beer shown to have been manufactured in another state.15 And a city may impose a license fee upon an express company desiring to transact business within the corporate limits, although the business of the company extends beyond the limits of the state. 16 A license granted upon certain specified conditions may be revoked as a penalty for a violation of the conditions. 17

1 City of Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. 415; Slaughter v. Commonw. 13 Gratt. 767; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534; Fretwell v. City of Troy, 18 Kan. 271; Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586; City of Burlington v. Lawrence, 42 Iowa, 681; Lick v. State, 42 Miss. 316.

2 State v. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123; Durach's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 491; Norwich Gaslight Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co. 25 Conn. 19; Hodgson v. New Orleans, 21 La. An. 301; Osborne v. Mobile, 44 Ala. 493.

3 Savannah v. Charlton, 36 Ga. 460; Mayor etc. v. Uille, 3 Ala. 137; Welch v. Hotchkiss, 39 Conn. 140; People v. Mulholland, 10 N. Y. Week. Dig. 564.

4 State v. Columbia, 6 Rich. 1; Wright v. Mayor etc. 54 Ga. 645.

5 Commissioners etc. v. Capehart, 71 No. Car. 156; City of Mem. phis v. Battaile, 8 Heisk. 524.

6 Davis v. State, 2 Tex. Ct. App. 425. Compare Burlington v. Law. rence, 42 Iowa, 681; Burlington v. Bumgardner, id. 673; Little v. City of Madison, 49 Wis. 605; 35 Am. R. 793.

7 Dunham v. Trustees etc. 5 Cowen, 462; St. 268; Plaquemine v. Roth, 29 La. An. 261. ton, 35 Miss. 189.

Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio
And see Leonard v. Can-

8 Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; 9 Am. R. 80; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405; Hayes v. Appleton, 24 Wis. 542; Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524. And compare Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307; Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe R. R. Co. 11 Leigh, 42; Missouri v. Fisher, 52 Mo. 47; Com mouw. v. Brooks, 109 Mass. 355.

9 East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 Ill. 28.

10 Darling v. St. Paul, 19 Minn. 389; Kinmundy v. Mahan, 72 Ill. 463. Compare Decorah v. Dunstan, 38 Iowa, 56.

11 Gartside v. East St. Louis, 43 Ill. 47.

12 St. Louis v. Grone, 46 Me. 574. And see Collinsville v. Cole, 75 Ill. 114.

13 City Council v. Ahrens, 4 Strob. 241. See Howe v. Treasurer etc. 37 N. J. L. 145; Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 325.

14 Heisem brittle v.ity Council, 2 McMull. 233. Compare Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; State v. Clark, 28 N. H. 176; State v. Freeman, 38 id. 426.

15 Downham v. Alexandria, 10 Wall. 173.

16 Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479. Compare Woodruff v. Parham, 41 Ala. 334.

17 Hurber v. Baugh, 43 Iowa, 514.

§ 297. Abatement of nuisances.-Municipal corporations are liberally endowed with power to prevent

8

and abate nuisances,1 and to punish the authors of them by penalties, fines, and imprisonment.2 But a municipal corporation cannot, in the absence of any general laws upon the subject, and by the mere declaration that a thing is a nuisance, subject it to removal by any person supposed to be aggrieved, or even by the corporation itself. In general, the municipal authorities may not declare anything a nuisance which cannot be detrimental to the health of the place, or dangerous to the citizens, or a public inconvenience; 4 and not even then, where the thing complained of exists by legislative sanction.5 A power to enact ordinances relative to nuisances authorizes the municipal authorities to impose penalties on the keepers of "houses of ill-fame," and on persons owning houses used, with their knowledge, for such purposes; but it does not authorize them to demolish a building so occupied and used:7 and individuals have no right to abate the nuisance occasioned by such occupation and use by demolishing the building. A board of trustees of a town, with power to "abate and remove nuisances," have not power to prohibit in advance the establishment of any cemetery, except as authorized by the board. So a dead animal is not per se a nuisance; 10 and to justify the removal of "dead animals," under an ordinance providing for their removal, "so as most effectually to secure the public health," it must be shown that they were or would become in some way dangerous to public health. But under a power to make by-laws relative to nuisances, a municipal corporation may prohibit, by ordinance, the keeping of a bowling-alley for gain or hire.12 So it may abate as a nuisance the cornice of a building which projects over a sidewalk in such a way as to be dangerous to persons using the sidewalk; 13 and the same is true as it respects a vacant building, which is so used as to endanger by fire the property of others, or the health of the community.14 So a city, whose duty it is to prevent obstructions in a river within its limits, may abate or re

move anything which obstructs the free and common use of the river.15 And the legislature may authorize city authorities to seclude persons affected with contagious diseases, 16

1 Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. An. 227; Roberts v. Ogle, 30 Ill. 459; Gregory v. New York, 40 N. Y. 273; Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 184; Union Railway Co. v. Mayor etc. 11 Allén, 287; Babcock v. Buffalo, 56 N. Y.

268.

2 Vandyke v. Cincinnati, 1 Disn. 532; Lake View v. Letz, 44 Ill. 81; Nolan v. Mayor etc. 4 Yerg. 163.

3 Yates r. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; and see Darst v. People, 51 Ill. 286; 2 Am. R. 301; Pye v. Peterson, 45 Tex. 312; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Joliet, 79 Ill. 25.

4 See Sheen v. Slothart, 29 La. An. 630; Waco v. Powell, 32 Tex. 258; Coates v. Mayor etc. 7 Cow. 585; Commonw. v. Goodrich, 13 Allen, 546; Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1.

5 State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170.

6 McAlister v. Clark, 33 Conn. 91; and see Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331.

7 Welch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 332; Miller v. Burch, 32 Tex. 208; 5 Am. R. 242; and see Clark v. Mayor etc. 13 Barb. 32.

8 Ely v. Supervisors, 36 N. Y. 297; Moody v. Supervisors etc. 46 Barb. 659; Goldsmith v. Jones, 43 How. Pr. 415.

9 Lake View v. Letz, 44 Ill. 81.

10 Underwood v. Green, 42 N. Y. 140.

11 Underwood v. Green, 42 N. Y. 140.

12 Tanner v. Trustees etc. 5 Hill, 121; and see Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111; State v. Hay, 29 Me. 457; Updike v. Campbell, Smith, E. D. 570. But compare State v. Hull, 32 N. J. L. 158.

13 Grove v. Fort Wayne, 45 Ind. 429; and see Kiley v. City of Kansas, 69 Mo. 102; 33 Am. R. 491.

14 Harvey v. Dewoody, 18 Ark. 252; and see Ferguson v. City of Salma, 43 Ala. 398.

15 Hart v. Mayor etc. 9 Wend. 571; and see People v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 396; Hoeft v. Seaman, 46 How. Pr. 24; 6 Jones & S. 62.

16 Haverty v. Bass, 66 Me. 71; Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495.

§ 298. Regulation of markets.-A market is a designated place in a town or city to which all persons can repair who wish to buy or sell articles there exposed for sale.1 Municipal corporations have, very generally, the power to establish and regulate markets within their limits; 2 the extent and limits of the power possessed by a particular corporation depending upon its charter.3 Grants of power in this respect will be liberally construed; but not so as to warrant an ordinance in restraint of trade, and tending to create a monopoly.5 A

charter power to make such necessary ordinances, etc., as may tend to the "good government of the town," confers discretionary power to build and repair a market-house, and also power to lease a building for market purposes.7 And power "to establish" a market authorizes, as a necessary incident, the purchase of ground upon which to erect a market-house; but gives no authority to erect one on a public street. Power to establish and regulate markets is a continuing one,10 and markets once established may be abandoned or changed at the pleasure of the corporation.11

1 Caldwell v. Alton, 33 Ill. 416; and compare Cincinnati v. Bucking. ham, 10 Ohio, 257.

2 Cougot v. New Orleans, 16 La. An. 21; Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71: Bowling Green v. Carson, 10 Bush, 64; Yates v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 673; and see Mayor etc. v. Pedley, 4 Barn. & Adol. 397; Rex v. Cottrell, 1 id. 67; In re Fennell etc. 24 Up. Can. Q. B. 238.

3 See New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 La. An. 417; Atlanta v. White, 33 Ga. 229; Le Claire v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 210.

4 St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 202; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550; Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356; Winsboro v. Smart, 11 Rich. 551.

5 Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; Bloomington v. Wahl. 46 III. 489; and see Peck v. Austin, 22 Tex. 261. Compare Le Claire v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 210.

6 Smith v. City of Newbern, 70 No. Car. 460. As to the duty of a municipal corporation to keep a market in repair: see Mayor etc. v. Cullens, 38 Ga. 334.

7 Wade v. City of Newbern, 77 No. Car. 14.

8 Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; 9 Am. R. 80; Caldwell v. Alton, 33 Ill. 416; People v. Lowber, 7 Abb. Pr. 158; 28 Barb. 65.

9 Wartınan v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 202. Compare State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. L. 201.

10 Gall v. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio St. 563.

11 Gall v. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio St. 563; Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 202.

§ 299. Powers as to taxation.—Municipal corporations have no inherent power to levy taxes; 1 but the legislature may constitutionally delegate the power to them to be exercised for the support of their local governments.2 The power must be conferred either in express words, or by necessary implication, and it must be construed in subordination to the general tax laws of the state, unless a contrary intent is clearly indicated. And

the power of the legislature to authorize a municipal corporation to tax the inhabitants is confined to taxes for public objects in which the inhabitants have a general interest. The power of the state to tax trades, etc., may, however, be delegated to municipal corporations; 8 but the power must be impartially exercised by them, and they have no right to discriminate in taxing privileges between merchants and other dealers residing without the corporation, and members of the same class residing within the corporate limits.9 But a tax on business and avocations, fixing a different rate of taxation for each distinct business or avocation, does not violate a constitutional provision requiring all taxes to be uniform. 10 A statute exempting particular property from municipal taxation is not unconstitutional. But property "exempted from taxation of every kind,"12 or from "any tax or public imposition whatever,"18 is not exempted from special assessments for street improvements in front of the property.14 And a general statute exempting from taxation property used for religious purposes does not exempt such property from assessments for local improvements.15 A charter power to assess taxes and licenses implies a right to enforce their payment by judicial proceedings. 16 And where municipal authorities have the power and are under a duty to levy a tax to pay a debt or demand, the performance of the duty may be enforced by mandamus.17 The federal constitution prohibits the states from levying any duty on tonnage, without the consent of Congress; 18 but the assessment of a vessel owned in a city, by the city assessor for city taxes, is not a "duty of tonnage" within such prohibition.19

1 Wheatly v. Covington, 11 Bush, 18; Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. 78; Vance . Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435; Dailey v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367; and see tit. TAXATION.

2 New Orleans v. Turpin, 13 La. An. 56; Gilkeson v. Frederick County, 13 Gratt. 577; Durach's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 491; Primm v. City of Belleville, 59 Ill. 142; Osborne v. Mobile, 44 Ala. 493; New Orleans v. Poutz, 14 La. An. 853.

3 Clark r. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494: Council of Augusta v. Dunbar, 50 Ga. 387; Pullen v. Commissioners, 68 No. Car. 451.