Where an employee was injured after the whistle blew and while he was running to get his coat and hat, it was held to be an accident arising out of and in the course of employment."

45

A railroad employee was given permission to go home for his dinner, which was contrary to custom. He chose to follow the railroad track in preference to taking a highway, which led in the same direction and to his home. He was struck by a train, of which he had been warned and was killed. It was held that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that the accident arose out of or in the course of the employment. The fact that he was still on the premises of the employer was immaterial, since he was on a mission of his own and traveling over a route entirely of his own choosing.46

Where an employee, who was ordered to bring his boots for use in the employment, was struck by a train and killed while crossing the tracks to sit upon a hand-car to put on his boots, it was held that at the time of the accident deceased was in the performance of an act incidental to his employment.*7

Where an employee is injured while ringing out at a time clock, at the close of his day's work the accident arises out of and in the course of the employment.48

Where an employee was injured while running with others at the close of the noon hour, to punch the time clock, after having been engaged in playing ball, it was held that the accident did. not arise out of and in the course of the employment.49

A workman fell and was injured while going through the main gate of a navy yard. It was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment.50

45 In Re Shroeb, Ohio I. C., (1914), 7 N. C. C. A. 420; Gardiner v. State of Cal. Printing Office, 1 Cal. I. A. C. D. (1914), 4, 4 N. C. C. A. 859. 46. Hills v. Blair et al., 182 Mich. 20, 148 N. W. 243, 7 N. C. C. A. 409. Brown v. City of Decatur, 186, Ill. App. 147, 7 N. C. C. A. 418.

47.

48.

In re Claim of Rugan, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L. 220, (1915).

49. In re Claim of David Kramer, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L. (1915), 322. 50. In re Claim of Guerin, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L. (1915), 324; In re Claim of Bernard Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L. (1915), 323; In re Claim of McSorley, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L. (1915), 331.

It may be stated as a general rule that an accident arises out of the employment if the employee has reached his employer's premises on his way to work, or is still on the employer's premises on his way home. The exception to this rule arising from certain extraordinary facts and circumstances are noted throughout this chapter.51

Where an employer's premises includes practically the whole town with no well defined routes for pedestrian travel, an employee killed by a train while returning from lunch was at the time in the course of the employment, even though the train was owned by others than the employer. The court said: "By the direct language of the Texas act there need be no direct causal connection between the actual employment and the injury, the statute in this particular being satisfied if it be merely shown that the injury occurred in the course of the employment in the sense that it had to do with and originated in the business of the employer, the only other requirement being that the employee be at the time engaged in or about the furtherance of his employer's affairs.

"As we understand the current decisions touching the spirit. of such laws as this, the employee does not have to be actually performing some specific duty of his employment at the precise time of the injury before it can be said to have been received 'in the course of employment,' but it is quite generally held that, if

51. Nicol v. Youngs Paraffin Light & Mineral Oil Co., (1915), (Scotch Court of Session), 8 B. W. C. C. 395, 12 N. C. C. A. 654; Gane v. Norton Hill Colliery Co., (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 42; Hoskins v. Lancaster, (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 476; Fitzpatrick v. Hindley Field Colliery Co., (1901), 3 W. C. C. 37; 4 W. C. C. 7; Re Ramon Z. Gonzales, Op. Sol. Dep. L. p 333; Re Wm. P. Fahey, Id. 218; Re O. D. Koontz, Id. 229, Re Joseph Chambers, Id. 226, 228, Re Emanual L. Bernard, Id. 323, Re M. Guerin, Id. 324; Sedlock v. Carr Coal Mining Co., (1916), 98 Kan. 680, 159 Pac. 9, In re Stacy, (1916), 225 Mass. 174; 114 N. E 206; De Mann v. Hydraulic Engineering Co., (1916), 192 Mich. 594, 159 N. W. 380; Matter of Kiernan v. Friestadt Underpinning Co., 171 App. Div. 539, 157 N. Y. Supp. 900; Leslie v. O'Connor & Richman, 5 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 383, 11 N. C. C. A. 501; Foley v. Bretton Hall Co., 4 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 339, Smith v. Gold, (1916)), 9 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 376, Nicholson v. Klipstein & Co., 4 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep 412. But see Schweiss v. Indus. Comm., (1920), 126 N. E. 566.

Ill.

he is doing something incidental to his service while on the premises of the master, the injury under such circumstances meets the requirements and is compensable. Carter v. Rowe, 92 Conn, 82, 101 Atl. 491; Milwaukee Fuel Co. v. Commission, 159 Wis. 635, 150 N. W. 998, par. 3, Rainford v. Ry. Co., 289 Ill., 427, 124 N. E. 643.

1952

§ 269. Going to and from Work Where Employment is not Limited to Fixed Hours.-An employee whose hours of work were not limited to any definite time was called upon to convey other employees to an outside job, and while returning his auto skidded and turned over and he was killed. The court, in holding that the accident arose "out of and in the course of the employment," said: "When a member of the firm directed Horace Rogers to take Mr. Walke to the Dolan camp, it was his duty to obey. There was no obligation resting on him to inquire whether the performance of that duty would inure to the benefit of the firm. That question was no concern of his. It would be an unjust and unreasonable rule that would have required him to decide that question at his peril. The presumption is that the master knows his own. business, and it is the exclusive province of the master to determine questions of that character for himself."'53

Decedent was in the employ of the relator, whose principal place of business was at Minneapolis, Minnesota. He received a salary and traveling expenses, excepting board while at home. His duties were to solicit shipments of grain to the relator. While on his way home from the field of labor on Sunday morning, he came to his death by accident, while attempting to cross the Missouri river in a row boat. In holding that the dependents were entitled to compensation, the court said: "Decedent's duties required his traveling from place to place in his territory, which was several hundred miles from his employers' place of business. It was proper that he have some regular or fixed place for communicating with his employers. His home was near his field of

52. Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, Tex. Civ. App.-, (1920), 226 S. W. 154, 7 W. C. L. J. 363.

53. Rogers v. Rogers, A. 1033, 4 W. C. L. J. 58.

Ind. App.-, 122 N. E. 778, (1919), 18 N. C. C.

labor. He made it his headquarters, as well as his retreat for over Sunday, as he properly would, and as his employers must naturally have expected and intended he should do. Indeed, all of the correspondence between them so indicates. We see no reason why he might not properly, and without stepping outside. the scope of his employment, return to his home from his field of labor on the Sabbath day."54

The duties of a flour salesman required him to be on the public streets, and his hours of labor were largely within his own discretion. While crossing a street, on his way to board a car to return to his home, from where it was customary for him to telephone orders for goods to his employer, he was struck and injured. It was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment.55

Deceased was an engineer employed by the defendant with no fixed hours of service. He was sent out to a point in another state to examine natural gas burners. Upon returning he was struck and killed while going to his home to sleep. It was held that the accident occurred in the course of the employment and arose out of it. The court holding, that the mere fact that he was going home before reporting to his employer was immaterial, in view of the fact that he arrived in town too late to go to his employer that day to report.50

Compensation was awarded for the death of an elevator operator which occurred after she had quit her regular shift, punched the clock and changed to street clothes, and was riding up and down on the elevator conversing with the operator who relieved her. She stepped off on the tenth floor, and when the elevator operator closed the door and started the elevator upwards, decedent pushed upon the door and attemped to enter, tripped, and fell back into

54. St. ex rel. McCarthy Bros. Co. v. District Court of Hennepin County et al., 140 Minn. 61, 169 N. W. 274, 3 W. C. L. J. 161; State ex rel London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America v. District Court of Hennepin County, 141 Minn. 348, 170 N. W. 218, (1919), 17 N. C. C. A. 958. 55. Bachman v. Waterman Ind. App. 121 N. E. 8, 3 W. C. I.. J.

115.

56. Haddock v. Edgewater Steel Co., 263 Pa. 120, 106 Atl. 19 (1919), 3 W. C. L. J. 786.

the shaft. In affirming an award for compensation the court said: "Relators make much of the fact that deceased had 'punched out' on the time clock and that she was dressed for the street; hence, it is said, the finding is not sustained that she met death in the course of her employment from an accident arising out of it. This overlooks some persuasive testimony given by the assistant manager of the employer, to the effect that deceased had no stated hours of work, but was practically on duty all the time, as he put it, '24 hours in the day;' that she used her own discretion as to the time within which she was to do that which was expected of her, that the wearing of the uniform was not obligatory for her, and that she was not required to punch the time clock, for her wages were not paid upon its record. The inference is near at hand that she was at the moment of the accident engaged in her work, endeavoring to ascertain whether the doors of the elevator she was riding on locked properly. It seems their defective condition in this respect was the direct cause of her death. ''57

A traveling salesman slipped on an icy sidewalk and sustained a compound fracture of the upper part of the femur. In holding that the accident arose out of the employment, the court said: "The localities to which he was sent in the discharge of the duties of his employment constituted the place or places in which he was required to work. By reason of his employment he was at the place where he was injured. He was where his employment took him, and the hazard of the icy street was incidental to such employment. This proposition is not changed by the fact that the public generally in that vicinity was exposed to the hazards of the icy street. ''58

An insurance agent was injured while riding with a prospective customer, who invited him to make a trip in an automobile. Believing he could further his employer's business thereby he accompanied him. In reversing an award the court said: "The

57. State ex rel. Radisson Hotel v. District Court of Hennepin County; 143 Minn. 144, 172 N. W. 897, (1919), 18 N. C. C. A. 1033; In re Foward C. Smith, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 175.

58. In re Harraden, 64 Ind. App. N. C. C. A. 230.

118 N. E. 142, 1 W. C. L. J. 338, 15