and being in a hurry to get back he caught a passing truck. In affirming a judgment of dismissal the court held that "plaintiff's employment was such that reasonable men could not conclude that, as an incident thereto, it might be expected that the hazard of accidental injury from obtaining rides on passing vehicles was connected therewith;" and that, "since plaintiff was provided with car fare when the messages were to go beyond a certain distance, he was to walk on all other occasions, and, therefore, when he sought other methods by which to accomplish his tasks he departed from the scope or ambit of his employment, and while so doing was not protected by the compensation act."4 An extra switchman, who reported for work and was informed that his services were not needed, climbed on a moving freight train for his own convenience in going home and was struck by a viaduct. It was held that the relation of master and servant did not exist at the time of the accident. Therefore the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment.5 Decedent was employed as a foreman. He had completed one job and was ordered to another at a different point in the state. Missing the regular stage he accepted the invitation of a friend to ride, as a guest, in an automobile. The automoblie skidded and turned over, Deceased sustained injuries which resulted in his death within twenty four hours thereafter. The court, in holding, on appeal, that an award should be made, said: "In the case at bar it was an essential part of his employment that the deceased should travel from the place where he had installed one plant to the place where he was to install another. It is also clear that he adopted a reasonable and apparently the only facility for such travel under the circumstances, and as safe as any other that may have been available. No case is cited that adopts a different rule, and we know of none, as applied to workmen's compensation statutes. 4. State ex rel. Miller v. District Court of Hennepin Co., 138 Minn. 334, 164 N. W. 1012, 15 N. C. C. A. 256, 1 W. C. L. J. 216. 5. Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Indus. 278, (Dec., 1919) 5 W. C. L. J. 189; 129 N. E. 420. Com. et al., 290 Ill. 503, 125 N. E. Mass.-, (1921), 6. Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 64 Col. 480, 174 Pac. 589, 17 N. C. C. A. 955, 2 W. C. L. J. 759. An employee was engaged to go from place to place at the direction of his employer for the purpose of setting up machinery, which his employer sold. On these occasions it was discretionary with the employee as to what means of conveyance he would select to take him from one place to another. At the time of the accident he was going to his work in the automobile of his son. The automobile was upset and he was seriously injured. Compensation was awarded and the appellate court, in denying an appeal and holding that the accident did arise out of and in the course of the employment, said that the facts of this case took it out of the general rule contended for by the employer, since in this case the particular destination to which the employee was to go was not defined in advance, "but was the subject of direction from time to time by the employer to an extent which rendered the travel of the employee to such place a part of the employment itself sufficient to bring him within the category of a traveling employee."" An injury to an employee while riding home in a conveyance owned by a fellow employee, when transportation was not furnished by the employer, does not arise out of the employment. An employee, engaged as cook in the river and harbor werk, was drowned while crossing the river in a launch of a private. party while on his way to work. It was held that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment." A life insurance agent was riding in an automobile of a prospective customer when the automobile turned over and he sustained injuries. It was held that the accident did not arise out of the employment.10 An employee injured while riding home from work in the truck. of another employee, over which the employer exercised no control, was not injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, since the employer had not undertaken to furnish transportation to his employees."1 7. London & L. Indem. Co. v. Indus. Acci. Com., 35, Cal. App. 681, 170 Pac. 1074, 16 N. C. C. A. 909, 1 W. C. L. J. 743. 8. In re Gillis, Ohio, I. C. 1915, 12 N. C. C. A. 388. 9. 10. 11. In re Claim of Aaron Ware, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L. (1915), 334. L. J. 517. § 268. Going to and from Work While on Premises of Employer and While Passing Over Ways of Egress and Ingress.— Where a carpenter fell when attempting to descend from the bin floor of an elevator, by way of a fire escape, which was used in going from his work to the timekeeper's office at the close of the day's work, it was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment.12 Compensation was allowed for the death of a miner, who was crushed between the cage and the buntons of the shafts while leaving the mine after work hours, the court holding that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment.13 Claimant had applied for work, and was informed that there was no work, but to call at the office before 7:30 the next morning and see if there would then be any. He was given, on request, lodging and a slip entitling him to supper and breakfast. He did not report at the appointed hour, but slept until 8:30; and at noon, while going from the sleeping car to the place where his pass entitled him to get breakfast, he was struck and injured while crossing the railroad tracks. Reversing an award in claimant's favor, the court held that claimant was not in defendant's employ at the time of the injury, and said further: "Even if claimant was an employee of the appellant, he was not acting in the course of his employment when injured. It is true that an employee is within the protection of the (New York) Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol Laws c. 67), not only when actually at work, but also while upon the premises of his employer he is going to or from work, or to or from a meal, or while at a meal which is had upon the premises during a temporary interrup. tion of work. This claimant was not going to or from his work at the time of the injury, nor was he going to a meal during the interruption of his work, for he had as yet not worked at all. Finally, he was not going to a meal upon the premises, which he was permitted to take there, for his card to the boarding house 12. Stephens Engineering Co. v. Indus. Com., 290 Ill. 88, 124 N. E. 869, 5 W. C. L. J. 205; In Re Geo. J. Wheeler, 2nd. A. R. U. S. C. C. 258. 13. Moury v. Latham Coal & Mining Co, 212 Ill. App. 508, 18 N. C. C. A. 1034. was for supper and breakfast only, and both these meals he had already eaten. He had no right to a noonday meal at the boarding house. Therefore, the claimant, even though an employee, was not in the course of his employment when injured.' An employee of a lumber company was required to remain on the premises and to sleep in a bunk furnished by the employer. While lying in the bunk, talking to a fellow employee in 'he bunk above him, a straw fell and lodged in his throat. The court, in in deciding that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment, said that the general rule under the authorities is that when the contract of employment contemplates that the employee shall sleep upon the premises of the employer, the employee is considered to be performing services growing out of and incidental to such employment during the time he is on the premises of the employer. Rucker v. Read, 39 N. J. Law J. 48; Chitty v. Nelson, 2 B. W. C. C. 496; Alderidge v. Merry, 6 B. W. C. C. 450; Griffith v. Cole Bros. et al., (Iowa), 165 N. W. 577; Meyers v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., (Mich.), 165 N. W. 703; Cokolon v. Ship Kentra, 5 B. W. C. C. 658; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Ryan, 82 Tex. 565, 18 S. W. 219. In the present case the employee was under the protection and using the things which were furnished to him by the company. Under such circumstances the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.15 Where an employee was killed when he turned back, five minutes after quitting time, after washing and putting on his coat and hat, to look for his companions, and in so doing thrust his head into an elevator shaft and was struck by a descending elevator, the court held that the accident did not arise "out of and in the course of the employment, and said: "At the time he met his death. he was not engaged in the business of his employment. He had ceased that. His act of turning back, looking about the room for 14. Brassard v. Delaware & H. Co., 186 App. Div. 647, 175 N. Y. Supp. 359 (1919), 18 N. C. C. A. 1038; Susznik v. Alger Logging Co., 176 Ore. 189, 147 Pac. 922. 15. Holt br. Co. et al., v. Indus. Comm, of Wis. et al., 168 Wis. 381, 170 N. W. 366;3 W. C. L. J. 549. his companions, and putting his head into the elevator shaft, was his own voluntary act. He had deviated from the direct and ordinary route of passage for purposes of his own. 916 An employee fell from a trestle and was killed, while en route to his home for lunch. The employee chose the railroad in preference to a highway, in order that he might not be seen in his working clothes on Sunday. Permission was given him, by his employer, to use the railroad, and he was paid for the hour consumed in going for lunch. In holding that the present case did not come under the rule of protection against accidents occurring upon the premises of the employer, the court said: "At the time. the deceased fell he was still within the limits of the railroad yards in which yard he performed certain of his duties,' there being nothing to indicate how far he had proceeded from where he stopped work. The fact that an employee is on the 'premises' of his employer when those premises consist of a railroad right of way or yards does not have the significance which it naturally would have in the case of an ordinary manufacturing plant. We know that such rights of way extend indefinitely, and that such yards are of no standard size, but run from small areas to tracts extending over many miles. Therefore, to say that the deceased was still within the yards where he performed some of his duties. in no manner indicates that he was still within that reasonable distance of the point of cessation of his actual work where he would be protected. Nor do we think that this distance and protection would be indefinitely and as a matter of course extended simply because the employer permitted him for his own purposes to travel on the railroad right of way instead of taking the usual and safe course by the highway.''17 Where an employee was injured by falling into the elevator shaft while attempting to use the elevator in going to his place of employment on the fourth floor, the court, in holding that the accident arose "out of and in the course of the employment, 16. Urban v. Topping Bros. et al., 184 App. Div. 633, 172 N. Y. Supp. 432, 3 W. C. L. J. 184. 17. McInerney v. Buffalo & S. R. Corp., 225 N. Y. 130, 121 N. E. 806, 3 W. C. L. J. 494. |