exercise of the taxing power, impose the cost of such improvements upon the neighboring proprietors who are to be benefited thereby; 2 and it can delegate this power to local municipal governments; and may, moreover, empower the city authorities to judge what property is specially benefited by the improvement, and define the taxing district accordingly. But a statute authorizing an assessment for street improvements, being in derogation of individual rights, must be strictly construed, and rigorously observed.5 And any departure in substance from the formula prescribed by the statute vitiates proceedings under it. Nor can a city so ratify proceedings as to render them valid, if they were in the first instance invalid;7 the power to ratify, if it exists, is in the legislature. But property owners benefited, who suffer street improvements to be completed without remonstrance, thereby affirm the acts of their agents (the common council of a city) in making the improvements. The right of a municipal corporation to condemn the lands of individuals for local improvements can only be exercised in virtue of some express legislative grant; 10 and the proceedings must comply strictly with all requirements of the law, or no title will be acquired." If notice of the proceedings be not given when required, or if not given in the way prescribed, the proceedings are void.12 So, if the charter require that an effort be made to purchase from the owner before condemnation of the property, and the property is condemned without its having been made, the proceedings are void. 18 The owner of the property appropriated and used for a city improvement is entitled to compensation; and this rule applies where the use of private lands involved consits in flooding them with waste water. 15 And if lands owned in fee by a municipal corporation are appropriated for the purpose of widening a public street, the corporation is entitled to compensation.16 It is not within the corporate power of a city to take the property of the state, 17 or of the United States, 18 for the purpose

14

of a public street. 19 And under a general power to lay out and open streets, a city has no authority to lay out and open a street through the depot grounds of a railway company, so as to destroy or impair the value of the company's easement, acquired under an express legislative grant.20 And property cannot in general be acquired against the owner's consent when wanted for purposes merely ornamental.21 But where the trustees of a village authorized the erection of a soldier's monument in one of the public streets, it was held that they could do so without the consent of the owner of the fee.22

1 Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494.

2 Palmer v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593; Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 495; Woodhouse v. Burlington, 47 Vt. 301; Hundley v. Commissioners etc. 67 Ill. 559; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 458; Broadway etc. Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush, 508; Matter of New Orleans, 20 La. An. 497. Compare St. John v. East St. Louis, 50 Ill. 92; State v. Mayor etc. 36 N. J. L. 291; Matter of Market St. 49 Cal. 546; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 id. 525; Morange r. Mix, 44 N. Y. 315; Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 676; Gilkeson v. Justices, 13 Gratt. 577. But a local assessment for a general public benefit is unconstitutional: Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 352; 8 Am. R. 255 3 Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 667; 3 Am. R. 309.

4 Moran v. Lindell, 52 Mo. 229;

Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; 2 Am. R. 76; Gest v. Cincinnati, 26 Ohio St. 275.

5 Hopkins v. Mason, 42 How. Pr. 115; 61 Barb. 469; and see Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St. 85; Hurford v. City of Omaha, 4 Neb. 336.

6 Merritt v. Village of Portchester, 71 N. Y. 309.

7 Meuser v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 239.

8 Meuser v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 239.

9 People v. Utica, 45 How. Pr. 289; 65 Barb. 1. See Bond v. Mayor etc. 19 N. J. Eq. 376; Lake v. Trustees, 4 Denio, 520.

10 Allen v. Jones, 47 Ind. 438; Water Works Co. v. Burkhart, 41 id. 364; Dyckman v. Mayor, 5 N. Y. 434. See tit. EMINENT DOMAIN.

11 Newell v. Wheeler, 48 N. Y. 496; Matter of Schreiber, 3 Abb. N. C. 68; Harbeck v. Toledo, 11 Ohio St. 219; City of Stockton v. Whitmore, 50 Cal. 554; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Coun. 189; New Orleans v. Sohr, 16 La. An. 393; Matter of Powers, 29 Mich. 504; Dennis v. Hughes, 8 Up. Can. Q. B. 444; McKernan v. Indianapolis, 38 İnd. 223.

12 Darlington v. Commonw. 41 Pa. St. 68; Baltimore_v. Bouldin, 23 Md. 328. Compare State r. City of Plainfield, 33 N. J. L. 95; Re Zbo rowski, 68 N. Y. 88; Palınyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593.

13 Nicholson v. St. Louis, 47 Mo. 499; Leslie v. St. Louis, id. 474. 14 Philadelphia v. Dickson, 38 Pa. St. 247; Mayor etc. v. Fitzpatrick. 36 N. J. L. 120; State v. Seymour, 35 id. 47.

15 Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223.

16 Matter of Ninth Avenue, 45 N. Y. 729. Compare Matter of De. partment of Public Parks, 6 Hun, 486.

17 Atlanta v. Central R. R. Co. 53 Ga. 120.

18 United States v. Chica, 7 How. 185.

19 Atlanta v. Central R. R. Co. 53 Ga. 120.

20 Milwaukee etc. R. R. Co. v. City of Fairbault, 23 Minn. 167.

21 See Woodstock r. Gallup, 28 Vt. 587; 29 id. 347; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 545; Higginson v. Inhabitants etc. 11 Allen, 530; Blodgett v. Boston, 8 id. 237.

22 Tompkins v. Hodgson, 2 Hun, 146; 4 Thomp. & C. 435.

§ 295. Contracts for local improvements, etc.If the preliminaries to be observed, and the manner in which a contract for a local improvement shall be entered into, are prescribed by a mandatory charter provision or law, its directions must be complied with; otherwise, the contract cannot be enforced.2 So, a city may prescribe, by ordinance, the manner in which the officers charged with negotiation of a contract for an improvement shall proceed in making it; and if the requirements of such ordinance are mandatory, and are not complied with, the contract will not be valid. If the charter requires contracts for improvements to be in writing, a verbal executory agreement of the common council to employ a person to make improvements cannot bind the city. If the charter prohibits any expense to be incurred, unless an appropriation has been previously made to cover it, the municipal body will not be bound by contracts involving liability beyond the amount appropriated. And generally, where the mode of action of a municipal corporation is limited by its charter, persons undertaking a contract for a local improvement must take notice of the restriction. If the law requires that contracts shall be made by advertising for proposals, and by awarding them to the lowest bidder, and the bids are opened and the award made accordingly, a contract is thereby created.8 These proceedings vest in the bidder a right, of which he cannot be divested without compensation, and create a liability on the part of the corporation to him. And the city officers have no authority, after the bids have been opened, to alter the contract materially, and then award it to one of the original bidders, without a new advertisement. 10 If the advertise

ment for bids contains a reservation of the right to reject all bids if unsatisfactory, the lowest bidder has no right of action against the corporation, either for refusing his bid, or for his time and expenses in preparing his esti mates and proposals.11 And the corporation may voluntarily increase the contract price for work, where the circumstances will equitably justify it, unless prohibited by its charter from doing so.12 A requirement that contracts for work shall be founded on bids and proposals upon a public notice does not embrace a contract for the purchase of fireworks for'a Fourth of July celebration; 18 nor a contract of carriage hire of city officers while engaged in public duties; 14 nor to contracts for services which require in their performance scientific knowledge or professional skill, such as the services of a surveyor.15 1 Terre Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind. 480; People v. San Francisco, 36 Cal. 595; Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray, 12.

2 McEwen v. Gilker, 38 Ind. 233; Baltimore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276. Compare Yarnold v. City of Lawrence, 15 Kan. 126.

3 Starr v. City of Burlington, 45 Iowa, 87.

4 Himmelmann v. Satterlee, 50 Cal. 68; Kretsch v. Helm, 45 Ind. 438; and see Brady v. Mayor etc. 20 N. Y. 312; 18 How. Pr. 343.

5 Starkey v. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203. Compare Alton v. Mulledy, 21 Ill. 76; Bigelow v. Perth Amboy, 25 N. J. L. 297.

6 Kingsland v. Mayor etc. 5 Daly, 448.

7 Murphy v. Louisville, 9 Bush, 189; and see Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153; Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143; Johnson v. Commion Council, 16 Ind. 227.

8 Argentiv. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255; Matter of Protestant etc. School, 40 How. Pr. 130; 58 Barb. 161. See Curtis v. Waterloo, 38 Iowa, 266; Smith v. Mayor etc. 10 N. Y. 504.

9 Matter of Protestant etc. Church, 40 How. Pr. 130; 58 Barb. 161. Compare Yarnold v. City of Lawrence, 15 Kan. 126; Brady v. Mayor etc. 18 How. Pr. 343; 20 N. Y. 312.

10 Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 7 Hun, 1. Compare Brevoort v. De troit, 24 Mich. 322; Findley v. Pittsburg, 82 Pa. St. 351.

11 Palmer v. Inhabitants etc. 98 Mass. 487.

12 Meech v. Buffalo, 29 N. Y. 198.

13 Detwiller v. Mayor etc. 1 Thomp. & C. 657; 46 How. 218.

14 Smith v. Mayor etc. 21 How. Pr. 1.

15 People v. Flagg, 16 How. 36; 5 Abb. Pr. 232; 17 N. Y. 584. A con. tract with a city for grading a street or other improvement does not involve personal knowledge, skill, and experience in such a sense as to prevent an assignment of the contract: St. Louis v. Clements, 42 Mo. 70; and see Philadelphia v. Lockhardt, 73 Pa. St. 211; Devlin v. Mayor etc. 63 N. Y. 8; 50 How. 1; Keffenbaugh v. Common Council, 40 Ind. 382.

§ 296. Power to grant licenses, etc.-Municipal corporations may be authorized to require persons exercising vocations within their limits, to take out licenses therefor, and may require the payment of a reasonable sum in consideration of the license,2 unless there is some specific limitation on the authority of the legislature in these respects. And this is so, although such persons have already obtained licenses from the state to prosecute their respective callings; 4 and the power may be exercised over all persons plying the vocation within the corporate limits, whether they reside within them or not.5 It is even competent for the legislature, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, to empower a municipality to license within its limits occupations which are illegal and punishable under the general laws of the state. But the right to license occupations, etc., must be plainly conferred; and power to license and regulate a lawful and necessary business confers no authority to make a contract creating or tending to create a monopoly.8 The power cannot be delegated by the common council to a particular officer to grant or refuse licenses as he sees fit; but must be exercised by the common council prescribing general rules under which a license may be obtained.10 A power to license and control vehicles authorizes an ordinance requiring persons intending to transport coal through the city streets to take out licenses for their vehicles, and pay a fee therefor; but it does not authorize a tax upon vehicles used by the owners for their own convenience, or in the transaction of their own private business, and not engaged in any public employment for compensation. A city ordinance prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors without a license is constitutional, 13 in the absence of general laws of the state controlling the sale of intoxicating liquors. 14 And a city council may impose a license fee on sales of beer or ale not manufactured in the city, without infringing the power of Congress to regulate commerce, except as to