avail themselves, however, of this advantage, but paffed on with out firing a fhot."

"At noon, the fea-breeze fprung up, which gave the British the weather gage. Both fleets formed their lines anew to the wind; and at twenty minutes paft twelve, Admiral Pocock made the fignal to bear down on the enemy, beth and Comte de Provence began the engagement; but foon and engage. The Eliza after, the mizen of the latter taking fire, fhe was obliged to quit the line, and her crew were constrained to cut away the maft, in order to fave the fhip. The Duc de Burgogne then attacked the Elizabeth, but was fo overpowered by her fire, that Comte d'Aché himself, at that time warmly engaged with the Yarmouth, endeavoured all he could to push up to her affiftance; but his inten tion was thwarted, by the steering wheel of the Zodiaque being fhattered by a shot from his antagonist; to repair which, fhe paffed under the lee of the Duc d'Orleans; and no fooner had the returned into the line, than one of her lower deck guns in the gun-room burst, and beat through the deck above. This misfortune was foon followed by another, of a much more ferious nature, and dreadfully alarming. The bulkhead of the powder-room was fet on fire; and whilft they were bufy in exftinguishing it, the newly repaired wheel gave way, whereby the fhip fell on board the Duc d'Orleans, her fecond ahead. Both, while trying to extricate themfelves, were expofed to a moft fevere cannonade from the Yarmouth and Tyger, to which the enemy, for a confiderable time, were unable to make any return. The Condé and Morás were by this time beat out of the line; and, at eight minutes after two, the Zodiaque having got difentangled, M. d'Aché bore away, and in fifteen minutes afterwards, the reft of his fhips followed his example: on which Admiral Pocock made the fignal for a ciofer engagement. This fignal was obeyed with alacrity by all the fhips, and the enemy were feverely raked by means of this well-timed manoeuvre; but, as they crowded all the fail they could fet, the Admiral foon after hauled down the fignal for the line, and made the fignal for a general chafe. On this the enemy cut away all their boats, that their fhips might have no impediment to retard their failing, and ftood to the N. N. W.

"A running fight now took place, which lasted til near three o'clock, by which time the enemy had got beyond reach of cannot-fhot. The purfuit was continued till dark, when Admiral Pocock finding it impoffible to get up with them, about eight o'clock came to anchor with his fquadron off Carical, three miles from the shore. The enemy made for Pondicherry.

"During the action, the breeze being gentle, the water mooth, and both fleets clofe to each other, they fired with great certainty. The French, as ufual, aimed at the rigging of the Britifh fhips, whilft they took a furer mark of their hulls, which fuffered feverely; and, notwithstanding the irregularity and short continuance of this action, the French fuftained as

great

great a lofs of men in it as they did in the former engagement although their numbers were lefs in this fight by one thousand two hundred, than it was in the firft. On board the Zodiaque thirty-three were killed, and one hundred and fifty dangerously wounded. The killed in the British fquadron amounted only to thirty-one, and the wounded to one hundred and fixty-fix. Both M. d'Aché and Admiral Pocock were wounded by fplinters; as alfo Captain Martin and M. d'Aché's Captain; and Admiral Stevens was wounded by a musket-ball, which lodged in his fhoulder, and was feen to be shot with aim by a French officer t. The British fleet were greatly damaged in their mafts and rigging, infomuch that, had not the weather proved extremely eafy, their mafts would moftly have gone by the board. The behaviour of our officers and men in this action, met with Admi. ral Pocock's highest approbation."—Vol. II. P. 110.

Our laft fpecimen fhall be the engagement between the British fleet under Sir George Rodney and the French fleet, on the 12th of April, 1782.

"The two fleets were now forming their lines upon oppofite tacks, and the French van was but a little to windward of the British. These motions of the two fleets were made between fix and feven o'clock; and at a quarter past feven, Admiral Roduey called in the four fhips which were in chafe of the French line of battle fhip in tow of the frigate. About a quarter before eight, the two fleets were nearly formed in order of battle, standing upon different tacks, the French but a little diftance to wind ward; and the leading fhip of the British van then began the action with the centre of the enemy's fleet. About this time, the fignal was made for battle, and at eight o'clock, Admiral Rodney made the fignal for clofe action. The hips of the French centre and rear, continued engaged with the van and centre of the British, till a little before ten, at which time Rear Admiral Drake's divifion had paffed the rear of the enemy. During this first part of the battle, the fhips engaged had a fresh fea-breeze, which was owing to their having the paffage be tween Dominica and the Saints fully open, through which the wind came in a direct line. But with refpect to thofe parts of the two fleets which were under the land of Dominica, the cafe was different.

"About ten o'clock, the van of the French fleet, part of the centre, and the whole of the rear of the British had little wind from the fouthward, which forced that part of the French fleet

* They acknowledged they had two hundred and fifty men killed, and fix hundred and two wounded.

+ Orme's History of the Wars in Indoitan, vol. ii. p. 331.

to

to alter its courfe: and which, by obliging the van to fteer to the weftward, whilft the rear continued its courfe to the fouthward, completely deranged the French line of battle, and formed the opening in which Admiral Rodney found his fhip, and fome part of his divifion, when the firing ceafed and the fmoke cleared away. This happened about twelve o'clock; but it was between ten and eleven that the firft derangement of the lines formed by both fleets took place. The van of the French had been obliged, by the foutherly breeze, to steer a wefterly courfe; and it was by thefe means forced into action with the British rear. The fhips of the British centre, by changing their course with the alteration of the wind during the battle, steered to the eastward instead of to the northward, as the fleet had been originally fteering. This occafioned the British line, by the parts fteering different courfes, to be alfo completely broken. The rear of the French fleet, confifting of about thirteen fhips, was between the British van, which was compofed of about seventeen fhips, and Admiral Rodney with fix of the centre divifion: thefe fix fhips had alfo Admiral De Graffe, with five fhips on the other fide of them; and he was completely divided from the reft of his own fhips, by Rear Admiral Hood's divifion, then engaged with the van of the French fleet. Thus were the two fleets, by changes of the wind alone, and by no other caufe, completely deranged: each of them divided into three different parts, which were entirely feparated, by fome of the fhips of the oppofing fleet intervening. In mentioning these different parts, the words van, centre, and rear, have been used, although in this cafe, these terms are not to be understood to mean the established divifion of the fleets, but fuch parts as were then connected by accidental circumftances. It has been faid already, that about noon all firing ceased on both fides, and the fituation of the two fleets became apparent. Whether by fignal from Admiral De Graffe, or from the established regulations of the French navy, we have not been able to learn; but it is certain, that all the parts of the French fleet endeavoured to re-unite, by failing be fore the wind. Upon a fuppofition, that Admiral Rodney had. kept his wind, without endeavouring to prevent this junction, the measure might have been attended with the defired fuccefs. But the British Admiral, instead of waiting to arrange his own ships in any regular order, continued the attack, which was now formed into the mode of a purfuit: and the difabled fhips of the French fleet were immediately attacked, by thofe British ships which could first approach them. They were confequently very foon obliged to yield. In the courfe of the action, before the firing ceafed at noon, many fhips of the French fleet were much difabled in their mafts and rigging; and the Prince George, Duke, Agamemnon, and Prothée, which fuftained material da mage in their mafts or yards, were the only fhips of the British fleet which were not in good condition to purfue the enemy.

About

About a quarter paft twelve, the French frigate which towed the Glorieux, of feventy-four guns, which had been entirely dif mafted, quitted her, and the ftruck to the Britifh fhips which, approached. This firft prize was taken poffeffion of by the Royal Oak, the Admiral having made a fignal for that purpose. The Bedford and Centaur attacked the Cæfar, of feventy-four guns, which, after an obftinate refiftance to a force fo much faperior, yielded; and the Centaur took poffeffion of the prize. The Hector, of feventy-four guns, alfo fubmitted to the Canada and Alcide; and the Admiral made the Alcide's fignal to take poffeffion of her. The Canada in the mean time pushed on, and was fo fortunate as foon to come up with the Ville de Paris, on board of which was Admiral De Graffe. She engaged closely till the Barfleur, Rear Admiral Hood came up, to whom the French Admiral very foon truck, after having fuftained great damage both in the hull and in the rigging, and after having had a great number of men killed and wounded. About this time, the Ardent, of fixty-four guns, (the fame fhip which had I been taken in the Channel by the combined fleet), ftruck to the Belliqueux, and this clofed the battle. It was now fun-fet; and the British Admiral, confidering the French fleet as completely defeated, and difabled from pursuing the object they had in view, did not think proper to risk a further purfait." Vol. V. p. 466.

Our limits will not permit us to give any extracts from Dr. Beatfon's defcriptions of land-operations, which are generally drawn up with much regard for truth and candour.

In thefe memoirs there are interfperfed many fenfible and judicious obfervations on various fubjects, which contribute to enhance their value, and ftrengthen their claim to the favourable reception of the public.

ART. IV. War in Difguife, or, the Frauds of the Neutral Flags. 8vo. 215 pp. 4s. 6d. Hatchard. 1805.

Na former occafion we remarked, that in the difputes

ON a

of Great Britain with the Neutral Powers, her rights had not been more triumphantly maintained by arms than by the vigour of eloquence, and irrefiftible power of truth. To the juftice of this obfervation the work before us affords a ftriking testimony; fince it inveftigates with equal ingenuity

See the Review of Dr. Croke's Anfwer to Schlegel, Brit. Crit. Vol. XVIII. p. 71.

and

and elegance the merits of a neutral claim, which hitherto had been imperfectly understood, and proves (we think to demonftration) that the indulgence granted in that inftance by Great Britain to neutrals, has been too liberal, and, what is ufually the confequence of too much indulgence, has been grofsly abused.

The author begins by ftating the propriety, at the present momentous period, of reviewing the conduct of the war, and of inquiring, "whether experience has not proved it to be, in fome points, erroneous and defective."

In cafe of decifive fuccefs against our allies (fays the author) the object of Bonaparte would then be to acquire the fuperiority at fea by poffeffing himself of all the maritime refources of the Continent.

"Nor let us," he adds, "proudly difdain to fuppofe the poffibility of fuch a reverfe. Let us reflect what the navies of France, Spain, and Holland once were; let us confider that thefe countries form but a part of thofe vaft regions, the re fources of which are now at the command of the fame energetic government."

In addition to which he proposes to show

"In the encroachments and frauds of the neutral flags a nurfery and a refuge of the confederated navies, as well as the fecret conduits of a large part of thofe imperial refources, the pernici. ous application of which to the reftitution of his marine the Ufurper has lately boafted."

With thefe and fimilar important obfervations the main fubject is introduced. The author proposes to confider,

"ift. The origin, nature, and extent of this infidious neutra. lity. 2dly. The remedy, and the right of applying it. 3dly. The prudence of that refort."

The nature of that neutral commerce, which has lately, in fome measure, excited the public attention, but which appears to be little underflood, is firft accurately and clearly ftated.

"The colonizing powers of Europe" (fays the author) "have always monopolized the trade of their refpective colonies, allowing no fupplies to be brought to them under any foreign flag, or on account of any foreign importers, and prohibiting the exportation of their produce in foreign fhips, or to any foreign country, till it has been previously brought into the ports of the parent ftate." "Such" (he obferves) has been the fyftem in time of peace. But, in the war which commenced in 1756, France