r. Rhodes, 56 Ga. 645; Steele v. Central R. R. 43 Iowa, 109; Lyon v. Detroit R. R. Co. 31 Mich. 429.

7 Memphis etc. R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 51 Miss. 637.

8 Weger v. Penn'a R. R. Co. 55 Pa. St. 460; Hough v. Railw. Co. 100 U. S. 213; Mad River etc. R. R. Co. v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541; Columbus etc. Railw. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174; Yeomans v. Contra Costa etc. Co. 44 Cal. 71; Davis v. Detroit etc. R. R. Co. 20 Mich. 105; 4 Am. R. 364; Pittsburg etc. Railw. Co. v. Ruby, 38 Ind. 294; 10 Am. R. 111; Osborne, r. Knox etc. R. R. 68 Me. 49: 28 Am. R. 16; Sh pp v. Eastern Counties Railw. Co. 9 Ex. 223; Hutchinson v. York etc. Railw. Co. 5 id. 343; Degg v. Midland Railw. 1 Hurl. & N. 773.

9 Howd r. Miss. Cent. R. R. Co. 50 Miss. 178; Baulec v. N. Y. etc. R. R. 0.48 How. Pr. 399; 52 N. Y. 633; S. C. again, 59 id. 256; 17 Am. R. 325; Ala. etc. R. R. Co. v. Waller, 48 Ala. 459; Tyson v. Railroad Co. 61 id. 554: 32 Am. R. 8.

10 McGowan v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. 61 Mo. 528; and see Moran v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co. 67 Barb. 96; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Young, 8 Kan. 658; Lawler v. Androscoggin R. R. Co. 62 Me. 463; 16 Am. R. 492; Laning . N. Y. etc. R. R. Co. 49 N. Y. 521; Ross v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co. 5 Hun, 453; Foster v. Minn. etc. Railw. Co. 14 Minn. 360.

11 Nashville etc. R. R. Co. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 347; Pittsburg etc. R. R. Co. v. l'owers, 74 Ill. 341.

12 Toledo etc. R. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 77 Ill. 391; and see McKnight v. Iowa etc. R. R. Co. 43 Iowa, 406; Ryan v. Chicago etc. Railw. Co. 60 Ill. 171; 14 Am. R. 32. But compare Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R. R. Co. 23 Pa. St. 384.

§ 268. Leases of railroads.-One railway company cannot lease the entire use of its road to another company without the consent of the legislature; and a court of equity will not aid in enforcing a lease of a railroad made without such consent.2 The English courts have even restrained railway companies from carrying such contracts into effect. But under a grant of authority from the legislature to do so, a railway company may lease its corporate works and property, with its franchises, to another company, and such lease will be valid. And under an authority to a railway company to take a lease of any railroad that might be connected with its own, it may take a lease of a competing road, if, when united, the two roads are capable of forming a continuous line. And an unrestricted power granted to a company to farm out its road was construed to authorize a lease, with power to the lessee to change the gauge of the road. But a lease made by the company for the purpose of extending its road beyond the terminus fixed by its charter is ultra

vires and void, as against public policy.7 A railway company leasing its road, even by consent of the legislature, does not thereby escape all responsibility to the public; and this is clearly so in the absence of statutory authority to lease its road. It is, however, held that the company lessee, under a lease authorized by statute, may, in respect to its traffic on the road, be held to the rule of liability imposed by law on the company leasing; 10 and that it cannot dispute its liability on the ground that the lease is void. So the company lessee is in general bound by all the prohibitions and limitations contained in the charter of the company leasing, as well as entitled to all its rights and franchises; 12 but it does not take the property and franchise, subject to an existing liability for an injury caused by negligence which occurred prior to the lease.18 Where the lease contains a covenant that the lessee shall keep up the fences, the leasing company is not liable to one traveling upon the highway for damages resulting from an omission of the lessee to repair a fence which was in good order at the time of the lease and surrender of possession to the lessee. 14 A lease by one company to another of its road for a hundred years does not vest in the lessee any power to exercise the right of eminent domain, but that power remains in the lessor, 15

1 Troy etc. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. 581; Black v. Del. etc. Canal Co. 22 N. J. Eg. 399; Thomas v. Railroad Co. 101 U. S. 71; Shrewsbury etc. Railw. v. London etc. Railw. 4 De Gex, M. & G. 115; 6 H. L. Cas. 113; and see Richardson v. Sibley, 11 Allen, 67.

2 Johnson v. Shrewsbury etc. Railw. Co. 3 De Gex, M. & G. 914.

3 Beman v. Rufford, 1 Sim. N. S. 550; West London etc. Railw. v. London etc. Railw. 11 Com. B. 327; London etc. Railw. v. Southeastern Railw. Co. 8 Ex. 584.

4 Black v. Del. etc. Canal Co. 24 N. J. Eq. 455; Kent Coast Railw. Co. v. London etc. Railw. Co. Law R. 3 Ch. 656; Phila. etc. R. R. Co. v. Catawissa R. R. Co. 53 Pa. St. 20; Peters v. Boston etc. R. R. Co. 114 Mass. 127; Central R. R. Co. v. Macon, 43 Ga. 605.

5 Wallace v. Long Island R. R. Co. 12 Hun, 460.

6 State v. Richmond etc. R. R. Co. 72 No. Car. 634.

7 Union Bridge Co. v. Troy etc. R. R. Co. 7 Lans. 240.

8 Nelson v. Vermont etc. Railw. 26 Vt. 717; and see Clement a Canfield, 28 id. 302; Parker v. Rensselaer etc. Railw. 16 Barb. 315; In

gersoll r. Stockbridge etc. R. R. Co. 8 Allen, 438; Whitney v. Atlantic etc. R. R. Co. 41 Me. 362; Wyman v. Penobscot etc. R. R. Co. 46 id. 162; York etc. Railw. v. Winans, 17 How. 30; Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445; Pittsburg etc. R. R. Co. v. Hannon, 60 Ind. 417; Macon etc. R. R. Co. v. Mayes. 49 Ga. 355; 15 Am. R. 678. But compare Mills v. Orange etc. R. R. Co. 1 McAr. 285; Nashville etc. R. R. Co. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 347.

9 Abbott v. Johnstown etc. Horse R. R. Co. 9 N. Y. Week. Dig. (Ct. App.) 548; 80 N. Y. 27.

10 McMillan v. Mich. etc. R. R. Co. 16 Mich. 79. See also Langley v. Boston etc. R. R. Co. 10 Gray, 103; Ohio etc. R. R. Co. v. Dunbar, 20 Ill. 623.

11 McCluer v. Manchester etc. R. R. 13 Gray, 124.

12 Penn'a R. R. Co. r. Sly, 65 Pa. St. 205; and see Linfield v. Old Colony R. R. Co. 10 Cush. 562.

13 Pittsburg etc. Railw. Co. r. Kain, 35 Ind. 291; and compare Pittsburg etc. R. R. Co. v. Harbaugh, 4 Brewst. 115.

14 Ditchett v. Spuyten Duyvil etc. R. R. Co. 67 N. Y. 425. See § 253, ante.

15 Mayor etc. v. Norwich etc. R. R. Co. 109 Mass. 103.

§ 269. Remedies.-An action at law is, in many cases, the proper remedy against a railway company;1 and especially in cases where the company has been guilty of negligence, or want of skill, in the exercise of its legal rights.2 So an action lies against a railway company for unlawfully entering upon and appropriating land for its road. But as a general rule, where the company proceeds, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, to take land for railroad right of way, the remedy provided by statute for the assessment of dainages is exclusive of all other remedies for that purpose, and the landowner cannot resort to a common-law action. A railway company may be sued in trespass for assault and battery. And for wrongfully refusing to receive and transport freight, a railway company is liable in an action at law, at the suit of the party aggrieved, and the remedy is not by mandamus. The measure of damages in such action is the difference between the value of the property at the place where it was tendered and its value at the place to which it was to be taken, less the expenses of transportation.7 Where a landowner relinquishes his right of way over his land to a railway company, on its engagement to locate the depot on a certain spot, his

remedy for the failure of the company to do so is by action for the breach of contract, or by suit for specific performance. In some cases, relief against a railway company must be sought in a court of equity; as where the company is acting in excess of its powers, and an injunction is issued to restrain it.9 So if the company neglect to pay the damages awarded to the landowner for the right of way, it may be restrained by injunction from using the land until the damages are paid. 10 And this remedy lies at the suit of an abutting house-owner, to enjoin a street railway company from leaving the snow which it removes from its tracks heaped up between them and the plaintiff's premises for a longer time than is reasonably necessary for its removal.11

1 See §§ 147, 255-60, ante.

2 Perley r. Railroad Co. 57 N. H. 212; Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Naylor, 2 Ohio St. 235; Tenn. etc. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 3 Head, 596; and see Estabrooks v. Peterborough etc. R. R. Co. 12 Cush. 224.

3 Sherman v. Milwaukee etc. R. R. Co. 40 Wis. 645; Kansas Pacific Railw. Co. v. Hopkins, 18 Kan. 494; Anderson etc. R. R. Co. v. Kernodle, 54 Ind. 314; Powers v. Hurmurt, 51 Mo. 136; and see § 248, ante.

4 Tenn. etc. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 3 Head, 596; Sherman v. Milwau kee etc. R. R. Co. 40 Wis. 645; East & West India etc. Railw. Co. v. Gattke, 3 Macn. & G. 155. But compare Kennett Nav. Co. v. Witherington. 18 Q. B. 531.

5 Mason v. Kennebec etc. Railw. Co. 31 Me. 215. See § 248, ante. 6 People v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co. 22 Hun, 533. Compare Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. People, 56 Ill. 365.

7 People v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co. 22 Hun, 533.

8 Hubbard v. Kansas City etc. R. R. Co. 63 Mo. 68.

9 See Stone v. Commercial Railw. 9 Sim. 621; Bohlman v. Green Bay etc. R. R. Co. 30 Wis. 105; Sandford v. Catawissa etc. R. R. Co. 24 Pa. St. 378; § 148, ante.

10 Ross v. Elizabeth etc. R. R. Co. 2 N. J. Eq. 422. Compare Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Davis, 86 Ill. 20.

11 Prime v. Twenty-third St. Railw. Co. 1 Abb. N. C. 63. Compare Short v. Balt. City etc. Railw. Co. 50 Md. 73; 33 Am. R. 298.

BOONE CORP.-36.

§ 281. Trustees and other officers.

$282. Pastor or priest.

§ 283. Expulsion of members.

§ 284. Judicial control and review.

§ 270. Nature of, in general.-Religious corporations or societies existing by statute in most of the states of the Union are not ecclesiastical corporations in the sense of the English law. They are rather to be regarded as civil corporations, to be controlled and managed according to the principles of the common law. Under the New York statute, a religious corporation consists of the members of the society. The members of the society, whether church members or not, are the corporators; and the trustees are but the managing officers of the corporation, invested, as to the temporal affairs of the society, with the powers specifically conferred by the statute, and with the ordinary discretionary powers of officers of civil corporations.6 So under the New Jersey statute, the congregation are the substantial beneficial owners of the church property, and the trustees are the legal instruments to execute the will of the congrega