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1830.]

he, Colonel Napier asks, maintain
himself with 23,000 men against the
whole French army? The natural
strength of the country between As-
torga and Corunna, misled, he says,
those persons who have since talked
of passes where an hundred men
could stop an army and so forth.
Moore knew, he admits, that he could
fight any number of men in some of
the mountainous positions on the road
to Corunna; but unless he could make
a permanent defence, such battles
would have been worse than useless;
and a permanent defence was impos-
sible, inasmuch as there were neither
carriages of transport, nor money to
procure them; a severe winter had
just set in, and the provinces being
poor, and the peasantry disinclined
to aid the troops, few resources
could be drawn from the country
itself; nor was there a position be-
tween Astorga and Corunna which
could be maintained for more than
a few days against a superior force.
That of Rodrigatos could be turned
by the old road leading to Villa
Franca; Villa Franca itself by the
valley of the Syl; and from thence
the whole line to Corunna might be
turned by the road to Orense, which
also led directly to Vigo,-and till he
reached Nogales, Sir John Moore's
intention was to retire to Vigo. Be-
sides, the French could have march-
ed through the richest parts of Gal-
licia to St Iago and Corunna on the
left, or from the Asturias, on the
right, by the way of Mondonedo.

If, says Napier, it be asked why they did not do so? The answer is prompt. The Emperor having quitted the army, the jealousies and misunderstandings usual between generals of equal rank impeded the operations. A coolness subsisted between Ney and Soult; and the former committed a great error by remaining at Villa Franca, instead of pushing his corps, or a part of it, (as recommended by Soult,) along the valley of St Orense to St Iago de Compostella. The British army would, in Colonel Napier's opinion, have been lost, if the sixth corps had reached Corunna before it; and what would have been the chances in the battle, if three additional French divisions had been engaged? Colonel Napier, then, finally concludes, that, granting that the troops could have been nourished during the winter

Villa Franca, Nogales, Constantino,
and Lugo, were not permanently de-
fensible by an army whose base of
operations was at Corunna. Hence
it was that Sir John Moore resolved
to regain his ships, with the view to
renew the war in the south-and
Hannibal himself, adds the enthu-
siastic soldier, could have done no

more.

The author of the " Annals," again, maintains, and with great shew of reason, that, had the information of the General, with regard to the country traversed by his army, been more accurate and extensive, he would have known that there was no road leading to Betanzos and Corunna, by which the enemy could, at any season, have advanced with rapidity sufficient to have endangered his communications. The roads on the right and left of that occupied by the British, most difficult at any season, must, at the period in question, when covered with deep snow, and intersected by swollen torrents from the mountains, have been utterly impracticable. At all events, no measures were taken to ascertain whether these roads were occupied by detachments of the enemy or not. Sir John Moore relied only for safety on the celerity of his marches; no attempt was made to impede the progress of the pursuers, by destroying the bridges which led across the numerous ravines; the soldiers, worn by incessant privation and fatigue to the lowest pitch of exhaustion compatible with life, became utterly demoralized; and all the proud attributes of a British army, save that of innate and indefeasible courage, were unnecessarily sacrificed.

Colonel Napier, again, thinks, that the retreat to Corunna was deficient in nothing, except, perhaps, something in discipline; but that that fault did not attach to the General. Sir John Moore had a young army suddenly placed under his guidance; and it was scarcely united, when the superior numbers of the enemy forced it to a retrograde movement, under very harassing circumstances; he had not time, therefore, to establish a system of discipline; and it is in the leading events, not the minor details, that we must seek for the just criterion of his merits. That, says he, with an earnestness highly honourable to him, is an honourable retreat, in which

the retiring General loses no trophies in the fight; sustains every charge without being broken; and, finally, after a severe action, reimbarks his army in the face of a superior enemy, without being seriously molested. It would be honourable to effect this before a foe only formidable in numbers; but it is infinitely more creditable, when the Commander, while struggling with bad weather, and worse fortune, had to oppose veterans with inexperienced troops, and to contend against an antagonist of eminent ability, who scarcely suffers a single advantage to escape him during his long and vigorous pursuit. All this, says Napier, Moore did; and finished his work by a death as glorious as any that antiquity can boast of.

In much of this eloquent defence the author of the "Annals" joins; for he says, whatever may have been the errors of Sir John Moore, it must be admitted that fortune also was against him. The elements were his opponents; and those most deeply conversant in warlike operations will be the first to acknowledge, how easily the wisest calculations may be overthrown by the occurrence of contingencies which human prudence could neither foresee nor arrest. The concluding words of the author of the "Annals" are " But enough. Such as Moore was, England is proud of him; and the moral perceptions of her people must indeed be blasted when they shall cease to regard his memory with love and honour."

We cannot abstain from giving one pretty long quotation from Colonel Napier's book, that our readers may know exactly and fully what is his final opinion of Sir John Moore's re

treat.

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thousand men, left Madrid on the 22d of December; the 28th he was at Villapando, having performed a march on bad roads of a hundred and sixty-four miles in seven days. The retreat to Corunna was, consequently, not precipitate, unless it can be shewn that it was unnecessary to retreat at all beyond Villa Franca; neither can it be asserted that any opportunity of crippling the enemy was lost. To fight a battle was the game of the French Marshal; and if any censure will apply to his able campaign, it is that he beaten, the embarrassments of his adverdelayed to attack at Lugo. Victorious or

sary must have been increased; Sir John Moore must have continued his retreat

encumbered with the wounded, or the latter must have been abandoned without succour in the midst of winter.

"At Corunna, the absence of the fleet necessarily brought on a battle; that it was honourable to the British troops, is clear, from the fact, that they embarked without loss after the action; and that it was absolutely necessary to embark, notwithstanding the success, is as certain a proof how little advantage could have been derived from any battle fought further inland, and how prudently Sir John Moore acted, in declining an action, the moment he had rallied his army at Lugo, and restored that discipline which the previous movements clamour with which this campaign has had shaken. But, notwithstanding the

been assailed,- -as if no army had ever yet that the nominal loss was small, the real suffered such misfortunes,-it is certain loss smaller; and that it sinks into nothing, when compared with the advantages gained. marching in advance or retreat, above five An army which, after hundred miles before an enemy of immensely superior force, has only lost, including those killed in battle, four thousand men, or a sixth part of its numbers, cannot be said to have suffered severely, nor would the loss have been so great, but for the intervention of the accidental occurrences mentioned in the Narrative. Night marches are seldom happy; that from Lugo to Betanzos, cost the army, in stragglers, more than double the number of men lost in all the preceding operations. Nevertheless, the reserve in that, as in all the other movements, suffered little; and it is a fact, that the light brigades detached by the Vigo road, which were not pursued, made no forced marches, slept under cover, and were well supplied, left, in proportion to their strength, as many men behind, as any other part of the army. Thus accumulating proof upon proof, that inexperience was the primary and principal cause of the disorders which attended the retreat. These disorders

were sufficiently great; but many circumstances contributed to produce an appearance of suffering and disorganization, which was not real. The intention of Sir John Moore was, to have proceeded to Vigo, in order to restore order, before he sailed for England. Instead of which, the fleet steered home directly from Corunna. A terrible storm scattered it; many ships were wrecked, and the remainder, driving up the Channel, were glad to put into any port. The soldiers, thus thrown on shore, were spread from the Land's End to Dover. Their haggard appearance, ragged clothing, and dirty accoutrements, things common enough in war, struck a people only used to the daintiness of parade with surprise; the usual exaggerations of men just escaped from perils and distresses, were increased by the uncertainty in which all were as to the fate of their comrades; a deadly fever, the result of anxiety, and of the sudden change from fatigue to the confinement of a ship, filled the hospitals at every port with officers and soldiers; and thus the miserable state of Sir John Moore's army became the topic of every letter, and a theme for every country newspaper along the coast. The nation, at that time unused to great operations, forgot that war is not a harmless game, and judging of the loss positively, instead of comparatively, was thus disposed to believe the calumnies of interested men, who were eager to cast a shade over one of the brightest characters that ever adorned the country. Those calumnies triumphed for a moment; but Moore's last appeal to his country for justice will be successful. Posterity, revering and cherishing his name, will visit such of

his odious calumniators, as are not too contemptible to be remembered, with a just and severe retribution; for thus it is that time freshens the beauty of virtue, and withers the efforts of baseness; and if authority be sought for in a case where reason speaks so plainly, future historians will not fail to remark, that the man, whose talents exacted the praises of Soult, of Wellington, and of Napoleon, could be no ordinary soldier.

"Sir John Moore,' says the first, 'took every advantage the country afforded to oppose an active and vigorous resistance, and he finished by dying in a combat that must do credit to his memory.'

"Napoleon more than once affirmed, that, if he committed a few trifling errors, they were to be attributed to his peculiar situation; for that his talents and firmness alone had saved the English army from destruction.

"In Sir John Moore's campaign,' VOL. XXVII. NO. CLXIV.

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We have now presented our readers with ample means of judging rightly of Sir John Moore's character and conduct in this campaign-from the opinions of by far the two ablest writers on the subject, themselves conversant with military affairs. Colonel Napier, as we have seen, justifies the General at all points, except that he allows there may be some trifling objections in the details of the execution of the movement towards Sahagun. Perhaps it would have been better, he says, to have carried the army on the 21st at once to Carrion, and neglected Sahagun and Saldanha; but in its stratagetical and political character, it was well conceived and well-timed, hardy and successful. But he denies that there is a single blot on Moore's scutcheon. We confess, that we are nearly converts to his opinion; nor can we do otherwise than admire his generous zeal in defence of the fair fame of the illustrious dead. With the views of an able writer in this Magazine, in his review of the Marquis of Londonderry's Narrative of the Peninsular War, we could not, even then, coincide; though we did not scruple to give our Imprimatur. That distinguished officer rather hints-insinuates objections to the conduct of the campaign-if, indeed, campaign it can be called-than states them in any tangible and permanent shape. In one page he is manifestly dissatisfied with something or other, and in the next qualifies or retracts any derogatory expressions, so that you cannot tell whether he means to praise or blame, pity or admire. He makes no positive charge against Sir John Moore; and yet he leaves on the minds of those who may choose to be influenced by vague and indefinite phrases, an impression that he was not a great-nay, even not a good commander. Thus the Marquis says, "The truth is, that Sir John Moore, 2 N

with many of the qualities requisite to constitute a General, was deficient in that upon which, more perhaps than any other, success in war must depend. He wanted confidence in himself, he was afraid of responsibility, he underrated the qualities of his own troops, and greatly overrated those of his adversary. Yet, let justice be done," &c. Now, if this be the truth, Sir John Moore was nothing but a very poor creature; for, consider these defects, and you at once see that among the many qualities requisite to constitute a General, which the Marquis allows he possessed, not one is included, requisite to constitute a great or good General; while want of confidence in himself, fear of responsibility, and ignorance of the qualities of his own troops,-after a life spent in the most active and perilous service,-together with a worse ignorance of the real qualities of the French troops, against whom he had often before fought, go a long way to constitute a blockhead or a poltroon. "Yet let justice be done," &c., comes in absurdly, if not insidiously; and they who dislike the libel, scorn the eulogy. The Marquis elsewhere says,—

It would be affectation to deny, that Sir John Moore, during his disastrous retreat, issued many orders, in the highest degree painful to the feelings of honourable men, who felt that their conduct had not merited them. His warmest admirers have acknowledged this, and his best friends have lamented it; but, in all probability, no one could have lamented it more heartily than himself, had he lived to review, in a moment of calmness, the general conduct of this campaign; because there never lived a man possessed of a better heart, nor, in ordinary cases, of a clearer judgment." That is poor weak stuff, indeed; and there is too much of it in the volume.

There were many causes,-too obvious to need being pointed out, of unjust judgments, at the time, on Sir John Moore's retreat. The nation was disappointed, and the ministry were dissatisfied; and it sométimes requires long years to wear out of the understanding an impression which has been strongly stamped upon it, even after it knows that the impression is erroneous and false. The people of this country do

not like retreats; and they have too little sympathy for unsuccessful Generals. Yet a man can but die for his country after all; and had Moore had twenty lives, he would have been willing to have parted with them all at Corunna. Had he survived that bloody day, Heaven knows how he might have been received in England. He would have seen that his country was not satisfied, or willing to do him justice; and heroic as his heart was, it was also most sensitive, and would probably have been broken. On the other hand, had he again commanded an army under

66

no malignant star," and been victorious in some great battle, who then would have troubled themselves with criticising his former retreat, fatal as it was, and most disastrous, any more than people now trouble themselves with criticising --as they once did-Wellington's retreat from Burgos-remembering his advance from Waterloo?

But we must conclude our article, which has extended far beyond the limits we designed for it-though we cannot fear that it will be thought too long, since it embodies the opinions on a subject that must be interesting to every truly British heart, of two writers who stand in the first rank of, military annalists-or, say rather-historians. We have borrowed freely and openly from both; for of what value would any thing be which we might say about the wars in Spain? Let them speak who were there to see-to suffer-and to act; and who write of campaigns, like old campaigners-having changed their spears, not into pruning-hooks, but into steel-pens-and their swords, not into ploughshares, but into penknives, to sharpen the nibs when they become blunt or obtuse. lonel Napier's volumes (two are now published-and may the others soon appear!) have already acquired a high reputation-but not higher than is due to their character. Of the "Annals of the Peninsular War," we have now given such an account and such specimens as will make thousands anxious to see the Work itself -and we do not doubt, that by confining our review to a few chapters, we have enabled our readers to form a truer notion of its general merits, than if we had vainly tried to sketch the contents of all the three volumes.

Co

NOTICE.

I. CAN there be one single solitary human creature so isolated in life as not to know that the Editor of Blackwood's Magazine is-Christopher North? Why, there would seem to be many such; and as they are getting troublesome, we beg to lay down a few rules for their future conduct. There is no monster behind our throne greater than the throne itself; so, Ladies and Gentlemen, who wish to have any thing to say or do with Us, ye must venture at once to the fountain-head. For a few years past, persons of communicative dispositions and habits have not unfrequently honoured several of our friends by contributions to Maga, addressed to them as Editors of that justly-popular periodical. Most of those who behave so are pure fools; but now and then this folly is committed by persons of some understanding; and, perhaps, some twice or thrice a year, by first-raters, labouring, we presume, under temporary delirium. The Gentlemen thus honoured, by having their identity lost in ours-or rather ours in theirsbeing remarkable for urbanity and good-nature, are not always disposedwe are sorry to say-to return such packets to their lawful owners-with a few hearty curses on their stupidity or impertinence. They have hitherto contented themselves with merely flinging them into the fire, or into hampers. Will the Public, then, have the kindness to allow us to announce that, in future, all Articles sent to any of our celebrated Contributors, for Maga, will be burnt publicly at the Cross of this City-unread-on the first of April, (an annual incremation,) by the hands of Dr Nimmo. An additional Balaam-box-constructed on a principle entirely new-has been purchased by us at considerable expense, for the reception of all such articles. 'Tis on the principle of the sliding bottom. This Balaam-box, which runs on wheels-ponderibus librata suis-seems at our bidding, though of cast-iron, as if instinct with life, to march into the Devouring Element. The Doctor, at safe distance from the conflagration, stands with the pen-ultimate and ultimate links of a steel-chain in his hands-and, at a given signal, pulls out, with one dexterous jerk, the sliding-bottom from the above Balaam-box, which forthwith drops into the flames all "that it inhabit," in articulo mortis. We have had several private exhibitions of this Balaam-box, called by Mullion "The Patent Purger," before a few select literary friends, at the Lodge; and it has performed to a miracle. But 'tis not possible for the Public, from any description, to form a just idea of this most meritorious machine. She must see it at work. The Exhibition will open precisely at one o'clock A. M., of April 1, 1830-as the effect is very fine by nightand it is hoped that there will not be much moon, only a few stars, and a proper assemblage of clouds. To prevent any effervescence in the minds of the Contributors to this Particular Conflagration, a strong Constabulatory Force will keep the Ring-and it is trusted that the Public will witness the spectacle with her usual decorum. On the subsiding of the flames into a state of safety, the Populace will be suffered to roast potatoes or apples in the embers.

II. We have taken twenty opportunities, within the last twenty months, of telling all dealers in tag-rag-and-bobtail-i. e. Poems-that they are not the salt, but the scum of the earth. Unluckily, we once said, " with a few exceptions;" and into that narrow door have they all made a simultaneous rush-helter-skelter-as if they would force the Sanctum. Perhaps they trust to their numbers for impunity; each bardling deluding himself with the hope that his own puny posteriors, in particular, will escape the knout. "Hope tells a flattering tale;" but, "Consideration, like an angel comes, and whips the offending Adam out of them." Let there be no more stuff of the sort sent to us, then; for we are determined to bear it no longer-and if farther provoked, will make some terrible examples. The culprits may have as silly faces as they choose; but the most lack-lustre eye will fail to inspire our hearts with pity,-nor will lisp, burr, or stutter, be suffered to soften the immitigable ferocity of our justice. Let Felicia Hemans and Caroline Bowles-for the present-suffice as Stars in our poetical hemisphere-with Delta so placed, that either luminary alternately seemeth the

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