A load of coal became mired, and the team hitched thereto was unable to move it. The driver requested plaintiff, a passerby, to assist in removing it, and while so doing he was injured. It was held that the driver had implied authority to employ someone for this temporary purpose, and that the plaintiff became the employee of the coal company for the purpose of rendering this assistance, and was entitled to the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act.30 Where a millwright, on leaving the plant long after customary working hours discovered a fire in the plant and returned to the building to put it out, and lost his life in the fire. The court, in holding that the death resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, said: "He must have entered the building voluntarily, and knowing the possibility of danger in so doing from its being then on fire. But it is a reasonable inference that he did so for either one or both of these purposes: (1) Under the specific duty devolving upon him to have charge of and look after the valuable patterns essential for the work being done by his employer; (2) from the sense of obligation to use a reasonable amount of care to save his employer's property at a time of such emergency. As to each of these it needed no specific instructions from any superior to perform such services or voluntarily assume such responsibility while making an effort within the field of reasonable care to save the property of his employer. While so doing he cannot be considered, as a matter of law, to be a stranger. McPhee's Case, 222 Mass. 1, 4, 109 N. E. 633, 10 N. C. C. A. 257; Munn v. Ind. Brd., 274 Ill. 70, 113 N. E. 110, 12 N. C. C. A. 652. We do not think that either the letter or the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act requires that such employee should be penalized for obeying such a natural and commendable instinct on his part." 31 & Ins. Rep. 398, (1914), 2 Sc. L. T. 27, 51 Sc. L. R. 653, 7 B. W. C. C. 918, 10 N. C. C. A. 483. 30. State ex rel. Nienaber v. Dist. Court of Ramsey Co., 138 Minn. 416, 165 N. W. 268, 1 W. C. L. J. 642. 31. Belle City Malleable Iron Co. v. Rowland. 170 Wis. 293, (1919), 174 N. W. 899, 5 W. C. L. J. 333; Munn v. Indus. Bd., 274 Ill. 70, 113 A fireman, in the fire department of the civil administration under the Isthmian Canal Commission, was injured while assisting in extinguishing a fire which had broken out in a building in Colon. The place where he sustained his injuries was without the limits of the Canal zone. It was held that the man acted in an emergency, and the fact that he was without the limits of the territory under the control of the United States, was not under these circumstances, sufficient, to exclude him from the operation of the act.32 Two butcher boys were employed on a wagon, and one fell off and was injured. A bystander volunteered to ride home on the wagon in order to assist in caring for the injured boy. On the way home the volunteer bystander fell off and was injured, and sought to hold the master liable on the gounds of implied authority of the driver to hire a person in the case of an emergency. The court held that there was no such implied authority and dismissed the case.3 33 An employee, who was left in temporary charge of machinery, was injured when he attempted to remove a belt to prevent its burning, when some of the machinery got out of gear. It was held that the injury arose out of the employment.34 Where a demonstrator of automobiles, fearing a collision, threw out his arm to protect himself, and his arm was broken, it was held that the injury arose out of the employment.35 A laborer fell and sustained injuries when attempting to get away from the danger zone where a blast was to be set off. It was held that he sustained injuries arising out of the employment.36 § 323. Erysipelas. Where an employee suffered from erysipelas, which originated from the infection of a pimple on his face, it was held that, in the absence of any showing that the in N. E. 110; Alexander v. Indus. Bd., 281 111. 201, 117 N. E. 1040. 1 W. C. L. J. 313. 32. Re James Nellis, Op. Sol. Dep. C. & L. p. 221. 33. 34. 35. 36. Houghton v. Pilkington, 107 L. T. R. 235. Blackford v. Green & Pierson, 37 N. J. L. J. 279. Todd v. Drouet & Page Co., 3 N. Y. St. Dep. 351, 12 N. C. C. A. 178. fection came from anything connected with the employment, it could not be said that the injury arose out of the employment.37 § 324. Explosions.-A station agent was injured by an explosion, as the result of pouring kerosene upon live coals. The rules of the company forbade the use of kerosene in this manner. It was contended that the employee had added risk to his employment, and therefore the accident did not arise out of the employment. On appeal, the court, in affirming a finding that the accident arose out of the employment, said: "A peril which arises from the negligent or reckless manner in which an employee does the work which he is employed to do may, in many cases, be held to be a risk incidental to the employment; and the same is true where he performs an authorized act in a forbidden manner, a distinction being taken in this regard from cases in which the act is altogether outside of, and unconnected with, the employment Here the agent was rightfully and properly attempting to start a fire, but carelessly used the wrong kind of kindling. This was not a conscious, voluntary choice between a safe and dangerous way to do his duty, but a careless use of a combustible, which careless use endangered his life and seriously injured him, but just such a careless use as was frequently made of kerosene by the station agents of the defendant and such a use as might be likely to result from the employment.'' 38 A traveling salesman for chemical compounds was killed as the result of an explosion in a creamery, where he had gone to sell soda and alkali. It was contended that, while the accident occurred in the course of the employment, it did not arise out of it. The commission found that the accident arose out of the employment, and the court on appeal unanimously affirmed the award.39 An electrician was severely injured by the explosion of a dyna mite cap, when he lighted a match for the purpose of smoking a cigarette upon his arrival in the morning at the place of employ 37. Miller v. Libby & Blinn, 1 Conn. C. Dec. 377. Note: See. § 184 ante. 38. Benson v. Bush, 104 Kan. 198, (1919, 178 Pac. 747, 3 W. C. L. J. 629, 18 N. C. C. A. 1026. 39. Cain v. United Breeder's Co., 224 N. Y. 568, 120 N. E. 858, 17 N. C. C. A. 938. # ment. The use of dynamite caps was common in certain branches of the employment, but there was nothing in the evidence to account for the presence of a dynamite cap in that particular place. In holding that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment, the court said: "It arose in the course of the employment because of the fact that it occurred when the employee was at his place of work ready to begin his duties. A causal connection between the employment and the injury is shown by the use of dynamite caps upon the premises and the presence thereof in the room where the plaintiff was regularly employed. It is apparent that plaintiff had no reason to anticipate the presence of dangerous explosives in the building where he was employed. It is true he did not, in the course of his employment, have anything to do with dynamite caps, nor was he ordinarily exposed to any hazard on account of the presence and use thereof by defendant upon the premises; but they were used by the defendant. That the legitimate use thereof was confined to parts of the premises remote from the building in which the accident occurred does not necessarily relieve the master from the duty to make compensation under the act to a servant, injured by the explosion of a dynamite cap in a part of the premises which ordinarily, and under the rules of the master, is free from danger on account thereof. The commissioner did not find that plaintiff took the explosive into the building where the accident occurred, and culpability upon his part causing the injury is not shown by evidence of fellow workmen that some time later they found a dynamite cap in a pocket of his overalls, which they took from a locker in which plaintiff kept them." 40 Where a miner was killed as the result of an explosion and the evidence was conflicting on the question as to whether the death was due to an accident or suicide, the court, in holding that the death was due to an accident arising out of the employment, said: "Other facts and circumstances are mentioned in the testimony, most of them unimportant and none or all of them conclusive of either theory. If death is not the result of suicide, the employer 40. Rish v. Iowa Portland Cement Co., (1919), 3 W. C. L. J. 463, 18 N. C. C. A. 1032. Iowa 170 N. W. 532, must respond. The evidence may be too meager to establish affirmatevely either accident or suicide, but when violent death is shown, the presumption arises that it was not self-inflicted. 'As between accident and suicide the law for logical, and sensible reasons supposes accident,' until the contrary is shown. The evidence is surely not conclusive of suicide. We conclude that the determination of the trial court that death was accidental is sustained. ""41 Where a brewery employee was severely burned, as the result of an explosion occurring in the course of his employment, and later died of Miliary tuberculosis, and the medical testimony was to the effect that the disease was due to the accident, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding that death was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." 42 An employee of an oil company engaged a man temporarily to assist him in placing a flywheel on a gasoline engine. In doing so an explosion occurred, killing both men. The case was reversed on other grounds, but the court said, with reference to the contention that deceased was not an employee. "We think there is no merit in the contention of the insurance carrier that Tillburg was not in the employ of the owners of the lease. Bacon appears to have had authority to hire such incidental help as might be necessary in the operation of the lease."43 Where an employee was killed by an explosion which occurred on the premises of his employer, while the employee was off duty and engaged in his own personal duties, it was held that the accident did not arise out of the employment.** Where an employee in a bakery was injured by an explosion of natural gas, used for heating ovens, which explosion was due to 41. State ex rel. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. District Court of St. Louis Co., 138 Minn. 138, 164 N. W. 582, 15 N. C. C. A. 526. 42. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Schultz, 161 Wis. 46, 152 N. W. 446, 15 N. C. C. A. 643. 43. Gillburg v. McCarthy & Townsend, 179 N. Y. App. Div. 593, 166 N Y. S. 878, 15 N. C. C. A. 449. 44. Brienen v. Wisconsin Public Service Co., 166 Wis. 24, 163 N. W. 182, 15 N. C. C. A. 289. |