field of Hewitt's (claimant's) employment, measured and limited, not by material space, but by his ability to find, interest and retain as customers, persons interested in providing for the whole or partial future independence of themselves or those dear to them. in a sense was boundless. The time for work and the manner and method to be followed in its successful pursuit, necessarily rested in the judgment of the agent, founded upon his experience and skill. In going to Providence, Rhode Island, the agent plainly did not leave the field within which he was authorized to work for his employer; nor in availing himself of the opportunity for legitimate persuasion granted to him by Pierce (the prospective customer), did he violate any express or implied condition of his employment? In the prosecution of the business of soliciting insurance Hewitt was independent. While authorized and expected to go where there was any reasonable prospect of securing a customer, his time and his method of procedure was his own. He might travel on foot, on horseback, by trolley, train or automobile. He might write, telephone or telegraph. He was wholly free as to time, place or weather. Under such circumstances, when one accepts an invitations to ride, an injury received is not 'occasioned by the nature of the employment.' The danger incident to the use of an automobile is not a 'causative danger peculiar to the work,' but is a risk which is common to all persons using one. The injury cannot be said reasonably to have been contemplated as the result of the exposure of the employment."59 Where an insurance agent fell down a stairway while going from door to door making collections, it was held that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment.60 Where a gas Company's employee's work was not limited to any fixed hours, and consisted of miscellaneous outside jobs, continuous in their nature, such as reading meters, shutting off gas when patrons ceased using it, collecting rents, etc., it was held that he was under the protection of the act at all times except when at home. Therefore disability caused by a collision 59. Hewitt's Case, 225 Mass. 1, 113 N. E. 572, L. R. A. 1917B, 249: Note; For further cases regarding salesmen, see Street Accidents. 60. Refuge Assurance Co. v. Millar, 49 Scot L. R. 67, 5 B. W. C. C. 522. between his mortorcycle and an automobile in the street, when he was on his way home and not actually engaged in the performance of a service of his employment at the specific time and place of the accident, was held to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. Compensation was allowed."1 Where a policeman was killed by being struck by a railroad train, after working hours, while on his way home, it was held that in the absence of any evidence to show that the policeman was executing some orders emanating from his superiors, or performing some duty of his own initative, which in either case, under the city ordinance, would bring him within the protection of the compensation act, it cannot be presumed that at the time he was killed he was still in the line of duty. Such presumption arises only when the accident occurs during the regular hours of duty. To hold otherwise would be arriving at a conclusion based merely on guess or conjecture which will not be permitted. The accident not having arisen out of nor in the course of the employment, compensation was denied.62 Applicant was employed as a police judge, and was allowed to devote that portion of his time not required in performing his duties as police judge, to private practice. In denying compensation, for an injury sustained as a result of being struck by an automobile, while on his way to his private office, it was held that the accident did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. Though, by the terms of his employment, an employee is required to be ready to perform certain duties at any hour of the day or night, it does not follow that every accidental injury which he may receive during the course of the twenty-four hours arises out of his employment. To have all the requisites for compensation present, it is necessary that the employee be, in fact, at the time of the injury, discharging some of the duties which he is employed to perform.63 61. Ferguerson v. Royal Indemnity Co., 1 Cal.. Ind. A. C. D. (1914), 8, 7 N. C. C. A. 414. 62. In re Lyman, Ohio Ind. Comm. (1914), 7 N. C. C. A. 412. 63. Gallup v. City of Pomona, 1 Cal. I. A. C. D. (1914) 6, 7 N. C. C. A. 411. It was held in a California case that compensation would not be awarded an employee who, purely for his own purpose, leaves his place of employment before his day's work is finished and, several hours later, is injured upon the public streets when returning to his place of work for the purpose of attending to some unfinished duties. The employee was expected to respond to emergency calls by telephone out of regular hours, though it does not appear that he was responding to such calls. The court quoted with approval the following from an earlier ease: "The right to an award is not founded upon the fact that the injury grows out of and is incidental to his employment. It is founded upon the fact that the service he is rendering at the time of the injury. grows out of and is incidental to the employment. Therefore ar employee going to and from his place of employment is not rendering any service, and begins to render such service only when, as has been said, arriving at his place of employment he proceeds to use some instrumentality provided, by means of which he immediately places himself in a position to perform his task. "764 Where a factory employee, who was obliged to look after fires and lights on Sunday and to see that everything was in working order for Monday, was injured while cranking his own car to go from the factory to a garage to get spark plugs for a truck which he would drive for his employer on Monday, it was held that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment.65 § 270. Seamen and Others Employed on Vessels Injured When Getting On and Off Vessels.-A captain of a tugboat was discharged because of intoxication and afterwards his body was found in the vicinity of the pier. The court, in denying compensation, said that if it be considered that, after discharge of deceased, his employment continued a reasonable length of time to enable him to remove his belongings from the boat, it must nevertheless have ceased immediately upon his leaving it. To infer that he fell into the water while in the act of leaving the boat, or prior thereto, rather than after leaving it he fell from the dock 64. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. et al. v. Indus. A. C. of Cal., Cal., 192 Pac. 166, 6 W. C. L. J. 640. 65. Martin v. Henry Card & Co., 183 N. Y. S. 88, 6 W. C. L. J. 484. while proceeding along its edge in an intoxicated condition, would be basing an award on mere conjecture. Therefore, there was no proof that the deceased came to his death through an accident arising in the course of his employment.66 A seaman was drowned when returning to the ship, after purchasing provisions for his own use. It was held that at the time. the seaman met his death he was not engaged in the ship business nor in any duty owed to his employer, therefore the accident did not arise out of and in the course of his employment." Where a cook on board a tugboat was drowned when he fell overboard from a wharf, to which his boat was moored, he having gone on shore to purchase supplies, a part of his duty, and returning with some of them in his possession, it was held that he was injured in the course of his employment, because at the time of his death he was doing, at a time, at a place and of a nature, the duties which his employment reasonably called him to perform. His accident was a natural incident to his work, the risk was one occasioned by the nature of his employment, the injury was traceable to the nature of his work and to the risks to which his employer's work exposed him.68 An employee on a boat reported for duty at 5 o'clock and was informed that the boat would not leave until 11 p. m., and was given permission to go ashore. When returning to the boat, and while going through their yard to board the boat, he fell and sustained injuries. The court said: "If Carter left the boat by permission, and while returning to it and his work he was injured upon his master's premises, and while he was proceeding over a not unreasonable route, and while he was at a place where he had a right to be, and within the period of his employment, which 66. In re Whalen, 186 App. Div. 190, 173 N. Y. Supp. 856 (1919) 18 N. C. C. A. 1037; Spencer v. Liberty (Owners of), (1917), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 293, 16 N. C. C. A. 913. 67. Parker v. Black Rock (Owners of), (1915), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 369, 15 N. C. C. A. 259; In re Theodore E. Perin, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 176. 68. Westman's Case, 118 Me. 133, (1919), 106 Atl. 532, 4 W C. L J. 213. began at 5 o'clock, he was injured in the course of his employment and his employment was the proximate cause of his injury."'69 A dredge employee was drowned when returning from a trip ashore on his own business. In holding that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment, the court said: "The controlling fact is that he had been ashore solely for purposes of his own, and lost his life before he returned to his place of employment or to the premises of his employer, and before he had gained access to the boat, which was to carry him from the dock to the dredge."" A seaman was drowned while returning from attending a wedding on shore. It was found that the boat used in reaching the shore was supplied by a fellow seaman, and was not provided by or with the knowledge of his employers, and that the accident happened while the workman was outside, and before he had returned to, the ambit of his employment."1 A seaman was drowned while leaving his boat to go ashore to collect the purchase money of rope sold by the defendants. The court held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment since the deceased was going ashore to perform a duty owed to his employer.72 A chief engineer aboard a vessel went ashore on business of his own and with permission. When returning he made his way along the quay towards a bridge which he had to cross to reach his vessel. He missed the bridge and fell from the pier into the water and was drowned. In holding that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, the court said: "If the employee had reached the ship or ladders by which the ship was to be boarded he might properly be taken to have been directed to use them as being part of the vessel on which he was living as an 69. Carter v. Rowe, 92 Conn. 82, 101 Atl. 491, 15 N. C. C. A. 258. 70. Berg v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 173 N. Y. App. Div. 82, 158, N. Y. Supp. 718, 12 N. C. C. A. 74. 71. McLean v. David McBrayne, (1915), W. C. Ins. Rep. Traveling Co., Ltd., (1915), W. C. & |