171 Pac. 1088; Consumers' Co. v. Ceislik (Ind. App.) 121 N. E. 832; Bachman v. Waterman (Ind. App.) 121 N. E. 8. It is now the definitely settled law in England. Dennis v. A. J. White & Co., (1917), App Cas. 479; Arkell v. Gudgeon, 118 L. T. R. 258. The injury arose in the course of the employment of the plaintiff. It is true that he was not using his delivery wagon and that it was not customary to carry laundry as he was doing at the time; but he was working in furtherance of his employer's interest. The laundry was received by the laundry company after the accident and laundered. He did not step aside from his work for some purpose of his own but was actually furthering the business of the company. It had never told him to do or not to do as he did. Such an occasion had not arisen. It is clear that if an injury had not intervened there would have been no thought of criticism. It would be too severe a rule that would permit a finding, if the proceeding were against the laundry company under the Compensation Act, that the plaintiff was not in the course of his employment. The result here should be the same. The holding that, as a matter of law, the injury arose out of the employment was right. The cases on principle, and some with somewhat resembling facts, support the rule. Mahowald v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 134 Minn. 113, 158 N. W. 913, 159 N. W. 565, State v. District Court, 141 Minn. 61, 169 N. W. 274; State v. District Court, 172 N. W. 897; Grieb v. Hammerle, 222 N. Y. 382, 118 N. E. 805; Mueller Con. Co. v. Ind. Board, 283 Ill. 148, 118 N. E. 1028, L. R. A. 1918F, 891, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 808; Kunze v. Detroit, etc., 192 Mich. 435, 158 N. W. 851, L. R. A. 1917A, 252; Robinson v. State, (Conn.), 104 Atl. 491; Frint Motor Co. v. Ind. Com., 168 Wis. 436, 170 N. W. 285; Dennis v. A. J. White & Co., (1917), A. C. 479; Arkell v. Gudgeon, 118 L. T. R. 258." 8

An employee's duties necessitated that he write letters and mail them at a street box. While crossing the street, after mailing a letter, on his return to his place of employment, he was struck and injured by an automobile. In affirming an award

8. Hansen v. N. W. Fuel Co., 144 Minn. 105, 174 N. W. 726, 5 W. C. L. J. 284.

for compensation the court said: "The conditions under which the work here was required to be performed took Roberts upon the street in the course of his employment in exactly the same. manner as that in which a factory hand is subjected to the dangers of the factory while in the course of his employment. There is a direct causal connection here between the fact that the man was on the street and the fact that he was injured. The accident was a natural accident of his work resulting from the exposure occasioned by the necessity of his going upon the street while performing such work. He was not exposed to this danger of the street apart from his employment.' The causative danger was peculiar to the work, in that, had he not been on the street in the course of his duty, he would not have been injured. The petitioner contends that, because Roberts was exposed only to the ordinary perils of the street to which any other person is exposed, he does not fall within the rule which awards compensation for an injury arising out of the employment of the injured man. When the logical result of the application of the rule for which petitioner is contending is considered, the justice of treating this case as one arising out of Roberts' employment is apparent. Consider the case of a messenger boy. He is in no greater peril on the street than any other person there. He carries perhaps his message in his pocket, leaving his arms disengaged and perfectly free to move about. But he is on the street. constantly in the course of his employment. To hold that Roberts is not entitled to compensation would be to hold that this messenger boy would likewise not be entitled to compensation for an injury caused to him by the perils of the street. The illustration might be extended further to truck drivers, teamsters, and numerous other classes of employment whose followers use the streets in the regular course of their duty, and whose peril on the streets is no greater than that of any other person, but who would not be injured but for the fact that their duty takes and keeps them on the street. It does not seem to us that the legislature ever intended that these persons should be excluded from the benefit of industrial accident compensation."

9. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Indus. Acc. Comm. of Cal., 36 Cal. App. 280,

A motion picture employee reported for work and was informed that he would not be needed, but the employer's rules required him to remain at the plant for possible service during the day. The plant occupied the four corners of intersecting streets, and the thoroughfares were constantly used by employees in passing from one part of the plant to another. On the morning of the accident applicant crossed the street to change his coat preparatory to playing a game of chess and when returning he stopped in the street and engaged in conversation with fellow employees. One of the director's automobiles approached and struck him. In reversing an award based upon the theory that the accident arose out of the employment, the court said: "Even if it were conceded that injuries suffered by Stanley would have been compensable if they had resulted from an accident happening to him while actually traversing the street on the way from changing his coat, for his own convenience, to a contest of chess, for his own pleasure, we have by no means settled the matter. If we admit that the risk in crossing the street was a risk incident to his employment, upon the theory that, for the purpose of crossing and recrossing, the street was a part of the company's lot, we are yet afield. The thoroughfare was certainly not a part of the lot in the sense that Stanley might properly have loitered, or stood in social converse, upon it, as he might very properly have done upon any part of the lot located upon the corners of the intersection. When he stopped in the street he assumed a risk common to all who might sojourn there in the same manner. Under such circumstances his employer is not called upon to make compensation for his injuries. They did not arise out of his employment."'10

A foreman of a street gang was struck and killed while crossing a street to talk to a friend. In holding that the accident happened at a place where deceased might reasonably be, consistently with the performances of his duties, the court said: "Finally, Robinson's employment as foreman did not require his

171 Pac. 1088, 16 N. C. C. A. 907, 2 W. C. L. J. 31; McDonald v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., Conn. (1920), 111 Atl. 65.

10. Balboa Amusement Producing Co. v. Indus. Acc. Comm. of Cal., 35 Cal. App. 793, 171 Pac. 108, 16 N. C. C. A. 906, 1 W. C. L. J. 747.

uninterrupted attention. No doubt he was expected to work on the road in the larger intervals of his supervisory employment, but was necessarily a foreman at all times, and his conduct must be measured accordingly. Upon the findings of the commissioner the case turns on the question whether one employed as a foreman of a repair gang on a much-traveled highway does or does not step outside of his employment as a matter of law, because he starts across the road, in response to a friendly salutation, for the purpose of conversation, when there is no evidence as to how long he intended to talk, and no evidence that his starting to cross the road did interfere, or that his intended conversation would have interfered, with the due performance of his work as foreman. We think this question must be answered in the negative. "11

A truck driver, whose duties were not limited to fixed hours, was ordered to take a pipe to the depot. The depot was closed so he stopped at his employer's office, where he usually stayed when not actively engaged, and when returning to his truck he was struck by a passing machine. It was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment."

A teamster was killed while passing a building in construction, when heavy beams fell upon him and crushed him to death. Plaintiff recovered a judgment at law against defendant, and the court held that since both parties were under the compensation act, the lower court should have reduced the verdict to the amount recoverable under the compensation act. The case was remanded with instructions accordingly.13

The general rule, supported by the weight of authority, is that when employees are injured on the street, from causes to which all other persons using the street are likewise exposed, the injury cannot be said to arise out of the employment. So where an em

11. Robinson v. State, 93 Conn. 49, 104 Atl. 491, 17 N. C. C. A. 954, 2 W. C. L. J. 779.

12. Burton Auto Transfer Co. v. Indus. Acc. Comm. of Cal., 37 Cal. App. 657, 174 Pac. 72, 17 N. C. C. A. 955, 2 W. C. L. J. 750.

13. Mahowald v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 134 Minn. 113, 158 N. W. 913, 14 N. C. C. A. 904.

ployee whose business for the company required him to travel on the streets between the various establishments of his employer, slipped on an ice covered sidewalk while running to catch a street car and sustained injuries from which he died, the court. in refusing to make an award, said: "Slipping upon snow covered ice and falling while walking or running is not even what is known as peculiarly a 'street risk;' neither is it a recognized extra hazard of travel, or particularly incidental to the employment of those who are called upon to make journeys between towns on business missions. *** This unfortunate accident resulted from a risk common to all, and which arose from no special exposure to dangers of the road from travel and traffic upon it. It was not a hazard peculiarly incidental to or connected with deceased's employment, and therefore is not shown to have a causal connection with it, or to have arisen out of it.'"

Where a workman is sent into the public streets on his employer's business, whether habitually or occasionally, and he meets with an accident by reason of a risk of the streets to which his employment exposes him, the accident arises out of and in the course of his employment. Lord Finley, speaking for the House of Lords, gives the English rule on this subject as follows: "If a servant in the course of his master's business has to pass along the public street, whether it be on foot or on a bicycle or on an omnibus or car, and he sustains an accident by reason of the risks incidental to the streets, the accident arises out of as well as in the course of his employment. The frequency or infrequency of the occasions on which the risk is incurred has nothing to do with the question whether an accident resulting from that risk arose out of the employment. The use of the streets by the workman merely to get to or from his work of course stands on a differ ent footing altogether, but as soon as it is established that the work itself involves exposure to the perils of the streets the workman can recover for any injury so occasioned. "The fact

14. Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co., 184 Mich. 87, 150 N. W. 325, L. R. A. 1916A, 310; In re Edward J. McDonough, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 243; In re Nelson L. Crapes, 2nd A. R. U. S. C. C. 286; Orsinnie v. Lorrance Conn. - (1921), 113 Atl. 924.