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Chief Justice Rugg of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in construing this provision of the Massachusetts Act said: "The Workmen's Compensation Act was not intended to confer its. advantages upon farm laborers, or to impose its burdens upon farmers. St. 1911, c. 751, pt. 1, art. 2. The legislative policy of exempting them from statutory benefits and liabilities established in addition to those of the common law disclosed in the Employer's liability Act, St. 1909, c. 514, art. 142, has been continued in the Workmen's Compensation Act. A farmer employing laborers in agriculture suffers no harm in not undertaking to become a subscriber under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Hence, it is apparent that a farmer who chooses to avail himself of its terms and thereby to confer the boon of its protection upon his employees, does so on other grounds than those which might actuate the manufacturer or other employers of labor.

The act is a practical measure designed for use among a practical people. There appears to be no reason for saying that a farmer may not adopt it if he desires. Any contract of insurance made by him under its terms is valid and enforceable. On the other hand, if he does not desire to make it available, for all of his employees, there is no insuperable objection to his undertaking an insurance for a limited portion of them. If there are those, separable from others by classification and definition, whose labor is more exposed or dangerous or whom he may desire to protect for any other reason, there is nothing in the act reasonably interpreted to show why he may not do so. **The exemption applies to all farmers so far as farming operations whether carrying on other business or not." 21

These provisions of compensation acts which thus except or exempt certain employments from the operation of the act are not in violation of the "equal protection of the laws" provision of the Federal Constitution.22

21. Keaney v. Tappen et al., 217 Mass. 5, 104 N. E. 438, 4 N. C. C. A. 556; Seggebrush v. Indus. Comm., 288 III. 163, (1919), 123, N. E. 276, 4 W. C. L. J. 156.

22. New York Central Ry. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 61 L. Ed. 667, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247, 13 N. C. C. A. 943.

§ 12. Election as to Part Only of Employees. It is a pertinent question under elective and partially elective compensation acts whether the employer has the right to accept the act as to a part of his employees and reject it as to the remainder. Can. an employer accept the act as to his factory employees and reject it as to his traveling salesmen, or clerical help? It has been urged that since each individual employee has the right to say whether he will be bound by his employer's election of the law that therefore the employer should have an equal right to make this discrimination as to his employees. Some of the acts, such as, for example, New York, cover only certain specifically named employments, or as in the case quoted from in the previous section, where the employer has two or more classes of employees, one of which is not covered by the act, he may elect to come under the act as to those classes that are not exempted from the act, but would not be bound to pay compensation as to the exempted class unless he also especially elected as to that class.23 It is however a different case to discriminate between classes of employees who are presumed to come under the act unless they or their employer rejects it. If the employer accepts the act it is generally held that he accepts for all of his employees connected with the business covered by the act, whether such employees be factory workers, traveling salesmen, clerical help, or what not.24 In Michigan it is held otherwise.25 Though it has been held in Michigan that where a chemical company also conducts a farm as an incident to its business and accepts the act generally its farm employees are not thereby brought under the act.20 Farm hands of an Illinois employer are not covered by

23. Shafer v. Parke, etc., 192 Mich. 577, 150 N. W. 304; Keaney v. Tappan, 217 Mass. 5, 104 N. E. 438, 4 N. C. C. A. 556.

24. Garls v. Pekin Cooperage Co., Ill. Ind. B'd. No. 561, Oct. 5, 1914, 11 N. C. C. A. 322; In re Cox, 225 Mass. 220, 114 N. E. 281.

25. Anderson v. McVannel, 202 Mich. 29, 167 N. W. 860, 2 W. C. L. J. 285, 17 N. C. C. A. 467; Kauri v. Messner, 198 Mich. 126, 164 N. W. 537, 17 N. C. C. A. 466; Bayer, v. Bayer, 191 Mich. 423, 158 N. W. 109, 17 N. C. C. A. 467.

26. Shafer v. Park, Davis & Co., 192 Mich. 577, 159 N. W. 304, 14 N. C. C. A. 1079.

the act merely because the employer also conducts an extrahazardous business.2

§ 13. Election to Reject and Abolition of Common Law Defenses. Unless the negligence of the servant was wilful28 many of the acts which are elective in form deprive the employer of the three common law defenses of negligence of fellow servant, assumed risk and contributory negligence, in actions for damages when he has expressly or through default20 rejected the

27. Vaughn's Seed Store v. Simonini, 275 Ill. 477, 114 N. E. 163, 14 N. C. C. A. 1075.

28.

Smith v. Hyne,

Mich., (Dec. 1919) 175 N. W. 293, 5 W. C. L. J. 407; Lydman v. De Haas, 185 Mich, 128, 151 N. W. 718, 8 N. C. C. A. 649.

29. National Enameling & Stamping Co. v. Padgett, 163 C. C. A. 280, 251 Fed. 30, 17 N. C. C. A. 517; Crucible Steel Forge Co. v. Moir, 219 F. 151, 135 C. C. A. 49; Price v. Clover Leaf Coal Mining Co., 188 Ill. App. 27; Boldt v. American Bottle Co., 208 Ill. App. 256, 17 N. C. C. A. 516; Strom v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 200 Ill. App. 431; Lydman v. De Haas, 185 Mich. 128, 151 N. W. 718, 8 N. C. C. A. 649; Wulff v. Bossler, 199 Mich. 70, 165 N. W. 1048, 17 N. C. C. A. 516; Hughes v. Warman Steel Casting Co., 174 Cal. 556, 163 Pac. 885; Mitchell v. Swanwood Coal Co., 182 Ia. 1001, 166 N. W. 391, 1 W. C. L. J. 603; Bednar v. Mt. Olive etc. Coal Co., 197 Ill. App. 251; Bell v. Toluca Coal Co., 272 Ill. 576, 112 N. E. 311; Von Boeckmann v. Corn Products Refin. Co., 274 Ill. 605, 113 N. E. 902; Gayton v. Borsofsky, 230 Mass. 369, 119 N. E. 831, 17 N. C. C. A. 517; Bernabeo v. Kaulback, 226 Mass. 128, 115 N. E. 279; Lizotte v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 78 N. H. 354, 100 Atl. 757; Watts v. Ohio Valley Elect. R. Co., 78 W. Va., 144, 88 S. E. 659; Nadeau v. Caribou Water, Light and Power Co., 118 Me. 325 (1919), 108 Atl. 190, 5 W. C. L. J. 238; Ayshire Coal Co. v. West, Ind. App. —, (1919) 125 N. E. 84, 5 W. C. L. J. 216; Lamberg v. Central Consumers Co., 184 Ky. 284, (1919), 211 S. W. 746, 4 W. C. L. J. 196; West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Smithers, 184 Ky. 211 (1919), 211 S. W. 580, 4 W. C. L. J. 198; New Staunton Coal Co. v. Promm, 286 Ill. 254 (1919), 121 N. E. 594, 3 W. C. L. J. 432; Smith v. White, La. 83 So. 584, 5 W. C. L. J. 531; Brown et al. v. Bristol Last Block Co., Vt., (1920) 108 Atl. 922; Long v. Foley, 82 W. Va. 502, 96 .S. E. 794, 17 N. C. C. A. 514: Noe v. Shoal Creek Coal Co., 207 App. Div. 615; 17 N. C. C. 514; Smith v. Stover Mfg. Co., 205 Ill. App. 169; Synkus v. Big Muddy Coal and Iron Co., 190 Ill. App. 602, 17 N. C. C. A. 514; Boldt v. American Bottle Co., 208 Ill. App. 578, 17 N. C. C. A. 516; Spichs v. Insull, 207 Ill. App. 256, Strom v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 200 I11. App. 431, 17 N. C. C. A. 517; Wulff v. Bossler, 199 Mich. 70, 165 N. W.

-

- (1920),

act.30 Under some acts contributory negligence may be shown not as a defense but in diminution of damages.32 The employer is not deprived of the common law defenses in an action for damages if he has elected to come under the act and the plaintiff employee has rejected it.33 Practically all compensation acts provide that the employer is deprived of these defenses in any proceeding against him for compensation under the act. These provisions are common to practically every elective compensation act, they being intended in the nature of a penalty to induce both employers and employees to elect to come under the act, the compulsory form of act having been avoided by many states, because of the fear of

1048; 17 N. C. C. A. 517; Gayton v. Borsofsky, 230 Mass. 369, 119 N. E. 831; 17 N. C. C. A. 517; Hodges v. Swastika Oil Co., Tex. Civ. App. 185 S. W. 369, 17 N. C. C. A. 519; Daly v. New Staunton Coal Co., 280 Ill. 175, 117 N. E. 413, 17 N. C. C. A. 524; Kittier v. Chicago & W. I. R. Co., 203 Ill. App. 439, 17 N. C. C. A. 520; Witchita Falls Motor Co. v. Meade, Tex. Civ. App. 203 S. W. 71, 17 N. C. C. A. 521; Robbins v. Magoon & Kinball Co., 193 Mich. 200, 159 N. W. 323, 17 N. C. C. A. 521; Henshaw v. Boston & M. R. R., 222 Mass. 459, 111 N. E. 172, 17 N. C. C. A. 523; Gibson v. Kennedy Extension Gold Mining Co., 172 Cal. 294, 156 Pac. 56; 17 N. C. C. A. 525; Stetson v. Mackinac Transportation Co., 182 Mich. 355, 148 N. W. 759, 8 N. C. C. A. 657; Dooley v. Sullivan, 218 Mass. 597, 8 N. C. C. A. 658; Dietz v. Big Muddy Coal Co., 263 Ill. 480, 5 N. C. C. A. 419, 105 N. E. 289; Foley v. Hines, (1920) 111 Atl. 715, 7 W. C. L. J. 203; West Ky. Coal Co. v. Smithers, Ky. App. 221 S. W. 558, 6 W. C. L. J. 177.

W. Va., (1919) 99 S. E.

30. Roberts v. United Fuel & Gas Co., 549, 4 W. C. L. J. 461; Talge Mahogany Co. v. Burrows, Ind. N. E. 865.

130

III. —, (1921),
Ind. App.

31. Western Coal and Mining Co. v. Indus. Comm. 129 N. E. 779; Jackson Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. McDaniel, -, 131 N. E. 408.

Tex. Civ. App. 185 S. W. 369,

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32. Hodges v. Swastika Oil Co., 17 N. C. C. A. 523; Bednar v. Mt. Olive & Staunton Coal Co., 197 Ill. App. 251, 17 N. C. C. A. 525; Day v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 208 Ill. App. 351, 17 N. C. C. A. 533; Lindblom v. Hazel Mill Co., 91 Wash. 333, 157 Pac. 998, 17 N. C. C. A. 533.

33. Karney v. Northwestern Malleable Iron Co., 160 Wis. 316; 151; N. W. 786; Wendzinski v. Madison Coal Corporation, 282 Ill. 32, 118 N. E. 435; Balken v. Cofax Consolidated Coal Co., 183 Ia. 1198, 168 N. W. 246, 17 N. C. C. A. 512; Bjork v. U. S. Bobbin & Shuttle Co. (1920), 111 Atl. 284, 6 W. C. L. J. 707.

N. H.

having it declared unconstituticual, as in the case of the early compulsory New York Act.

The abolition of the common law defenses, as provided in the compensation acts, has been universally approved by the courts as a proper legislative prerogative.34 "To deprive an employer" (under an elective act) "of the right to assert those defenses is not an exercise of the police power, but is merely a declaration by the Legislature of the public policy of the State in that regard. The right of the Legislature to abolish these defenses cannot be seriously questioned. The rules of law relating to the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and negligence of a fellow servant were established by the courts, and not by our

34. Hawkins v. Bleakley, 221 Fed. 378; Hotel Bond Co.'s appeal, 98 Conn. 143, 93 Atl. 245; Havis v. Cudahy Ref. Co., 95 Kan. 505, 148 Pac. 626; Wheeler v. Contoocook Mills Corp., 77 N. H. 551, 94 Atl. 265; Sexton v. Newark Dist. Teleg. Co., 84 N. J. L. 85, 86 Atl. 451, 3 N. C. C. A. 569; Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162, 1 N. C. C. A. 517; Opinion of the Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 96 N. E. 308, 1 N. C. C. A. 557; Matheson v. Minneapolis Street R. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, 5 N. C. C. A. 871; Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489, 3 N. C. C. A. 649; De Francesco v. Piney Min. Co., W. Va., 86 S. E. 77; State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St., 349, 97 N. E. 602, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 694, 1 N. C. C. A. 30; Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, 186 S. W. 648, Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33, 99 Atl. 215; Brost v. Whitall-Tatum Co., 89 N. J. L. 531 L. R. A. 1917D, 71; De Constantine v. Piney Mining Co., 76 W. Va. 765; Thornton v. Duffy, 99 Ohio 120, 124 N. E. 54, 4 W. C. L. J. 548; State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, N. D. -, (1919) 175 N. W. 372, 5 W. C. L. J. 446; Superior & Pittsburg Copper Co. v. Davidovich, 19 Ariz. 402, 171 Pac. 127, 16 N. C. C. A. 801; Shade v. Ash Grove Lime and Portland Cement Co., 92 Kan. 146, 139 Pac. 1193, 5 N. C. C. A. 763; State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 3 N. C. C. A. 599, 117 Pac. 1101, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466; Stoll v. Pac. Steamship Co., 205 Fed. 169, 3 N, C. C. A. 606; State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 4 N. C. C. A. 811, 135 Pac. 645; Cunningham v. Northwestern Imp. Co., 44 Mont. 80, 119 Pac. 554; 1 N. C. C. A. 720; Mondou v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 1 N. C, C. A. 875, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. E. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44; Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., Tenn. (1920), 223 S. W. 844, 6 W. C. L. J. 580; Eassig v. State, Ohio 116 N. E. 104, B 1 W. C. L. J. 1458; State ex rel. Turner v. Fidelity Guaranty Co., Ohio 117 N. E. 232; Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., Okla. 162 Pac. 938 B 1 W. C.

L. J. 1480.

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