June 16. Napoleon's letter from Charleroi to Ney. 137 Première Division à deux lieues en avant des Quatre Chemins s'il n'y a pas d'inconvénient. Six Divisions d'Infanterie autour des Quatre Chemins, et une Division à Marbais, afin que je puisse l'attirer à moi à Sombref, si j'en avais besoin. Elle ne retarderait d'ailleurs pas votre marche. Le Corps du Comte DE VALMY, qui a 3,000 Cuirassiers d'Élite, à l'intersection du chemin des Romains et de celui de Bruxelles, afin que je puisse l'attirer à moi, si j'en avais besoin; aussitot que mon parti sera pris, vous lui enverrez l'Ordre de venir vous rejoindre. Je désirerais avoir avec moi la Division de la Garde que commande le Général LEFEBVRE-DESNOUETTES, et je vous envoie les deux Divisions du Corps du Comte DE VALMY pour la remplacer. Mais dans mon projet actuel, je préfère placer le Comte DE VALMY de manière à le rappeler si j'en avais besoin, et ne point faire de fausses marches au Général LEFÈbvre-Desnou etTES; puisqu'il est probable que je me déciderai ce soir à marcher sur Bruxelles avec la Garde. Cependant, couvrez la Division LEFEBVRE par les deux Divisions de Cavalrie D'ERLON et de REILLE, afin de ménager la Garde; et que, s'il y avait quelque échauffourée avec les Anglais, il est préférable que ce soit sur la Ligne que sur la Garde. troops in the following manner :First Division at two leagues in front of Quatre Bras, if in doing so there is no inconvenience. Six Divisions of Infantry about Quatre Bras; and one Division at Marbais, so that I may draw it to myself at Sombref, if I should have need of it. It would not otherwise retard your march. The Corps of the Count DE VALMY, which has 3,000 Cuirassiers d'Elite, at the intersection of the Roman road with that of Brussels, in order that I may draw it to myself if I should have need of it as soon as my decision is made, you will send him the Order to rejoin you. I would desire to have with me the Division of theGuard commanded by General LEFEBVRE DESNOUETTES, and I send you the two Divisions of the Corps of the Count DE VALMY to replace it. But in my present design, I prefer to place the Count DE VALMY in such a manner as to be able to recall him if I should have need of him; and not to make false marches for General LEFEBVRE DESNOUETTES: since it is probable that I shall decide this evening to march on Brussels with the Guard. However, cover LEFEBVRE's Division with the two Cavalry Divisions of D'ERLON and REILLE, in order to spare the Guard; and that, if there shall be any affray there with the English, it may be with the Line rather than with the Guard. 138 Napoleon's letter from Charleroi to Ney. June 16. "J'ai adopté comme principe général pendant cette Campagne, de diviser mon Armée en deux Ailes et une Réserve. Votre Aile sera composée des quatre Divisions du 2 Corps, de deux Divisions de Cavalerie Légère, et de deux Divisions du Corps DE VALMY. Cela ne doit pas être loin de 45 à 50 mille hommes. "Le Maréchal GROUCHY aura à peu près la même force, et commandera l'Aile Droite. La Garde formera la Réserve, et je me por terai sur l'une ou l'autre Aile, selon les circonstances. Le Major Général donne les Ordres les plus précis pour qu'il n'y ait aucune difficulté sur l'obéissance à vos Ordres lorsque vous serez détaché; les Commandants de Corps devant prendre mes Ordres directement quand je me trouve présent. Selon les circonstances, j'affaiblirai l'une ou l'autre Aile en augmentant ma Réserve. "Vous sentez assez l'importance attachée à la prise de Bruxelles. Cela pourra d'ailleurs donner lieu à des accidents, car un mouvement aussi prompt et aussi brusque isolera l'Armée Anglaise de Mons, Ostende, etc. Je désire que vos dispositions soient bien faites pour qu'au premier Ordre, vos huit Divisions puissent marcher rapidement, et sans obstacle sur Bruxelles. "N." I have adopted as a general principle during this Campaign to divide my Army into two Wings and a Reserve. Your Wing will be composed of the four Divisions of the Second Corps, the two Light Cavalry Divisions, and the two Divisions of the Corps DE VALMY. That ought not to be far from 45,000 to 50,000 men. "Marshal GROUCHY will have nearly the same force, and will command the Right Wing. The Guard will form the Reserve, and I shall repair to one or other Wing according to circumstances. The Major General is giving the most precise Orders that there may be no difficulty as regards obedience to your Orders when you will be detached ; the Commanders of Corps must take my Orders directly from me, when I am present. According to circumstances, I shall weaken the one, or the other, Wing in augmenting my Reserve. "You will sufficiently perceive the importance attached to the capture of Brussels. That will otherwise give occasion to incidents: for a movement equally prompt and abrupt will isolate the English Army from Mons, Ostend, &c. I would desire that your dispositions may be well made that, at the first Order, your eight Divisions may march rapidly and without obstacle upon Brussels. "N." "Charleroi, 16th June 1815."] June 16. Napoleon's instructions to Ney. 139 This letter, which was intended to convey to NEY a general notion of NAPOLEON's intentions, prescribed to him, at the same time, as a principle, that he was to consider his movements subordinate to those of the Emperor. The latter intimated his purpose of attacking the Enemy at Fleurus, should he find him there, and of pushing on as far as Gembloux, where he would decide upon his plan of further operation," perhaps at three o'clock in the afternoon, perhaps in the evening;" immediately after which NEY was to be ready to march upon Brussels, supported by NAPOLEON with the Guards, it being the Emperor's desire to reach that capital in the morning. The idea of advancing upon Gembloux, and of capturing Brussels by a coup de main, which could only be effected by a vigorous repulse and signal defeat of the Corps of ZIETEN, and by a successful turning and partial dispersion of those of PIRCH and THIELEMANN, as also by the rapid march of a closely collected force under NEY, proves that NAPOLEON had either been insufficiently informed as to the general dispositions of his opponents, or had greatly miscalculated the degree of energy and promptitude required in his movements for the execution of such a design. Very shortly afterwards, NEY received the official Order of Movement to which NAPOLEON adverted in his letter as having been sent by SOULT. It instructed him to put the Second and First Corps d'Armée, as also the Third Corps of Cavalry which had been placed at his disposal, in movement upon Quatre Bras; to take up a position at that point; thence to push forward reconnaissances as far as possible on the roads to Brussels and Nivelles, d'où probablement l'Ennemi s'est retiré; to establish, should he meet with no impediment, a Division with some Cavalry at Genappe; and to detach another Division towards Marbais, in order to 140 Ney sends out his Orders. June 16. He cover the interval between Sombref and Quatre Bras. was also to desire the General Officers commanding the two Corps d'Armée to assemble their troops, collect the stragglers, and order up all the waggons belonging to the Artillery and to the Hospitals that might still be in the rear. In pursuance of these instructions, NEY despatched Orders of Movement to Counts REILLE and D'ERLON. The former was desired to put the Second Corps immediately on the march, for the purpose of taking up the following position:-the Fifth Division in rear of Genappe, upon the Heights which command that town, the left appuied upon the high road; one or two Battalions covering all the débouchés in advance on the Brussels road; the Ninth Division, following the movement of the Fifth, to take up a position in second line on the Heights to the right and left of the village of Bauterlet; the Sixth and Seventh Divisions at Quatre Bras. It was at the same time intimated to REILLE that the three first Divisions of n'ERLON'S Corps were to take post at Frasne; the Right Division to establish itself at Marbais along with PIRE'S Division of Light Cavalry; that the former was to cover his (REILLE'S) march towards Brussels, and both his Flanks; that two Divisions of KELLERMANN'S Corps were to take post at Frasne and Liberchies; and that the Regiments of the Guard under Generals LEFEBVRE-DESNOUETTES and COLBERT were to remain in their actual position at Frasne. This Order had scarcely been sent off to REILLE when NEY received from the latter a despatch, dated Gosselies, 16th June, a quarter past ten A.M., announcing his having just received from GIRARD (whose Division was still at Heppignies) a verbal report by one of his Officers, to the effect that the Enemy continued to occupy Fleurus with June 16. Reille's Corps halts at Gosselies. 141 Light Cavalry; that hostile masses were observed advancing along the Namur road, the heads of their Columns reaching as far as St Amand; that these troops were gradually forming, and gaining ground; that as far as could be judged at that distance, the Columns appeared to consist of six Battalions each; and that movements of additional troops were perceived in their rear. REILLE added that General FLAHAUT, in passing through Gosselies, had made him acquainted with the purport of the Orders he was conveying to the Marshal, whereupon he had communicated with Count D'ERLON, in order that the latter might follow the movement which he (REILLE) had intended to commence as soon as the Divisions were under arms, but that in consequence of this report from GIRARD he would wait for the Marshal's further instructions, holding the troops ready to march. About the same time, Orders reached NEY from NAPOLEON, desiring him to unite the Corps under REILLE and D'ERLON, and the Cavalry Corps under KELLERMANN, which latter, it was stated, was on the point of commencing its march towards him; remarking also, that with these troops he ought to be able to destroy whatever forces the Enemy might bring forward; that GROUCHY was going to advance upon Sombref; and that the Emperor was setting off for Fleurus, to which place the Marshal was to address his reports. In consequence of these instructions, NEY became anxious for the speedy concentration of his troops, and again sent Orders to REILLE and D'ERLON to move up their Divisions. The information which he had obtained concerning the Enemy in his front, and GIRARD's report of the assembling of troops in front of Fleurus, induced him to be cautious in his proceedings, and not to attempt any impetuous onset until he could have all his force more in hand, instead of |