shop in a wagon that was furnished to him. He was found seriously injured in the roadway. The commission awarded compensation on the theory that the employee had been thrown from the wagon. The evidence which consisted wholly of medical testimony was to the effect that the organs of the body were in normal condition and that death was due to a hemorrhage. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision, holding that there was no evidence to support such a finding, and that it was based merely upon conjecture which could not be allowed to stand.63 Where an employee insisted upon riding upon a load of hay against the positive objections of the driver and contrary to the rules of the employer, and fell off, sustaining injuries, it was held that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment.64 Where the contract of employment included an agreement on the part of the employer to transport the workmen to and from work, and an employee was injured by the breaking down of the automobile used as the means of conveyance, it was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment.65 The duties of an employee of an oil company were performed partly at the plant, and the remainder of the day he was in the field looking after business and collecting bills, etc., in an automobile furnished by his employer. His employment began upon reaching the plant in the morning and terminated when he reached home in the evening. While on the way to work one morning his car collided with a trolley car resulting in serious injuries to himself. It was held that, because his work did not terminate until he reached home in the evening, it could not be said that, as regarding coming to work in the morning, he could avoid coming under the general rule pertaining to accidents happening while the 63. In re Sanderson, 224 Mass. 558, 113 N. E. 355, 12 N. C. C. A. 374. 64. Gonzales v. Lee Moor Contr. Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 325 (1915) 12 N. C. C. A. 373. 65. Gilbert v. Employers' Liab Assur. Corp. Ltd, 1 Mass. W. C. C. 133 (1913) 12 N. C. C. A. 373. employee was coming to and going from work. Compensation was denied.66 Plaintiff was injured by the overturning of his employer's car in which he was being transported from his home to a place where he was to work. The plaintiff's duties as a plasterer required him to go from one job to another and upon this occasion the employer told him that certain materials were needed at the next job and he would send a car to transport him and the materials to the new job. The board in discussing the contention of defendant that the accident did not arise out of and in course of the employment in which the general rule that an employee, when on his way to work is not in the course of his employment, was relied upon, said that while the rule might be general it was by no means a universal rule, because coexistent with it is another general rule that where workmen are employed to work at a certain place by the employer, as a part of their contract of employment, the period of service continues during the time of transportation. "In this case it appears from the evidence, without any dispute, that the plaintiff was not riding in the automobile at his own solicitation or for his own convenience or purpose, but that he was riding at the solicitation of the defendant under his direction and for the purpose of the furtherance of his interests. Under such a state of facts, the board holds that the plaintiff's injuries were caused directly by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. 9967 Compensation was denied for the death of a superintendent caused by the overturning of his employer's automobile, in which he was riding to work. The automobile of the superintendent was broken and he asked permission to ride with the contractor in the latter's car. It was held that there was no evidence to take the case out of the general rule that accidents on the way to and from work are not compensable."s Where an employer furnished his own wagon to transport his employees from the city to the place of employment and the horse 66. Zbinden v. Union Oil Co. of California, 2 Cal. Ind. Acc. Com. 590 (1915) 12 N. C. C. A. 371. 67. Yeargin v. Bode, Ind I. Bd. No. 62, 1916, 12 N. C. C. A. 371. 68. Sampo v. Yellow Aster Mining and Milling Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 530 (1915) 12 N. C. C. A. 370. ran away injuring one of the employees, it was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. The commission saying that the moment the employee stepped into the employer's conveyance he was on the premises within the meaning of the Compensation Act.69 An employee fell off of one of his employer's wagons on which he was riding to work and died as the result of the injuries thereby sustained. The employer did not furnish transportation to its employees in going to and from work. The employee had not reported for work at the time the accident occurred. It was held that the injury was not sustained in the course of the employment.70 A bricklayer refused to work unless a conveyance was furnished to and from the depot, so the employer agreed to furnish a truck. While making a trip to the depot the truck went into the ditch and claimant was thrown out and injured. The Court of Appeals said: "The Industrial Commission properly held that the injuries. arose out of and in the course of Littler's employment. The vehicle was provided by the employer for the specific purpose of carrying the workmen to and from the place of the employment in order to secure their services. The place of the injury was brought within the scope of the employment because Littler when he was injured was 'on his way precincts of the company. from his duty within the The day's work began when he entered the automobile in the morning and ended when he left it in the evening. The rule is well established that in such cases compensation should be awarded. ''71 A workman employed in the canal zone was injured while riding home from work on a labor train. It was held that he was injured in the course of his employment.72 Where an employee was injured while driving his employer's wagon back to the place of employment after making a delivery 69. Oldham v. Southwestern Surety Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. D. (1914) 7, 7 N. C. C. A. 425. 70. In re Schmitt Ohio Ind. Com., (1914), 7 N. C. C. A. 415. 71. Littler v. Geo. A. Fuller Co., 223 N. Y. 369, 119 N. E. 554, 16 N. C. C. A. 901. 72. In re Claim of William Gerow, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L. (1915), 282. for his employer, it was held that the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.73 An employee engaged to load and unload a barge was drowned while riding on the barge to the place where it was to be unloaded. It was held that the accident arose out of the employment.74 Where the contract of employment entitled a waitress to ride in her employer's hotel bus while on personal errands during her off hours and she was injured by the negligence of the chauffeur while returning with him to report for duty, such injury did not arise in her employment, so as to make her and the chauffeur fellow servants and require her to proceed under the compensation law.75 Where a boy left his work and took a government skiff to go across a river for some reason unknown to anyone but himself, it was held, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that he was doing something incidental or necessary to his occupation and that the accidental injury which he suffered arose out of and in the course of his employment.76 A section hand was injured when he jumped from a burning car while returning to work. The car was furnished by the employer as a means of conveying his workmen to their place of work. It was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment." Section hands, who are furnished handears for transportation to and from work, sustaining injuries while enroute, even though the homeward trip is begun after the day's working hours are over, are still within the course of their employment.78 73. 938. White v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 211 Ill. App. 14, 17 N. C. C. A. 74. Rideout Co. v. Pillsbury, 173 Cal. 132, 159 Pac. 435, 12 N. C. C. A. 1032. 75. Roth v. Adirondack Co., 183 N. Y. S. 717, 6 W. C. L. J. 557. 77. Potts v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 4 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 421. Cicalese v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 69 Atl. 166, Arkadephia Lbr. Co. v. Smith, 78 Ark. 505, 75 N. J. L. 897; Wilson v. Ban Where a farm laborer was permitted to use a horse of his enployer to take his personal belongings to the place of his employer, and the horse became frightened by a motor and the man was seriously injured, compensation was denied, the court holding that he was using the horse merely as a license, and that when an employer permits an employee to ride in his conveyance without any obligation on his part to do so the employer is not liable for injuries received on the trip.79 Where an employee at his request was furnished a bicycle to ride to and from work, and was killed when he collided with a motor car on his way home, it was held that the accident did not arise out of the employment, even though the employee would not accept the employment unless provided with a bicycle.80 Deceased was killed by a current of electricity received from a third rail while waiting to take a train home. "The deceased was entitled to journey from his work free of charge upon the cars of the appellant, and while so traveling would have been in the course of his employment, Russell v. H. R. R. R. Co, 17 N. Y. 134; Ross v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 5 Hun, 488; Vick v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 267, 47 Am. Rep. 36; MeLaughlin v. Interurban R. R. Co., 101 App. Div. 134, 91 N. Y. Supp. 883. The deceased was also entitled to a reasonable opportunity, after his work was done, to remove himself from the premises of his employer. Pope v. Merritt & Chapman Derrick & Wreckage Co., 177 App. Div. 69, 163 N. Y. Sup. 655; Bylow v. St. Regis Paper Co., 179 App. Div. 555, 166 N. Y. Supp. 874. The 10 minutes, which elapsed between the moment when he gave in his time and the moment of the accident, was a reasonable time during which to stay upon the premises of his employer waiting to take the next train home. Therefore, whether the accident happened while the plaintiff was thus waiting, or after his homeward journey had begun, he was in either case, under the authorities 79. Whitefield v. Lambert, (1915), 8 B. W. C. C. 91, 12 N. C. C. A. 905; Whitebread v. Arnold, (1908), 99 L. T. 103, 1 B. W. C. C. 317; Nolan v. Porter & Sons, (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 106; Henson v. Standard Oil Co., 1 Cal. Ind. A. C. part 2, 383, 12 N. C. C. A. 379. 80. Edwards v. Wingham Agri. Implmts. Co., (1913), 6 B. W. C. C. 511. |