defective stopcock, it was held that he sustained an injury arising out of the employment.27

An employee was disfigured by coming in contact with acids. He sought compensation claiming that his disfigurement prevented him from obtaining work. The court held that compensation will not be awarded for mere disfigurement, but if it were shown that because disfigurement precluded an employee from obtaining work that compensation would be granted. In the present case the applicant did not sustain by evidence the allegation of nonability to obtain work, and therefore his claim was dismissed.28

Where an employee, engaged in cleaning a floor, sustained an abrasion on the ends of his fingers, but it was shown that the acids used were disinfectants and that the germs which caused infection were not due to the solution, it was held that the applicant had not shown that the injury was due to an accident arising out of the employment.29

An employee was requested to bring a bottle of muriatic acid to the place of his employment the next day. He purchased it and placed it in his hip pocket, and it broke while he was sitting in a saloon talking to friends, some two or three hours later. It was held that the accident did not arise out of the employment, but the board said that if the employee had purchased the muriatic acid and proceeded within a reasonable time to his home, and while on his way received the injury, there would probably be no question as to his right to compensation, or if having taken the acid home, he met with the injury while taking it to his place of employment the following morning, his right to compensation would not be denied.30

27. Del Bianco v. Gen. Chemical Co. of Cal., 2 Cal. I. A. C. D,, (1915), 210, 10 N. C. C. A. 265.

28. Clooney v. Cresent Glass Specialty Co., 37 N. J. L. J. 82, 10 N. C. C. A. 265.

29. Norris v. Williams & Larson, 3 Wis. I. C. D., (1914), 69, 10 N. C. C. A. 266; Mrczee v. Pfister & Vogel Leather Co., 3 Wis. I. C. D., (1913), 46, 10 N. C. C. A. 266; Murphy v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp. Ltd., 2 Mass. Wkm. C. C., (1914), 643, 10 N. C. C. A. 269.

30. Callahan v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 2 Mass. I. A. Bd. 684, 12 N. C. C. A 397.

§ 298. Act of God.-Where a factory foreman suffered a fatal injury when the walls of a building collapsed on account of a high wind while the foreman was attempting to close windows, a part of his duties, death was held to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment, and not to have been caused by an act of God.31

Where an employee was accidently drowned while on a dredge on account of a violent storm, recovery on the employer's insurance policies could not be defeated under the Workmen's Compensation Act on the ground that the accident was an act of God, since this obligation having been voluntarily and knowingly entered into, with knowledge of all the dangers incident to this class of employment, this absolute and unqualified contract of insurance was not one the surety company was bound or compelled to make, nor did the law require any such duty or impose any such obligation upon it, as would permit it to excuse itself by pleading an inevitable accident or the act of God.32

Death from lightning, while operating a steel road grader was due to an act of God and not to any peculiar hazard of the em ployment.33

Where an employee was killed in a cyclone, while working in a plant, where ammonia fumes and scalding steam contributed to his injuries the court in holding that the death was due to a peculiar risk of the employment said: "We believe the reasonable rule to be that if deceased, by reason of his employment, was exposed to a risk of being injured by a storm which was greater than the risk to which the public in that vicinity was subjected, or if his employment necessarily accentuated the natural hazard from the storm, which increased hazard contributed to the injury, it was an injury arising out of the employment, although unex

pected and unusual. An injury, to come within the Compensation Act (Laws 1913 p. 335,) need not be an anticipated one, nor, in general, need it be one peculiar to the particular employment in which one is engaged at the time. While the risk arising from the action of the elements, such as a cyclone, is such a risk as all people of the same locality are subjected to independent of employment, yet the circumstances of a particular employment may make the danger of receiving a particular injury through such storm an exceptional risk, and one to which the public is not subjected. Such injury may be then said to rise out of the employment. In the instant case, while the risk of being injured by this cyclone may be said to have been a risk common to the public in the vicinity of such cyclone, regardless of employment, yet if there was in the circustances of Kilgore's employment an unusual risk or danger of injury from the destruction by storm of the building in which he was employed, such risk may be said to be incident to the employment of the deceased, and the injury received to rise out of such employment. Deceased at the time the storm broke was engaged in assisting and directing the closing up of the plant of defendant in error. These duties took him among the steam pipes and ammonia coils, which subjected him to an unusual risk of being injured from escaping steam and ammonia fumes should the building be destroyed by storm. The evidence shows that the ammonia fumes and scalding steam contributed most largely to the injuries which caued his death. We are therefore of the opinion that there were in the circumtances of the employment of the deceased risks of being injured by the storm not common to the public in that vicinity, and the circuit court therefore erred in setting aside the award.'734

§ 299. Anaesthetic Causing Death During Surgical Operation. Where a workmen's arm was so badly cut by his coming in contact with a saw that an immediate amputation was made necessary without sufficient time to prepare him for ether, and as a re

34. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Indus. Comm., N. E. 144, 5 W. C. L. J. 661..

sult he contracted ether pneumonia and died, it was held that the death was due to the accident, which arose out of and in the course of the employment.35

Where an employee suffered an injury in the course of his employment, including a laceration of his fingers, and gangrene set in, necessitating an operation, and later a second operation was necessary, and as a result of the anaesthetic the patient developed pneumonia and died, the death was held to be due to the accident.36 Where a workman crushed his hand, and by a skillful operation the hand was saved, but later a second operation became necessary to prevent the hand becoming stiff and useless. and the patient died under the anaesthetic, it was held that the second operation was merely a continuation of the first. and that the death arose from the accident, which occurred in the course of the employment.37

An employee received an injury necessitating the amputation of one of his fingers. When he was recovering from the anaesthetic the surgeons decided to remove a bad tooth of which he had complained. Further anaesthetics were administered, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to remove the tooth. Shortly afterwards the workman died. In a claim for compensation it was held that the workman died from a failure of respiration caused by the anaesthetic, and that it was as likely that he died from an attempt to swallow blood oozing from his tooth as it was that the first anaesthetic caused it, and the onus of proving the death was due to an accident arising out of the employment had not been discharged.38

§ 300. Anthrax.-Where a wool sorter became infected with anthrax germs while working in the course of his employment,

35. In re Raymond Mass. Wkm. Comp. Rep., (1913), 277, 6 N. C. C. A. 627; O'Connor v. Daly, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 643.

36. Favro v. Board of Public Library Trustees, 1 Cal. I. A. C. D., (1914), 1, 6 N. C. C. A. 627.

37. Shirt v. Calico Printers' Ass'n., Ltd., 78 L. J, K, B, 528, 2 B. W. C. C. 342, (1909), 2 K. B. 51, 100 L. T. 740, 25 L. T. R. 451, 53 Sol, J. 430, 6 N. C. C. A. 627.

38. Charles v. Walker, Ltd., 25 T. L. R. 609, 2 B. W. C. C, 5, (1909), 6 N. C. C. A. 628.

and later died, the court held that the death was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, within the meaning of the act.39

Decedent was engaged in handling hides in a tannery. A day or so later he noticed a swelling on his neck under his jaw. He grew rapidly worse and died a few days later from sceptic infection. The board found that anthrax germs had been taken up by the respiration organs and carried into his system, an occurrence so unusual in the work at which he was engaged as to constitute an accident arising out of his employment. On appeal the finding of the board was affirmed.40

An employee engaged in weighing hides suffered a fissure in the back of his hand as a result of wet salt permeating his gloves. Anthrax germs from dirty and diseased hides entered his system. through this fissure. In affirming an award, the court said: "The claimant, in the course of his employment and as a result thereof, had received an abrasion on his hand or a fissure therein. This may properly be deemed an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, and the disease or infection. caused by the anthrax germ may be deemed 'such disease or infection as may naturally and unavoidaby result' from such injury, within the meaning of the statute."'41

Where a workman suffered from anthrax as a result of bacillus entering into his eye, while pursuing his usual course of employment sorting wool, it was held that he suffered from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.42

Where an employee had cut himself with a razor when not engaged in the duties of his employment, and later contracted anthrax germs through the cut on his face and died as a result there

39. McCauley v. Imperial Wollen Co., 261 Pa. 312. 17 N. C. C. A. 864, 104 Atl. 617.

40. Dove v. Alpena Hide & Leather Co., 198 Mich. 132, 164 N. W. 253. 41. Hiers v. Hull & Co., 178 N. Y. App. Div. 350, 14 N. C. C. A 853, 164 N. Y. S. 767.

42. Brintons Ltd. v. Turvey, (1905), A. C. 230, 74 L. J. K. B. 474, 92 L. T. 578, 21 T. L. R. 444, 53 W. R. 641, 7 W. C. C. 1, 6 N. C. C. A. 880; Bellamy v. Humphries, (1913), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 169, 6 B. W. C. C. 53.