specified, state, territorial, and federal, shall extend only to aliens resident within the respective judicial districts of such courts." It is plain that this petitioner resided within the Eastern district of Michigan, which is the "judicial district" of this court. It is true that section 114 of title 28 of the United States Code, being section 53 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1035), provides that, "when a district contains more than one division, every suit not of a local nature against a single defendant must be brought in the division where he resides." Clearly, however, the defendant here, the government, cannot be said to reside in the Northern division in any different sense or extent than in the Southern division, and this section, therefore, can have no application to a naturalization proceeding in this court. I conclude, and hold, that the petition was properly filed, and could properly be heard and determined, in the Southern division of this district, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner resided in the Northern division. An order will be entered in accordance with the terms of this opinion. et al. citizenship, which petition had been denied by said state court on June 15, 1926, for the reason that, as then and there found and decided by said court, said petitioner was not "a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same," as required by section 382 of title 8 of the United States Code (Comp. St. § 4352 [4]). This decision was apparently based upon evidence that the petitioner had been, and then was, violating a statute of the state of Michigan pertaining to the regulation of hotels, and applicable to said petitioner as a hotel keeper. The question now presented to this court in this connection is whether the judgment of the state court is binding upon the petitioner here and precludes the granting of the citizenship sought in the present proceedings. It is now settled that naturalization proceedings before courts having the necessary jurisdiction are judicial, not administrative, in character, and that "in passing upon the application the court exercises judicial judgment." Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568, 46 S. Ct. 425, 70 L. Ed. 738. It is, therefore, clear that, as the parties to the proceeding before the state court mentioned, BECK v. PATTERSON, Governor of Oregon, the petitioner and the government, are also the parties to the present proceeding, and the questions, including that of the requisite qualifications of the petitioner, passed upon and decided by the state court, are the same questions again presented in the present proceeding, the judgment of the state court referred to is now res judicata here, as between these same parties, and requires this court to deny the present petition, without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to file another petition at the expiration of the fiveyear period prescribed by the statutory provision already cited; that is, five years from the date of said judgment of the state court. In re Guliano (D. C.) 156 F. 420; In re Centi (D. C.) 217 F. 833; In re Hartman (D. C.) 232 F. 798; In re Norman (D. C.) 256 F. 543; In re Kornstein (D. C.) 268 F. 172. [3] The only other question presented is whether the fact that the petitioner resides in the Northern division of this district made it necessary for him to file, and the court to hear, his petition in that division rather than in the Southern division, where such peti tion was actually filed. The only statutory provision applicable is the following language of section 357 of title 8 of the United States Code (Comp. St. § 4351): "The naturalization jurisdiction of all courts herein District Court, D. Oregon. June 27, 1927. No. 8912. Eminent domain 2(1)-Oregon Stock Inspection Law held beyond power of Legislature and void, as taking citizen's property and giving it to another (Or. L. §§ 9172, 9175, as amended by Laws 1927, pp. 426, 427). 1927, p. 426, provides that on request of the Or. L. 9175, as amended by Laws Cattle & Horse Raisers' Association of Oregon, a voluntary association of private inand dealing in cattle and horses, the Governor dividuals interested in the business of raising shall appoint an inspector for any stockyard in the state, his compensation to be agreed on and paid by the association. Or. L. § 9172, as amended by Laws 1927, p. 427, provides for a stated fee per head for all cattle and horses inspected, to be paid by the owner to the inspector and by him paid over to the association, which is required to pay 5 per cent. of the tion, and may retain the excess, which, as apsame to the state, and all expenses of inspecpears, if the law is carried out as intended, will amount to some $70,000 per year. Held, that such enactments constitute arbitrary decrees to others, and are beyond the power of the state for taking property of one citizen and giving it and void. In Equity. Suit by L. G. Beck against Isaac Lee Patterson, as Governor and Isaac H. Van Winkle, as Attorney General of the 21 F.(2d) 72 State of Oregon, and Gerry C. Snow, heretofore appointed State Brand Inspector. On motion for preliminary injunction. Injunction granted. Gustav Anderson, of Baker, Or., and P. J. Gallagher, of Portland, Or., for plaintiff. I. H. Van Winkle and Willis S. Moore, both of Salem, Or., for defendants. Before GILBERT, Circuit Judge, and BEAN and McNARY, District Judges. BEAN, District Judge. This is a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act of the Oregon Legislature providing for the appointment of stock inspectors, the fees to be paid by the owners of stock inspected, and the disposition of the funds to be derived therefrom. It was submitted on application for preliminary injunction. By section 9175 of the Oregon Laws, as amended in 1927 (chapter 329, Laws of 1927), it is provided that the Governor shall, upon the request of the Cattle & Horse Raisers' Association of Oregon, appoint a stock inspector or inspectors for any stock yard or yards in the state, for the purpose of inspecting all cattle and horses coming to said yards, the compensation of such inspector or inspectors to be agreed upon and paid by the Cattle & Horse Raisers' Association. By section 9172, as amended in 1927 (chapter 330, Laws of 1927), a charge of 10 cents per head on all cattle and horses weighing 400 pounds or more, and 5 cents for all weighing less than 400 pounds, is paid by the owner or person in charge of the stock inspected to the inspectors, and by them paid over to the Cattle & Horse Raisers' Association, it to pay all costs and expenses of all brand inspections provided by law, first, however, paying in to the state treasurer 5 per cent. of the fees so collected. It appears from the complaint that the Cattle & Horse Raisers' Association is a voluntary association of an uncertain number of private individuals, engaged or interested in the business of raising and dealing in cattle and horses; that, if the various inspectors are permitted to collect the fees provided by law, they will amount in the aggregate to approximately $75,000 annually, while the costs and expenses of inspection will not exceed $4,000, and the surplus is intended to be used by the association in publishing and distributing information to its various members relating to the market ing of live stock and the payment of expenses incident thereto. The state has a right to legislate for the safety and welfare of its citizens, and therefore may, for the purpose of preventing fraud and crime, enact and enforce reasonable inspection and quarantine laws, so long as they do not conflict with some act of Congress or attempt to regulate interstate commerce. New Mexico ex rel. McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 38, 27 S. Ct. 1, 51 L. Ed. 78. But the question here presented is whether the state may, under the guise of an inspection law, lawfully exact a fee to be paid by the owners of stock inspected for the benefit of an association of individuals, not a public agency or controlled or managed by the state. We think not. It is a fundamental principal of our government that no man shall be involuntarily deprived of his property, except for a public purpose, and therefore a legislative act which takes or undertakes to authorize the taking of one person's property for the benefit of another is not a law, but an arbitrary decree whereby the property of one citizen may be transferred to another, and is beyond the power of the Legislature. Dodge v. Mission Tp. (C. C. A.) 107 F. 829, 54 L. R. A. 242. As said by Judge Miller, in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L. Ed. 455: "To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favorite individuals, to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law." Now, under the law in question the inspectors are to be appointed only when requested by an association of an uncertain number of private individuals, and for such yard or yards as it may determine. The compensation of inspectors is to be fixed by the association, and it is to receive and apply to its own use the funds received from inspection fees, less the 5 per cent. to be paid to the state, and such an amount as it sees proper to pay inspectors, which surplus fund, it is alleged in the complaint, will exceed $70,000 a year. This is but an attempt, under legislative form, to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to the use and benefit of another. This the Legislature has no power to do. The injunction will issue. Ex parte THOMPSON. as a fugitive from justice, of the executive District Court, D. Massachusetts. July 19, authority of any state or territory to which 1927. No. 3727. Habeas corpus 45 (2)-Legality of arrest in interstate extradition should be tested in state court (28 USCA § 455). Notwithstanding the mandatory terms of Rev. St. § 755 (Comp. St. § 1283 [28 USCA § 455]), as to issuance of writ of habeas corpus, to avoid conflict between federal and state courts, legality of arrest of one held in interstate extradition proceeding should usually be tested by proceeding in state court. Habeas Corpus. Petition by Fred H. Thompson for writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from the custody of John F. Stokes. Writ discharged. such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any state or territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the state or territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear." The Attorney General of Massachusetts asked that the writ be, discharged. It was Edmund A. Whitman, of Boston, Mass., for petitioner. Ralph W. Stearns, Asst. Atty. Gen., op- stated, without contradiction, that it had alposed. LOWELL, District Judge. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. By the return to the writ the petitioner is alleged to have committed larceny in New Hampshire and to be a fugitive from the justice of that state. The Governor of New Hampshire requested the Governor of Massachusetts to return Thompson to New Hampshire and appointed an agent to bring him back. The Governor of Massachusetts honored the requisition and Thompson was placed in the custody of the New Hampshire agent. He then applied to this court for a writ of habeas corpus, which issued, and the petitioner was admitted to bail. ways been the custom in this district to test in the state courts the legality of the arrest of a person held on the requisition of the Governor of another state. An instance of this practice is shown in Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 27 S. Ct. 122, 51 L. Ed. 161, 7 Ann. Cas. 1073. The petitioner contended that Revised Statutes, §§ 751 to 761, inclusive (Comp. St. §§ 1279-1289 [28 USCA §§ 451-461]), especially section 755, required the court of the United States to whom application for a writ of habeas corpus was directed to consider the merits of the case. Section 755 (Comp. St. § 1283 [28 USCA § 455]), reads as follows: "The court, or justice, or judge to whom such application is made shall forthwith The Constitution of the United States award a writ of habeas corpus, unless it approvides as follows: pears from the petition itself that the party is not entitled thereto. "A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." Article 4, § 2. The history of the provision is shown in Ex parte Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 99, 16 L. Ed. 717. In 1793 the Congress passed a statute (1 Stat. 302) relating to the rendition of fugitives from justice. Ex parte Kentucky v. Dennison, supra. The subject is now covered by Revised Statutes, § 5278 (Comp. St. § 10126 [18 USCA § 662]), which reads as follows: "Whenever the executive authority of any state or territory demands any person 99 The statute is mandatory in terms, but in a very well considered opinion, which is often cited, Mr. Justice Harlan decided that, in order to avoid conflict between the federal and state courts, a person should usually be left to his remedy in the state courts. Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 734, 29 L. Ed. 868. See, also, Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179, 27 S. Ct. 459, 51 L. Ed. 760; Ex parte Coatz (D. C.) 242 F. 1003; Shapley v. Cohoon (D. C.) 258 F. 752. The petitioner admits that this is the general rule on the subject, but insists that it is not the proper rule in the case of interstate rendition, where the application for a writ of habeas corpus is first made to a federal court. He points out that there is no decision in the books in which a petition of this 21 F.(24) 75 kind has been denied. I have been referred to no such decision, and it is true that the statute gives the federal court authority to pass on the merits of the case, and that in some circuits this is often done. Day v. Keim (C. C. A.) 2 F. (2d) 966. See, also, Austin v. Williams (C. C. A.) 12 F. (2d) 66. This is not, however, the practice in this district, and the settled opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, as laid down in the case of Ex parte Royall, supra, seems to indicate that the Massachusetts practice is more consonant with the proper relations between the courts of the state and of the nation than the practice in vogue in other circuits. See Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 4 S. Ct. 544, 28 L. Ed. 542; Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183, 13 S. Ct. 40, 36 L. Ed. 934; Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231, 16 S. Ct. 297, 40 L. Ed. 406. The writ is discharged. THE SOUTHERN CROSS. THE SOCONY NO. 4. out a stern line to the dock, as it would have endangered the May Queen's cabin to carry a stern line from the Southern Cross to the dock. The dock runs with the creek. While both scows were so made fast and lying safely, the steam tug Socony No. 4 came into the creek at some speed, with the oil barge Socony No. 124, 235 feet long and 38 feet wide, in tow alongside on the tug's starboard side, from Sparkhill, bound to Kings No. 1, a refinery farther up Newtown creek. The Socony No. 4, with her tow, passed so close to the Southern Cross and the May Queen that, with the depth of water at that point in the creek, she created such a suction that she caused the Southern Cross and May Queen to surge back and forth, as a result of which the lines on the after end of the May Queen parted, and the wind caused both boats, which remained fast to each other, to swing around, and, in order to prevent the bow line of the May Queen from parting, the captain of the Southern Cross slacked off the bow line from the May Queen, got out a bow line from his boat to the dock, and let the boats swing around until they brought up District Court, E. D. New York. June 1, 1926. alongside the dock farther up the creek than No. 7538. Shipping 81(1)—Steam tug passing scow tied to dock at speed causing suction, which caused lines to part, held negligent. Steam tug passing scow tied to dock at speed sufficient to create suction, causing lines of scow to part, held negligent, and liable for resulting damages. In Admiralty. Libel by the C. F. Harms Company, owner of the scow Southern Cross, against the steam tug Socony No. 4. Decree for libelant. Decree affirmed 21 F. (2d) 76. William F. Purdy, of New York City, for libelant. Peter M. Speer, of New York City, for claimant. CAMPBELL, District Judge. There is considerable conflict in the testimony, but the facts appear to me to be as follows: After noon on November 4, 1920, the scow Southern Cross, laden with a load of sand waiting to be unloaded, was lying stern out alongside another scow, the May Queen, which was lying stern out laden with gravel, alongside the Sicilian Asphalt Company's dock at the foot of Box street, Newtown creek. The May Queen was properly made fast to the dock with good, although not new, lines, and the Southern Cross was made fast to the May Queen. She could not have put the place where they were formerly made fast. ried from the dock forward to the winch of The captain, using a line which he carthe Southern Cross, made considerable effort, with the assistance of men from the Sicilian Asphalt Company, to pull the boats back to the place alongside the dock where they had been made fast, but without success, and then notified the libelant, and it made efforts to get a tug to assist the Southern Cross; but it was election day, and no tug could be obtained. The libelant then notified the harbor police, and finally succeeded in getting Capt. Stillwagon, of the Newtown Creek Towing Company, to get a special crew and take a tug to the assistance of the Southern Cross; but when he arrived nothing could be done, as the tide had fallen. On the falling tide the Southern Cross grounded and sustained damages. The testimony of the witnesses produced by the Socony No. 4, that they saw no scows angling out, is negative, and, even if true, does not show the positive testimony of the captain of the Southern Cross to be other than true, because undoubtedly the Socony No. 4 had passed before the boats began to swing around, and the master of the Socony No. 4 was undoubtedly more concerned with the navigation of his boat and what was ahead than with boats he had passed, and the deck hand of the Socony No. 4 was a lookout on the bow of the barge No. 124, and undoubtedly was concerned with what was ahead, and not with what they had passed. William F. Purdy, of New York City, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Decree (21 F.[2d] 75) affirmed, with costs. The fact that no boats were seen angling P. J. MCGOWAN & SONS, Inc., v. VAN In my opinion, both the captain of the Southern Cross and the master of the Socony No. 4 are in error as to the rate of speed of the No. 4 and her tow, and while she was not going 10 miles an hour, she was going more than 2 miles an hour, and was going fast enough to create, with her deep draft tow, the suction which caused the lines of the May Queen to part. The injuries were received on election day, and there was little activity in the creek, and greater speed could be made. It is not a question of the precise speed of the No. 4, but whether her speed, when passing as she did the Southern Cross, was sufficient to inflict the damage, and, as I have found, she was guilty of negligence in passing at such speed. The New York (D. C.) 34 F. 757; The New Hampshire (D. C.) 88 F. 306; The Rhode Island (D. C.) 24 F. 295. I find no fault on the part of the libelant or the Southern Cross. A decree may be entered in favor of libelant, with costs and the usual order of ref erence. THE SOUTHERN CROSS. THE SOCONY NO. 4. No. 312. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York. et al. No. 8909. June 27, 1927. 1. States 6-Compact between Oregon and Washington respecting regulations for protection of fish in Columbia river held not to prohibit either state from narrowing class of persons who may take fish or appliances which may be used within its own waters (40 Stat. 515). The compact between the states of Oregon and Washington, ratified by Congress in April, 1918 (40 Stat. 515), and providing that laws and regulations then existing or subsequently made for protecting or preserving fish in the Columbia River "shall be made, changed, alter ed or amended * consent and approbation of both states," is a * only with the mutual limitation beyond which the states singly may not go, but is not an inhibition against the narrowing by either state of the class of persons who may be permitted by it to take fish, or the appliances they may use within its own waters. 2. Fish 9-Initiated law, Oregon 1926, prohibiting use of fishwheel or seine for taking fish from Columbia river in state held valid (Laws 1927, p. 17). Initiated Law Oregon, adopted Nov. 1926 (Laws 1927, p. 17), making it unlawful to maintain or operate any fishwheel in the waters of Columbia river in the state after May 1, 1927, or to take fish therefrom with a seine at any point east of Cascade Locks, held valid. In Equity. Suit by P. J. McGowan & Sons, Inc., against I. H. Van Winkle, as Attorney General, John C. Veatch and others, as Fish Commissioners, and M. P. Hoy, as Master Fish Warden, of the state of Oregon. On motion for preliminary injunction. Denied. W. B. McCord (of Kerr, McCord & Ivey), of Seattle, for complainant. I. H. Van Winkle, of Salem, Or., A. E. Clark, of Portland, Or., and James W. Mott, of Astoria, Or., for defendants. Before GILBERT, Circuit Judge, and Before MANTON, L. HAND, and BEAN and McNARY, District Judges. SWAN, Circuit Judges. Macklin, Brown, Lenahan & Speer, of New York City (Paul Speer, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant. BEAN, District Judge. The plaintiffs and interveners are and have been for some years the owners and operators of sundry fish wheels and fish seines located and operated on |