claimant was suffering from all the symptoms of Bright's disease, including a diseased condition of the heart, lungs, and kidneys which had no causal connection with the injury. It was held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the disease was caused by an injury arising out of the employment.15

A ship's cook, who was suffering from Bright's disease necessi tating frequent micturition, was last seen in the ships galleys, and would have to step outside to reach a urinal upon a deck guarded by a railing. The seas were rough. It was held that there was no evidence sufficient to prove that his disappearance was due to an accident arising out of the employment.'

16

An employee was furnished with boots by his employer, and the boots produced an abrasion upon his heel. Germs entered through this abrasion and infection followed, causing Bright's disease. It was held that the infection was due to the accidental injury arising out of the employment.17

§ 310. Burns.-An employee suffered an injury to his hand in the course of his employment, and had it bandaged by an agent of the employer, who poured turpentine over the bandage. Later, when the employee endeavored to light a cigarette, the saturated bandage became ignited and his hand was severely burned. The court held that such acts as are necessary to life, comfort, and convenience of the workman while at work, though personal to himself, are incidental to the service and an injury sustained while performing any of them arises out of the employment.18

Where a guard was severely burned in a wreck, which occurred while he was riding on his employer's train for his own purposes during his off hours, it was held that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment.19

An employee in a hospital sustained severe burns when he was unable to escape from a room after a fire had broken out, because

15. Lima v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 2 Mass. W. C. Cas. 800. 16.

Burwash v. Leyland & Co., Ltd., (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 663, C. A. 17. Wheadon v. Red River Lbr. Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. (Part II) 640. 18. Whiting Mead Commercial Co. v. Indus. Acc. Comm., 178 Cal. 505, 173 Pac. 1105, 2 W. C. L. J. 746.

19. Pierson v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 102 N. Y. Misc. 130, 168 N. Y. S. 425, 16 N. C. C. A. 885.

of the alleged serious and wilful misconduct of the superintendant in charge, and claimed double compensation. The claim for double compensation was not allowed because of the failure to sustain the allegation of wilful misconduct. Compensation for the actual disability was awarded.20

Where a stenographer was burned to death, when her means of escape was cut off by a fire on the lower floor, it was held that her death was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.21

An employee fainted after a quarrel with her employer. Other employees threw ammonia in her face, in the mistaken belief that it was water, and it resulted in burns and ulcers. It was held that the accident arose out of the employment.22

Where a carpenter, who was subject to dizzy spells, suffered from an attack of dizziness while cooking lunch, and as a result, laid his hand upon a hot stove, it cannot be said that the injury was due to an accident arising out of the employment.23

An employee burned as the result of carrying matches where there was no express provision against such practice, although smoking was prohibited, cannot, as a matter of law, be said to be without the protection of the act.24

§ 311. Cancer.-A workman sustained an injury to his hand and blood poison followed. Two years later he sought compensation for a cancer on his penis which, he contended was caused by his impaired physical condition following the injury to the hand. The medical testimony failed to show any causal connection between the injury to the hand and the cancer which developed two years later. Therefore the injury did not arise out of the employment.25

20. Keane v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., Ltd., 1 Mass. W. C. C. 193, (1913), 11 N. C. C. A. 558.

21. Newark Hair, etc. Co. v. Feldman, 89 N. J. L. 504, 99 Atl. 602. 22. Saenger v. Locke, (1916), 9 N. Y. St. Dep. Rep. 330.

23. Neuberger v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 183 N. Y. S. 348, (1920), 6 W. C. L. J. 485.

24. Steel Sales Corp. v. Indus. Comm., Ill.

6 W. C. L. J. 303.

(1920), 127 N. E. 698,

25. Ortner v. Zenith Carburetor Co., (Mich.), (1919), 175 N. W. 122,

5 W. C. L. J. 273.

Claimant fell in the course of his employment and broke his thigh. The board found that the breaking of the bone and the subsequent fall was due to a cancerous infection and therefore did not arise out of the employment. On appeal the court said: "The evidence is wholly undisputed that the claimant had a 'pathological fracture.' This is his own admission. Upon his being taken to the Roosevelt Hospital it was found that he had a osteosarcoma, popularly known as cancer of the bone, at the point of the fracture, and there is no dispute in the evidence that the amputation was made, not because of the fracture, but because of the diease. Dr. Gillespie testified, and there was no condradiction, that there was no visible injury to the outside of the leg that he could find, and that 'the leg was amputated because the growth was malignant,' that if the accident had occurred. as described. and there had been no sarcoma at that point, no amputation would have been necessary. The diagnosis was made immediately after the accident, and the operration took place within the eight days of the diagnosis, and the undisputed evidence is to the effect that the operation was for the purpose of curing the diseased condition of the leg, not because of the fracture. Indeed, the fair inference from the evidence is that the fracture was the result of the disease rather than of the accident, though it was inferentially admitted that the false step hastened the break. But the loss of the leg was clearly due to the diseased condition, that disease was the only justification for the amputation, and the disease concedely existed before the accident and was, doubtless, the underlying cause of the fracture, for it is hardly conceivable that such a fall as the claimant describes could have resulted in a breaking of a thigh bone at its lower extremity. It is not shown that the claimant was bruised in any way; he apparently fell forward down an incline of about 30 degrees and rolled to the bottom, with no other injury than the breaking of the diseased bone, and to charge this disease to the industry, simply because it became manifest by reason of this inconsequential fall, is an abuse of the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Law, which

sought to insure against the inherent risks of certain classes of industry. "26

An employee sustained a fall in the course of his employment, and a sarcoma or cancer appeared on his left clavicle a few hours later. The medical testimony was conflicting as to the possibility of a cancer being caused by the injury and making its appearance the same day of the injury. The board found that the cancer was due to the fall, and on appeal the court held that, in view of the conflicting testimony, the finding would not be distrubed.27

Where an employee suffered a blow on the head, which drove a tooth through his tongue, and the wound later developed into a cancer, causing his death, the court denied compensation because of a failure to give notice of the injury."

28

Where a driver was thrown from a wagon, and accelerated an unknown cancer of the stomach causing his death, it was held that the death was due to an accident arising out of the employment.29 Where an employee fell astride of a hot pipe, and the burns he sustained developed into a cancer necessitating an operation, compensation was awarded.30

A falling chunk of coal struck a fireman on the leg just over a sarcoma of the bone, and made an amputation of the leg necessary. The commission allowed compensation on the ground that the blow aggravated a cancerous condition. The appellate court reversed the award on the ground that notice of the accident was not given.31

An employee worked in a browning room where fumes of obnoxious, poisonous gases were given off. He developed cancer of the

26. Brady v. Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corp., 178 N. Y. S. 504, (1919), 5 W. C. L. J. 91, 189 App. Div. 405.

27. Santa Ana Sugar Co. of Santa Ana v. Indus. Acc. Comm., 35 Cal. App. 652, 170 Pac. 630, 17 N. C. C. A. 877, 1 W. C. L. J. 745.

28. Potter v. John Welsh & Sons, Ltd., (1914), 3 K. B. 1020, W. C. & Ins. Rep. 607, 7 B. W. C. C. 738, 9 N. C. C. A. 1033.

29. Blatt v. Schonberger & Noble, 176 N. Y. App. Div. 924, 162 N. Y. S. 1111.

30. Richardson v. Builders' Exchange Assn., 179 N. Y. App. Div. 949, 165 N. Y. S. 1109.

31. Prokopiak v. Buffalo Gas Co., 176 App. Div. 128, 162 N. Y. S. 288.

liver and died. It was contended that the cancerous condition was brought about by the poisonous fumes. The medical experts denied that this was the cause of the cancer, and that the conditions necessary for the bringing on of cancer were not present. It was held that the burden of showing a causal connection between the conditions of employment and the cancerous condition had not been discharged.32

Deceased was engaged in furrowing certain posts, pushing them against the knives by pressing his abdomen forcibly against them. After working in this manner for some time he sat down, and was evidently in great pain. He died three days later from hemorrhages, which defendant claimed were produced by a rupture of an internal cancer. The court held that, though deceased was suffering from a cancer, still the cause of the rupture was due to the unusual pressure, and hence the death was due to an accident arising out of the employment.33

A dock laborer was incapacitated for three months by a blow on the back. He underwent two operations for cancers of the kidney, and died in the second operation. The testimony regarding the origin of the cancer was conflicting. The court held that there was sufficient testimony to support a finding that the cancer was due to an injury arising out of the employment.3

34

A butcher's canvasser was injured when the bicycle he was riding skidded, and he fell. Two months later he was found to be suffering from a cancer, and the medical testimony was to the effect that the disease was brought on by the accident. It was held that the cancer arose out of the employment.3

An employee punctured his tongue with some tacks he was holding in his mouth while putting up shades. A cancer developed on his tongue, necessitating an operation, and he died under the

32. Alton v. Hopkins & Allen Arms Co., 1 Conn. C. C. D. 378; Marcontonio v. The Charles Francis Press, N. Y. Bull. Vol. 1, No. 12, pg. 16. 33. Voorhees v. Smith Schoonmaker Co., 86 N. J. L. 500, 92 Atl. 280, Rose, v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. I. A. C. D. 551.

34. Lewis v. Port of London Authority, (1914), 7 B. W. C. C. 577 C. A. 35. Howard v. Rowsell & Mathews, (1914), 7 B. W. C. C. 552.