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sion. June 9, 1891.)

(127 N. Y. 329)

SALE-EVIDENCE-REPLEVIN.

by statute, in order to entitle conveyances the conclusion reached in Wilder v. Butor mortgages or securities in the nature terfield, supra. The judgment should be of mortgages to be recorded, nor was it modified accordingly, and as modified afrecorded in the books required by the re- firmed, with costs to the plaintiff. All concording act to be kept for such purpose, cur. but instead it was filed and entered in a separate book, as required by statute, in the same manner in which judgments are entered of record. And in that which was HOTCHKIN V. THIRD NAT. BANK OF MALONE. done the county clerk did all that the stat- (Court of Appeals of New York, Second Diviute commanded him to do, and, in the absence of an acknowledgment, all that he was authorized to have done, had the su- FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS-VALIDITY OF pervisor requested that it be recorded in the book in which mortgages, or securities in the nature of mortgages, are required to be recorded. But the statute does not seem to have contemplated that such a bond should be within the protection of the recording act. It does not refer to the act, require the bond to be acknowledged, nor make provision for recording it; but declares that a lien shall be created if the bond be "filed in the office of the county clerk, who shall make an entry thereof, in a book to be provided for the purpose, in the same manner in which judgments are entered of record." Since the execution of the bond the legislature has provided that such bonds shall be recorded, (chapter 372, Laws 1887), but such enactment, in so far as it may be said to indicate legislative construction of the statute before us, supports the view we have expressed.

Where a merchant represents himself as solvent, though he knows that he is insolvent, tains goods, which he subsequently pays for, and. and on the strength of such representations obseveral months after, buys more goods from the same person, but makes no further representations, and transfers the last goods bought to other creditors to secure precedent debts, the seller cannot recover them from the transferee on the ground that the sale was induced by fraudulent and false representations by the purchaser as to his credit; for, though the purchasgiven unrecorded bills of sale and chattel morter knew that he was insolvent, and had in fact gages on nearly all of his property, yet if, from all the circumstances of the purchase, it appears that the purchaser hoped to extricate himself from his embarrassments, and that he intended to pay for the goods, the sale was valsolvency, his suppression of that fact from the id, notwithstanding the facts of his known inseller, and his immediate transfer of the goods to secure other creditors. VANN, J., dissenting. Appeal from supreme court, general term, third department.

P. B. McLennan, for appellant. William P. Cantwell and John I. Gilbert, for respondent.

The question remaining is whether the decree was right, in so far as it adjudged that the subsequent grantee and mortgagee should be permitted to redeem within the period of time provided by statute for the redemption of lands sold under execution. The right in law to redeem lands from sale exists only when given by statute. BROWN, J. This action was brought to Our statutes provide for a redemption of recover the possession of a lot of top buglands sold under mortgages to the state, gies alleged to have been fraudulently ob(Rev. St. pt. 1, c. 9, tit. 6, § 14), or for tained from the plaintiff by one Lyman J. non-payment of taxes, (Id. pt. 1, c. 13, tit. Folsom in the months of October and No3, 93;) and from a sale under an ex-vember, 1886, and by said Folsom transecution, (Code Civil Proc. § 1446.) And ferred. to the defendant as security for courts of equity will decree that redemp- the payment of a precedent debt. The tion may be made in certain cases. Tag- plaintiff had judgment upon the referee's regart v. Wade, 1 N. Y. Supp. 900; Crane port for the possession of 39 of the bugv. McDonald, 2 N. Y. St. Rep. 150; Cas- gies. The order of the general term, which serly v. Witherbee, 119 N. Y. 522, 23 N. E. reversed the judgment, and from which this Rep. 1000. But in equity the general rule appeal is taken, was upon questions of fact is that, where all the parties are before and law. Hence both are open to our conthe court, and the rule is to be made pur- sideration. The complaint alleged that Folsuant to its decree, and by an officer ap- som obtained the property in question in pointed by it for the purpose, the right the months of October, November, and Deof redemption will not be allowed except cember, 1886; and with intent to defraud by command of the statute; and this case the plaintiff, and induce her to deliver said comes within that rule. The lien creat- property to him on credit, falsely and frauded by the filing and entry of the bond is ulently represented himself to be finana general lien, with no greater force and cially good and solvent, and worth the effect, as against prior unrecorded mort- sum of $15,000, and that the plaintiff begages, than that of a judgment. But it is lieving and relying upon such representanot a judgment lien, nor is it to be en- tions, and believing said Folsom to be solforced by sale under execution, as the stat- vent, was induced to deliver said properute provides a judgment lien shall be. The ty to him upon credit, and that said Folsection of the Code above referred to is som obtained the same with a preconceived not, therefore, applicable to the situation design and intent not to pay therefor. It presented, and, as there exists none of the further alleged that Folsom was insolequities requisite to bring this case with- vent at the time aforesaid, and knew himin the rule which has led courts of equity self to be so; that he had transferred and in certain cases to adjudge that a party delivered the property to the defendant as be permitted to redeem, the right of re- security for the payment of a precedent demption should not have been authorized debt; and that defendant was not a bona by this decree. This view accords with fide purchaser thereof. It further alleged

a demand for the possession of the prop-ty was obtained from the plaintiff by the erty, and an unlawful refusal and deten- false representations of Folsom, without tion thereof by defendant. The answer de- showing that in parting with the propernied any fraud upon the part of Folsom, ty the plaintiff was influenced by those repand alleged that defendant was a purchas-resentations; and, to show that, it must er in good faith of the property in ques- appear that she relied upon them in givtion. To substantiate the allegations of ing the credit upon the sale. Fraud withher complaint, the plaintiff proved by Al-out damage, or damage without fraud, fred J. Hotchkin, her husband, who was will not sustain an action for deceit; her agent and general business manager, and a false and fraudulent representation that on April 13, 1886, Folsom came to made by one party to induce a contract his office in Syracuse, and said he had entered into by another is not actionable, come to buy some carriages, if they could unless the party to whom it was made agree on price. There had been sales to believed the representation to be true, and Folsom prior to this date, but generally acted upon the faith of it to his damfor cash. The witness asked him if he age. Allen v. Addington, 7 Wend. 9; Oberwished to buy for cash, and he said, "No;" lander v. Spiess, 45 N. Y. 175; Lefler v. he wished to buy on time. The witness Field, 52 N. Y. 621; Taylor v. Guest, 58 then continued as follows: "I said: 'We N. Y. 266. The essential elements of an achave sold you before for cash, and not tion for false pretenses are representations, on time; how is your financial condition?' falsity, scienter, deception, and injury. He said: 'I am good for what I wish Arthur v. Griswold, 55 N. Y. 400. "In a leto buy. I am solvent, and am worth $15,- gal sense, a person is not damaged by a false 000.' I then asked him if he would wish representation by which he is not influto buy more than the number he had enced." Taylor v. Guest, supra. And in named; and he said: 'Not to-day, but Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N. Y. 454, 20 N. will want more later on;' that it was E. Rep. 376, it is said: "There must have early for him to buy buggies at that time. been false representations, known to be I then asked him if three or four months' such, calculated and intended to influence draft or note would be satisfactory; and the plaintiff, and in reliance upon which he he replied that it would; and I filled out in good faith parted with property." All an order, and he signed it." This is the these circumstances must be found to exonly evidence contained in the case of a ist, and the absence of any one of them representation made by Folsom as to his is fatal to a recovery. The judgment of financial condition which plaintiff claims the trial court cannot be upheld, therefore, influenced her in making the sale in ques- upon the findings in reference to the false tion. There was evidence that in Feb- representations of April 13th. There is not ruary, 1886, Folsom made some statements alone an absence of any finding that such as to his condition to one Wilder, a trav- representations were relied upon by plaintiff, eling salesman for the plaintiff; but it does or influenced her in making the October not appear that these statements were and November sales, but there is a total communicated to plaintiff or her husband, absence of any fact found by the referee and the referee specifically found that they connecting those sales in any way with were not relied upon in selling the prop- the representations made in April, and erty which is the subject of this action. there is nothing in the opinion of the refThe wagons that were purchased in April eree from which it can be inferred that were paid for, and between that date and he intended to decide that the October the month of October other sales were and November sales were induced by made by plaintiff to Folsom, some for the representations made in April. It becash, and one on a credit of three months, comes unnecessary, therefore, for us to which was also paid. The buggies which examine the evidence to determine whethwere transferred to the defendant were er the facts that those representations sold to Folsom in the months of October were made and were false were supportand November, and it is conceded that no ed by the weight of testimony; for we representations were made by Folsom at need not consider further a branch of the that time; and, if those sales were in-case which was rejected by the referee. duced by any statements as to his finan- The referee found, however, "that at the cial condition, they were those of April time Folsom purchased and received said 13th which I have quoted. But the ref- carriages he was insolvent, knew himself eree did not find that the sales of October and November were induced by the representations made in April. Nor did he find that plaintiff relied upon that representation in making those sales. The finding is "that upon the 13th day of April, 1886, said Folsom, for the purpose of obtaining carriages from the plaintiff at that time upon credit, and for the purpose of obtaining further credit, falsely represented himself as solvent, and worth fifteen thousand dollars." As has already been stated, carriages bought on April 13th were paid for, as were most of those purchased during the summer of 1886.

The title of the defendant could not be impeached on the ground that the proper

to be insolvent, fraudulently concealed his insolvency from the plaintiff, and must necessarily have known that he could not continue in business and pay for said property; that the said goods were purchased and received of the plaintiff by said Folsom fraudulently, with the preconceived design and intent not to pay for the same."

If a purchaser who is insolvent conceals that fact from the vendor for the purpose of defrauding him, and thus obtains goods without intending to pay for them, the title of the property is not changed, and it may be reclaimed by the vendor. Durell v. Haley, 1 Paige, 492; Ash v. Putnam, 1 Hill, 302; Ferguson v. Carrington, 9 Barn. & C. 59; Devoe v. Brandt, 53 N. Y. 462;

Wright v. Brown, 67 N. Y. 1. Therefore, ing, not growing. Mr. French, the cashier if the findings I have quoted are sustained of the People's Bank, testified that from by the weight of testimony, they will up- October 1, 1886, to January 1, 1887, Folhold the judgment of trial court. I shall som's indebtedness to that bank was reassume that Folsom was insolvent in Octo- duced $2,500; and Mr. Pease, the cashier ber, 1886, and must have known that fact; of the defendant bank, testified that shortbut I think the evidence does not support ly before his death Folsom reduced his inthe conclusion that he knew he could not debtedness in that bank. Notwithstanding continue in business and pay for the car- some losses, his financial condition in Janriages, and that he acquired the property uary, 1887, was better and stronger than with a preconceived design not to pay for in October, when the first lot of wagthe same. The reasons given for the con- ons in question were sold to him by the clusion of the learned referee are-First, plaintiff. It is also true that the buggies, Folsom's insolvency and large indebted soon after their receipt by Folsom, were ness; second, that he had mortgaged all by bill of sale transferred to the defendhis property to his numerous creditors, ant bank; but this transfer was not made which mortgages were not filed until after with any intent to cheat the plaintiff, his death, and that he had been sued, and or to dispose of the property for any a small judgment recovered against him; fraudulent purpose, but in aid and assistand, third, that all the carriages obtained ance of his business. As has already apfrom the plaintiff were almost immediate- peared, the bills of sale were not filed, and ly transferred to the defendant. I am un- the wagons remained in Folsom's possesable to perceive how the fact that the sion, to be sold in the usual course of busichattel mortgages and bills of sale were ness in the spring, when there was a marnot filed indicated a fraudulent intent on ket for them. The same may be said of Folsom's part in procuring the property the chattel mortgage to Adams & Martin, in question. The chattel mortgage to who were indorsers on an overdue promAdams for $6,000 was executed in Janu- issory note of $2,000 held by the People's ary, 1886; and the bill of sale to Shields & Bank. There is nothing in the general apShane, conveying personal property, notes, pearance of Folsom's business in the fall and accounts to an amount in excess of of 1886, as disclosed by the record, that $26,000, was executed in February of the indicates impending failure. No creditors same year. Neither was filed until aft- were pressing him, but all were lenient, er his death. If the securities, and the and apparently satisfied with the situation. fact that they were not filed, are indica- There was no market for his stock of tions of a fraudulent intent in the pur- wagons until spring, and apparently there chase of property by Folsom, that infer- was a reasonable hope and expectation ence would be as strong as to purchases of a profitable business at that time, and prior to October as after; and yet we find with the sale of his stock a reduction of that purchases made of the plaintiff in indebtedness and an improved financial conApril and throughout the summer were dition. He possessed the confidence of the paid for, and during the same period Fol- community in which he lived, conducted a som was actively engaged in business, buy- large business, kept a livery stable, and ing from other manufacturers, and not operated a stage line, and was in possesa single fraudulent act on his part prior sion of a large amount of property. He to the sales of plaintiff in October is prov- was the sheriff of the county, holding that en or suggested. The inference of fraud office for a second term, and in the enjoyfrom the giving and failing to file the ment of an annual income therefrom of at various chattel mortgages is greatly weak- least $3,500. It is important in looking ened, if not totally destroyed, when we at his business prospects and endeavoring find that Folsom to the day of his death to determine the probability of his paying was conducting his business in the usual for property bought in the fall of 1886 to way, dealing with many persons, with bear in mind that he died suddenly on no charge of fraud against him except the the 1st of March, 1887. It is not just, single one involved in this action. More- therefore, to look at the situation as it exover, I do not see how the failure to file isted after his death. The abrupt termithe chattel mortgages and bills of sale, or nation of his personal conduct of the busito take possession of the property, is to ness caused results not only unexpected, be regarded as Folsom's act. It is true, but which probably would not have ocin some instances he requested it; but curred if he had lived. The indebtedness the various mortgagees could at any time to plaintiff did not mature until June and have filed their securities, and their fail- July following. Before that time elapsed, ure to do so indicates a leniency on their the buggies would in all probability have part towards their debtor, born of their been sold, and the proceeds of the sales confidence in him and of his honesty in been available in his business. With his dealing. It is true that Folsom's indebt- death, there was nothing to do but settle edness was large, and especially so to the his estate, with the usual result of forced three banks at Malone; but none of his sales and liquidation, and rapid depreciacreditors were pressing him, and no suits tion of the value of his property. Many were pending against him, and no judg- a business man, if compelled to go into ment was recovered against him until after liquidation on a given day, would find the sales in question, and then only for the himself insolvent, whereas, if allowed to small sum of $190. That he had the con- close up his business in his own way, he fidence of his creditors is indicated by their would realize more than sufficient to pay leniency towards him, and their apparent his debts; and many men have bridged confidence in his business ability. But it over a worse situation than confronted appears that his indebtedness was decreas- Folsom in the fall of 1886. Every failure

has its accumulation of embarrassments, but it cannot be said in this case that had Folsom lived he might not have extricated himself from his difficulties.

Thus far I have attempted to examine the general appearance of Folsom's business as disclosed by the record. To my mind it does not show him to be a dishonest man; and in this connection it is a fact of great weight that, notwithstanding his business life was open to the scrutiny of the plaintiff, no witness testified to a single act indicating fraud in another transaction. Let us now look briefly at the immediate transaction involved in this suit. The usual concomitant of fraud is a desire and effort on the part of the fraudulent purchaser to get possession of the property. Terms and conditions and length of credit are of no importance. So long as the possession of property is obtained, the fraudulent purpose is accomplished, and all conditions of sale are but unimportant incidents of the transaction. The negotiations leading to the delivery of the wagons are all in writing, and speak for themselves. The first was instituted by the plaintiff in a letter to Folsom written by her husband from Syracuse under date of September 28, 1886, in which he said: "If you want to make some money, I will give you a chance now. Then followed an offer to sell 50 buggies on 8 months' credit, and a description of the wagons; following which he says: "This is a splendid chance for you.' Two days after, not having a reply to his letter, Hotchkin wrote again, saying: "I wrote you several days ago making you special low offer on fifty buggies and on favorable terms. Please let me hear from you by next mail." But Folsom did not reply until October 6th, when he telegraphed: "Send me one sample carriage. Will buy more if suits. The sample carriage was sent, and on the 9th of October Hotchkin writes again, saying Folsom had better send his order by next mail, as they are selling very fast." On October 11th the order was sent, and the wagons were shipped, and the first sale was completed. On November 6, 1886, Hotchkin began negotiations for another sale, by letter of that date, in which he said: "If you want another bargain, and will keep prices to yourself, I will sell you fifty Brewster buggies at $65 each, same terms as before, if order is sent by return mail. The lowest price will be, after December 1st, $75.

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If you want this chance, you had better gobble it at once. You can advise by telegram at my expense, or they may be sold." Folsom, notwithstanding the chance that the buggies would all be sold, did not advise by telegram or order by return mail, but waited until November 15th, when he wrote that he would take 35 side-spring buggies of the same kind as the October order, and at the same price, and 15 Brewsters, on 8 months' credit from December 1st. On the following day Hotchkin replied that he had only 25 sidespring, and that he would have no more of either kind at the price named, and then says: "This is the last chance. I have made this offer to a party in Elmira for net cash, and expect his order to-morrow;

so, if you want them, you had better telegraph me to-morrow morning. First come first served." But notwithstanding this seductive offer, and the probability that Hotchkin would sell to his Elmira customer for net cash instead of on eight months' time, Folsom did not reply, and two days later Hotchkin telegraphed: "Do you want the buggies?" Evidently the "Elmira party" did not want them, and apparently neither did Folsom, for he replied: "Will take twenty-five sidesprings. Don't want auy Brewsters." But the next day the price of Brewsters fell, and Hotchkin telegraphed: "Will make price sixty dollars on twenty-five Brewsters; answer;" and Folsom answered: "Will take side-springs. Don't want any Brewsters." But Hotchkin's auction had not yet closed, and he immediately telegraphed: "Will sell twentyfive Brewsters at fifty-five dollars. Last chance. Answer. And Folsom took them at the last offer on a credit of four months' note, and an agreement by Hotchkin to renew for an additional four months, and the second sale was concluded. Now, it is impossible for any one to read this correspondence and say that it indicates fraud on Folsom's part. Indeed, one is amused at the persistency of Hotchkin in his efforts to sell his property, and his statements that the wagons are "selling fast," and that "another party will take them for cash to-mor row:" "that the price will go up after December 1st," and unless Folsom "telegraphs his order the opportunity will be gone;" his rapid reduction in the price when Folsom hestitates, and his advice to "gobble them at once." What the transaction does indicate is, on one hand, a manufacturer with a large stock of wagons in the fall of the year, who desires to sell them at low figures, and who is willing to take commercial paper on long time, upon which he can realize the money; on the other hand, a cautious dealer induced to become a purchaser by the exceptionally low price and long credit offered, and who expects to realize on sales of the wagons before his paper matures. In this connection the evidence of Charles Fury is very significant. He was in the employ of Folsom until December, 1886, and he testifies that he saw the letters from Hotchkin, and that Folsom consulted with him as to whether it would be safe to rely on the promise to renew his paper at the end of four months in the event of Hotchkin failing in the mean time; also as to the probability of his being able within the further period of four months to make sales, and meet the renewed paper; and that the result of that consultation was the order for the carriages. This evidence shows Folsom's mind on the subject, and absolutely destroys all inference of fraud. He had reason to be apprehensive as to the plaintiff's responsibility on account of the husband's former failure in the same business, and it shows that he was calculating the chances of his business enabling him to sell the wagons during the time of credit, and meet his obligations when they matured. Our conclusion is that the weight of evidence is against

the finding that Folsom, when he bought | enough to pay his debts; and as every the wagons, knew that he could not pay for them, and that he purchased them with a preconceived intent not to pay for them.

There is nothing, therefore, left to uphold the referee's judgment except that Folsom knew that he was insolvent when he made the purchases, and did not disclose that fact to the plaintiff. But this is not sufficient. The law is well settled in this state that the mere omission of a pur. chaser of goods on credit to disclose his insolvency to the vendor, in the absence of any attempt to defraud, is not such a concealment as will avoid the sale, al though the fact, if known to the seller would affect his credit. Nichols v. Pinner 18 N. Y. 295; Bank v. Bogart, 81 N. Y. 101108; Morris v. Talcott, 96 N. Y. 107; Macullar v. McKinley, 99 N. Y. 353, 2 N. E. Rep. 9; Coffin v. Hollister, 7 N. Y. Supp. 734. The intent not to pay must exist when the property is purchased, and without proof of such an intent a judgment for the plaintiff cannot be sustained. Brackett v. Griswold, supra. Mere insolvency undisclosed is not enough. We are of the opinion that the general term was right in reversing the judgment. The order appealed from should be affirmed, and judgment absolute rendered against the appellant, with costs. All concur, except VANN, J., dissenting.

VANN, J., (dissenting.) The judgment about to be rendered by the court impresses me as opposed to the weight of evidence given upon the trial. I do not intend to engage in an extended discussion of the facts, but will allude to enough of the evidence to define my position, and me judice, justify my vote to reverse the judgment of the general term and affirm that of the referee. The question presented for decision is whether Lyman J. Folsom practiced deception in order to induce the plaintiff to part with her property. A careful consideration of all the evidence has convinced me that he deceived her both by the statement of what was false and by the concealment of what was true. On the 13th of January, 1886, Folsom, offering to buy goods of the plaintiff, and stating that he should want more in the future, represented to her that he was solvent, and worth $15,000. Three months before, he had given a chattel mortgage to Adams for $6,000, and, within less than two months before, another to Shields and others for $10,000, subject to a third for $1,000, covering most of the personal property that he had, and all that he was using in his business. Two other mortgages on his livery stock, one three years old and the other two, amounting to $1,500, remained unpaid at this time. None of these mortgages were filed. His real estate was already mortgaged to its full value, except one parcel, and when the representations were made he had very little property free from incumbrance, or available to pay his unsecured debts, amounting to some thousands of dollars. According to the most charitable definition of insolvency, he was insolvent, because he had not property

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mau, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to know the situation of his own affairs, it must be assumed that he knew he was insolvent, especially as he was a good book-keeper and a good business man. Having established his credit with the plaintiff, he bought goods of her to a small amount, which he subsequently paid. He was then ready to load up and fail; and the eagerness of the plaintiff to sell goods to a man worth $15,000, as she supposed, made her an easy victim. During the month of September, 1886 in order to secure previous indorsements, he gave two bills of sale, one covering his interest in a crop of hops, and the other embracing his horses, wagons, sleighs, and all the property used in his livery business; and neither of these were filed. Even notes, accounts, and all his evidences of debt were included in one of these instruments, as well as cash on hand and estimated profits. October 11, 1886, he bought of the plaintiff 50 car. riages, for which he agreed to pay her $2,250 in 8 months, and 1 month later he gave a bill of sale to the defendant for 30 of said carriages to secure overdrafts and past-due paper. November 20, 1886, he bought of the plaintiff 50 more carriages, for which he agreed to pay her $2,500, eight months thereafter. He waited until the last of these carriages was delivered, when, about December 13, 1886, he gave a bill of sale to the defendant, covering this lot also, to secure a past indebtedness of $3,500. Neither of these instruments was filed. December 28, 1886, he gave a chattel mortgage for $1,000, apparently a renewal, that was filed; and January 19, 1887, he mortgaged the rest of his real estate for $6,000 to secure an indorser, and this mortgage was not recorded. On the 24th of the same month he gave a bill of sale covering 40 of the carriages that he had purchased of the plaintiff, to secure his indorsers upon a note past due and under protest for more than four months, but it was not filed. The omission to tile and record might be regarded as a remarkable coincidence, if he had not in several instances made a request upon the subject to the holder of the security. The proper ty embraced in all of these bills of sale and chattel mortgages remained in his possession, the same as if they had not been given. Before he purchased said carriages of the plaintiff he had given bills of sale or chattel mortgages covering substantially all his personal property, so that nothing was realized therefrom above the incumbrances. At the same time his real estate was all mortgaged to its full value, except one parcel, and that was likewise fully incumbered within a brief period thereafter. His subsequent transfers were, therefore, necessarily confined to property subsequently acquired, and that was mainly obtained from the plaintiff. From May, 1886, until March, 1887, when he died, he had notes protested repeatedly, and the protests were especially numerous during the period when he bought the carriages in the months of October and November, 1886. He had thousands of dollars in commercial paper under protest,

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