was expert testimony that they never heard of a case of this kind which would cause impairment of vision.1

§ 327. Falls From Vertigo or Other Like Causes.-An employee, whose business was to see that yarn was wound around a revolving cylinder, was killed when he fell on a machine, so that his neck was torn open and the carotid artery was cut. Medical testimony was to the effect that the fall was caused by a pre-existing diseased condition. The court held that, even though the cause of the fall was the diseased condition of decedent, it was a remote cause and the fall itself was the dominant and proximate cause which placed the body of the employee in such relation to the revolving parts of the machine as to result in an injury causing death. "Indisputably the injury occurred during the course of the employment, and the fall into the machine was from the front of the machine where the employee was standing in the active performance of his duty. The real question is not so much the cause of the fall or whether the fall as such arose out of the employment, but whether the risk and harm of a fall into or upon machinery then in use by an employee are incidents of that business and hazards to which the workman would have been exposed apart from that business. McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 499, 102 N. E. 697, L. R. A. 1916A. 306, 4 N. C. C. A. 522: Wicks v. Dowell, (1905), 2 K. B. 225. We think the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. Brightman's Case, 220 Mass. 17, 107 N. E. 527, L. R. A. 1916A, 321; Mooradjian's Case, 229 Mass. 521, 118 N. E. 951; Hallett's Case, 230 Mass. 326, 328, 119 N. E. 673.62

Where a water boy, whose duties required him to distribute drinking water to the different working men on a building, fell down an elevator shaft, and no one saw or knew anything about the circumstances of the fall, the commission found that the fall was due to an accident arising out of the employment, and where

61.

Raina v. Standard Gaslight Co. of N. Y., 183 N. Y. S. 264, (1920), 6 W. C. L. J. 490.

62. Dow's Case, 231 Mass. 348, 121 N. E. 19, 3 W. C. L. J. 144; In re Stanley Lonowiski, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 122.

there is evidence to support such finding it will not be disturbed on appeal.63

Where an employee fell in the course of the employment and died later, the evidence of medical experts after performing an autopsy was to the effect that the fall which caused death was due to a blood clot on the brain caused by a previous injury, and therefore the death was not due to an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.64

Applicant, a man of 71 years of age, fell, striking his head, causing a scalp wound. Prior to the accident he had slight attacks of dizziness and weak spells, but they never caused him to fall. There was testimony to the effect that applicant was never seen to fall prior to the accident, and that there were nails protruding from the floor where applicant worked and on two occasions he had tripped on the nails, and that there was no way of accounting for the fall other than tripping on the nails. Affirming an award, the court said: "While plaintiff testifies that at times he had been dizzy and weak, he also testifies that it was nothing to speak of, but slight, and never sufficient to cause him to lose his balance and fall. His fellow workmen and superiors in the plant who saw him daily never noticed any appearance of dizziness or fainting, and never saw him fall before. The fact that he did not recall just how the accident happened is in no way extraordinary, when we contemplate that in the fall he struck his head with sufficient force to inflict a gash in his scalp. He was over 70 years of age, not as nimble as in his younger years, and had had trouble with his limbs and feet a short time before. We are not persuaded that we should say, as matter of law, that the cause of the accident under the evidence in the case is so conjectural as to require us to set aside the finding and award of the board.

77 65

63. Gabriel v. A. J. Smith Const. Co., 206 Mich. 470, (1919), 173 N. W. 195, 4 W. C. L. J. 504.

64. Hansen v. Turner Const. Co., 224 N. Y. 331, 120 N. E. 693, 17 N. C. C. A. 786, 3 W. C. L. J. 168; Cox v. Kansas City Ref. Co., Kan., (1921), 195 Pac. 863.

65. Wilson v. Phoenix Furniture Co., 201 Mich. 531, 167 N. W. 839, 2 W. C. L. J. 327.

W. C.-52

"The claimant, a brickmaker, was required to perform his duties while standing on a pile of brick about 15 feet above the ground. He was seized 'with an attack of vertigo, or with some similar disorder, which caused him to fall to the frozen ground.' 'It is urged that his injury was the result of the vertigo, and not of an accident; but the findings and proceedings indicate that he was in good health at the time, and no reason is given for the fall except the dizziness. The natural inference is that the dizziness, the fall, and the injury resulted from the elevated position in which he was standing while performing his work.' The injury was held to be due to an accident arising out of the employment."

An assistant foreman, in the employ of the street department of a gas company, while pursuing the duties of his employment, suddenly fell to the street and later died in a hospital. An autopsy revealed that in all probability the fall had been due to an attack of cardiac syncope, to which a previous disposition of the heart disposed it. It was held that the fall and subsequent death was not due to an accidental injury arising out of the employment.67

Where a driver, by reason of a fainting fit, fell from a wagon and fractured his skull, it was held that the injury arose out of the employment, because the employee was exposed to a substantial and increased risk owing to his occupation.68

Where an employee became faint from vertigo and illness, and fell on a table, injuring herself, it was held that, in the absence of a showing that the faintness was due to a condition of the employment, and not due to her own physical condition, it could not be said that the accident arose out of the employment."

66. Santa Corce v. Sag Harbor Brick Works, 169 N. Y. Supp. 695, 182 N. Y. App. Div.442, 1 W. C. L. J. 1132, 17 N. C. C. A. 787; Board of Comm'rs of Greene Co., v. Shertzer, Ind. App. (1920), 127 N. E. 843,

6 W. C. L. J. 310; Miller v. Biel, 127 N. E. 567, 6 W. C. L. J. 315. Collins v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 171 App. Div. 381, 156 N. Y. S.

67.

957.

68. Driscoll v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 1 Mass. Ind. Acc. Bd. 125; Hanson v. Commercial Sash Door Co., 1 Bull. Ill. Ind. Bd. 30; Burke v. Mayer, (1916), 3 Cal. I A. C. 310; Crase v. North Star Mines Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. (part 1) 68.

69. Erickson v. Empire Laundry Co., 1 Cal. Ind. Acc. Comm., part 2, 612; In re Frank Kasobuski, 3rd A. R. U. S. C. C. 169; Reeves v. J. A. Dady Corp.,

Conn. 113 Atl. 162 (1921).

Where a salesman, crossing the ferry from San Francisco to Oakland, became nauseated and dizzy, and sustained a fall due to such dizziness, resulting in concussion of the brain, it was held that, in the absence of a showing that the bay was rough or the weather bad, applicant had failed to establish a case of accident arising out of the employment.70

A buyer and department store manager became faint, fell, and sustained injuries, while in a bathroom of a hotel during a business trip. It was held that the accident did not arise out of the employment."1

§ 328. Falling Objects.-An apartment building janitress, who received free use of an apartment and a small wage, was injured by falling plaster as she was about to sit down to breakfast in her own apartment. In holding that the accident did not arise out of the employment,the court said: "The case is no different than it would be if the claimant, although janitress of the building in question, had occupied an apartment in another building and the accident had there occurred. In no proper sense can it be said that she was janitress of her own apartment, merely because it happened to be a part of the building of which she was the janitress. In her own apartment she presided over her household affairs and was serving, not her employers, but herself and her family. If this award can be sustained, so also it should be sustained if the plaster had fallen on her at night while she was sleeping, or while doing any ordinary housework for the requirements or convenience of her family. At the time of the accident she was doing nothing for her employers, nor anything incidental thereto. Her duty to them did not require her presence in her apartment. What she was doing was personal to herself. It was entirely disassociated with the work of her employers.

1972

70. Van Winkle v. G. S. Johnson & Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 212.

71. Jacobs v. Davis Schonwasser Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 938.

Note: See § 188 ante.

72. In re Lauterbach, (1919), 189 App. Div. 303, 178 N. Y. S. 480, 5 W. C. L. J. 100.

Where an employee was carrying a plank to a saw and dropped it upon his toe, thereby injuring the toe, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding that the injury arose out of the employment.73

A restaurant dishwasher was injured when the ceiling fell upon her. The cause of the fall was the overloading of the floor above over which the master had no control. It was held that the injury arose out of the employment.74

Where a teamster, while driving his employer's team on a street, was killed when a beam fell from a building under construction, it was held that the injury arose out of the employment.75

Where a domestic servant lost the sight of an eye as the result of plaster falling into it when she was arising in the morning, it was held that the accident arose out of the employment."

Where a wagon bed suspended by ropes fell upon an employee while asleep and killed him, the court in awarding compensation to his dependents said: "Bollman's employment was not for certain hours of each day, with no obligation to his employer for the remaining hours of the 24, as is usual in employment contracts. By the terms of his agreement, Bollman was required to leave his own domicile, and travel from farm to farm with the threshing outfit, to stay of nights on the premises where the machine happened to be, and as watchman guard and protect it from fire and trespassers. Since he was not only to act as engineer in the oper ation of the machine, but was to remain overnight and act as watchman, it must be presumed that it was not the intention of the parties that Bollman was to remain awake through each night, but rather that he should sleep on the premises where the machine. was left, and be ready for such emergency as might arise. It cannot be said that Bollman could not, and did not, render service to his employer while asleep, though it is not stated that he was asleep at the time of the accident, but that he "had retired in the

73. Mallory's Case, 231 Mass. 225, 120 N. E. 591, 17 N. C. C. A. 941. 74. Kimbol v. Indus. Acci. Comm., 173 Cal. 351, 160 Pac. 150, L. R. A. 1917B, 595, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 312.

75. Mahowald v. Thompson Starrett Co., 134 Minn. 113, 158 N. W. 913 76. Alderidge v. Merry, (1912), Ir. Ct. of Appeal, 6 B. W. C. C. 450.