slight injury would result in extended disability, and who was injured when a wheelbarrow fell upon him, resulting in varicose veins and other diseases, that all of the disability was compensable.68

Where an employee sustains an accidental injury, which is aggravated by a pre-existing varicose condition, prolonging the disability, compensation will be allowed for the length of time the employee would have been disabled were it not for the pre-existing diseased condition.69

An employee who was moving barrels in some way got between two barrels and jammed his scrotum, which he claims brought on. a varicocele six months later. It was held upon expert testimony

65.

Mitchell v. McNab & Smith, 1 Cal. I. A. C. D. (No. 7, 1914) 14, 6 N. C. C. A. 399.

66. Mustaikas v. Casualty Co. of America, 2 Mass. Wk. Comp. Cases

547.

67.

Jorgensen v. Healy-Tibbits Const. Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. D. 46. 68. Rounda & Spivock v. Heenan 3 Cal. I. A. C. D. 36.

[blocks in formation]

that traumatism, like that suffered by the claimant, will not cause a varicocele six months after the accident. Compensation was denied.70

§ 260. Vertigo.-Where an employee received an accidental injury, and vertigo followed, but medical testimony indicated no fracture of the skull or concussion of the brain, and that the vertigo was due to arterio sclerosis, compensation was denied, because the disability was not caused by an accident."

§ 261. Wood Alcohol Poisoning.-A show card writer, who used wood alcohol for the purpose of dissolving certain dyes for use in his work, suffered the loss of his eyesight. Just prior to the accident he used an extraordinary quantity in cleaning the apparatus and his hands. This was held to be an accidental injury.72

A family servant used wood alcohol in starting a fire, and was burned to death as a result thereof. This was held to be an accident arising out of the employment.73

A sign painter who used wood alcohol in his preparation of dyes, suffered from a total loss of eyesight after using an extraordinary amount. In distinguishing this injury from an occupational disease, and allowing compensation therefor, the commission. said: "The loss of the vision by poisoning by wood alcohol is not among the number of diseases standardized and commonly classified as occupational disease, and we think that without doing violence to the statute, we may reasonably regard the sudden destruction of the vision by the use of wood alcohol as an accident. We recognize that the issue is one of extreme difficulty, and that two opinions may reasonably be entertained as to the

70. Keen v. Burns, 2 Conn. C. D. 170.

71. Carter v. Llewellyn Iron Works, 2 Cal. I. A. C. 855. See Falls from vertigo or other like causes.

72. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York et al. v. Industrial Accident Com. of Cal, et al., 177 Cal. 472, 171 Pac. 429, 17 N. C. C A. 784, 1 W C. L. J. 903.

73. Kolaszynski v. Klie, 91 N. J. L. 37, 102 Atl. 5, 15 N. C. C. A. 160.

correctness of our decision, but we believe that the weight of authority, of justice and of sound reason is on the side of awarding compensation in this case." 74

74. Dewitt v. Jacoby Bros., 1 Cal. I. A. C. D. (1914), 170, 6 N. C. C. A. 488.

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »