An employee fell downstairs when on his way out after working hours on his way home, intending to make a delivery of cigars for his employer according to his usual custom. Holding that the accident arose out of and in the course of deceased's employment, the court said: "It is plain, therefore, that Grieb's service, if it had been rendered during working hours would have been incidental to his employment. To overturn this award, it is necessary to hold that the service ceased to be incidental because rendered after hours. The law does not insist that an employee shall work with his eyes upon the clock. Services rendered in a spirit of helpful loyalty, after closing time had come, have the same protection as the services of the drone or laggard. * * * All the circumstances point to the conclusion that Grieb left the factory on the fatal errand for the sole purpose of helping the master in the transaction of the master's business. It was not mere friendship, it was the relation of employer and employee, that led the one to request the service and the other to render it. If such service is not incidental to the employment within the meaning of this statute, loyalty and helpfulness have earned a poor reward.''31

A miner slipped and fell on a track in leaving the premises on a frosty morning, and sustained injuries. The lower court held that the risk of falling was common to all persons on a frosty morning and therefore the accident did not arise out of the employment. Applying the rule laid down by the House of Lords in Simpson v. Sinclair, (1917) A. C. 127, (1917) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 164, 15 N. C. C. A. 224n, rev'g (1915) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 543, (1915) 2 Sc. L. T. 291, Swinfen Eady, L. J., said: "Here it was by reason of the workman's employment that he was compelled to be in this particular place. It was the ordinary way of leaving the colliery premises to go to his home. There is no suggestion that it was a way that he ought not to have taken, or a prohibited way. It was the ordinary way home, and slipping and falling with his arm on this rail at this spot was, in my opinion, an accident that arose out of as well as in the course of his employ

31.

Grieb v. Hammerle, 222 N. Y. 382, 118 N. E. 805, 16 N. C. C. A. 897, 1 W. C. L. J. 846; In re Caim of Fahey, Op. Sol. (1915), 218.

ment. For these reasons I am of opinion that the appeal should be allowed, and an award made in favor of the workman.''32

The usual means of heating water, for washing before leaving the premises after work hours, was out of order, and the employees sought to heat a bucket of water by placing it in a tank, which they took to be filled with hot water, but which in fact was an explosive acid that exploded when it came in contact with the cold bucket and severly burned the employee. The tank bore no danger label. The fact that the injured employee departed from the usual and customary way of providing hot water for washing, when deprived of the usual means of heating water for such purpose, cannot deprive him of the benefits provided by the Indiana workmen's compensation law. He was still pursuing his original purpose and the deviation in the plan of accomplishing the end in view, under the circumstances, was not unreasonable or unnatural.33

The test in determining whether the injury has arisen in the course of employment is then said to be where the deceased, "though actually through with the work, was still within the sphere of the work, or was doing what a man so employed may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time. ''34

Where a threshing hand was injured while assisting in placing the machine on the highway after a job had been finished and the employee paid off, it was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, because of a custom of the

32. Wales v. Lambton & H. Colliries, (1917), W. & C. Ins. Rep. 289, 16 N. C. C. A. 898; Marsh v. Pope & Pearson, Ltd., (1917), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 267, 16 N. C. C. A. 899; In re Herbert Ferguson, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 262.

33. In re Ayers, 64 Ind. App.

1 W. C. L. J. 559.

118 N. E. 386, 16 N. C. C. A. 900,

34. In re Stacy, 225 Mass. 174 114 N. E. 206; Demann v. Hydraulic Engineering Co., 192 Mich. 594, 159 N. W. 380; Indian Creek Coal Mining Co. v. Wehr, Ind. (1920), 128 N. E. 765, 7 W. C. L. J. 47; In Re

Louis Mahin, 3rd. A. R. U. S. C. C. 174.

country wherein threshing employees were expected to assist in placing the machine out on the highway.35

An employee was compelled to cross a trestle over planks which were unguarded in order that he might reach the car from which he was to unload coal. The planks leading to the car were frosty and slippery. Deceased was found on the ground below the ladder, where he naturally would have been had he fallen from the trestle. In overruling the contention of the employer that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment, the court said: "The board were well warranted in finding that the employee met with his injury in the course of his employment. It occurred at the time and place of his occupation, and while he was engaged in the duties incidental to it. The evidence also warranted their conclusion that the injury arose out of his employment. If his fall was due to the slippery, unguarded and dangerous condition of the trestle and ladder, then his injury was caused by a risk incident to the work he was employed to do."'36

An employee was blind in one eye, but his vision was ample for the work he did. About 6 p. m., when he was on his way leaving the premises by a stairway, he slipped or became overbalanced and fell. In holding that the accident arose out of his employment the court said: "We are of opinion that there is a reasonable probability that some employee in the course of his employment will fall and receive an injury while descending a stairway of an employer, constructed and used as the stairway was in the case at bar. It follows that the likelihood of such a fall is a risk and hazard of that business.''37

Where a miner was injured by a projecting piece of slate, while leaving the mine at the close of his day's work, it was held

35. Newson v. Burstal, (1915), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 16, 15 N. C. C. A. 218.

36. In re Uzzio, 228 Mass. 331, 117 N. E. 349, 15 N. C. C. A. 234, 1 W. C. L. J. 80.

37. In re O'Brien, 228 Mass. 380, 117 N. E. 619, 15 N. C. C. A. 236, 1 W. C. L. J. 213.

that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment.

38

7739

Where an employee was injured when he attempted to board. a switch engine to go to punch a time clock at the entrance of the employer's plant, about five blocks from where the employee quit work, it was held that the accident happened in the course of the employment but did not arise out of it, the court saying: "It cannot be said that the attempt to mount the locomotive was in the interest of the employer, or for the purpose of expediting the employer's work, since the employer was not interested in the speedy checking out of the appellee, but interested only in the checking out being accomplished. In our judgment the facts do not present a situation wherein the employee negligently performed a duty, or was guilty of negligence in the performance of a duty, but rather a case wherein he attempted unnecessarily to do a perilous act, not reasonably incident to his employment. Where a workman quit his work at the end of the day and rode towards the other end of the mine on an engine with other employees for the purpose of ascending and was injured, when the engine collided with cars which had been insecurely placed on the switch line, it was held that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The court said: "While he had ceased work at the coal loader, he was still in the pit, the place of employment, and still under the direction and control of the defendant. It cannot be said he was outside of his employment, when he was passing from one part of the pit to the other, riding on the engine, a common means of transportation in going to the tipple, an appliance of the defendant for the purpose of ascending above ground. It was the usual custom of the miners "to ride out upon the last trip" upon the dinkey engines, and this was done with the acquiescence of the defendant. The injury which occurred on the trip was a result which was or should

38. Sedlock v. Carr, Coal & Mfg. Co., 98 Kan. 680, L. R. A. 1917 B. 372, 159 Pac. 9, 15 N. C. C. A. 237.

39. Inland Steel Co. v. Lambert, 64 Ind. App. C. C. A. 240, 1 W. C. L. J. 347.

118 N. E. 162, 15 N.

have been in contemplation of the defendant and which grew out of and was reasonably incident to plaintiff's. employment. "40 Where an employee attempted to cross between the cars of a train standing on the track, and the train moved, precipitating the employee to the ground and killing him, it was held that the accident did not arise out of the employment, the court saying: "To establish that the accident arose out of the employment it must be shown that it was part of his employment to hazard, suffer or do that which caused the injury. Therefore where a workman has permission to traverse his employer's property, but not by any prescribed route, or marked path. such permission does not entitle him to climb over or scramble under any obstacle which he may find on a route chosen arbitrarly by him."'41

Where an employee, while attempting to leave a ship, fell from a plank used in reaching the quay and sustained injuries resulting in his death, it was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment.42

Where a warehouse employee was killed by an electric current when he went into the washroom to clean up after his day's work, it was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment.43

Where a boy was suspended from work and ordered to go to the pit bottom, a place where the miners waited for the ascension. of the cage, but refused to do so and was injured, it was held that his injury did not arise out of nor in the course of the employment.44

40.

Chance v. Reliance Coal & Mining Co., - Kan. 889, 7 W. C. L. J. 201.

41.

(1920), 193 Pac.

Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. v. Highley, (1917), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 179, 15 N. C. C. A. 210.

42. Duck v. North Sea Steam Trawling Co. Ltd., (1915), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 529, 15 N. C. C. A. 257.

43. Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky., 262, 204 S. W. 152, 2 W. C. L. J. 492.

44. Smith v. South Normanton Colliery Co., (1903), 1 K. B. 204, 5 W. C. C. 14, 7 N. C. C. A. 422; Schlenker v. Panama Col. Expos. Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. D. (1914), 9, 7 N. C. C. A. 423.