by reason of the mistake, the defendant Beaulieu worked harder then he ordinarily did, as a result of which his feet became wet from perspiration, a circumstance which made them more susceptible to cold, and as a consequence thereof his feet were frozen. It seems clear that the hazard to which the defendant Beaulieu was exposed was one which was incident to and can be fairly traced to his employment as a contributing cause, and that he would not have been equally exposed to such a hazard apart from his employment. If the defendant Beaulieu while engaged in his work had wet his feet by stepping into an open spring and the freezing had resulted therefrom, it could scarely be claimed that the injury was not proximately caused by accident. In this case the condition of his feet was due to extra exertion caused by reason of a misunderstanding as to orders. Because there would be no logs for hauling in the morning, he was required to put forth an unusual and extra effort, which made him more susceptible to cold than he otherwise would have been. It is clear that the exposure of the defendant Beaulieu to injury by freezing was substantially increased by reason of the nature of the services which he was obliged to render. We think it must be held that the injury for which compensation was awarded was proximately caused by accident within the meaning of the act."'61 Claimant sustained a burn in the course of and arising out of the employment. He visited a doctor, and on the day of his last visit, his burned hand showed signs of improvement, and he did not return for further treatment until the finger had nearly rotted off. The physician testified that he told claimant to return for further treatment and claimant testified that he was told not to return. The court held that, in view of the fact that claimant was a foreigner and did not understand the English language to any extent, he was not guilty of such wilful misconduct as would preclude a recovery."2 An oiler was told not to allow oil to drop on a pulley of a particular machine, and not to put so much oil on the machine; 61. Ellingson Lbr. Co. v. Indus. Comm. of Wis., 168 Wis. 227, 169 N. W. 568, 3 W. C. L. J. 215, 17 N. C. C. A. 1003. 62. Oniji v. Studebaker Corporation, 196 Mich. 397, 163 N. W. 23, 15 N. C. C. A. 76; Poniatowski v. Stickley Bros. Co., 194 Mich. 294, 160 N. W. 569, 15 N. C. C. A. 77. but the oiler through a misunderstanding or otherwise, hung a pail to catch the dripping oil and was injured while removing the pail. It was held that the injury arose out of the employment." Where a deaf employee misunderstood orders as to where his work was to be performed and went to a different place with the approval of his fellow workmen, an injury, sustained there while doing the exact work he had been instructed to do, arose out of his employment." § 346. Neurosis.-That the workman, but for the want of sufficient will power, could have thrown off the condition of hysterical blindness and neurosis caused by the injury, did not deprive him of his right to compensation.65 Where a workman receives a blow on the head, causing no apparent serious injury, but inducing him to sincerely believe. that he is incurably injured, which belief incapacitates him, the incapacity is an injury for which compensation will be allowed.66 Where a workman, after the effects of the injury are all gone, still suffers from traumatic neurosis, he is entitled to compensation until the traumatic neurosis ceases to incapacitate him.7 Where a workman, after his injuries have healed, complains of pain, loses weight and gradually becomes an invalid, due to traumatic neurosis, although there is no physical basis for such condition, it is held that he is entitled to compensation."8 Where disability of a workman was due largely to imagination and a slight neurotic condition, which would best be cured by claimants return to work, the court made an award of six weeks compensation in addition to the twenty-six weeks that had already been paid by the employer.69 63. Panacona v. Vulcanite Portland Cement Co., 37 N. J. L. J. 75. 64. In re Greeney, App. Div. -, (1920), 180 N. Y. S. 648, 5 W. C. L. J. 723. 65. 66. 67. In re Hunnewell, 220 Mass. 351, 107 N. E. 934. 68. Hakala v. Jacobsen-Bade Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. 328; Kelly v. Pac. Electric Ry. Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. 150. 69. Intorigne v. Smith & Cooley, 1 Conn. Comp. 228; Pendo v. Mammoth Copper Mining Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. 80. A cigar maker, by reason of his occupation, received a personal injury due to the unusual degree of strain on certain muscles in his arm, and also to the rapidity with which he used them, which caused a condition of neurosis incapacitating him for labor. The commission held that the incapacity was the result of an accidental injury.70 Where an injury caused the loss of will power, due to traumatic neurosis, whereby claimant was unable to work, the court found that he was entitled to compensation for such disability"1 § 347. Paralysis.-An employee sustained a blow on the neck from a shovel. A state of paralysis followed. The Commission arrived at the following conclusion, and their award was affirmed by the higher court, which quoted from their decision as follows: 'In view of the extreme hot weather, age of the applicant, and the obvious susceptibility of applicant to suffer a paralytic stroke at the time of the accident, the fact that no evidence of sickness or distress was apparent immediately before the blow, that a strange feeling, sickness, and a paralytic stroke developed in usual time immediately following the blow, it is reasonable to conclude that the blow from the shovel, received accidentally and arising out of and in the course of his employment by the defendant corporation, was the proximate cause of the disability suffered by applicant, and an award of compensation should be made accordingly. ''72 It was held that where an employee's duties exposed him to unusual risk from the sun's heat and he suffered a sunstroke' which caused paralysis of the brain and death, that the paralysis and death was due to an accident arising out of the employment.T 70. Lee v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., Mass. Work. Comp. Cases, 753. 71. Smith v. Smith (Globe Indemnity Co.), 2 Conn. Workm. Comp. Com. 628. Note: See "Mental Shock," § 344, also "Insanity" § 339. 72. Murray City v. Indus. Comm. of Utah, (Utah), (1919), 183 Pac. Rep. 331, 4 W. C. L. J. 647. 73. Ahern v. Spier, 93 Conn. 151, 105 Atl. 340, 3 W. C. L. J. 221. Where an employee was awarded compensation for paralysis following heavy lifting, but it appeared that the board based its finding on a previous fall received by the employee, the court on appeal reversed the decision on the ground that there was no showing that the fall was received in the course of the employment.74 A candy packer, whose duties necessitated that she work in a cool room, suffered from facial paralysis, which began while she was at work. It was held that the injury was received in, and arose out of the employee's employment.75 Where an employee sought to reach his place of employment by a very dangerous means of ingress, instead of using the safe way provided by the employer, and fell, sustaining injuries to his back and paralysis, the court held that he was not acting within the scope of his employment and that his injury did not arise out of the employment.76 A fireman, while attempting to move heavy iron beams, became faint and weak, complaining of pains in his stomach, and a few days later suffered a paralytic stroke. It was held that the paralytic stroke was due to an accidental injury arising out of the employment." An employee who had previously suffered a stroke of paralysis and recovered therefrom, was later found drowned in a vat on his employer's premises, and all the evidence tended to show that his fall into the vat was due to dizziness. It was held that the accident arose out of the employment.78 § 348. Pneumonia.-A driver on a lumber sleigh suffered an injury while lifting the end of the sleigh. Later he developed 74. David-Bradley Mfg. Co. v. Ind. Bd. of Ill., 283 Ill. 468, 11 N. E. 615, 2 W. C. L. J. 226, 17 N. C. C. A. 250. 75. Dalton v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp. Ltd., 2 Mass. W. C. C. 231, 12 N. C. C. A 327, 76. In re Babcock, Ohio Ind. Comm., (1919), 12 N. C. C. A. 655. 77. Manning v. Pomerene, 101 Neb. 127, 162 N. W. 492. 78. Harmon v. Gen. Acc. Assur. Corp., 3 Mass. Indus. Acc. Bd. 166, 12 N. C. C. A. 80, Note: See § 232 ante. lobar pneumonia, and traumatic gangrene of the lungs, from which he died. The evidence was conflicting as to whether the disease was due to the injury. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to justify a finding that the injury produced an impaired physical condition resulting in disease and death, and that the death was attributable to the injury arising out of the employ. ment.79 A night watchman went to work as usual. The following morning he was discovered in a state of collapse. He developed pneumonia and peritonitis, and after a few days died. It was alleged that the disease was due to an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. In affirming an award the court said: "The defendants deny that the illness and death of Mailman was due to an injury, accidental or otherwise. They argue that when he began work on the evening of April 18th he was 'coming down' with pneumonia. This is disputed. If true, it is not decisive. Evidence that an existing disorder reaches the point of disablement during employment, of course, does not prove accidental or other injury arising out of such employment. It is sufficient however (assuming other elements proved), if by weakening resistance or otherwise an accident so influences the progress of an existing disease as to cause death or disablement Voorhees v. Smith 86 N. J. Law, 500, 92 Atl. 280; Trodden v. McLennard, 4 B. W. C. C. 190; Doughten v. Hickman, 6 B. W. C. C. 77; Puritan v. Wolfe (Ind. App.) 120 N. E. 417. 'There is some evidence that upon the body of the deceased a mark, or marks, were observed which turned black when blood poisoning set in. There is some medical testimony to the effect that the symptoms were more consistent with traumatic pneumonia than with illness otherwise caused. The spontaneous exclamation of the suffering man, 'I got hurt,' clearly admissible for this purpose, shows that what he sensed and felt was the shock of a hurt rather than the prostration of illness. In view of these circumstances, it cannot be reasonably said that there was no evidence that the illness of the deceased 79. Folts v. Robertson, (1919), 188 App. Div. 359, 177 N. Y. S. 34, 4 W. C. L. J. 429; Tanner v. Aluminum Castings Co., Mich. - (1920), 178 N. W. 69, 6 W. C. L. J. 337. |