A school teacher, in order to open a bookcase to obtain needed books, attempted to move a row of desks weighing 458 pounds, which had been placed in front of the case on the previous Friday night to make room for a dancing party, and as a result of the attempt she injured her back. It was held that she had sustained an injury arising out of the employment regardless of the fact that the duty of replacing the seats devolved upon the janitor.95

A school teacher tripped and fell and sustained injuries while going to a telephone on business of her own after school, but while she was still at the schoolhouse finishing her work. It was held that she had suffered an accidental injury arising out of her employment, for the course of employment is not restricted to acts solely for the master's benefit, but includes all acts which an employee may reasonably do while at work.96

Where the evidence showed that a school teacher's previous health was very poor, and the evidence of the schoolroom being poorly heated was contradicted, it was held that it could not be said that her death from pneumonia had any causal connection with the employment97

§ 351. Self Inflicted Injuries.-An employee of a logging crew was killed by dynamite which was used in blowing out stumps. The accident occurred while everybody, except deceased, was at dinner. It was contended that the applicant had not shown that the accident arose out of the employment and was not a case of self-inflicted injury. The commission found that the death was due to an accident arising out of the employment. On appeal the court said: "The appellant contends that the facts in the record before the commission were not such as to warrant the inference arrived at by the commission that Perry's death occurred while he was in the performance of his duty and in the master's employment, and that such conclusion must have been based upon mere

95. Elk Grove Union High School District v Indus. Acc. Comm. of Cal., 34, Cal. App. 589, 168 Pac. 392, 15 N. C. C. A. 148, 1 W. C. L. J. 143. 96. Reiff v. City of Sacremento, 2 Cal. I. A. C. 251, (1915), 12 N. C. C. A. 901.

97. Arnold v. Town of Brooklyn, 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 188.

conjecture, and that therefore the claimant had not met the burden. of proof imposed upon her under the law. It is also contended. that there was no evidence showing that there was any reason for blowing up the tree near which Perry was found dead, or that there was any further work of blasting required for the stump, already partly blasted, which was near where his body was found, and that there was no foundation for the suggestion by the commission in their finding that Perry remained at the place after the crew went to dinner in order to clear away the tree or stumps, and that therefore there was a total absence of evidence upon which might be predicated a finding that Perry met his death while within the scope of his employment. It is undoubtedly the rule of law in this state that findings of the Industrial Commission must be supported by evidence and not based upon mere conjecture. Voelz v. Industrial Com., 161 Wis. 240, 152 N. W. 830. The situation here was one clearly requiring the commission to apply the well-recognized presumption against suicide in such cases of accidental, death. Mil. W. F. Co. v. Industrial Com., 159 Wis. 635, 150 N. W. 998. With that presumption, therefore, and the facts disclosed in the testimony of Perry's employment as foreman in charge of the construction of this road, the partially exploded stump left in the road, or even the sapling near which he was found, upon either of which Perry might have been contemplating the use of dynamite, even though such use might not have been in accordance with the customary or enconomical way of constructing such a road, all presented a situation from which the conclusion might have been reasonably and properly drawn that whatever Perry was then doing was within what he then thought. was his duty rather than the conclusion that it was an intentionally self-inflicted injury. Within the broad field intended to be covered. by our Compensation Act we think the conclusion arrived at by the commission was within their discretion.''98

"There can be no presumption that a man recklessly imperils his own life." So where an officer returned to a vessel from his life boat, after the ship had drifted onto the rocks and had been

98. Bekkedal Lumber Co. v. Indus. Comm. of Wis., 168 Wis. 230, 169 N. W. 561, 3 W. C. L. J. 212, 17 N. C. C. A. 247.

abandoned, thereby losing his life, it was held that there was no presumption that he intended to sacrifice himself.99

Where a boy fifteen years of age was killed as the result of an attempt to play a practical joke upon a fellow employee, the injury cannot be said to have been purposely self-inflicted so as to defeat a claim for compensation.1

§ 352. Suicide.-An employee who was engaged in removing ashes from a pit under a large steel burner, died from the effects of ashes which had been taken into his stomach. "There is no evidence tending to show that on the night in question plaintiff's decedent had with him a pail of water into which large quantities of ashes might have fallen in the course of the work. There is no evidence that decedent drank from a pail of water heavily impregnated with ashes. There is evidence of the physician to the effect that the liquid taken from the man's stomach would be a little burning;' that it would burn and taste nasty;' and that. To swallow something that hasn't a pleasant taste involves an effort of the will.' Counsel for claimant assert that the foregoing facts are sufficient to support the inference indulged in by the board to the effect that decedent swallowed the ashes and alkaline liquid accidentally. They point out that, it being undis puted the lye and ashes were in the stomach and caused the death, the only possible inferences are: (1) That they were taken into the stomach by the decedent accidentally; or (2) that they were so taken willfully and with suicidal intent-and they rest upon the presumption against suicide, citing Wishcaless v. Hammond, 201 Mich. 193, 166 N. W., 993. This position is met by counsel for appellant with the argument that the presumption arises only where the facts and the logical deductions therefrom point with equal cogency to suicide or accidental death, and that in the case at bar the accidental theory is negatived by the testimony of the doctor that the substance found in the stomach of

99. North Pac. S. S. Co. v. Indus. Comm. of Cal., 174 Cal. 346, 163 Pac. 910, 14 N. C. C. A. 425.

1. Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Indus. Comm., Pac. 853.

Utah

-, (1921), 196

the decedent could not have been taken by decedent without a conscious effort because of its unpleasant taste. The rule to be adopted by the board is set out clearly in the case of Ginsburg v. Adding Machine Co., 204 Mich. 130, 170 N. W. 15, in the following language: 'It is the province of the board to draw the legitimate inference from the established facts and to weigh the probabilities from such established facts. Wilson v. Phoenix Furniture Co., 201 Mich. 531, 167 N. W. 839. But the inferences drawn must be from established facts; inference may not be built upon inference, possibilities upon possibilities, or inferences drawn contrary to the established facts, contrary to the undisputed evidence. If an inference favorable to the appellant can only be arrived at by conjecture or speculation, the applicant may not recover. So if there are two or more inferences equally consistent with the facts, arising out of the established facts, the applicant must fail'-citing many cases. Applying that rule to the facts in the case at bar, and in further consideration of the rule which places the burden of establishing the claim for compensation on those seeking the award, we are constrained to the view that the inference that the liquid and ashes found in decedent's stomach and which caused his death were taken into the system by the decedent with suicidal intent is at least as reasonable as that they found entrance to the stomach accidentally, and where two inferences equally consistent with the facts arise out of established facts, one involving liability on the part of the employer under the act, and the other relieving him from liability, the applicant must fail. The award must be vacated." In this case there was a dissenting opinion concurred in by three of the seven judges and based principally upon the authority of the case mentioned in the following paragraph.2

An elevator operator disappeared, and three days later his body was found in the bottom of an elevator shaft. There was evidence that deceased was intoxicated early in the morning on the day of the accident, that his domestic relations had not been

2. Chaudier v. Stearns & Culver Lbr. Co., 206 Mich. 433, (1919), 4 W. C. L. J. 508, 173 N. W. 198; Rourke v. Holt & Co. (1918) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 7, 51 Ir. L. T. 121.

happy, and that the mechanical superintendent had reprimanded him for inattentiveness to his duties. The court held that where the death occurred under circumstances which would suggest either suicide or accident the presumption is against suicide and in favor of an accident.3

A miner was found dead, following an explosion. No one saw the accident, and there was no occasion for the use of explosives at that time. There was evidence tending to show circumstances equally consistent with a finding of suicide as with that of accident. The court said: "Other facts and circumstances are mentioned in the testimony, most of them unimportant and none or all of them conclusive of either theory. If death is not the result of suicide, the employer must respond. The evidence may be too meager to establish affirmatively either accident or suicide, but when violent death is shown, the presumption arises that it was not self-inflicted. 'As between accident and suicide the law for logical, and sensible reasons supposes accident,' until the contrary is shown. *** The evidence is surely not conclusive of suicide. We conclude that the determination of the trial court that death was accidental is sustained."

§ 353. Testing Racing Motorcycle.-Where an employee of a firm dealing in racing motorcycles sustained serious injuries while testing the speed of a motorcycle at the direction of his employer, it was held that the crashing of the motorcycle through

3. Wishcaless v. Hammond, Standish & Co., 201 Mich. 192, 166 N. W 993, 1 W. C. L. J. 1055, 17 N. C. C. A. 792; Bekkedal Lbr. Co. v. Indus. Com. of Wis., 168 Wis. 230 169 N. W. 561, 3 W. C. L. J. 212, 17 N. C. C. A. 247.

4. State ex rel. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. District Court of St. Louis County, 138 Minn. 138, 164 N. W. 582, 15 N. C. C. A. 526; Milwaukee Western Fuel Co. v. Indus. Comm., 159 Wis, 635, 150 N. W. 998; Sorensen v. Menasha Paper Co., 56 Wis. 342, 14 N. W. 446; W. R. Rideout Co. v. Pillsbury, 173 Cal. 132, 159 Pac. 435, 12 N. C. C. A. 1032.

Note: See "Suicide" § 248 ante, also "Death, Presumption From While at Work," § 167 ante. "Insanity" § § 210 and 339 ante, see also "SelfInflicted Injuries" § 351 ante.